{"attribution":{"source":"legal.exploreworldai.com","canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:tex-25-0149-2026-06-19","cite_as":"NovaCopilot, legal.exploreworldai.com (https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:tex-25-0149-2026-06-19)","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/revision","version":"legal-2026-10-17","fingerprint":"ewai:us:e7344b","proof":"sha256:5b769e53275310ed7783f04edd5cb6ab5e4f25f69946c7bd92dc4f64156846ce","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","publisher":"NovaCopilot by ExploreWorld Legal","terms":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/om"},"brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","item":{"schema_version":"1.0.0","id":"us:tex-25-0149-2026-06-19","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","brand":{"product":"NovaCopilot","platform":"ExploreWorldAI","infrastructure":"ExploreWorld Legal","infrastructure_url":"legal.exploreworldai.com","legal_entity":"Valkiv Ventures AB","permanent_url":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/novacopilot","source":"Source: NovaCopilot","powered_by":"Powered by NovaCopilot","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/licensvillkor"},"sections":[{"title":"Supreme Court of Texas","paragraphs":["para_2"]},{"title":"No. 25-0149","paragraphs":["para_4","para_5"]},{"title":"Relator","paragraphs":["para_7"]},{"title":"On Petition for Writ of Mandamus","paragraphs":["para_9","para_10"]},{"title":"Our primary-jurisdiction doctrine emerged from its federal","paragraphs":["para_12","para_13","para_14","para_15","para_16","para_17","para_18","para_19","para_20","para_21","para_22","para_23"]},{"title":"Today’s case requires no final determination of the primary-","paragraphs":["para_25"]},{"title":"2","paragraphs":["para_27","para_28","para_29","para_30","para_31","para_32","para_33","para_34","para_35","para_36","para_37","para_38","para_39","para_40","para_41","para_42","para_43","para_44","para_45"]},{"title":"Before turning to the doctrine’s “second” version, it is worth pausing","paragraphs":["para_47","para_48"]},{"title":"Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). Coincidentally, that case concerned","paragraphs":["para_50","para_51","para_52"]},{"title":"3","paragraphs":["para_54","para_55","para_56"]},{"title":"That question followed from Congress’s having created a","paragraphs":["para_58","para_59","para_60","para_61","para_62","para_63","para_64","para_65","para_66","para_67"]},{"title":"Allowing individual courts and juries to adjudicate whether any particular","paragraphs":["para_69","para_70","para_71","para_72","para_73","para_74"]},{"title":"The Court continued to apply the primary-jurisdiction doctrine as","paragraphs":["para_76","para_77","para_78"]},{"title":"ICC, to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over questions that implicated the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"4","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"ICC’s core regulatory authority. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"U.S. 477, 484 (1918) (concluding that Minnesota courts “may not be","paragraphs":["para_83","para_84"]},{"title":"Barkley, 276 U.S. 482, 485 (1928) (holding that an Arkansas state-court","paragraphs":["para_86","para_87","para_88"]},{"title":"125, 139 n.22 (1939) (collecting cases); Diana R.H. Winters, Restoring the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 541, 552–62 (2017) (tracing","paragraphs":["para_91","para_92"]},{"title":"Although the doctrine’s original formulation arose to address ICC","paragraphs":["para_94","para_95","para_96","para_97"]},{"title":"303 U.S. 41 (1938) (National Labor Relations Board)). The Court, for","paragraphs":["para_99","para_100","para_101","para_102","para_103","para_104","para_105","para_106"]},{"title":"5","paragraphs":["para_108","para_109","para_110"]},{"title":"As originally formulated, therefore, the primary-jurisdiction doctrine","paragraphs":["para_112","para_113","para_114","para_115","para_116","para_117"]},{"title":"(holding that certain questions of tariff construction and reasonableness","paragraphs":["para_119"]},{"title":"Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) (describing primary jurisdiction in that","paragraphs":["para_121","para_122"]},{"title":"In other words, it applies where “the court has jurisdiction of the case, but","paragraphs":["para_124","para_125","para_126","para_127","para_128","para_129","para_130","para_131","para_132","para_133"]},{"title":"6","paragraphs":["para_135"]},{"title":"The origin of this expansion of the doctrine is unclear. It seems to","paragraphs":["para_137"]},{"title":"(collecting cases); Winters, supra, at 569–72 (enumerating the factors","paragraphs":["para_139"]},{"title":"Supreme Court has never squarely endorsed it. (Indeed, the last time the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Court appears to have applied the doctrine at all in a majority opinion was","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"28 years ago in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33 (1998).)