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} ], "paragraphs": [ { "text": "1(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025", "paragraph_id": "para_1" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_2" }, { "text": "NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is", "paragraph_id": "para_3" }, { "text": "being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.", "paragraph_id": "para_4" }, { "text": "The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been", "paragraph_id": "para_5" }, { "text": "prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.", "paragraph_id": "para_6" }, { "text": "See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.", "paragraph_id": "para_7" }, { "text": "SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES", "paragraph_id": "para_8" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_9" }, { "text": "TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.", "paragraph_id": "para_10" }, { "text": "v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_11" }, { "text": "CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES", "paragraph_id": "para_12" }, { "text": "COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT", "paragraph_id": "para_13" }, { "text": "No. 25–332. Argued December 8, 2025—Decided June 29, 2026", "paragraph_id": "para_14" }, { "text": "The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is a regulatory agency that has", "paragraph_id": "para_15" }, { "text": "accumulated vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers.", "paragraph_id": "para_16" }, { "text": "The FTC’s powers belong not to the President or his appointees alone,", "paragraph_id": "para_17" }, { "text": "but instead to five Commissioners, each of whom serves for seven years", "paragraph_id": "para_18" }, { "text": "and may be removed by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of", "paragraph_id": "para_19" }, { "text": "duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U. S. C. §41.", "paragraph_id": "para_20" }, { "text": "Soon after President Trump began his second term in January 2025, he", "paragraph_id": "para_21" }, { "text": "fired the FTC’s two Democratic appointees, Rebecca Slaughter and Al-", "paragraph_id": "para_22" }, { "text": "varo Bedoya. He did not identify a cause under the statute. He instead", "paragraph_id": "para_23" }, { "text": "told them their “continued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with", "paragraph_id": "para_24" }, { "text": "[his] Administration's priorities” and that they were removed “pursu-", "paragraph_id": "para_25" }, { "text": "ant to [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution.” App. 28.", "paragraph_id": "para_26" }, { "text": "Slaughter filed suit against the President and other executive officials,", "paragraph_id": "para_27" }, { "text": "seeking relief to restore her to office. She argued that her removal was", "paragraph_id": "para_28" }, { "text": "ultra vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated", "paragraph_id": "para_29" }, { "text": "the Constitution. The District Court granted Slaughter’s motion for", "paragraph_id": "para_30" }, { "text": "summary judgment. It acknowledged that Myers v. United States, 272", "paragraph_id": "para_31" }, { "text": "U. S. 52, generally permits the President to remove executive officers", "paragraph_id": "para_32" }, { "text": "at will, but explained that Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295", "paragraph_id": "para_33" }, { "text": "U. S. 602, carved out an exception for the FTC. The court declared the", "paragraph_id": "para_34" }, { "text": "President’s “purported removal” ultra vires and issued a permanent", "paragraph_id": "para_35" }, { "text": "injunction barring interference “with Ms. Slaughter’s right to perform", "paragraph_id": "para_36" }, { "text": "her lawful duties.” App. 90–91. A divided Court of Appeals denied the", "paragraph_id": "para_37" }, { "text": "Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, and this Court stayed", "paragraph_id": "para_38" }, { "text": "the District Court’s order and granted certiorari before judgment.", "paragraph_id": "para_39" }, { "text": "Held: The FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the", "paragraph_id": "para_40" }, { "text": "2 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_41" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_42" }, { "text": "separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. Pp. 2–36.", "paragraph_id": "para_43" }, { "text": "(a) The Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” in a “President of", "paragraph_id": "para_44" }, { "text": "the United States of America” and instructs that he “take Care that", "paragraph_id": "para_45" }, { "text": "the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §§1, 3. To vest the