{"attribution":{"source":"legal.exploreworldai.com","canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:tex-23-0634-2025-04-25","cite_as":"NovaCopilot, legal.exploreworldai.com (https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:tex-23-0634-2025-04-25)","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/revision","version":"legal-2026-10-17","fingerprint":"ewai:us:e7344b","proof":"sha256:fed643a96bdc6f350ea8ab3d37f08b89b24b2525c3a6591466d8984f62c7028d","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","publisher":"NovaCopilot by ExploreWorld Legal","terms":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/om"},"brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","item":{"schema_version":"1.0.0","id":"us:tex-23-0634-2025-04-25","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","brand":{"product":"NovaCopilot","platform":"ExploreWorldAI","infrastructure":"ExploreWorld Legal","infrastructure_url":"legal.exploreworldai.com","legal_entity":"Valkiv Ventures AB","permanent_url":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/novacopilot","source":"Source: NovaCopilot","powered_by":"Powered by NovaCopilot","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/licensvillkor"},"sections":[{"title":"Supreme Court of Texas","paragraphs":["para_2"]},{"title":"No. 23-0634","paragraphs":["para_4"]},{"title":"First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P., Sabrepoint Capital","paragraphs":["para_6","para_7","para_8","para_9","para_10"]},{"title":"Respondent","paragraphs":["para_12"]},{"title":"On Petition for Review from the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas","paragraphs":["para_15"]},{"title":"Argued January 16, 2025","paragraphs":["para_17"]},{"title":"A Colorado real estate investment trust sued a Texas hedge fund","paragraphs":["para_19","para_20"]},{"title":"Colorado federal court for lack of personal jurisdiction, the trust sued in","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Texas state court. The defendants did not challenge personal","paragraphs":["para_23"]},{"title":"Participation Act (TCPA) and for summary judgment based on collateral","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"2","paragraphs":["para_26","para_27","para_28","para_29","para_30","para_31","para_32","para_33","para_34"]},{"title":"I. Background","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. is a hedge fund with","paragraphs":["para_37"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint entered into an agreement with QKM, L.L.C., an","paragraphs":["para_39","para_40","para_41","para_42"]},{"title":"Donald Marchiony, sent Mathews an email about Farmland Partners","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Inc. (FPI). FPI is a publicly traded real estate investment trust that","paragraphs":["para_45","para_46","para_47","para_48","para_49"]},{"title":"3","paragraphs":["para_51","para_52"]},{"title":"Mathews began researching FPI’s financial condition and","paragraphs":["para_54","para_55","para_56","para_57"]},{"title":"FPI’s business, noting it faced a “significant risk of insolvency.”","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Shortly before the article was published, Mathews hired a Dallas","paragraphs":["para_60","para_61","para_62","para_63","para_64","para_65","para_66","para_67","para_68"]},{"title":"Later that month, FPI sued Mathews—identified initially only by","paragraphs":["para_70"]},{"title":"Alpha article contained false statements and was published as part of a","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"1 “Shorting” a stock is a technique in which an investor, expecting a","paragraphs":["para_73","para_74"]},{"title":"SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 31, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/","paragraphs":["para_76"]},{"title":"4","paragraphs":["para_78","para_79","para_80","para_81","para_82","para_83","para_84","para_85"]},{"title":"First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and Marchiony moved to dismiss under","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). In response, FPI contended","paragraphs":["para_88"]},{"title":"Colorado by publishing Mathews’s article and by sending Mitzner’s","paragraphs":["para_90","para_91","para_92","para_93","para_94","para_95","para_96","para_97"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint defendants knew about this article “until after it was","paragraphs":["para_99"]},{"title":"2 A “short and distort” scheme is intended to cause a selloff to benefit","paragraphs":["para_101","para_102","para_103","para_104"]},{"title":"5","paragraphs":["para_106","para_107","para_108","para_109"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint’s knowledge that Mr. Mathews might publish","paragraphs":["para_111"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint purposely directed its activities at Colorado. In","paragraphs":["para_113","para_114"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint. Thus, the article on its own cannot establish","paragraphs":["para_116","para_117"]},{"title":"Id. The court also concluded there was no evidence that the First","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Sabrepoint defendants had any involvement with hiring Mitzner or","paragraphs":["para_120","para_121","para_122","para_123","para_124"]},{"title":"Marchiony. FPI also added two new defendants: Sabrepoint Capital","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Partners, LP (a separate fund that FPI alleges acted through First","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Sabrepoint) and Sabrepoint Capital Participation, LP (the general","paragraphs":["para_128","para_129"]},{"title":"3 The Colorado court’s order used “Sabrepoint” to refer collectively to all","paragraphs":["para_131"]},{"title":"4 FPI earlier sued in the Northern District of Texas, but that action was","paragraphs":["para_133","para_134"]},{"title":"6","paragraphs":["para_136","para_137","para_138"]},{"title":"Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (3) civil conspiracy; (4) unjust","paragraphs":["para_140","para_141"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint answered and asserted collateral estoppel as an","paragraphs":["para_143","para_144","para_145","para_146","para_147"]},{"title":"Colorado federal court’s dismissal order adjudicated a jurisdictional","paragraphs":["para_149","para_150"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint’s potential ties to the article was not “essential” to the","paragraphs":["para_152"]},{"title":"In addition to seeking summary judgment, Sabrepoint moved to","paragraphs":["para_154","para_155","para_156","para_157","para_158","para_159","para_160","para_161"]},{"title":"7","paragraphs":["para_163","para_164","para_165"]},{"title":"2021, but did not rule within the thirty-day deadline the statute","paragraphs":["para_167","para_168","para_169","para_170","para_171","para_172"]},{"title":"FPI appealed. The court of appeals initially questioned its","paragraphs":["para_174","para_175"]},{"title":"(requiring the court to award a successful movant court costs and","paragraphs":["para_177","para_178","para_179","para_180","para_181"]},{"title":"Having decided that the portion of the order granting the TCPA motion","paragraphs":["para_183","para_184"]},{"title":"Following the court of appeals’ order to this effect, the parties","paragraphs":["para_186","para_187"]},{"title":"Colorado court’s order dismissing FPI’s suit determined that Sabrepoint","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"8","paragraphs":["para_190","para_191","para_192","para_193","para_194","para_195"]},{"title":"Id. at 134–35. Therefore, the issue in the prior case was not the identical","paragraphs":["para_197"]},{"title":"Additionally, the court noted that FPI’s claims against the two new","paragraphs":["para_199","para_200","para_201"]},{"title":"II. The trial court did not commit reversible error","paragraphs":["para_203"]},{"title":"The Legislature enacted the TCPA to protect against “retaliatory","paragraphs":["para_205","para_206"]},{"title":"2019). The statute’s express purpose is “to encourage and safeguard the","paragraphs":["para_208","para_209","para_210","para_211"]},{"title":"PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002. The TCPA itself explicitly directs courts","paragraphs":["para_213","para_214"]},{"title":"9","paragraphs":["para_216","para_217"]},{"title":"The TCPA provides for “early dismissal” of claims to which it","paragraphs":["para_219","para_220","para_221","para_222","para_223","para_224","para_225"]},{"title":"TCPA then imposes a deadline by which the trial court must rule:","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"The court must rule on a motion under Section 27.003 not","paragraphs":["para_228","para_229"]},{"title":"Id. § 27.005(a). If the court does not rule within thirty days of the","paragraphs":["para_231","para_232","para_233","para_234"]},{"title":"This Court recently held that the expiration of the deadline for a","paragraphs":["para_236"]},{"title":"5 An appeal from the trial court’s order (or failure to rule) is similarly","paragraphs":["para_238","para_239"]},{"title":"P. 26.1(b) (“[I]n an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"20 days after the judgment or order is signed . . . .”); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(“[A]ppeals required by statute to be accelerated or expedited . . . are","paragraphs":["para_243"]},{"title":"10","paragraphs":["para_245","para_246","para_247","para_248","para_249","para_250","para_251"]},{"title":"TCPA motion. Id. at 541. We noted that “the TCPA is silent about a","paragraphs":["para_253","para_254","para_255","para_256","para_257"]},{"title":"As a general matter, a trial court also “retains continuing control over","paragraphs":["para_259","para_260","para_261"]},{"title":"1993)). We thus concluded that “nothing in the statutory scheme [of the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"TCPA] prohibits