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"But the Court at least has hinted that the primary-jurisdiction doctrine","paragraphs":["para_144","para_145","para_146","para_147","para_148"]},{"title":"J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (enumerating prudential","paragraphs":["para_150","para_151","para_152"]},{"title":"This Court, too, has been somewhat imprecise when it comes to","paragraphs":["para_154","para_155","para_156","para_157","para_158","para_159","para_160"]},{"title":"7","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Because the board had the statutory authority and duty “to regulate and","paragraphs":["para_163","para_164","para_165","para_166","para_167","para_168","para_169"]},{"title":"We similarly treated primary jurisdiction as an exclusive-agency-","paragraphs":["para_171","para_172","para_173","para_174","para_175","para_176","para_177","para_178"]},{"title":"344 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1961) (emphasis added). We determined that","paragraphs":["para_180","para_181","para_182","para_183","para_184"]},{"title":"In our more recent primary-jurisdiction cases, however, we have","paragraphs":["para_186","para_187","para_188","para_189"]},{"title":"8","paragraphs":["para_191","para_192","para_193","para_194","para_195"]},{"title":"12, 15 (Tex. 2000). In other words, “when a pervasive regulatory scheme","paragraphs":["para_197","para_198","para_199","para_200","para_201"]},{"title":"In theory, the Texas primary-jurisdiction doctrine could still apply","paragraphs":["para_203","para_204","para_205","para_206","para_207"]},{"title":"El Rucio Land & Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Tex. 2017); see also","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 220 (“Despite similar terminology, primary","paragraphs":["para_210"]},{"title":"Accordingly, the primary-jurisdiction doctrine currently “arises","paragraphs":["para_212","para_213"]},{"title":"S.W.3d at 221 (explaining that this “judicially-created primary jurisdiction","paragraphs":["para_215","para_216"]},{"title":"9","paragraphs":["para_218","para_219","para_220","para_221","para_222","para_223","para_224","para_225"]},{"title":"(explaining that the doctrine’s purpose includes “ensuring that","paragraphs":["para_227","para_228"]},{"title":"S.W.3d 198, 209 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the Motor Vehicle Board has","paragraphs":["para_230","para_231"]},{"title":"As I read our cases, our modern primary-jurisdiction doctrine has","paragraphs":["para_233","para_234","para_235","para_236","para_237","para_238","para_239","para_240","para_241","para_242"]},{"title":"All of that strikes me as an inefficient and even somewhat dubious","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"10","paragraphs":["para_245","para_246","para_247","para_248","para_249","para_250","para_251"]},{"title":"Indeed, as I have said before, “I am unaware of any appellate system that","paragraphs":["para_253","para_254","para_255","para_256","para_257","para_258","para_259","para_260","para_261","para_262","para_263","para_264","para_265","para_266","para_267","para_268"]},{"title":"All of this is to say that the primary-jurisdiction doctrine may be out","paragraphs":["para_270"]},{"title":"11","paragraphs":["para_272","para_273","para_274","para_275","para_276"]},{"title":"1991) (reversing referral to the Environmental Protection Agency based on","paragraphs":["para_278","para_279","para_280","para_281","para_282","para_283","para_284","para_285"]},{"title":"But if referral does bind courts—or if, perhaps more likely, courts","paragraphs":["para_287","para_288","para_289"]},{"title":"Houston Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Tex. 2021) (plurality opinion)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(“Courts are not free to outsource to [an agency] the authority to adjudicate","paragraphs":["para_292","para_293"]},{"title":"(concluding that federal courts may not cede the task of legal interpretation","paragraphs":["para_295"]},{"title":"(holding that, when an agency’s civil-enforcement action resembles a","paragraphs":["para_297"]},{"title":"12","paragraphs":["para_299","para_300"]},{"title":"We need not resolve these important questions today because Rail","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Link has not asked the Surface Transportation Board to exercise concurrent","paragraphs":["para_303","para_304","para_305","para_306","para_307"]},{"title":"Evan A. Young","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Justice","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"OPINION FILED: June 19, 2026","paragraphs":[]}],"paragraphs":[{"text":"Supreme Court of Texas","paragraph_id":"para_1"},{"text":"══════════","paragraph_id":"para_2"},{"text":"No. 25-0149","paragraph_id":"para_3"},{"text":"══════════","paragraph_id":"para_4"},{"text":"In re Demaree Reed,","paragraph_id":"para_5"},{"text":"Relator","paragraph_id":"para_6"},{"text":"═══════════════════════════════════════","paragraph_id":"para_7"},{"text":"On Petition for Writ of Mandamus","paragraph_id":"para_8"},{"text":"═══════════════════════════════════════","paragraph_id":"para_9"},{"text":"JUSTICE YOUNG, with whom Justice Hawkins joins, concurring.","paragraph_id":"para_10"},{"text":"Our primary-jurisdiction doctrine emerged from its