executive", "paragraph_id": "para_46" }, { "text": "power in one person was to establish a hierarchy—a “Chief Magis-", "paragraph_id": "para_47" }, { "text": "trate” with whom the buck stops, and below him various “assistants or", "paragraph_id": "para_48" }, { "text": "deputies” who “derive their offices from his appointment” and remain", "paragraph_id": "para_49" }, { "text": "“subject to his superintendence.” The Federalist No. 72, p. 436 (A.", "paragraph_id": "para_50" }, { "text": "Hamilton). To remain accountable to the President, those officers", "paragraph_id": "para_51" }, { "text": "must be removable by the President. Pp. 4–13.", "paragraph_id": "para_52" }, { "text": "(1) The idea that one President would be in charge was by no", "paragraph_id": "para_53" }, { "text": "means a foregone conclusion in 1787. The flurry of state constitutions", "paragraph_id": "para_54" }, { "text": "that followed the Declaration of Independence “made of the guberna-", "paragraph_id": "para_55" }, { "text": "torial magistrate a new kind of creature, a very pale reflection indeed", "paragraph_id": "para_56" }, { "text": "of his regal ancestor.” G. Wood, The Creation of the American Repub-", "paragraph_id": "para_57" }, { "text": "lic, 1776–1787, p. 136. Almost every State had but a nominal Gover-", "paragraph_id": "para_58" }, { "text": "nor, who could act only with his council’s consent. These early chief", "paragraph_id": "para_59" }, { "text": "executives were “little more than chairmen of their executive boards.”", "paragraph_id": "para_60" }, { "text": "Id., at 138.", "paragraph_id": "para_61" }, { "text": "The Framers chose to depart from this model, for they had seen its", "paragraph_id": "para_62" }, { "text": "flaws up close. For “fear” of “monarchical . . . power,” William Living-", "paragraph_id": "para_63" }, { "text": "ston lamented, the States “improvidently” had devised executives “too", "paragraph_id": "para_64" }, { "text": "weak & inefficatious to operate with proper energy & vigour.” 5 Papers", "paragraph_id": "para_65" }, { "text": "of William Livingston 56–57 (C. Prince, M. Lustig, & D. Vorhees eds.).", "paragraph_id": "para_66" }, { "text": "Thus when delegates at the Constitutional Convention objected to", "paragraph_id": "para_67" }, { "text": "“unity in the Executive magistracy” as “the foetus of monarchy,” 1 Rec-", "paragraph_id": "para_68" }, { "text": "ords of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 66 (M. Farrand ed.) (E. Ran-", "paragraph_id": "para_69" }, { "text": "dolph), others replied that the concern was quite backward. “[I]nstead", "paragraph_id": "para_70" }, { "text": "of being the fetus of Monarchy,” they explained, “[u]nity in the Execu-", "paragraph_id": "para_71" }, { "text": "tive” was “the best safeguard against” it—for only a “single Person”", "paragraph_id": "para_72" }, { "text": "could produce the “vigor and activity” necessary to preserve the Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_73" }, { "text": "stitution’s separation of powers. Id., at 66, 109 (J. Wilson).", "paragraph_id": "para_74" }, { "text": "In opting for one President, however, the Framers did not opt for the", "paragraph_id": "para_75" }, { "text": "President to work alone. They knew that Congress would “institut[e]", "paragraph_id": "para_76" }, { "text": "the great Departments” and allow the President to “appoint[ ] officers", "paragraph_id": "para_77" }, { "text": "therein, to assist [him] in discharging the duties of his trust.” 30 Writ-", "paragraph_id": "para_78" }, { "text": "ings of George Washington 334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed.). These officers were", "paragraph_id": "para_79" }, { "text": "to serve as envoys of the President, not his equals. They “ought to be", "paragraph_id": "para_80" }, { "text": "considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief Magistrate,” Ham-", "paragraph_id": "para_81" }, { "text": "ilton explained, “and on this account, they ought to derive their offices", "paragraph_id": "para_82" }, { "text": "from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be", "paragraph_id": "para_83" }, { "text": "subject to his superintendence.” The Federalist No. 72, at 436.", "paragraph_id": "para_84" }, { "text": "Because these officers were subject to the President’s superintend-", "paragraph_id": "para_85" }, { "text": "ence, they had to be removable by him at will. The power to remove at", "paragraph_id": "para_86" }, { "text": "3Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_87" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_88" }, { "text": "will was a necessary corollary of the Constitution’s design. The “unity”", "paragraph_id": "para_89" }, { "text": "of the Executive Branch would be “destroyed” if it were vested “osten-", "paragraph_id": "para_90" }, { "text": "sibly in one man, subject in whole or in part to the control and