trial courts from vacating their own orders when they","paragraphs":["para_264"]},{"title":"Consistent with Panchakarla, we conclude that the court of","paragraphs":["para_266"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion to dismiss. The trial court’s ruling on","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion came only five days after the expiration of","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Section 27.005(a)’s deadline to rule. At that time, no final judgment was","paragraphs":["para_270"]},{"title":"11","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Panchakarla, under those circumstances, nothing in the TCPA","paragraphs":["para_273","para_274"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint does not challenge Panchakarla’s holding; instead, it","paragraphs":["para_276","para_277","para_278","para_279","para_280"]},{"title":"CIV. P. 329b(e) (providing that trial courts have plenary power to grant","paragraphs":["para_282","para_283","para_284","para_285","para_286"]},{"title":"The text of the TCPA does not require a different result. The","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"TCPA’s command is that courts “must rule” no later than thirty days","paragraphs":["para_289","para_290","para_291"]},{"title":"Instead, the statute provides a simple consequence for a trial court’s","paragraphs":["para_293","para_294"]},{"title":"We do not suggest that the trial court committed no error by","paragraphs":["para_296","para_297"]},{"title":"12","paragraphs":["para_299","para_300","para_301"]},{"title":"APP. P. 44.1(a) (“No judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground","paragraphs":["para_303","para_304","para_305"]},{"title":"(Tex. 2023) (“As a general rule, ‘[n]o [civil] judgment may be reversed on","paragraphs":["para_307","para_308"]},{"title":"P. 44.1(a))). In granting the motion when it did, the ultimate outcome","paragraphs":["para_310","para_311","para_312","para_313","para_314","para_315"]},{"title":"1980) (explaining that the harmless error rule “establishes a sound and","paragraphs":["para_317","para_318","para_319"]},{"title":"790–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (holding that a","paragraphs":["para_321","para_322"]},{"title":"Rule 91a “does not contain any sanction for non-compliance with the","paragraphs":["para_324"]},{"title":"13","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Beavers, 675 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(concluding that a trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and","paragraphs":["para_328"]},{"title":"This conclusion aligns with the TCPA’s objective, which is to","paragraphs":["para_330","para_331"]},{"title":"Legislature expressly provided for an immediate right to appeal when a","paragraphs":["para_333"]},{"title":"CODE § 27.008(b). Rather than force a TCPA movant to file a","paragraphs":["para_335"]},{"title":"(and stay all trial court proceedings), judicial economy and the objectives","paragraphs":["para_337","para_338","para_339","para_340","para_341","para_342","para_343","para_344"]},{"title":"The court of appeals erroneously held that the portion of the trial","paragraphs":["para_346","para_347","para_348"]},{"title":"6 While the TCPA permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a","paragraphs":["para_350","para_351"]},{"title":"14","paragraphs":["para_353","para_354","para_355","para_356"]},{"title":"While the court of appeals erred by declaring void the trial court’s","paragraphs":["para_358","para_359","para_360","para_361","para_362"]},{"title":"Accordingly, in the interest of judicial efficiency, we will address its","paragraphs":["para_364"]},{"title":"Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Tex. 2015) (“[I]n the interest of judicial","paragraphs":["para_366","para_367","para_368","para_369","para_370"]},{"title":"Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 691 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. 2024) (quoting","paragraphs":["para_372"]},{"title":"2019)). To establish entitlement to summary judgment based on an","paragraphs":["para_374"]},{"title":"7 While FPI’s appeal was pending, the trial court signed an order","paragraphs":["para_376","para_377","para_378","para_379"]},{"title":"15","paragraphs":["para_381"]},{"title":"Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 87–88 (Tex. 2021). The","paragraphs":["para_383"]},{"title":"Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). We review","paragraphs":["para_385","para_386"]},{"title":"Partners US, LP, 608 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]","paragraphs":["para_388"]},{"title":"Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, bars parties","paragraphs":["para_390","para_391","para_392"]},{"title":"213 (Tex. 1999) (“[T]he basic function of collateral estoppel [is] to","paragraphs":["para_394","para_395","para_396","para_397"]},{"title":"S.W.2d at 384. Specifically, collateral estoppel prevents the same","paragraphs":["para_399"]},{"title":"Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984). In","paragraphs":["para_401","para_402","para_403"]},{"title":"16","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"A party must establish several elements to prevail under the","paragraphs":["para_406","para_407","para_408"]},{"title":"Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. 1992); see also Johnson & Higgins of","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 521 (Tex. 1998)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(holding that “the issue decided in the first action must be . . . identical","paragraphs":["para_412"]},{"title":"Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. 1994) (requiring","paragraphs":["para_414","para_415","para_416","para_417","para_418","para_419"]},{"title":"Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. 2001) (holding that collateral estoppel","paragraphs":["para_421","para_422","para_423","para_424","para_425"]},{"title":"8 The elements required to establish collateral estoppel under Texas law","paragraphs":["para_427","para_428","para_429","para_430","para_431"]},{"title":"17","paragraphs":["para_433"]},{"title":"Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 802 (holding that the defendants “had the","paragraphs":["para_435"]},{"title":"Next, the party seeking the application of collateral estoppel must","paragraphs":["para_437","para_438","para_439","para_440","para_441","para_442","para_443"]},{"title":"Third, a party asserting the defense must establish that the same","paragraphs":["para_445"]},{"title":"S.W.2d at 801. A fact issue is considered essential and an “ultimate","paragraphs":["para_447","para_448","para_449"]},{"title":"Lastly, the parties must have been “cast as adversaries in the first","paragraphs":["para_451","para_452","para_453","para_454"]},{"title":"807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990); see also Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 802","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(“[I]t is only necessary that the party against whom the [collateral","paragraphs":["para_457","para_458"]},{"title":"18","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"We agree with the court of appeals that Sabrepoint failed to","paragraphs":["para_461","para_462","para_463"]},{"title":"See Ayre v. J.D. Bucky Allshouse, P.C., 942 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (“Collateral estoppel requires","paragraphs":["para_466","para_467","para_468","para_469","para_470","para_471","para_472"]},{"title":"Johnson & Higgins, 962 S.W.2d at 523 (holding that collateral estoppel","paragraphs":["para_474","para_475","para_476","para_477","para_478","para_479","para_480"]},{"title":"Fortunae.” Farmland Partners Inc., 2021 WL 765362, at *7. It","paragraphs":["para_482","para_483","para_484"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint correctly points out that the Colorado and Texas actions","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"19","paragraphs":["para_487","para_488","para_489"]},{"title":"John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"268, 288–89 (Tex. 2002) (holding that collateral estoppel did not","paragraphs":["para_492","para_493"]},{"title":"Here, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Sabrepoint did","paragraphs":["para_495","para_496","para_497","para_498","para_499","para_500","para_501"]},{"title":"But that is not what the court of appeals held. The mere fact that the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Colorado court’s determination was jurisdictional is not what prevents","paragraphs":["para_504","para_505","para_506"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint did not conclusively establish how the facts decided in","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Colorado regarding lack of targeting for purposes of purposeful","paragraphs":["para_509"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint failed to conclusively establish that the Colorado court’s","paragraphs":["para_511","para_512"]},{"title":"20","paragraphs":["para_514","para_515"]},{"title":"Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Tex. 2001) (concluding","paragraphs":["para_517","para_518"]},{"title":"In particular, Sabrepoint’s trial court briefing did not conclusively","paragraphs":["para_520","para_521","para_522"]},{"title":"Sabrepoint, which hired Mathews and assisted him in conducting the","paragraphs":["para_524"]},{"title":"S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2025) (stating that a plaintiff must show that the","paragraphs":["para_526","para_527","para_528","para_529","para_530"]},{"title":"TORTS § 577 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1977))). The same can be said for other","paragraphs":["para_532","para_533"]},{"title":"Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 474","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The