federal","paragraph_id":"para_11"},{"text":"counterpart. As first adopted by the federal courts and later endorsed by","paragraph_id":"para_12"},{"text":"this Court, primary jurisdiction served a narrow purpose: when an issue","paragraph_id":"para_13"},{"text":"within an agency’s exclusive jurisdiction arose in a case, courts would","paragraph_id":"para_14"},{"text":"pause the suit and allow the agency to resolve that issue. The doctrine","paragraph_id":"para_15"},{"text":"thus helped avoid friction among the branches and facilitated rapid,","paragraph_id":"para_16"},{"text":"accurate decisions by whatever governmental entity was lawfully","paragraph_id":"para_17"},{"text":"empowered to make them. But over time, the doctrine’s reach has","paragraph_id":"para_18"},{"text":"expanded considerably, and it is worth asking whether that expansion has","paragraph_id":"para_19"},{"text":"gone too far. Today’s version of the doctrine may work at cross-purposes","paragraph_id":"para_20"},{"text":"with its original justification. Rather than allowing the executive branch","paragraph_id":"para_21"},{"text":"to do its job without improper judicial interference, the doctrine may impede","paragraph_id":"para_22"},{"text":"the judiciary in properly performing its work.","paragraph_id":"para_23"},{"text":"Today’s case requires no final determination of the primary-","paragraph_id":"para_24"},{"text":"jurisdiction doctrine’s fate, and I gladly concur in the Court’s well-reasoned","paragraph_id":"para_25"},{"text":"2","paragraph_id":"para_26"},{"text":"opinion. I write separately with a view to future cases. I briefly delineate","paragraph_id":"para_27"},{"text":"the doctrine’s origin and explain why we should consider restoring its","paragraph_id":"para_28"},{"text":"original formulation, or even discarding it altogether, if we conclude that","paragraph_id":"para_29"},{"text":"now-existing tools render it obsolete. We will be greatly aided if the lower","paragraph_id":"para_30"},{"text":"courts, the bar, legal academics, and amici likewise refocus attention on","paragraph_id":"para_31"},{"text":"the Texas primary-jurisdiction doctrine.","paragraph_id":"para_32"},{"text":"* * *","paragraph_id":"para_33"},{"text":"The federal primary-jurisdiction doctrine, in Judge Posner’s words,","paragraph_id":"para_34"},{"text":"“is really two doctrines.” Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir.","paragraph_id":"para_35"},{"text":"2001). In its “central and original form,” the doctrine “applies only when,","paragraph_id":"para_36"},{"text":"in a suit involving a regulated [entity] but not brought under the regulatory","paragraph_id":"para_37"},{"text":"statute itself, an issue arises that is within the exclusive original","paragraph_id":"para_38"},{"text":"jurisdiction of the regulatory agency to resolve,” id., thus functioning as","paragraph_id":"para_39"},{"text":"an exclusive-agency-jurisdiction doctrine. “If the agency’s resolution of the","paragraph_id":"para_40"},{"text":"issue does not dispose of the entire case,” therefore, “the case can resume","paragraph_id":"para_41"},{"text":"subject to judicial review of that resolution along whatever path governs","paragraph_id":"para_42"},{"text":"review of the agency’s decisions, whether back to the court in which the","paragraph_id":"para_43"},{"text":"original case is pending or, if the statute governing review of the agency’s","paragraph_id":"para_44"},{"text":"decisions designates another court, to that court.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_45"},{"text":"Before turning to the doctrine’s “second” version, it is worth pausing","paragraph_id":"para_46"},{"text":"to trace the original formulation back to the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal","paragraph_id":"para_47"},{"text":"primary-jurisdiction-doctrine case, Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene","paragraph_id":"para_48"},{"text":"Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). Coincidentally, that case concerned","paragraph_id":"para_49"},{"text":"whether a Texas state court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a common-law","paragraph_id":"para_50"},{"text":"suit challenging an interstate railway’s shipping rates because such claims","paragraph_id":"para_51"},{"text":"“must, under the [Interstate Commerce Act], primarily invoke redress","paragraph_id":"para_52"},{"text":"3","paragraph_id":"para_53"},{"text":"through the Interstate Commerce Commission, which body alone is vested","paragraph_id":"para_54"},{"text":"with power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an","paragraph_id":"para_55"},{"text":"established schedule . . . .” Id. at 448 (emphasis added).","paragraph_id":"para_56"},{"text":"That question followed from Congress’s having created a","paragraph_id":"para_57"},{"text":"comprehensive regulatory scheme in which the ICC—the first modern","paragraph_id":"para_58"},{"text":"federal regulatory agency—“was endowed with plenary administrative","paragraph_id":"para_59"},{"text":"power to supervise the conduct of carriers, to investigate their affairs, their","paragraph_id":"para_60"},{"text":"accounts, and their methods of dealing, and generally to enforce the","paragraph_id":"para_61"},{"text":"provisions of the act” by, among other things, “hear[ing] complaints","paragraph_id":"para_62"},{"text":"concerning violations of the [ICA]” and “order[ing] the carrier to desist from","paragraph_id":"para_63"},{"text":"such violation[s] in the future.” Id. at 438. And in the event the carrier","paragraph_id":"para_64"},{"text":"refused to comply, the ICC could “compel compliance by invoking the","paragraph_id":"para_65"},{"text":"authority of the courts of the United States . . . , prima facie effect in such","paragraph_id":"para_66"},{"text":"courts being given to the findings of fact made by the Commission.