co-op-", "paragraph_id": "para_91" }, { "text": "eration of others, in the capacity of counselors to him.” Id., No. 70, at", "paragraph_id": "para_92" }, { "text": "424 (A. Hamilton). Text and structure thus both taught that the Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_93" }, { "text": "ident had to be able to remove those who fail to live up to their duties,", "paragraph_id": "para_94" }, { "text": "lest he fail to live up to his.", "paragraph_id": "para_95" }, { "text": "(2) This aspect of the President’s role was confirmed in the Consti-", "paragraph_id": "para_96" }, { "text": "tution’s first year and the years that followed, resulting in a “regular", "paragraph_id": "para_97" }, { "text": "course of practice” that “liquidate[d] & settle[d]” the President’s power", "paragraph_id": "para_98" }, { "text": "of removal. 8 Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed.).", "paragraph_id": "para_99" }, { "text": "When the First Congress met in 1789, one of its first tasks was to", "paragraph_id": "para_100" }, { "text": "establish the first executive departments—and with them the first de-", "paragraph_id": "para_101" }, { "text": "partment heads. Under the Constitution, those officers had to be ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_102" }, { "text": "pointed by the President, with the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate.", "paragraph_id": "para_103" }, { "text": "Art. II, §2, cl. 2. The question before Congress was how those officers", "paragraph_id": "para_104" }, { "text": "were to be removed. Madison contended that removal was part of “the", "paragraph_id": "para_105" }, { "text": "Executive power” vested in the President, which “the Legislature has", "paragraph_id": "para_106" }, { "text": "no right to diminish or modify.” 1 Annals of Cong. 463. It is only with", "paragraph_id": "para_107" }, { "text": "that power, he explained, that “the chain of dependence [can] be pre-", "paragraph_id": "para_108" }, { "text": "served”—“the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest” made", "paragraph_id": "para_109" }, { "text": "to “depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the", "paragraph_id": "para_110" }, { "text": "community.” Id., at 499.", "paragraph_id": "para_111" }, { "text": "Madison emerged victorious, and Congress’s confirmation of the", "paragraph_id": "para_112" }, { "text": "President’s power gained fame as “the Decision of 1789.” Chief Justice", "paragraph_id": "para_113" }, { "text": "Marshall described the decision as “a full expression of the sense of the", "paragraph_id": "para_114" }, { "text": "legislature,” 5 J. Marshall, The Life of George Washington 199–200,", "paragraph_id": "para_115" }, { "text": "and early Presidents of all persuasions agreed. Pp. 9–13.", "paragraph_id": "para_116" }, { "text": "(b) What text, history, and structure settle, the Court’s precedent", "paragraph_id": "para_117" }, { "text": "confirms—the President may remove his subordinates at will. Pp. 13–", "paragraph_id": "para_118" }, { "text": "25.", "paragraph_id": "para_119" }, { "text": "(1) As early as 1839, the Court reaffirmed what the First Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_120" }, { "text": "had held. It was “very early adopted, as the practical construction of", "paragraph_id": "para_121" }, { "text": "the Constitution,” the Court noted, that the power “to remove, where", "paragraph_id": "para_122" }, { "text": "the tenure of the office was not fixed by the Constitution,” was “vested", "paragraph_id": "para_123" }, { "text": "in the President alone.” Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 259. See also", "paragraph_id": "para_124" }, { "text": "Parsons v. United States, 167 U. S. 324, 330 (“[T]he decision of Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_125" }, { "text": "gress in 1789, and the universal practice of the Government under it,", "paragraph_id": "para_126" }, { "text": "ha[s] settled the question beyond any power of alteration”).", "paragraph_id": "para_127" }, { "text": "The Court's landmark decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_128" }, { "text": "52, confirmed the President’s power to fire his subordinates at will.", "paragraph_id": "para_129" }, { "text": "The case arose when President Wilson fired Frank Myers—the post-", "paragraph_id": "para_130" }, { "text": "master in Portland, Oregon—without consulting the Senate, notwith-", "paragraph_id": "para_131" }, { "text": "standing an 1876 statute that required the President to receive the", "paragraph_id": "para_132" }, { "text": "4 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_133" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_134" }, { "text": "“advice and consent of the Senate” not only to appoint postmasters but", "paragraph_id": "para_135" }, { "text": "also to remove them. §6, 19 Stat. 80. Writing