classic","paragraphs":["para_536","para_537"]},{"title":"Colorado order concerned only whether Sabrepoint’s conduct—or","paragraphs":["para_539"]},{"title":"21","paragraphs":["para_541","para_542","para_543"]},{"title":"The addition of two new defendants in FPI’s Texas suit is also","paragraphs":["para_545","para_546","para_547","para_548","para_549","para_550","para_551","para_552","para_553","para_554","para_555","para_556","para_557"]},{"title":"S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971) (noting that “determination of who are","paragraphs":["para_559","para_560","para_561","para_562","para_563","para_564"]},{"title":"22","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"IV. Conclusion","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"The court of appeals correctly held, on the summary judgment","paragraphs":["para_568","para_569"]},{"title":"We affirm this portion of the appellate court’s judgment. But the court","paragraphs":["para_571","para_572","para_573","para_574","para_575"]},{"title":"Rebeca A. Huddle","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Justice","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"OPINION DELIVERED: April 25, 2025","paragraphs":[]}],"paragraphs":[{"text":"Supreme Court of Texas","paragraph_id":"para_1"},{"text":"══════════","paragraph_id":"para_2"},{"text":"No. 23-0634","paragraph_id":"para_3"},{"text":"══════════","paragraph_id":"para_4"},{"text":"First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P., Sabrepoint Capital","paragraph_id":"para_5"},{"text":"Partners, L.P., Sabrepoint Capital Participation, L.P.,","paragraph_id":"para_6"},{"text":"George Baxter, and Donald Marchiony,","paragraph_id":"para_7"},{"text":"Petitioners,","paragraph_id":"para_8"},{"text":"v.","paragraph_id":"para_9"},{"text":"Farmland Partners Inc.,","paragraph_id":"para_10"},{"text":"Respondent","paragraph_id":"para_11"},{"text":"═══════════════════════════════════════","paragraph_id":"para_12"},{"text":"On Petition for Review from the","paragraph_id":"para_13"},{"text":"Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas","paragraph_id":"para_14"},{"text":"═══════════════════════════════════════","paragraph_id":"para_15"},{"text":"Argued January 16, 2025","paragraph_id":"para_16"},{"text":"JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.","paragraph_id":"para_17"},{"text":"A Colorado real estate investment trust sued a Texas hedge fund","paragraph_id":"para_18"},{"text":"and its employees for damages caused by an allegedly defamatory article","paragraph_id":"para_19"},{"text":"published under a pseudonym. After those claims were dismissed in","paragraph_id":"para_20"},{"text":"Colorado federal court for lack of personal jurisdiction, the trust sued in","paragraph_id":"para_21"},{"text":"Texas state court. The defendants did not challenge personal","paragraph_id":"para_22"},{"text":"jurisdiction here but instead moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens","paragraph_id":"para_23"},{"text":"Participation Act (TCPA) and for summary judgment based on collateral","paragraph_id":"para_24"},{"text":"2","paragraph_id":"para_25"},{"text":"estoppel. The trial court granted both motions, but the court of appeals","paragraph_id":"para_26"},{"text":"reversed, holding (1) the trial court lacked authority to grant the TCPA","paragraph_id":"para_27"},{"text":"motion after it was overruled by operation of law and (2) the defendants","paragraph_id":"para_28"},{"text":"failed to conclusively establish that collateral estoppel barred the","paragraph_id":"para_29"},{"text":"claims. We agree with the court of appeals that the defendants were not","paragraph_id":"para_30"},{"text":"entitled to summary judgment on their collateral estoppel defense. But","paragraph_id":"para_31"},{"text":"the court of appeals erred in holding that the order granting the TCPA","paragraph_id":"para_32"},{"text":"motion was void. We therefore reverse and remand for the court of","paragraph_id":"para_33"},{"text":"appeals to address the TCPA motion on its merits.","paragraph_id":"para_34"},{"text":"I. Background","paragraph_id":"para_35"},{"text":"First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. is a hedge fund with","paragraph_id":"para_36"},{"text":"its principal place of business in Dallas. In February 2018, First","paragraph_id":"para_37"},{"text":"Sabrepoint entered into an agreement with QKM, L.L.C., an","paragraph_id":"para_38"},{"text":"independent advisory firm owned by David Quinton Mathews. In","paragraph_id":"para_39"},{"text":"exchange for a $9,500 monthly fee, QKM agreed to conduct investment","paragraph_id":"para_40"},{"text":"research and advisory services for First Sabrepoint.","paragraph_id":"para_41"},{"text":"Several months later, a senior analyst at First Sabrepoint,","paragraph_id":"para_42"},{"text":"Donald Marchiony, sent Mathews an email about Farmland Partners","paragraph_id":"para_43"},{"text":"Inc. (FPI). FPI is a publicly traded real estate investment trust that","paragraph_id":"para_44"},{"text":"acquires agricultural land across North America and is headquartered","paragraph_id":"para_45"},{"text":"in Colorado. Marchiony’s email attached a slide deck with information","paragraph_id":"para_46"},{"text":"on FPI’s value and business operations. He described the attachment","paragraph_id":"para_47"},{"text":"as a “new idea” on which he and Mathews could collaborate “if there’s","paragraph_id":"para_48"},{"text":"something juicy.” Marchiony told Mathews that First Sabrepoint held a","paragraph_id":"para_49"},{"text":"3","paragraph_id":"para_50"},{"text":"relatively small short position1 on FPI’s stock but “unless we have a","paragraph_id":"para_51"},{"text":"catalyst [we] probably won’t do too much higher than that.”","paragraph_id":"para_52"},{"text":"Mathews began researching FPI’s financial condition and","paragraph_id":"para_53"},{"text":"communicated his findings to additional First Sabrepoint employees,","paragraph_id":"para_54"},{"text":"including George Baxter, First Sabrepoint’s CEO. Mathews eventually","paragraph_id":"para_55"},{"text":"wrote an article about FPI under his pseudonym “Rota Fortunae” for the","paragraph_id":"para_56"},{"text":"financial blog “Seeking Alpha.” The article painted a bleak picture of","paragraph_id":"para_57"},{"text":"FPI’s business, noting it faced a “significant risk of insolvency.”","paragraph_id":"para_58"},{"text":"Shortly before the article was published, Mathews hired a Dallas","paragraph_id":"para_59"},{"text":"attorney, Matthew Mitzner, to send a letter informing FPI of the","paragraph_id":"para_60"},{"text":"article’s impending publication and offering FPI an opportunity to","paragraph_id":"para_61"},{"text":"comment. FPI did not respond within Mitzner’s 24-hour deadline, and","paragraph_id":"para_62"},{"text":"the article was published on Seeking Alpha the following day. On the","paragraph_id":"para_63"},{"text":"day the article was published, FPI issued a press release denying some","paragraph_id":"para_64"},{"text":"of the article’s statements. Yet within one day of the article’s","paragraph_id":"para_65"},{"text":"publication, FPI’s stock price dropped 39%. FPI released another public","paragraph_id":"para_66"},{"text":"statement rebutting the article’s assertions, including that the company","paragraph_id":"para_67"},{"text":"was nearly insolvent.","paragraph_id":"para_68"},{"text":"Later that month, FPI sued Mathews—identified initially only by","paragraph_id":"para_69"},{"text":"his pseudonym—in Colorado state court. FPI alleged that the Seeking","paragraph_id":"para_70"},{"text":"Alpha article contained false statements and was published as part of a","paragraph_id":"para_71"},{"text":"1 “Shorting” a stock is a technique in which an investor, expecting a","paragraph_id":"para_72"},{"text":"stock price to decline, borrows and then sells shares of a stock intending to","paragraph_id":"para_73"},{"text":"purchase them later for a lower price. Key Points About Regulation SHO, U.S.","paragraph_id":"para_74"},{"text":"SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 31, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/","paragraph_id":"para_75"},{"text":"regsho.htm?os=i&ref=app.","paragraph_id":"para_76"},{"text":"4","paragraph_id":"para_77"},{"text":"“short and distort” scheme2 in which false information is disseminated","paragraph_id":"para_78"},{"text":"to generate profits for short sellers. The suit was removed, and FPI","paragraph_id":"para_79"},{"text":"amended its complaint to add First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and Marchiony","paragraph_id":"para_80"},{"text":"as defendants, alleging that they conspired with Mathews to manipulate","paragraph_id":"para_81"},{"text":"securities markets to help First Sabrepoint profit from its short position","paragraph_id":"para_82"},{"text":"on FPI’s stock. FPI alleged it and its shareholders suffered financial and","paragraph_id":"para_83"},{"text":"reputational harm as a result, including the loss of prospective business","paragraph_id":"para_84"},{"text":"relations.","paragraph_id":"para_85"},{"text":"First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and Marchiony moved to dismiss under","paragraph_id":"para_86"},{"text":"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). In response, FPI contended","paragraph_id":"para_87"},{"text":"that the defendants had purposefully directed their activities toward","paragraph_id":"para_88"},{"text":"Colorado by publishing Mathews’s article and by sending Mitzner’s","paragraph_id":"para_89"},{"text":"letter to FPI in Colorado two days before publication. The district court","paragraph_id":"para_90"},{"text":"concluded neither of these acts supported the exercise of personal","paragraph_id":"para_91"},{"text":"jurisdiction and granted the Rule 12(b)(2) motion. Farmland Partners","paragraph_id":"para_92"},{"text":"Inc. v. Rota Fortunae, No. 1:18-CV-02351-RBJ, 2021 WL 765362, at *7,","paragraph_id":"para_93"},{"text":"*12 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2021). In explaining its reasoning, the district","paragraph_id":"para_94"},{"text":"court noted that although FPI presented evidence that the defendants","paragraph_id":"para_95"},{"text":"knew Mathews previously had published articles under the pseudonym","paragraph_id":"para_96"},{"text":"“Rota Fortunae” on Seeking Alpha, there was no evidence that the First","paragraph_id":"para_97"},{"text":"Sabrepoint defendants knew about this article “until after it was","paragraph_id":"para_98"},{"text":"published.” Id. at *6. The court concluded that the evidence at most","paragraph_id":"para_99"},{"text":"2 A “short and distort” scheme is intended to cause a selloff to benefit","paragraph_id":"para_100"},{"text":"short sellers. It is accomplished by spreading false or misleading information","paragraph_id":"para_101"},{"text":"about a publicly traded company. Matthew B. Schneider, Coming Up Short:","paragraph_id":"para_102"},{"text":"Using Short-Seller Reports to Plead Loss Causation in Securities Class Actions,","paragraph_id":"para_103"},{"text":"124 COLUM. L. REV. 1485, 1505 (2024).","paragraph_id":"para_104"},{"text":"5","paragraph_id":"para_105"},{"text":"supported “a reasonable inference that Sabrepoint knew . . . it was","paragraph_id":"para_106"},{"text":"possible Quinton Mathews would publish an article about FPI.