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_67"},{"text":"Allowing individual courts and juries to adjudicate whether any particular","paragraph_id":"para_68"},{"text":"rate was reasonable, the Court concluded, would generate disuniformity","paragraph_id":"para_69"},{"text":"that would undermine the ICA’s purpose. See id. at 440–41. Courts","paragraph_id":"para_70"},{"text":"therefore had “no primary jurisdiction to fix rates” and thus could not “do","paragraph_id":"para_71"},{"text":"so at the suit of a single plaintiff who claims to have been damaged because","paragraph_id":"para_72"},{"text":"an allowance paid its competitors was unreasonable in amount.” Mitchell","paragraph_id":"para_73"},{"text":"Coal & Coke Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 230 U.S. 247, 256 (1913).","paragraph_id":"para_74"},{"text":"The Court continued to apply the primary-jurisdiction doctrine as","paragraph_id":"para_75"},{"text":"an exclusive-agency-jurisdiction doctrine (and in this single context) in the","paragraph_id":"para_76"},{"text":"early twentieth century. The cases were primarily interstate-railway","paragraph_id":"para_77"},{"text":"disputes in which litigants asked federal or state courts, rather than the","paragraph_id":"para_78"},{"text":"ICC, to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over questions that implicated the","paragraph_id":"para_79"},{"text":"4","paragraph_id":"para_80"},{"text":"ICC’s core regulatory authority. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247","paragraph_id":"para_81"},{"text":"U.S. 477, 484 (1918) (concluding that Minnesota courts “may not be","paragraph_id":"para_82"},{"text":"resorted to” to assess the reasonableness of a railway’s routing decision","paragraph_id":"para_83"},{"text":"until the ICC had first resolved the question); Midland Valley R.R. Co. v.","paragraph_id":"para_84"},{"text":"Barkley, 276 U.S. 482, 485 (1928) (holding that an Arkansas state-court","paragraph_id":"para_85"},{"text":"action challenging a railway’s failure to furnish cars could not be","paragraph_id":"para_86"},{"text":"maintained because the reasonableness inquiry was “a matter for the","paragraph_id":"para_87"},{"text":"[ICC],” not courts); see also Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.","paragraph_id":"para_88"},{"text":"125, 139 n.22 (1939) (collecting cases); Diana R.H. Winters, Restoring the","paragraph_id":"para_89"},{"text":"Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 541, 552–62 (2017) (tracing","paragraph_id":"para_90"},{"text":"the primary-jurisdiction doctrine’s evolution and arguing that its original","paragraph_id":"para_91"},{"text":"conception developed in the rate-setting and labor contexts).","paragraph_id":"para_92"},{"text":"Although the doctrine’s original formulation arose to address ICC","paragraph_id":"para_93"},{"text":"rate-setting issues, by the 1930s the Court had given the doctrine “general","paragraph_id":"para_94"},{"text":"application” in any comparable regulatory context. See Rochester Tel., 307","paragraph_id":"para_95"},{"text":"U.S. at 139 n.22 (citing U.S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S.","paragraph_id":"para_96"},{"text":"474 (1932) (Shipping Board), and Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,","paragraph_id":"para_97"},{"text":"303 U.S. 41 (1938) (National Labor Relations Board)). The Court, for","paragraph_id":"para_98"},{"text":"example, construed the Shipping Act of 1916 consistent with the “settled","paragraph_id":"para_99"},{"text":"construction” of the ICA, under which the “questions essentially of fact and","paragraph_id":"para_100"},{"text":"those involving the exercise of administrative discretion . . . were primarily","paragraph_id":"para_101"},{"text":"within [the ICC’s] exclusive jurisdiction.” Cunard, 284 U.S. at 481. Just","paragraph_id":"para_102"},{"text":"as the ICC exercised primary jurisdiction over rate-setting disputes for","paragraph_id":"para_103"},{"text":"land carriers, the Shipping Board occupied an analogous role for water","paragraph_id":"para_104"},{"text":"carriers and therefore had “exclusive preliminary jurisdiction” over certain","paragraph_id":"para_105"},{"text":"issues arising under the Shipping Act. Id. at 485. Accordingly, courts could","paragraph_id":"para_106"},{"text":"5","paragraph_id":"para_107"},{"text":"not entertain certain antitrust challenges to the underlying shipping","paragraph_id":"para_108"},{"text":"agreements until the Shipping Board had first passed on their validity.","paragraph_id":"para_109"},{"text":"See id. at 487–88.","paragraph_id":"para_110"},{"text":"As originally