for the Court, Chief", "paragraph_id": "para_136" }, { "text": "Justice Taft noted that in the wake of the political differences following", "paragraph_id": "para_137" }, { "text": "the Civil War between President Johnson—a Jacksonian Democrat—", "paragraph_id": "para_138" }, { "text": "and congressional Republicans, Congress had sought to “curtail the", "paragraph_id": "para_139" }, { "text": "then acknowledged powers of the President” with the Tenure of Office", "paragraph_id": "para_140" }, { "text": "Act. Myers, 272 U. S., at 165–166. Under that law, the President was", "paragraph_id": "para_141" }, { "text": "required to receive the Senate’s consent before firing most officers. See", "paragraph_id": "para_142" }, { "text": "ibid. “[T]he injury and invalidity” of the Act was “immediately recog-", "paragraph_id": "para_143" }, { "text": "nized by the Executive and objected to”—and not just by President", "paragraph_id": "para_144" }, { "text": "Johnson, but by General Grant who succeeded him. Id., at 167. What", "paragraph_id": "para_145" }, { "text": "these events revealed, Chief Justice Taft wrote, was a consistent Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_146" }, { "text": "idential rejection of “the validity of such legislation” as incompatible", "paragraph_id": "para_147" }, { "text": "with “the legislative action of 1789.” Id., at 172–173.", "paragraph_id": "para_148" }, { "text": "The law concerning postmasters thus raised the question whether", "paragraph_id": "para_149" }, { "text": "“to set aside” the First Congress’s “construction, thus buttressed, and", "paragraph_id": "para_150" }, { "text": "adopt an adverse view” contrary to the Constitution’s text, history, and", "paragraph_id": "para_151" }, { "text": "structure. Id., at 175. The Court refused to do so, and instead hewed", "paragraph_id": "para_152" }, { "text": "to the “constitutional construction . . . reached by the First Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_153" }, { "text": ". . . and acquiesced in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a", "paragraph_id": "para_154" }, { "text": "century.” Id., at 176. Pp. 13–16.", "paragraph_id": "para_155" }, { "text": "(2) Nine years after Myers, the Court decided Humphrey’s Execu-", "paragraph_id": "para_156" }, { "text": "tor v. United States. Pp. 16–25.", "paragraph_id": "para_157" }, { "text": "(i) Humphrey’s arose when President Roosevelt fired an FTC", "paragraph_id": "para_158" }, { "text": "Commissioner without specifying a cause for his removal, contrary to", "paragraph_id": "para_159" }, { "text": "a statute permitting removal only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or", "paragraph_id": "para_160" }, { "text": "malfeasance in office.” §1, 38 Stat. 718. The Court ruled against Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_161" }, { "text": "ident Roosevelt, distinguishing Myers by explaining that some presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_162" }, { "text": "dentially appointed officials may perform “executive function[s]” but", "paragraph_id": "para_163" }, { "text": "exercise “no part of the executive power,” 295 U. S., at 628, and holding", "paragraph_id": "para_164" }, { "text": "that the FTC’s duties were “neither political nor executive, but pre-", "paragraph_id": "para_165" }, { "text": "dominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative,” id., at 624. Because", "paragraph_id": "para_166" }, { "text": "these quasi functions did not require the use of “executive power,” the", "paragraph_id": "para_167" }, { "text": "Court reasoned, Humphrey needed to answer only to Congress and the", "paragraph_id": "para_168" }, { "text": "courts. Id., at 628. Pp. 16–18.", "paragraph_id": "para_169" }, { "text": "(ii) Humphrey’s framework has not withstood the test of time.", "paragraph_id": "para_170" }, { "text": "From the start, Humphrey’s was tethered to a highly circumscribed", "paragraph_id": "para_171" }, { "text": "view of the FTC’s role. Humphrey’s by its terms applied only to agen-", "paragraph_id": "para_172" }, { "text": "cies that occupy “no place in the executive department,” are “independ-", "paragraph_id": "para_173" }, { "text": "ent of executive authority,” and exercise “no part of the executive", "paragraph_id": "para_174" }, { "text": "power.” Id., at 625, 628. Indeed, the Court took pains to emphasize", "paragraph_id": "para_175" }, { "text": "that “the character of the office”—executive or nonexecutive—would", "paragraph_id": "para_176" }, { "text": "determine the result of future cases. Id., at 631.", "paragraph_id": "para_177" }, { "text": "In later cases, the Court concluded that more functions fell on the", "paragraph_id": "para_178" }, { "text": "5Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_179" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_180" }, { "text": "executive side of that line—and thus within the President’s exclusive", "paragraph_id": "para_181" }, { "text": "control. Soon enough, the Court recognized that Humphrey’s flunked", "paragraph_id": "para_182" }, { "text": "even its own test. “[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of the FTC,”", "paragraph_id": "para_183" }, { "text": "even “at the time of Humphrey’s Executor,” the Court explained in", "paragraph_id": "para_184" }, { "text": "1988, “would at the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to", "paragraph_id": "para_185" }, { "text": "some degree.