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_107"},{"text":"at *7.3 Yet, in its view, this was not enough to establish purposeful","paragraph_id":"para_108"},{"text":"availment:","paragraph_id":"para_109"},{"text":"Sabrepoint’s knowledge that Mr. Mathews might publish","paragraph_id":"para_110"},{"text":"an article about FPI is insufficient to establish that","paragraph_id":"para_111"},{"text":"Sabrepoint purposely directed its activities at Colorado. In","paragraph_id":"para_112"},{"text":"sum, there is nothing in the record to support an inference","paragraph_id":"para_113"},{"text":"that the Seeking Alpha article is attributable to","paragraph_id":"para_114"},{"text":"Sabrepoint. Thus, the article on its own cannot establish","paragraph_id":"para_115"},{"text":"that Sabrepoint purposely directed its activity at","paragraph_id":"para_116"},{"text":"[Colorado].","paragraph_id":"para_117"},{"text":"Id. The court also concluded there was no evidence that the First","paragraph_id":"para_118"},{"text":"Sabrepoint defendants had any involvement with hiring Mitzner or","paragraph_id":"para_119"},{"text":"instructing him to send the letter to FPI. Id. at *7–8. The court further","paragraph_id":"para_120"},{"text":"rejected FPI’s arguments that personal jurisdiction was proper under an","paragraph_id":"para_121"},{"text":"agency or conspiracy theory. Id. at *8–12.","paragraph_id":"para_122"},{"text":"Following dismissal in Colorado, FPI sued in Texas state court,","paragraph_id":"para_123"},{"text":"asserting similar claims against First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and","paragraph_id":"para_124"},{"text":"Marchiony. FPI also added two new defendants: Sabrepoint Capital","paragraph_id":"para_125"},{"text":"Partners, LP (a separate fund that FPI alleges acted through First","paragraph_id":"para_126"},{"text":"Sabrepoint) and Sabrepoint Capital Participation, LP (the general","paragraph_id":"para_127"},{"text":"partner of Sabrepoint Capital Partners).4 Unless clarity requires","paragraph_id":"para_128"},{"text":"otherwise, we will refer to all five defendants collectively as","paragraph_id":"para_129"},{"text":"3 The Colorado court’s order used “Sabrepoint” to refer collectively to all","paragraph_id":"para_130"},{"text":"three defendants: First Sabrepoint, Baxter, and Marchiony. Id. at *1.","paragraph_id":"para_131"},{"text":"4 FPI earlier sued in the Northern District of Texas, but that action was","paragraph_id":"para_132"},{"text":"dismissed because the presence of Sabrepoint Capital Partners defeated","paragraph_id":"para_133"},{"text":"diversity jurisdiction.","paragraph_id":"para_134"},{"text":"6","paragraph_id":"para_135"},{"text":"“Sabrepoint.” FPI alleged six claims against Sabrepoint: (1) intentional","paragraph_id":"para_136"},{"text":"and tortious interference with prospective business relations/advantage","paragraph_id":"para_137"},{"text":"and/or negligence; (2) deceptive trade practice in violation of the","paragraph_id":"para_138"},{"text":"Colorado Consumer Protection Act; (3) civil conspiracy; (4) unjust","paragraph_id":"para_139"},{"text":"enrichment/money had and received; (5) disparagement/business","paragraph_id":"para_140"},{"text":"disparagement; and (6) defamation.","paragraph_id":"para_141"},{"text":"Sabrepoint answered and asserted collateral estoppel as an","paragraph_id":"para_142"},{"text":"affirmative defense. It then moved for summary judgment on that basis,","paragraph_id":"para_143"},{"text":"arguing that the Texas suit was based on the same underlying factual","paragraph_id":"para_144"},{"text":"issue decided in Sabrepoint’s favor by the Colorado court: Sabrepoint’s","paragraph_id":"para_145"},{"text":"“lack of involvement with the allegedly defamatory article.” FPI","paragraph_id":"para_146"},{"text":"responded that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the","paragraph_id":"para_147"},{"text":"Colorado federal court’s dismissal order adjudicated a jurisdictional","paragraph_id":"para_148"},{"text":"question, not the merits. FPI also argued that the Colorado order did","paragraph_id":"para_149"},{"text":"not address all the claims at issue in Texas and its analysis of","paragraph_id":"para_150"},{"text":"Sabrepoint’s potential ties to the article was not “essential” to the","paragraph_id":"para_151"},{"text":"Colorado judgment.","paragraph_id":"para_152"},{"text":"In addition to seeking summary judgment, Sabrepoint moved to","paragraph_id":"para_153"},{"text":"dismiss FPI’s claims under the TCPA. It argued that the TCPA applied","paragraph_id":"para_154"},{"text":"to those claims and FPI failed to establish a prima facie case by clear","paragraph_id":"para_155"},{"text":"and specific evidence. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.003(a) (“If","paragraph_id":"para_156"},{"text":"a legal action is based on or is in response to a party’s exercise of the","paragraph_id":"para_157"},{"text":"right of free speech, . . . that party may file a motion to dismiss the legal","paragraph_id":"para_158"},{"text":"action.”), .005(c) (prohibiting a court from dismissing a legal action if the","paragraph_id":"para_159"},{"text":"claimant “establishes by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case","paragraph_id":"para_160"},{"text":"for each essential element of the claim in question”). Sabrepoint later","paragraph_id":"para_161"},{"text":"7","paragraph_id":"para_162"},{"text":"supplemented its TCPA motion to add another ground for dismissal:","paragraph_id":"para_163"},{"text":"that it established its collateral estoppel defense as a matter of law. See","paragraph_id":"para_164"},{"text":"id. § 27.005(d). The court heard the TCPA motion on November 12,","paragraph_id":"para_165"},{"text":"2021, but did not rule within the thirty-day deadline the statute","paragraph_id":"para_166"},{"text":"prescribes. See id. § 27.005(a) (requiring the trial court to rule within","paragraph_id":"para_167"},{"text":"thirty days after the hearing); id. § 27.008(a) (providing that the motion","paragraph_id":"para_168"},{"text":"is denied by operation of law if the trial court does not rule within that","paragraph_id":"para_169"},{"text":"time period). Rather, on December 17, thirty-five days after the hearing","paragraph_id":"para_170"},{"text":"on the TCPA motion, it granted both the TCPA motion and the motion","paragraph_id":"para_171"},{"text":"for summary judgment.","paragraph_id":"para_172"},{"text":"FPI appealed. The court of appeals initially questioned its","paragraph_id":"para_173"},{"text":"jurisdiction over the appeal, noting that the December 17 order granting","paragraph_id":"para_174"},{"text":"the TCPA motion did not address attorney’s fees, see id. § 27.009(a)(1)","paragraph_id":"para_175"},{"text":"(requiring the court to award a successful movant court costs and","paragraph_id":"para_176"},{"text":"reasonable attorney’s fees), and therefore may not constitute a final","paragraph_id":"para_177"},{"text":"judgment. 703 S.W.3d 123, 129 & n.12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023). After","paragraph_id":"para_178"},{"text":"the parties briefed the jurisdictional question, the court of appeals","paragraph_id":"para_179"},{"text":"concluded the TCPA motion, which was overruled by operation of law","paragraph_id":"para_180"},{"text":"thirty days after the hearing, could not be granted thereafter. Id. at 129.","paragraph_id":"para_181"},{"text":"Having decided that the portion of the order granting the TCPA motion","paragraph_id":"para_182"},{"text":"was void, the court of appeals determined it would review only the trial","paragraph_id":"para_183"},{"text":"court’s grant of summary judgment. Id.","paragraph_id":"para_184"},{"text":"Following the court of appeals’ order to this effect, the parties","paragraph_id":"para_185"},{"text":"limited their briefing and argument to the summary judgment ruling,","paragraph_id":"para_186"},{"text":"which was based on collateral estoppel. Sabrepoint argued that the","paragraph_id":"para_187"},{"text":"Colorado court’s order dismissing FPI’s suit determined that Sabrepoint","paragraph_id":"para_188"},{"text":"8","paragraph_id":"para_189"},{"text":"had no involvement at all in the Seeking Alpha article and this","paragraph_id":"para_190"},{"text":"determination barred FPI’s claims in Texas. The court of appeals","paragraph_id":"para_191"},{"text":"disagreed and reversed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 136. According","paragraph_id":"para_192"},{"text":"to the court of appeals, the Colorado court considered only whether it","paragraph_id":"para_193"},{"text":"could exercise personal jurisdiction over Sabrepoint, which was not at","paragraph_id":"para_194"},{"text":"issue in this case because personal jurisdiction in Texas is unchallenged.","paragraph_id":"para_195"},{"text":"Id. at 134–35. Therefore, the issue in the prior case was not the identical","paragraph_id":"para_196"},{"text":"issue presented here, and the Colorado judgment was not preclusive. Id.","paragraph_id":"para_197"},{"text":"Additionally, the court noted that FPI’s claims against the two new","paragraph_id":"para_198"},{"text":"defendants were never litigated in Colorado, leaving “no possibility of","paragraph_id":"para_199"},{"text":"an inconsistent determination of the same ultimate issue.” Id. at 135.","paragraph_id":"para_200"},{"text":"Sabrepoint petitioned for review, which we granted.","paragraph_id":"para_201"},{"text":"II. The trial court did not commit reversible error","paragraph_id":"para_202"},{"text":"by granting the TCPA motion.","paragraph_id":"para_203"},{"text":"The Legislature enacted the TCPA to protect against “retaliatory","paragraph_id":"para_204"},{"text":"lawsuits meant to intimidate or silence citizens on matters of public","paragraph_id":"para_205"},{"text":"concern.” Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex.","paragraph_id":"para_206"},{"text":"2019). The statute’s express purpose is “to encourage and safeguard the","paragraph_id":"para_207"},{"text":"constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely,","paragraph_id":"para_208"},{"text":"and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent","paragraph_id":"para_209"},{"text":"permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to","paragraph_id":"para_210"},{"text":"file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV.","paragraph_id":"para_211"},{"text":"PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002. The TCPA itself explicitly directs courts","paragraph_id":"para_212"},{"text":"to construe the statute “liberally to effectuate its purpose and intent","paragraph_id":"para_213"},{"text":"fully.” Id. § 27.011(b). When, as here, we consider issues of statutory","paragraph_id":"para_214"},{"text":"9","paragraph_id":"para_215"},{"text":"interpretation, our review is de novo. Morath v. Lampasas Indep. Sch.","paragraph_id":"para_216"},{"text":"Dist., 686 S.W.3d 725, 734 (Tex. 2024).","paragraph_id":"para_217"},{"text":"The TCPA provides for “early dismissal” of claims to which it","paragraph_id":"para_218"},{"text":"applies. Greer v. Abraham, 489 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2016). A","paragraph_id":"para_219"},{"text":"defendant may file a motion to dismiss within sixty days after the","paragraph_id":"para_220"},{"text":"lawsuit’s service. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(b). Discovery","paragraph_id":"para_221"},{"text":"is stayed (with limited exceptions), id. § 27.003(c), and the trial court","paragraph_id":"para_222"},{"text":"must hold a hearing within sixty days after the motion is served, unless","paragraph_id":"para_223"},{"text":"there is good cause or the parties agree to an extension, but in no event","paragraph_id":"para_224"},{"text":"later than ninety days after service of the motion, id. § 27.004(a). The","paragraph_id":"para_225"},{"text":"TCPA then imposes a deadline by which the trial court must rule:","paragraph_id":"para_226"},{"text":"The court must rule on a motion under Section 27.003 not","paragraph_id":"para_227"},{"text":"later than the 30th day following the date the hearing on","paragraph_id":"para_228"},{"text":"the motion concludes.","paragraph_id":"para_229"},{"text":"Id. § 27.005(a). If the court does not rule within thirty days of the","paragraph_id":"para_230"},{"text":"hearing, “the motion is considered to have been denied by operation of","paragraph_id":"para_231"},{"text":"law and the moving party may appeal.” Id. § 27.008(a). We have","paragraph_id":"para_232"},{"text":"described this procedure generally as a “special motion for . . . expedited","paragraph_id":"para_233"},{"text":"consideration.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015).5","paragraph_id":"para_234"},{"text":"This Court recently held that the expiration of the deadline for a","paragraph_id":"para_235"},{"text":"trial court to rule on a TCPA motion does not extinguish the court’s","paragraph_id":"para_236"},{"text":"5 An appeal from the trial court’s order (or failure to rule) is similarly","paragraph_id":"para_237"},{"text":"expedited. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(b). The notice of appeal","paragraph_id":"para_238"},{"text":"must be filed within twenty days of the trial court’s order. See TEX. R. APP.","paragraph_id":"para_239"},{"text":"P. 26.1(b) (“[I]n an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within","paragraph_id":"para_240"},{"text":"20 days after the judgment or order is signed . . . .”); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a)","paragraph_id":"para_241"},{"text":"(“[A]ppeals required by statute to be accelerated or expedited . . . are","paragraph_id":"para_242"},{"text":"accelerated appeals.”).","paragraph_id":"para_243"},{"text":"10","paragraph_id":"para_244"},{"text":"plenary power to later reconsider that ruling. In In re Panchakarla, the","paragraph_id":"para_245"},{"text":"trial court granted a TCPA motion within the thirty-day period following","paragraph_id":"para_246"},{"text":"the hearing, dismissing the plaintiff’s claims. 602 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Tex.","paragraph_id":"para_247"},{"text":"2020). The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial,","paragraph_id":"para_248"},{"text":"which the court granted over two months later, vacating its initial order","paragraph_id":"para_249"},{"text":"and denying the TCPA motion. Id. at 538–39. We held that the trial","paragraph_id":"para_250"},{"text":"court did not abuse its discretion in vacating its order granting the","paragraph_id":"para_251"},{"text":"TCPA motion. Id. at 541. We noted that “the TCPA is silent about a","paragraph_id":"para_252"},{"text":"trial court’s authority to reconsider either a timely issued ruling","paragraph_id":"para_253"},{"text":"granting a TCPA motion to dismiss or a timely order denying such a","paragraph_id":"para_254"},{"text":"motion when no interlocutory appeal is pending.” Id. at 540. And we","paragraph_id":"para_255"},{"text":"observed that this Court has “long recognized that trial courts retain","paragraph_id":"para_256"},{"text":"plenary power over their judgments until they become final.” Id. at 539.","paragraph_id":"para_257"},{"text":"As a general matter, a trial court also “retains continuing control over","paragraph_id":"para_258"},{"text":"interlocutory orders and has the power to set those orders aside any time","paragraph_id":"para_259"},{"text":"before a final judgment is [rendered].” Id. at 539–40 (alteration in","paragraph_id":"para_260"},{"text":"original) (quoting Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex.","paragraph_id":"para_261"},{"text":"1993)). We thus concluded that “nothing in the statutory scheme [of the","paragraph_id":"para_262"},{"text":"TCPA] prohibits trial courts from vacating their own orders when they","paragraph_id":"para_263"},{"text":"otherwise have plenary power to do so.” Id. at 541.","paragraph_id":"para_264"},{"text":"Consistent with Panchakarla, we conclude that the court of","paragraph_id":"para_265"},{"text":"appeals erred by declaring void the trial court’s order granting","paragraph_id":"para_266"},{"text":"Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion to dismiss. The trial court’s ruling on","paragraph_id":"para_267"},{"text":"Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion came only five days after the expiration of","paragraph_id":"para_268"},{"text":"Section 27.005(a)’s deadline to rule. At that time, no final judgment was","paragraph_id":"para_269"},{"text":"in place, and Sabrepoint had not appealed. As we recognized in","paragraph_id":"para_270"},{"text":"11","paragraph_id":"para_271"},{"text":"Panchakarla, under those circumstances, nothing in the TCPA","paragraph_id":"para_272"},{"text":"extinguished the trial court’s plenary power to reconsider the TCPA","paragraph_id":"para_273"},{"text":"motion’s merits. Id.","paragraph_id":"para_274"},{"text":"Sabrepoint does not challenge Panchakarla’s holding; instead, it","paragraph_id":"para_275"},{"text":"argues that Panchakarla is distinguishable because it involved","paragraph_id":"para_276"},{"text":"reconsideration of an order that timely granted a TCPA motion. We are","paragraph_id":"para_277"},{"text":"not persuaded. We see no reason to apply a different rule simply","paragraph_id":"para_278"},{"text":"because the initial order in Panchakarla was one the trial court","paragraph_id":"para_279"},{"text":"expressly made as opposed to one made by operation of law. Cf. TEX. R.","paragraph_id":"para_280"},{"text":"CIV. P. 329b(e) (providing that trial courts have plenary power to grant","paragraph_id":"para_281"},{"text":"a new trial for thirty days after a motion for new trial has been denied","paragraph_id":"para_282"},{"text":"“either by a written and signed order or by operation of law”). Nor does","paragraph_id":"para_283"},{"text":"it matter that, on reconsideration, the trial court in Panchakarla denied","paragraph_id":"para_284"},{"text":"the motion, whereas the trial court in this case reconsidered and granted","paragraph_id":"para_285"},{"text":"the motion.","paragraph_id":"para_286"},{"text":"The text of the TCPA does not require a different result. The","paragraph_id":"para_287"},{"text":"TCPA’s command is that courts “must rule” no later than thirty days","paragraph_id":"para_288"},{"text":"after the hearing has concluded. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE","paragraph_id":"para_289"},{"text":"§ 27.005(a). But as we noted in Panchakarla, the statute nowhere limits","paragraph_id":"para_290"},{"text":"the trial court’s authority to revisit that ruling. 