formulated, therefore, the primary-jurisdiction doctrine","paragraph_id":"para_111"},{"text":"applies “where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into","paragraph_id":"para_112"},{"text":"play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues","paragraph_id":"para_113"},{"text":"which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special","paragraph_id":"para_114"},{"text":"competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process","paragraph_id":"para_115"},{"text":"is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for","paragraph_id":"para_116"},{"text":"its views.” United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63–64 (1956)","paragraph_id":"para_117"},{"text":"(holding that certain questions of tariff construction and reasonableness","paragraph_id":"para_118"},{"text":"were within the ICC’s “exclusive primary jurisdiction”); see also Reiter v.","paragraph_id":"para_119"},{"text":"Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993) (describing primary jurisdiction in that","paragraph_id":"para_120"},{"text":"way and adding that it requires a court to “stay[] further proceedings so as","paragraph_id":"para_121"},{"text":"to give the parties reasonable opportunity to seek an administrative ruling”).","paragraph_id":"para_122"},{"text":"In other words, it applies where “the court has jurisdiction of the case, but","paragraph_id":"para_123"},{"text":"the agency of the issue.” Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 564.","paragraph_id":"para_124"},{"text":"At some point, however, lower federal courts enlarged the doctrine,","paragraph_id":"para_125"},{"text":"giving rise to a second, advice-seeking formulation. This version of the","paragraph_id":"para_126"},{"text":"doctrine applies not when an agency has exclusive jurisdiction to initially","paragraph_id":"para_127"},{"text":"resolve an issue, but rather when “either court and agency have concurrent","paragraph_id":"para_128"},{"text":"jurisdiction to decide an issue, or only the court has the power to decide it,","paragraph_id":"para_129"},{"text":"and seeks merely the agency’s advice.” Id. The expansion is obvious. The","paragraph_id":"para_130"},{"text":"doctrine makes sense when a non-judicial entity lawfully has sole authority","paragraph_id":"para_131"},{"text":"to make a determination. It is less justifiable, but still plausible, when","paragraph_id":"para_132"},{"text":"such an entity has concurrent authority along with the courts. But it is hard","paragraph_id":"para_133"},{"text":"6","paragraph_id":"para_134"},{"text":"to justify at all if the courts have sole authority.","paragraph_id":"para_135"},{"text":"The origin of this expansion of the doctrine is unclear. It seems to","paragraph_id":"para_136"},{"text":"have developed primarily in the federal appellate courts. See id. at 563–64","paragraph_id":"para_137"},{"text":"(collecting cases); Winters, supra, at 569–72 (enumerating the factors","paragraph_id":"para_138"},{"text":"federal appellate courts consider when applying the doctrine). The U.S.","paragraph_id":"para_139"},{"text":"Supreme Court has never squarely endorsed it. (Indeed, the last time the","paragraph_id":"para_140"},{"text":"Court appears to have applied the doctrine at all in a majority opinion was","paragraph_id":"para_141"},{"text":"28 years ago in Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33 (1998).)","paragraph_id":"para_142"},{"text":"But the Court at least has hinted that the primary-jurisdiction doctrine","paragraph_id":"para_143"},{"text":"may have broader application than its original conception. See, e.g., Ricci","paragraph_id":"para_144"},{"text":"v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 305 (1973) (stating that “prior agency","paragraph_id":"para_145"},{"text":"adjudication of” the dispute would “be a material aid in ultimately deciding","paragraph_id":"para_146"},{"text":"whether the Commodity Exchange Act forecloses this antitrust suit”);","paragraph_id":"para_147"},{"text":"Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 673 (2003) (Breyer,","paragraph_id":"para_148"},{"text":"J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (enumerating prudential","paragraph_id":"para_149"},{"text":"considerations—including “whether preliminary reference of issues to the","paragraph_id":"para_150"},{"text":"agency will promote th[e] proper working relationship between court and","paragraph_id":"para_151"},{"text":"agency”—that inform the primary-jurisdiction doctrine’s application).","paragraph_id":"para_152"},{"text":"This Court, too, has been somewhat imprecise when it comes to","paragraph_id":"para_153"},{"text":"applying our own primary-jurisdiction doctrine, and we, too, have allowed","paragraph_id":"para_154"},{"text":"it to expand dramatically. We first endorsed it by refusing the application","paragraph_id":"para_155"},{"text":"for writ of error in Kavanaugh v. Underwriters Life Insurance Co., in which","paragraph_id":"para_156"},{"text":"the court of civil appeals held that the Board of Insurance Commissioners","paragraph_id":"para_157"},{"text":"had primary jurisdiction to determine whether an insurance company’s","paragraph_id":"para_158"},{"text":"directors were mismanaging the company and therefore should be","paragraph_id":"para_159"},{"text":"removed. 