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 690, n. 28.", "paragraph_id": "para_186" }, { "text": "In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight", "paragraph_id": "para_187" }, { "text": "Board, 561 U. S. 477, and Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_188" }, { "text": "tection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197, the Court reiterated Myers’s rule that", "paragraph_id": "para_189" }, { "text": "the President exercises “general administrative control of those exe-", "paragraph_id": "para_190" }, { "text": "cuting the laws” and must be able to “remov[e] those for whom he can", "paragraph_id": "para_191" }, { "text": "not continue to be responsible.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_192" }, { "text": "492–493 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 117, 164); Seila Law, 591 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_193" }, { "text": "at 214 (same). And the Court refused to extend Humphrey’s to “new", "paragraph_id": "para_194" }, { "text": "situation[s].” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 220; see Free Enterprise Fund,", "paragraph_id": "para_195" }, { "text": "561 U. S., at 483. At this point, all that is left of Humphrey’s is its", "paragraph_id": "para_196" }, { "text": "observation that an agency that “exercises no part of the executive", "paragraph_id": "para_197" }, { "text": "power” need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal. 295 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_198" }, { "text": "at 628. Pp. 18–21.", "paragraph_id": "para_199" }, { "text": "(iii) If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, the Court overrules", "paragraph_id": "para_200" }, { "text": "it. Humphrey’s has for decades been a result in search of a rationale,", "paragraph_id": "para_201" }, { "text": "and every relevant factor to stare decisis—the “quality” of the deci-", "paragraph_id": "para_202" }, { "text": "sion’s reasoning, its “consistency” with the Court’s other cases, the", "paragraph_id": "para_203" }, { "text": "“workability” of its rule, and reliance interests, Knick v. Township of", "paragraph_id": "para_204" }, { "text": "Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 203—counsels in favor of letting Humphrey’s go.", "paragraph_id": "para_205" }, { "text": "Slaughter relies on reliance. She argues that Congress has relied", "paragraph_id": "para_206" }, { "text": "upon Humphrey’s to create agencies that are “insulated from presiden-", "paragraph_id": "para_207" }, { "text": "tial control.” Brief for Respondent 15. But that is precisely the prob-", "paragraph_id": "para_208" }, { "text": "lem. Despite what Humphrey’s may say, independent agencies are not", "paragraph_id": "para_209" }, { "text": "“independent” in the sense that they are free of the President and thus", "paragraph_id": "para_210" }, { "text": "responsive “only to the people of the United States.” 295 U. S., at 625.", "paragraph_id": "para_211" }, { "text": "Placing the power to administer laws in officers who enjoy “freedom", "paragraph_id": "para_212" }, { "text": "from Presidential oversight (and protection)” does not deliver us to a", "paragraph_id": "para_213" }, { "text": "promised land of technocratic governance—it often results only in an", "paragraph_id": "para_214" }, { "text": "“increased subservience to congressional direction.” FCC v. Fox Tele-", "paragraph_id": "para_215" }, { "text": "vision Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 523 (plurality opinion). Pp. 21–25.", "paragraph_id": "para_216" }, { "text": "(c) With these principles in mind, the FTC’s for-cause removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_217" }, { "text": "vision violates the separation of powers. In its present form, the FTC", "paragraph_id": "para_218" }, { "text": "enforces and administers some 80 statutes covering almost every facet", "paragraph_id": "para_219" }, { "text": "of the Nation’s economy, and the tasks it undertakes are “the very es-", "paragraph_id": "para_220" }, { "text": "sence of ‘execution’ of the law.