602 S.W.3d at 540–41.","paragraph_id":"para_291"},{"text":"Instead, the statute provides a simple consequence for a trial court’s","paragraph_id":"para_292"},{"text":"failure to timely rule: the motion is overruled by operation of law and","paragraph_id":"para_293"},{"text":"the movant may appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.008(a).","paragraph_id":"para_294"},{"text":"We do not suggest that the trial court committed no error by","paragraph_id":"para_295"},{"text":"granting the TCPA motion outside Section 27.005(a)’s thirty-day","paragraph_id":"para_296"},{"text":"window. But because the trial court’s ruling occurred within the time","paragraph_id":"para_297"},{"text":"12","paragraph_id":"para_298"},{"text":"during which Sabrepoint could have appealed the denial of its motion by","paragraph_id":"para_299"},{"text":"operation of law and stayed all proceedings, we conclude that any error","paragraph_id":"para_300"},{"text":"in failing to rule by the thirty-day deadline was harmless. See TEX. R.","paragraph_id":"para_301"},{"text":"APP. P. 44.1(a) (“No judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground","paragraph_id":"para_302"},{"text":"that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals","paragraph_id":"para_303"},{"text":"concludes that the error complained of . . . probably caused the rendition","paragraph_id":"para_304"},{"text":"of an improper judgment . . . .”); see also In re J.N., 670 S.W.3d 614, 618","paragraph_id":"para_305"},{"text":"(Tex. 2023) (“As a general rule, ‘[n]o [civil] judgment may be reversed on","paragraph_id":"para_306"},{"text":"appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless’","paragraph_id":"para_307"},{"text":"that error was harmful.” (alterations in original) (quoting TEX. R. APP.","paragraph_id":"para_308"},{"text":"P. 44.1(a))). In granting the motion when it did, the ultimate outcome","paragraph_id":"para_309"},{"text":"was the same as if Sabrepoint had filed an interlocutory appeal from the","paragraph_id":"para_310"},{"text":"denial by operation of law and succeeded on appeal. Provided the trial","paragraph_id":"para_311"},{"text":"court’s ruling on the TCPA motion was correct on the merits (an issue","paragraph_id":"para_312"},{"text":"we do not decide), granting the motion within the time to appeal from","paragraph_id":"para_313"},{"text":"the denial by operation of law did not result in an improper judgment.","paragraph_id":"para_314"},{"text":"See Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 819–20 (Tex.","paragraph_id":"para_315"},{"text":"1980) (explaining that the harmless error rule “establishes a sound and","paragraph_id":"para_316"},{"text":"common sense policy of not reversing a judgment unless the error or","paragraph_id":"para_317"},{"text":"errors can be said to have contributed in a substantial way to bring","paragraph_id":"para_318"},{"text":"about the adverse judgment”); see also Walker v. Owens, 492 S.W.3d 787,","paragraph_id":"para_319"},{"text":"790–91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (holding that a","paragraph_id":"para_320"},{"text":"trial court committed harmless error in granting defendant’s motion to","paragraph_id":"para_321"},{"text":"dismiss outside of the deadline in Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, as","paragraph_id":"para_322"},{"text":"Rule 91a “does not contain any sanction for non-compliance with the","paragraph_id":"para_323"},{"text":"forty-five day deadline” despite its mandatory language); cf. Beavers v.","paragraph_id":"para_324"},{"text":"13","paragraph_id":"para_325"},{"text":"Beavers, 675 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)","paragraph_id":"para_326"},{"text":"(concluding that a trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and","paragraph_id":"para_327"},{"text":"conclusions of law within prescribed time limits was harmless error).","paragraph_id":"para_328"},{"text":"This conclusion aligns with the TCPA’s objective, which is to","paragraph_id":"para_329"},{"text":"encourage expedient litigation for parties whose rights the lawsuit","paragraph_id":"para_330"},{"text":"threatens. Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 584. To achieve that end, the","paragraph_id":"para_331"},{"text":"Legislature expressly provided for an immediate right to appeal when a","paragraph_id":"para_332"},{"text":"TCPA motion is denied by operation of law.6 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.","paragraph_id":"para_333"},{"text":"CODE § 27.008(b). Rather than force a TCPA movant to file a","paragraph_id":"para_334"},{"text":"time-consuming interlocutory appeal from a denial by operation of law","paragraph_id":"para_335"},{"text":"(and stay all trial court proceedings), judicial economy and the objectives","paragraph_id":"para_336"},{"text":"of the TCPA are served by allowing the trial court to reverse that ruling","paragraph_id":"para_337"},{"text":"within the window in which the movant could have filed an interlocutory","paragraph_id":"para_338"},{"text":"appeal. We hold that, while a trial court errs by granting a TCPA motion","paragraph_id":"para_339"},{"text":"after the expiration of Section 27.005(a)’s thirty-day window, the error","paragraph_id":"para_340"},{"text":"is harmless and does not warrant reversal if made within the","paragraph_id":"para_341"},{"text":"twenty-day period in which the movant could have filed a notice of","paragraph_id":"para_342"},{"text":"appeal from the motion’s denial by operation of law. See TEX. R. APP.","paragraph_id":"para_343"},{"text":"P. 44.1(a).","paragraph_id":"para_344"},{"text":"The court of appeals erroneously held that the portion of the trial","paragraph_id":"para_345"},{"text":"court’s order granting Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion to dismiss was void. It","paragraph_id":"para_346"},{"text":"therefore did not address the motion’s merits. We reverse that portion","paragraph_id":"para_347"},{"text":"of the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to that court to address in","paragraph_id":"para_348"},{"text":"6 While the TCPA permits an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a","paragraph_id":"para_349"},{"text":"motion to dismiss, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12), there is","paragraph_id":"para_350"},{"text":"no provision for an interlocutory appeal from the granting of such a motion.","paragraph_id":"para_351"},{"text":"14","paragraph_id":"para_352"},{"text":"the first instance the merits of FPI’s appeal from the order dismissing","paragraph_id":"para_353"},{"text":"its claims under the TCPA, which the court of appeals instructed the","paragraph_id":"para_354"},{"text":"parties not to brief.7","paragraph_id":"para_355"},{"text":"III. Summary judgment on collateral estoppel was improper.","paragraph_id":"para_356"},{"text":"While the court of appeals erred by declaring void the trial court’s","paragraph_id":"para_357"},{"text":"order granting Sabrepoint’s TCPA motion, it correctly reversed the trial","paragraph_id":"para_358"},{"text":"court’s order granting Sabrepoint’s motion for summary judgment based","paragraph_id":"para_359"},{"text":"on collateral estoppel. Because collateral estoppel is the basis for the","paragraph_id":"para_360"},{"text":"summary judgment motion and a basis for the TCPA motion, the","paragraph_id":"para_361"},{"text":"doctrine’s application to this case will be at issue on remand.","paragraph_id":"para_362"},{"text":"Accordingly, in the interest of judicial efficiency, we will address its","paragraph_id":"para_363"},{"text":"application here. See Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v.","paragraph_id":"para_364"},{"text":"Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Tex. 2015) (“[I]n the interest of judicial","paragraph_id":"para_365"},{"text":"economy we also consider [petitioner’s] other potentially dispositive","paragraph_id":"para_366"},{"text":"issues instead of remanding them to the court of appeals.”).","paragraph_id":"para_367"},{"text":"“We review summary judgments de novo, taking as true all","paragraph_id":"para_368"},{"text":"evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and indulging every reasonable","paragraph_id":"para_369"},{"text":"inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Weekley","paragraph_id":"para_370"},{"text":"Homes, LLC v. Paniagua, 691 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. 2024) (quoting","paragraph_id":"para_371"},{"text":"Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex.","paragraph_id":"para_372"},{"text":"2019)). To establish entitlement to summary judgment based on an","paragraph_id":"para_373"},{"text":"affirmative defense—like collateral estoppel—the defendant must","paragraph_id":"para_374"},{"text":"7 While FPI’s appeal was pending, the trial court signed an order","paragraph_id":"para_375"},{"text":"awarding Sabrepoint attorney’s fees under the TCPA and stated that this order","paragraph_id":"para_376"},{"text":"“resolves disputes of all remaining issues and claims and is final and","paragraph_id":"para_377"},{"text":"appealable.” FPI amended its notice of appeal to include this order, so there is","paragraph_id":"para_378"},{"text":"no question about the court of appeals’ jurisdiction over the appeal.","paragraph_id":"para_379"},{"text":"15","paragraph_id":"para_380"},{"text":"conclusively establish each element of its affirmative defense.","paragraph_id":"para_381"},{"text":"Draughon v. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 81, 87–88 (Tex. 2021). The","paragraph_id":"para_382"},{"text":"nonmovant must then present evidence raising a fact issue. Centeq","paragraph_id":"para_383"},{"text":"Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). We review","paragraph_id":"para_384"},{"text":"issues of collateral estoppel de novo because collateral estoppel’s","paragraph_id":"para_385"},{"text":"application “is a question of law.” Reynolds v. Quantlab Trading","paragraph_id":"para_386"},{"text":"Partners US, LP, 608 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]","paragraph_id":"para_387"},{"text":"2020, no pet.).","paragraph_id":"para_388"},{"text":"Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, bars parties","paragraph_id":"para_389"},{"text":"from relitigating identical issues of fact or law in multiple lawsuits. Van","paragraph_id":"para_390"},{"text":"Dyke v. Boswell, O’Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex.","paragraph_id":"para_391"},{"text":"1985); see also Quinney Elec., Inc. v. Kondos Ent., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 212,","paragraph_id":"para_392"},{"text":"213 (Tex. 1999) (“[T]he basic function of collateral estoppel [is] to","paragraph_id":"para_393"},{"text":"prevent a party from relitigating an issue that the party previously","paragraph_id":"para_394"},{"text":"litigated and lost.”). By focusing on the issues being litigated instead of","paragraph_id":"para_395"},{"text":"entire claims, collateral estoppel is “more narrow” in scope than the","paragraph_id":"para_396"},{"text":"related doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. Van Dyke, 697","paragraph_id":"para_397"},{"text":"S.W.2d at 384. Specifically, collateral estoppel prevents the same","paragraph_id":"para_398"},{"text":"“ultimate issue of fact” from being litigated in more than one suit.","paragraph_id":"para_399"},{"text":"Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984). In","paragraph_id":"para_400"},{"text":"so doing, collateral estoppel promotes judicial efficiency, protects parties","paragraph_id":"para_401"},{"text":"from multiple lawsuits, and prevents inconsistent judgments. In re","paragraph_id":"para_402"},{"text":"USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 629 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. 2021).","paragraph_id":"para_403"},{"text":"16","paragraph_id":"para_404"},{"text":"A party must establish several elements to prevail under the","paragraph_id":"para_405"},{"text":"doctrine of collateral estoppel.8 First, the party asserting the defense","paragraph_id":"para_406"},{"text":"must show that the issue as to which it seeks to estop relitigation is the","paragraph_id":"para_407"},{"text":"identical issue litigated in the other case. Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N.","paragraph_id":"para_408"},{"text":"Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 802 (Tex. 1992); see also Johnson & Higgins of","paragraph_id":"para_409"},{"text":"Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 521 (Tex. 1998)","paragraph_id":"para_410"},{"text":"(holding that “the issue decided in the first action must be . . . identical","paragraph_id":"para_411"},{"text":"to the issue in the pending action” for collateral estoppel to apply); Sysco","paragraph_id":"para_412"},{"text":"Food Servs., Inc. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. 1994) (requiring","paragraph_id":"para_413"},{"text":"“proper[] identifi[cation]” of the issue as to which the party seeks to estop","paragraph_id":"para_414"},{"text":"relitigation). When, as here, this element is in dispute, courts must","paragraph_id":"para_415"},{"text":"carefully analyze the ultimate issues to be proven—i.e., the factual","paragraph_id":"para_416"},{"text":"issues and “essential elements of the claims”—being asserted in the","paragraph_id":"para_417"},{"text":"different actions. Ctr. Equities, Inc. v. Tingley, 106 S.W.3d 143, 153","paragraph_id":"para_418"},{"text":"(Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.","paragraph_id":"para_419"},{"text":"Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. 2001) (holding that collateral estoppel","paragraph_id":"para_420"},{"text":"bars claims when “the facts necessary to establish [those] claims” are","paragraph_id":"para_421"},{"text":"“the same facts” found in a previous case). The party asserting the","paragraph_id":"para_422"},{"text":"defense bears the burden to “map” the previous findings onto the claims","paragraph_id":"para_423"},{"text":"asserted, demonstrating how the findings and issues actually litigated","paragraph_id":"para_424"},{"text":"in the first action will be determinative of the claims asserted in the","paragraph_id":"para_425"},{"text":"8 The elements required to establish collateral estoppel under Texas law","paragraph_id":"para_426"},{"text":"mirror those of federal law. See John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found.","paragraph_id":"para_427"},{"text":"v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 288 (Tex. 2002) (“As for whether collateral","paragraph_id":"para_428"},{"text":"estoppel—the preclusive effect of the federal case on litigation of issues in the","paragraph_id":"para_429"},{"text":"present case—is governed by federal or state law, we have previously","paragraph_id":"para_430"},{"text":"concluded that both are the same.”).","paragraph_id":"para_431"},{"text":"17","paragraph_id":"para_432"},{"text":"second action. In re Calvert, 913 F.3d 697, 701 (7th Cir. 2019); see also","paragraph_id":"para_433"},{"text":"Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 802 (holding that the defendants “had the","paragraph_id":"para_434"},{"text":"burden of pointing out the issue they wished to be estopped”).","paragraph_id":"para_435"},{"text":"Next, the party seeking the application of collateral estoppel must","paragraph_id":"para_436"},{"text":"demonstrate that the facts in the current suit “were fully and fairly","paragraph_id":"para_437"},{"text":"litigated” in the earlier action. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 801. To","paragraph_id":"para_438"},{"text":"determine this question, we often consider three procedural matters:","paragraph_id":"para_439"},{"text":"“(1) whether the parties were fully heard, (2) that the court supported","paragraph_id":"para_440"},{"text":"its decision with a reasoned opinion, and (3) that the decision was","paragraph_id":"para_441"},{"text":"subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal.” Mower v. Boyer,","paragraph_id":"para_442"},{"text":"811 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1991).","paragraph_id":"para_443"},{"text":"Third, a party asserting the defense must establish that the same","paragraph_id":"para_444"},{"text":"facts “were essential to the judgment” in the first suit. Trapnell, 890","paragraph_id":"para_445"},{"text":"S.W.2d at 801. A fact issue is considered essential and an “ultimate","paragraph_id":"para_446"},{"text":"issue” if the factual determinations “are necessary to form the basis of a","paragraph_id":"para_447"},{"text":"judgment.” Tarter v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 744 S.W.2d 926, 928","paragraph_id":"para_448"},{"text":"(Tex. 1988).","paragraph_id":"para_449"},{"text":"Lastly, the parties must have been “cast as adversaries in the first","paragraph_id":"para_450"},{"text":"action.” Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 801. Mutuality of parties is not","paragraph_id":"para_451"},{"text":"necessary, though, as it is only required “that the party against whom","paragraph_id":"para_452"},{"text":"the plea of collateral estoppel is being asserted be a party or in privity","paragraph_id":"para_453"},{"text":"with a party in the prior litigation.” Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer,","paragraph_id":"para_454"},{"text":"807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990); see also Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d at 802","paragraph_id":"para_455"},{"text":"(“[I]t is only necessary that the party against whom the [collateral","paragraph_id":"para_456"},{"text":"estoppel] doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in","paragraph_id":"para_457"},{"text":"the first action.” (emphasis omitted)).","paragraph_id":"para_458"},{"text":"18","paragraph_id":"para_459"},{"text":"We agree with the court of appeals that Sabrepoint failed to","paragraph_id":"para_460"},{"text":"conclusively establish the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel","paragraph_id":"para_461"},{"text":"because it did not establish that the fact issue as to which it seeks to","paragraph_id":"para_462"},{"text":"estop litigation in Texas is identical to one the Colorado court decided.","paragraph_id":"para_463"},{"text":"See Ayre v. J.D. Bucky Allshouse, P.C., 942 S.W.2d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—","paragraph_id":"para_464"},{"text":"Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (“Collateral estoppel requires","paragraph_id":"para_465"},{"text":"that the issue decided in the first action be identical to the issue in the","paragraph_id":"para_466"},{"text":"pending action.”). Sabrepoint needed to establish that the Colorado","paragraph_id":"para_467"},{"text":"court’s factual determination—that Sabrepoint’s alleged conduct related","paragraph_id":"para_468"},{"text":"to the Seeking Alpha article was insufficient to amount to purposeful","paragraph_id":"para_469"},{"text":"availment in Colorado—is identical to the question posed in the Texas","paragraph_id":"para_470"},{"text":"litigation: whether Sabrepoint was sufficiently “involved” in the alleged","paragraph_id":"para_471"},{"text":"short-and-distort scheme so as to justify imposing liability. See","paragraph_id":"para_472"},{"text":"Johnson & Higgins, 962 S.W.2d at 523 (holding that collateral estoppel","paragraph_id":"para_473"},{"text":"was improper “because the issue decided in [a previous] federal action","paragraph_id":"para_474"},{"text":"[wa]s not identical to the issue” litigated in a subsequent state action).","paragraph_id":"para_475"},{"text":"The Colorado court’s findings suggest the issues, while related,","paragraph_id":"para_476"},{"text":"are distinct. In granting the Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Colorado district","paragraph_id":"para_477"},{"text":"court observed that FPI’s evidence supported a “reasonable inference","paragraph_id":"para_478"},{"text":"that Sabrepoint knew that, by hiring [Mathews] to