231 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1950, writ ref’d).","paragraph_id":"para_160"},{"text":"7","paragraph_id":"para_161"},{"text":"Because the board had the statutory authority and duty “to regulate and","paragraph_id":"para_162"},{"text":"control mutual assessment companies” and “give all the relief [the","paragraph_id":"para_163"},{"text":"plaintiffs] sought,” the court held that the plaintiffs “should first apply to","paragraph_id":"para_164"},{"text":"the Board for relief before seeking redress in the courts.” Id. Accordingly,","paragraph_id":"para_165"},{"text":"the trial court had correctly sustained the defendants’ plea to the","paragraph_id":"para_166"},{"text":"jurisdiction. Id. This application of our primary-jurisdiction doctrine,","paragraph_id":"para_167"},{"text":"therefore, largely mirrored the federal primary-jurisdiction doctrine’s","paragraph_id":"para_168"},{"text":"original form.","paragraph_id":"para_169"},{"text":"We similarly treated primary jurisdiction as an exclusive-agency-","paragraph_id":"para_170"},{"text":"jurisdiction doctrine in Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., the central","paragraph_id":"para_171"},{"text":"question in which was","paragraph_id":"para_172"},{"text":"whether the courts have the power to determine whether a","paragraph_id":"para_173"},{"text":"subsurface trespass is occurring or is about to occur, or","paragraph_id":"para_174"},{"text":"whether the Railroad Commission has this power to the","paragraph_id":"para_175"},{"text":"exclusion of the courts, with the courts having the power only","paragraph_id":"para_176"},{"text":"to review, under the substantial evidence rule, or otherwise,","paragraph_id":"para_177"},{"text":"the action of the Commission.","paragraph_id":"para_178"},{"text":"344 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. 1961) (emphasis added). We determined that","paragraph_id":"para_179"},{"text":"the primary-jurisdiction doctrine did not apply precisely because the","paragraph_id":"para_180"},{"text":"questions were “primarily judicial in nature.” Id. at 415. And “[w]here","paragraph_id":"para_181"},{"text":"the issue is one inherently judicial in nature . . . , the courts are not","paragraph_id":"para_182"},{"text":"ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature, by a valid statute, has","paragraph_id":"para_183"},{"text":"explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_184"},{"text":"In our more recent primary-jurisdiction cases, however, we have","paragraph_id":"para_185"},{"text":"applied the doctrine more broadly. Indeed, because we have developed a","paragraph_id":"para_186"},{"text":"separate basis for enforcing exclusive-agency jurisdiction, we have","paragraph_id":"para_187"},{"text":"abandoned the use of the primary-jurisdiction doctrine as a tool for ensuring","paragraph_id":"para_188"},{"text":"that courts stand down when agencies have exclusive jurisdiction. We","paragraph_id":"para_189"},{"text":"8","paragraph_id":"para_190"},{"text":"have treated the two doctrines as separate, explaining that exclusive-","paragraph_id":"para_191"},{"text":"agency jurisdiction arises “when the Legislature gives the agency alone the","paragraph_id":"para_192"},{"text":"authority to make the initial determination in a dispute” and authorizes","paragraph_id":"para_193"},{"text":"courts to “review the administrative action only at the time and in the","paragraph_id":"para_194"},{"text":"manner designated by statute.” Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d","paragraph_id":"para_195"},{"text":"12, 15 (Tex. 2000). In other words, “when a pervasive regulatory scheme","paragraph_id":"para_196"},{"text":"indicates that” the legislature “intended for the regulatory process to be","paragraph_id":"para_197"},{"text":"the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the regulation is","paragraph_id":"para_198"},{"text":"addressed,” courts lack jurisdiction to consider claims implicating the","paragraph_id":"para_199"},{"text":"agency’s exclusive jurisdiction. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid","paragraph_id":"para_200"},{"text":"Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).","paragraph_id":"para_201"},{"text":"In theory, the Texas primary-jurisdiction doctrine could still apply","paragraph_id":"para_202"},{"text":"to an issue over which an agency has exclusive jurisdiction despite the","paragraph_id":"para_203"},{"text":"courts’ having authority over the dispute as a whole. But when that","paragraph_id":"para_204"},{"text":"happens, we no longer talk about primary jurisdiction—we just apply the","paragraph_id":"para_205"},{"text":"exclusive-jurisdiction rules. In contemporary usage, we have said that","paragraph_id":"para_206"},{"text":"primary jurisdiction is a wholly “prudential doctrine.” Forest Oil Corp. v.","paragraph_id":"para_207"},{"text":"El Rucio Land & Cattle Co., 518 S.W.3d 422, 429 (Tex. 2017); see also","paragraph_id":"para_208"},{"text":"Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 220 (“Despite similar terminology, primary","paragraph_id":"para_209"},{"text":"jurisdiction is prudential whereas exclusive jurisdiction is jurisdictional.”).","paragraph_id":"para_210"},{"text":"Accordingly, the primary-jurisdiction doctrine currently “arises","paragraph_id":"para_211"},{"text":"when a court and an agency have concurrent original jurisdiction over a","paragraph_id":"para_212"},{"text":"dispute.” Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 18 (emphasis added); see Subaru, 84","paragraph_id":"para_213"},{"text":"S.W.3d at 221 (explaining that this “judicially-created primary jurisdiction","paragraph_id":"para_214"},{"text":"doctrine operates to allocate power between courts and agencies when both","paragraph_id":"para_215"},{"text":"have authority to make initial determinations in a dispute”). If there is","paragraph_id":"para_216"},{"text":"9","paragraph_id":"para_217"},{"text":"concurrent jurisdiction, we have said, courts “should allow an","paragraph_id":"para_218"},{"text":"administrative agency to initially decide an issue when: (1) an agency is","paragraph_id":"para_219"},{"text":"typically staffed with experts trained in handling the complex problems in","paragraph_id":"para_220"},{"text":"the agency’s purview; and (2) great benefit is derived from an agency’s","paragraph_id":"para_221"},{"text":"uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations, whereas courts and","paragraph_id":"para_222"},{"text":"juries may reach different results under similar fact situations.” Forest","paragraph_id":"para_223"},{"text":"Oil, 518 S.W.3d at 429–30. The agency’s initial determination, in turn,","paragraph_id":"para_224"},{"text":"may not bind the court post-referral. See Cash Am., 35 S.W.3d at 18","paragraph_id":"para_225"},{"text":"(explaining that the doctrine’s purpose includes “ensuring that","paragraph_id":"para_226"},{"text":"administrative agencies decide, at least initially, questions that”","paragraph_id":"para_227"},{"text":"implicate agency expertise); see also, e.g., Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84","paragraph_id":"para_228"},{"text":"S.W.3d 198, 209 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the Motor Vehicle Board has","paragraph_id":"para_229"},{"text":"“primary jurisdiction to determine, at least in the first instance, whether","paragraph_id":"para_230"},{"text":"a right of first refusal violates the” Motor Vehicle Commission Code).","paragraph_id":"para_231"},{"text":"As I read our cases, our modern primary-jurisdiction doctrine has","paragraph_id":"para_232"},{"text":"mostly become a mechanism for judges to learn an agency’s view of an issue","paragraph_id":"para_233"},{"text":"before a court ultimately decides it. If so, then the doctrine’s legal effect","paragraph_id":"para_234"},{"text":"undermines its modern justification. Courts refer proceedings to agencies","paragraph_id":"para_235"},{"text":"in the name of expertise and uniformity while simultaneously disclaiming","paragraph_id":"para_236"},{"text":"any obligation to adopt the agency’s conclusion. If the agency’s initial","paragraph_id":"para_237"},{"text":"determination does not bind courts, uniformity is a largely illusory benefit,","paragraph_id":"para_238"},{"text":"and agency expertise in and of itself does not impart decision-making","paragraph_id":"para_239"},{"text":"authority. Litigants, in turn, face delayed resolution of their claims and","paragraph_id":"para_240"},{"text":"pay additional legal fees—all so courts can hear what an agency thinks","paragraph_id":"para_241"},{"text":"about an issue that is squarely within the judiciary’s power to decide.","paragraph_id":"para_242"},{"text":"All of that strikes me as an inefficient and even somewhat dubious","paragraph_id":"para_243"},{"text":"10","paragraph_id":"para_244"},{"text":"way to obtain what is essentially an amicus brief. But, to be clear, I think","paragraph_id":"para_245"},{"text":"that it can be highly desirable for courts to have the views of the government","paragraph_id":"para_246"},{"text":"in cases where a judicial decision is likely to significantly affect regulatory","paragraph_id":"para_247"},{"text":"programs in which agencies hold vast expertise and responsibility. The","paragraph_id":"para_248"},{"text":"judiciary may have the obligation to decide legal issues without legal","paragraph_id":"para_249"},{"text":"deference to an agency, but at the same time it should exhibit the virtue of","paragraph_id":"para_250"},{"text":"humility by seeking information that we judges otherwise would lack.","paragraph_id":"para_251"},{"text":"Indeed, as I have said before, “I am unaware of any appellate system that","paragraph_id":"para_252"},{"text":"is as welcoming of amicus participation” as ours is, and far from being","paragraph_id":"para_253"},{"text":"frustrated by too many amici’s voices, “I frequently regret the absence of","paragraph_id":"para_254"},{"text":"any amicus briefs” in even the most important cases. Perez v. City of San","paragraph_id":"para_255"},{"text":"Antonio, 711 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. 