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 733.", "paragraph_id": "para_221" }, { "text": "The FTC has the power to promulgate substantive rules carrying the", "paragraph_id": "para_222" }, { "text": "force of law, investigate businesses and enforce statutes through in-", "paragraph_id": "para_223" }, { "text": "house adjudications, and file civil suits on behalf of the United States", "paragraph_id": "para_224" }, { "text": "6 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_225" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_226" }, { "text": "in federal court. The FTC unquestionably exercises executive power", "paragraph_id": "para_227" }, { "text": "and must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive. Pp. 25–27.", "paragraph_id": "para_228" }, { "text": "(d) Because the FTC’s activities fall well within the heartland of ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_229" }, { "text": "ecutive power, the Court has no occasion today to define the bounds of", "paragraph_id": "para_230" }, { "text": "what such power entails. Not all offices created by Congress neces-", "paragraph_id": "para_231" }, { "text": "sarily come with executive power, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_232" }, { "text": "1, 137–138 (per curiam), and the Court has left open the possibility", "paragraph_id": "para_233" }, { "text": "that some functions traditionally handled outside the Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_234" }, { "text": "Branch may not be encompassed by Myers’s general rule. One example", "paragraph_id": "para_235" }, { "text": "the Court has given of such an entity is the Federal Reserve, to the", "paragraph_id": "para_236" }, { "text": "extent that it follows in the tradition of the First and Second Banks of", "paragraph_id": "para_237" }, { "text": "the United States. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8. And as the", "paragraph_id": "para_238" }, { "text": "Government recognizes, the permissibility of tenure protections for", "paragraph_id": "para_239" }, { "text": "non-Article III courts is not presented or briefed in this case. The", "paragraph_id": "para_240" }, { "text": "Court leaves those questions for another day. All the Court does today", "paragraph_id": "para_241" }, { "text": "is recognize what has been clear for a century—that those who fall", "paragraph_id": "para_242" }, { "text": "within the President’s “general administrative control” must be remov-", "paragraph_id": "para_243" }, { "text": "able by the President at will. Myers, 272 U. S., at 135. Pp. 27–28.", "paragraph_id": "para_244" }, { "text": "(e) Slaughter’s counterarguments are rejected. She relies on", "paragraph_id": "para_245" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s and stare decisis, but she does not defend Humphrey’s on", "paragraph_id": "para_246" }, { "text": "its own terms. She does not argue that the FTC today occupies “no", "paragraph_id": "para_247" }, { "text": "place in the executive department” or exercises “no part of the execu-", "paragraph_id": "para_248" }, { "text": "tive power.” 295 U. S., at 628. Her historical arguments regarding", "paragraph_id": "para_249" }, { "text": "early multimember agencies fail because the members of these agen-", "paragraph_id": "para_250" }, { "text": "cies, too, were removable by the President at will.", "paragraph_id": "para_251" }, { "text": "Slaughter ultimately proposes that the Court police Congress’s deci-", "paragraph_id": "para_252" }, { "text": "sions in this area only for “reasonableness.” She argues that Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_253" }, { "text": "may “reasonably” decide “that the President should be able to remove", "paragraph_id": "para_254" }, { "text": "some duly appointed officers only for certain causes and through cer-", "paragraph_id": "para_255" }, { "text": "tain processes.” Brief for Respondent 25 (internal quotation marks", "paragraph_id": "para_256" }, { "text": "omitted). Slaughter’s supposed limiting principle is neither limiting", "paragraph_id": "para_257" }, { "text": "nor much of a principle. On her view, Congress could commandeer the", "paragraph_id": "para_258" }, { "text": "Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, the", "paragraph_id": "para_259" }, { "text": "Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Ser-", "paragraph_id": "para_260" }, { "text": "vices, most (if not all) of the Department of Justice, and a number of", "paragraph_id": "para_261" }, { "text": "other agencies besides. Indeed, if Slaughter were correct, then it is not", "paragraph_id": "para_262" }, { "text": "clear why Congress would need to allow the President any say in fir-", "paragraph_id": "para_263" }, { "text": "ings at all.", "paragraph_id": "para_264" }, { "text": "Slaughter’s view is incompatible with our constitutional design. Alt-", "paragraph_id": "para_265" }, { "text": "hough it is up to the Senate to decide whether to confirm those with", "paragraph_id": "para_266" }, { "text": "whom the President would prefer to