research FPI, it was","paragraph_id":"para_479"},{"text":"possible [Mathews] would publish an article about FPI as Rota","paragraph_id":"para_480"},{"text":"Fortunae.” Farmland Partners Inc., 2021 WL 765362, at *7. It","paragraph_id":"para_481"},{"text":"concluded this “foreseeability” that the article may be published was","paragraph_id":"para_482"},{"text":"“insufficient to establish an intentional action for purposeful direction”","paragraph_id":"para_483"},{"text":"at Colorado, as the purposeful-availment doctrine requires. Id.","paragraph_id":"para_484"},{"text":"Sabrepoint correctly points out that the Colorado and Texas actions","paragraph_id":"para_485"},{"text":"19","paragraph_id":"para_486"},{"text":"share a focus on Sabrepoint’s “involvement” with the Seeking Alpha","paragraph_id":"para_487"},{"text":"article. But whether the factual issues in the two suits overlap or bear","paragraph_id":"para_488"},{"text":"similarities is not the relevant inquiry; the issues must be identical. See","paragraph_id":"para_489"},{"text":"John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found. v. Dewhurst, 90 S.W.3d","paragraph_id":"para_490"},{"text":"268, 288–89 (Tex. 2002) (holding that collateral estoppel did not","paragraph_id":"para_491"},{"text":"preclude litigation of issues in a second suit that were not identical to","paragraph_id":"para_492"},{"text":"issues in the first action).","paragraph_id":"para_493"},{"text":"Here, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Sabrepoint did","paragraph_id":"para_494"},{"text":"not conclusively establish that the Colorado court’s finding is “identical”","paragraph_id":"para_495"},{"text":"to any issue that will determine whether FPI may prevail on the claims","paragraph_id":"para_496"},{"text":"it has raised in Texas. Sabrepoint complains that the court of appeals’","paragraph_id":"para_497"},{"text":"analysis was too simplistic. In Sabrepoint’s view, the court of appeals","paragraph_id":"para_498"},{"text":"held, as a categorical matter, that a fact determined in the context of a","paragraph_id":"para_499"},{"text":"jurisdictional question may never have preclusive effect in a case in","paragraph_id":"para_500"},{"text":"which the same factual issue arises in the context of a merits question.","paragraph_id":"para_501"},{"text":"But that is not what the court of appeals held. The mere fact that the","paragraph_id":"para_502"},{"text":"Colorado court’s determination was jurisdictional is not what prevents","paragraph_id":"para_503"},{"text":"its finding regarding Sabrepoint’s insufficient “involvement” from","paragraph_id":"para_504"},{"text":"having preclusive effect in the Texas suit. Instead, we conclude that","paragraph_id":"para_505"},{"text":"summary judgment based on collateral estoppel was improper because","paragraph_id":"para_506"},{"text":"Sabrepoint did not conclusively establish how the facts decided in","paragraph_id":"para_507"},{"text":"Colorado regarding lack of targeting for purposes of purposeful","paragraph_id":"para_508"},{"text":"availment necessarily dispose of FPI’s claims in Texas. Put differently,","paragraph_id":"para_509"},{"text":"Sabrepoint failed to conclusively establish that the Colorado court’s","paragraph_id":"para_510"},{"text":"factual determinations are identical to findings that would preclude","paragraph_id":"para_511"},{"text":"liability on the part of Sabrepoint under FPI’s theory that Sabrepoint","paragraph_id":"para_512"},{"text":"20","paragraph_id":"para_513"},{"text":"“intended, knew, recklessly disregarded, and/or should have known”","paragraph_id":"para_514"},{"text":"that Mathews would publish an article about FPI. Cf. State & Cnty.","paragraph_id":"para_515"},{"text":"Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 697 (Tex. 2001) (concluding","paragraph_id":"para_516"},{"text":"that collateral estoppel barred a plaintiff’s claims for which the issues","paragraph_id":"para_517"},{"text":"were “identical” to those in a previous action).","paragraph_id":"para_518"},{"text":"In particular, Sabrepoint’s trial court briefing did not conclusively","paragraph_id":"para_519"},{"text":"demonstrate that the Colorado court’s findings—which acknowledged","paragraph_id":"para_520"},{"text":"that Sabrepoint might have known it was possible Mathews would","paragraph_id":"para_521"},{"text":"publish the article—precluded defamation liability on the part of","paragraph_id":"para_522"},{"text":"Sabrepoint, which hired Mathews and assisted him in conducting the","paragraph_id":"para_523"},{"text":"research on FPI out of which the article arose. See Roe v. Patterson, 707","paragraph_id":"para_524"},{"text":"S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2025) (stating that a plaintiff must show that the","paragraph_id":"para_525"},{"text":"defendant “intended or knew that the defamatory statements . . . would","paragraph_id":"para_526"},{"text":"be published”); id. at 98–99 (noting that the Restatement allows for","paragraph_id":"para_527"},{"text":"defamation liability if “a reasonable person would recognize that an act","paragraph_id":"para_528"},{"text":"creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be","paragraph_id":"para_529"},{"text":"communicated to a third person” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF","paragraph_id":"para_530"},{"text":"TORTS § 577 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1977))). The same can be said for other","paragraph_id":"para_531"},{"text":"tort claims that FPI asserts, including tortious interference with","paragraph_id":"para_532"},{"text":"prospective business relations and disparagement. See","paragraph_id":"para_533"},{"text":"Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 213 S.W.3d 469, 474","paragraph_id":"para_534"},{"text":"(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The classic","paragraph_id":"para_535"},{"text":"proximate-cause tests for cause-in-fact and foreseeability apply to","paragraph_id":"para_536"},{"text":"claims of tortious interference.”). In short, the ultimate issue in the","paragraph_id":"para_537"},{"text":"Colorado order concerned only whether Sabrepoint’s conduct—or","paragraph_id":"para_538"},{"text":"“involvement”—was purposefully directed at Colorado, and Sabrepoint","paragraph_id":"para_539"},{"text":"21","paragraph_id":"para_540"},{"text":"failed to demonstrate, conclusively, that—and how—the Colorado","paragraph_id":"para_541"},{"text":"court’s “involvement” findings necessarily preclude liability under each","paragraph_id":"para_542"},{"text":"of FPI’s claims in Texas. Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 87–88.","paragraph_id":"para_543"},{"text":"The addition of two new defendants in FPI’s Texas suit is also","paragraph_id":"para_544"},{"text":"relevant. As the court of appeals noted, the presence of new parties","paragraph_id":"para_545"},{"text":"further demonstrates that the Colorado and Texas issues are not","paragraph_id":"para_546"},{"text":"identical. 703 S.W.3d at 135. As the Sabrepoint fund and general","paragraph_id":"para_547"},{"text":"partner were not sued in the Colorado action, there was no possibility","paragraph_id":"para_548"},{"text":"that the Colorado district court determined their respective","paragraph_id":"para_549"},{"text":"“involvement” in the article’s publication. Sabrepoint argues that these","paragraph_id":"para_550"},{"text":"entities are in privity with the Colorado defendants such that the new","paragraph_id":"para_551"},{"text":"defendants could only be held liable through the Colorado defendants’","paragraph_id":"para_552"},{"text":"actions. See Wilhite v. Adams, 640 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex. 1982) (“Under","paragraph_id":"para_553"},{"text":"a plea of collateral estoppel, essential issues of fact . . . are binding in a","paragraph_id":"para_554"},{"text":"subsequent action between the same parties and those who stand in","paragraph_id":"para_555"},{"text":"privity with them.”). But that passing contention was also not","paragraph_id":"para_556"},{"text":"conclusively established. See Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468","paragraph_id":"para_557"},{"text":"S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971) (noting that “determination of who are","paragraph_id":"para_558"},{"text":"privies requires careful examination into the circumstances of each case","paragraph_id":"para_559"},{"text":"as it arises”). We conclude that Sabrepoint has not conclusively","paragraph_id":"para_560"},{"text":"established that the fund and general partner share an “identity of","paragraph_id":"para_561"},{"text":"interest” with the Colorado defendants such that they are privies of one","paragraph_id":"para_562"},{"text":"another. See id. This was an independent basis to reverse the summary","paragraph_id":"para_563"},{"text":"judgment as to the defendants who were not parties to the Colorado suit.","paragraph_id":"para_564"},{"text":"22","paragraph_id":"para_565"},{"text":"IV. Conclusion","paragraph_id":"para_566"},{"text":"The court of appeals correctly held, on the summary judgment","paragraph_id":"para_567"},{"text":"record before it, that the trial court erred in determining that collateral","paragraph_id":"para_568"},{"text":"estoppel bars FPI’s suit against Sabrepoint in Texas as a matter of law.","paragraph_id":"para_569"},{"text":"We affirm this portion of the appellate court’s judgment. But the court","paragraph_id":"para_570"},{"text":"of appeals erred in declaring void the portion of the trial court’s order","paragraph_id":"para_571"},{"text":"that granted Sabrepoint’s motion to dismiss under the TCPA. We","paragraph_id":"para_572"},{"text":"therefore reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment and","paragraph_id":"para_573"},{"text":"remand to that court to consider the merits of FPI’s appeal from that","paragraph_id":"para_574"},{"text":"order.","paragraph_id":"para_575"},{"text":"Rebeca A. 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