2024) (statement of Young, J.,","paragraph_id":"para_256"},{"text":"respecting the denial of the motion for participation in oral argument). I","paragraph_id":"para_257"},{"text":"imagine that useful assistance is even less frequently forthcoming in the","paragraph_id":"para_258"},{"text":"lower courts, but it would surely be at least as helpful. Especially when","paragraph_id":"para_259"},{"text":"the interests of a co-equal branch of government are at stake, I would","paragraph_id":"para_260"},{"text":"expect any Texas judge to welcome amicus submissions flexibly and","paragraph_id":"para_261"},{"text":"respectfully. When the government has responsibility over a regulatory","paragraph_id":"para_262"},{"text":"area, expertise in its underlying contours, and a stake in the work of the","paragraph_id":"para_263"},{"text":"courts, we should expect its views to have the “power to persuade, if lacking","paragraph_id":"para_264"},{"text":"power to control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Courts","paragraph_id":"para_265"},{"text":"may retain the obligation—often the burden—to decide independently, but","paragraph_id":"para_266"},{"text":"only a foolish court would reject the opportunity to avoid error by receiving","paragraph_id":"para_267"},{"text":"the views of those able to assist it.","paragraph_id":"para_268"},{"text":"All of this is to say that the primary-jurisdiction doctrine may be out","paragraph_id":"para_269"},{"text":"of date in its modern manifestation, but courts should not draw from that","paragraph_id":"para_270"},{"text":"11","paragraph_id":"para_271"},{"text":"conclusion that they ought to close their eyes and ears to the views of the","paragraph_id":"para_272"},{"text":"executive branch. They should consider alternative means of soliciting an","paragraph_id":"para_273"},{"text":"agency’s advice while avoiding the practical costs that a formal referral","paragraph_id":"para_274"},{"text":"would impose. They could simply invite agencies to participate as amici","paragraph_id":"para_275"},{"text":"curiae. See, e.g., Ryan v. ChemLawn Corp., 935 F.2d 129, 132 (7th Cir.","paragraph_id":"para_276"},{"text":"1991) (reversing referral to the Environmental Protection Agency based on","paragraph_id":"para_277"},{"text":"primary jurisdiction and noting that “[i]f the district court believed that it","paragraph_id":"para_278"},{"text":"needed specific information from the EPA to decide this case, it could have","paragraph_id":"para_279"},{"text":"asked the EPA to file an amicus brief”). And the respect that judges pay","paragraph_id":"para_280"},{"text":"submissions from the executive branch should, I would hope, lead entities","paragraph_id":"para_281"},{"text":"within that branch to begin to offer those views even without invitation. If","paragraph_id":"para_282"},{"text":"an agency is concerned about uniformity, for example, one way to promote","paragraph_id":"para_283"},{"text":"it is to express the agency’s views to courts that confront cases that can","paragraph_id":"para_284"},{"text":"help generate uniformity (or avoid spreading disuniformity).","paragraph_id":"para_285"},{"text":"But if referral does bind courts—or if, perhaps more likely, courts","paragraph_id":"para_286"},{"text":"simply rubber-stamp agency conclusions—primary jurisdiction would","paragraph_id":"para_287"},{"text":"often implicate a host of constitutional concerns, including the separation","paragraph_id":"para_288"},{"text":"of powers and the right to a jury trial. See In re CenterPoint Energy","paragraph_id":"para_289"},{"text":"Houston Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 164 (Tex. 2021) (plurality opinion)","paragraph_id":"para_290"},{"text":"(“Courts are not free to outsource to [an agency] the authority to adjudicate","paragraph_id":"para_291"},{"text":"common-law questions and factual disputes properly decided by judges and","paragraph_id":"para_292"},{"text":"juries.”); cf. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024)","paragraph_id":"para_293"},{"text":"(concluding that federal courts may not cede the task of legal interpretation","paragraph_id":"para_294"},{"text":"to administrative agencies); SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109, 120–21 (2024)","paragraph_id":"para_295"},{"text":"(holding that, when an agency’s civil-enforcement action resembles a","paragraph_id":"para_296"},{"text":"common-law cause of action and the “public rights” exception to Article III","paragraph_id":"para_297"},{"text":"12","paragraph_id":"para_298"},{"text":"jurisdiction does not apply, the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury-","paragraph_id":"para_299"},{"text":"trial right).","paragraph_id":"para_300"},{"text":"We need not resolve these important questions today because Rail","paragraph_id":"para_301"},{"text":"Link has not asked the Surface Transportation Board to exercise concurrent","paragraph_id":"para_302"},{"text":"jurisdiction over the underlying FELA dispute. But should the primary-","paragraph_id":"para_303"},{"text":"jurisdiction doctrine reach this Court again, and if the petition presents a","paragraph_id":"para_304"},{"text":"question of purely state law, I hope that the Court will consider, at the","paragraph_id":"para_305"},{"text":"least, returning the doctrine to its original formulation rather than allow","paragraph_id":"para_306"},{"text":"it to continue to metastasize.","paragraph_id":"para_307"},{"text":"Evan A. 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