work, neither Congress nor the", "paragraph_id": "para_267" }, { "text": "7Cite as: 609 U. S. ___ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_268" }, { "text": "Syllabus", "paragraph_id": "para_269" }, { "text": "courts may saddle him with those with whom he cannot work. Subor-", "paragraph_id": "para_270" }, { "text": "dinates who exercise the President’s power are subject to removal by", "paragraph_id": "para_271" }, { "text": "him. Then, and only then, can they remain accountable to the Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_272" }, { "text": "dent, and the President to the people. Pp. 28–36.", "paragraph_id": "para_273" }, { "text": "Reversed and remanded.", "paragraph_id": "para_274" }, { "text": "ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ALITO,", "paragraph_id": "para_275" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS,", "paragraph_id": "para_276" }, { "text": "J., joined as to all but Part III–B. GORSUCH, J., filed a concurring opinion.", "paragraph_id": "para_277" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON,", "paragraph_id": "para_278" }, { "text": "JJ., joined.", "paragraph_id": "para_279" }, { "text": "_________________", "paragraph_id": "para_280" }, { "text": "_________________", "paragraph_id": "para_281" }, { "text": "1Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_282" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_283" }, { "text": "NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the", "paragraph_id": "para_284" }, { "text": "United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of", "paragraph_id": "para_285" }, { "text": "Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,", "paragraph_id": "para_286" }, { "text": "pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.", "paragraph_id": "para_287" }, { "text": "SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES", "paragraph_id": "para_288" }, { "text": "No. 25–332", "paragraph_id": "para_289" }, { "text": "DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED", "paragraph_id": "para_290" }, { "text": "STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. REBECCA", "paragraph_id": "para_291" }, { "text": "KELLY SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_292" }, { "text": "ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE", "paragraph_id": "para_293" }, { "text": "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE", "paragraph_id": "para_294" }, { "text": "DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT", "paragraph_id": "para_295" }, { "text": "[June 29, 2026]", "paragraph_id": "para_296" }, { "text": "CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the", "paragraph_id": "para_297" }, { "text": "Court.", "paragraph_id": "para_298" }, { "text": "Nearly 250 years ago, the Framers decided to vest “[t]he", "paragraph_id": "para_299" }, { "text": "executive Power” in one person—“a President of the United", "paragraph_id": "para_300" }, { "text": "States of America.” Art. II, §1, cl. 1. The choice was not", "paragraph_id": "para_301" }, { "text": "made lightly. Within living memory were the “long train of", "paragraph_id": "para_302" }, { "text": "abuses and usurpations” of a King who reigned as “a Ty-", "paragraph_id": "para_303" }, { "text": "rant.” Declaration of Independence ¶¶2, 30. Indeed, sev-", "paragraph_id": "para_304" }, { "text": "eral delegates to the Constitutional Convention pushed for", "paragraph_id": "para_305" }, { "text": "a multimember council instead of “unity in the Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_306" }, { "text": "magistracy,” which they feared would serve as “the foetus", "paragraph_id": "para_307" }, { "text": "of monarchy.” 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,", "paragraph_id": "para_308" }, { "text": "p. 66 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (Farrand’s Records) (E. Ran-", "paragraph_id": "para_309" }, { "text": "dolph). But unity won out. Our Constitution’s drafters", "paragraph_id": "para_310" }, { "text": "knew from experience that a “plurality in the executive”—", "paragraph_id": "para_311" }, { "text": "the model in use by most States at the time—not only “di-", "paragraph_id": "para_312" }, { "text": "minishe[s]” the “activity, secrecy, and dispatch” necessary", "paragraph_id": "para_313" }, { "text": "to ensure “good government” but “tends to conceal faults", "paragraph_id": "para_314" }, { "text": "and destroy responsibility.” The Federalist No. 70, pp. 423–", "paragraph_id": "para_315" }, { "text": "424, 427 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). With just one", "paragraph_id": "para_316" }, { "text": "2 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_317" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_318" }, { "text": "President in charge, they reasoned, there would be no doubt", "paragraph_id": "para_319" }, { "text": "“on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious", "paragraph_id": "para_320" }, { "text": "measure . . . ought really to fall.” Id., at 428.", "paragraph_id": "para_321" }, { "text": "One hundred years ago, this Court honored the Conven-", "paragraph_id": "para_322" }, { "text": "tion’s choice in the seminal case of Myers v. United States,", "paragraph_id": "para_323" }, { "text": "272 U. S. 52 (1926). There, we held that the Constitution", "paragraph_id": "para_324" }, { "text": "“grants to the President” the “general administrative con-", "paragraph_id": "para_325" }, { "text": "trol of those executing the laws, including the power of ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_326" }, { "text": "pointment and removal of executive officers.” Id., at 163–", "paragraph_id": "para_327" }, { "text": "164. Because no one could “execute the laws” “alone and", "paragraph_id": "para_328" }, { "text": "unaided,” Chief Justice Taft explained for the Court, the", "paragraph_id": "para_329" }, { "text": "President must be permitted to “select those who . . . act for", "paragraph_id": "para_330" }, { "text": "him” and “remov[e] those for whom he can not continue to", "paragraph_id": "para_331" }, { "text": "be responsible.” Id., at 117. “[T]o hold otherwise would", "paragraph_id": "para_332" }, { "text": "make it impossible for the President” to fulfill his constitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_333" }, { "text": "tional obligation “to take care that the laws be faithfully ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_334" }, { "text": "ecuted.” Id., at 164.", "paragraph_id": "para_335" }, { "text": "Today we confront one of several regulatory agencies that", "paragraph_id": "para_336" }, { "text": "deviate from this model of Presidential supervision—the", "paragraph_id": "para_337" }, { "text": "Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Since its creation in", "paragraph_id": "para_338" }, { "text": "1914, the FTC has accumulated vast rulemaking, enforce-", "paragraph_id": "para_339" }, { "text": "ment, and adjudicatory powers under more than 80 stat-", "paragraph_id": "para_340" }, { "text": "utes. Not only does it promulgate rules that carry the force", "paragraph_id": "para_341" }, { "text": "of law, but it also enforces those rules against private par-", "paragraph_id": "para_342" }, { "text": "ties, collecting civil penalties in the billions of dollars. Its", "paragraph_id": "para_343" }, { "text": "powers, however, do not belong to the President or his ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_344" }, { "text": "pointees alone; they instead belong to five Commissioners,", "paragraph_id": "para_345" }, { "text": "each of whom serves for seven years and may be removed", "paragraph_id": "para_346" }, { "text": "by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or", "paragraph_id": "para_347" }, { "text": "malfeasance in office.” 38 Stat. 718, 15 U. S. C. §41.", "paragraph_id": "para_348" }, { "text": "We hold that such protection from removal is contrary to", "paragraph_id": "para_349" }, { "text": "the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.", "paragraph_id": "para_350" }, { "text": "I", "paragraph_id": "para_351" }, { "text": "When President Trump began his second term in Janu-", "paragraph_id": "para_352" }, { "text": "ary 2025, the FTC was led by two Republicans and three", "paragraph_id": "para_353" }, { "text": "3Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_354" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_355" }, { "text": "Democrats. On his first day in office, he designated a new", "paragraph_id": "para_356" }, { "text": "Chair, replacing President Biden’s pick. See 15 U. S. C. §41", "paragraph_id": "para_357" }, { "text": "(permitting the President to choose a Chair “from the Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_358" }, { "text": "mission’s membership”). As is customary, the former", "paragraph_id": "para_359" }, { "text": "Chair, Lina Khan, resigned her seat a few weeks later, per-", "paragraph_id": "para_360" }, { "text": "mitting President Trump to appoint a replacement (contin-", "paragraph_id": "para_361" }, { "text": "gent, of course, on the Senate’s advice and consent). In the", "paragraph_id": "para_362" }, { "text": "meantime, however, the FTC would be split down the mid-", "paragraph_id": "para_363" }, { "text": "dle.", "paragraph_id": "para_364" }, { "text": "That split came to an abrupt end in March, when Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_365" }, { "text": "dent Trump fired the two remaining Democratic Commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_366" }, { "text": "sioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. He did not", "paragraph_id": "para_367" }, { "text": "assert that they were “inefficien[t],” “neglect[ed]” their", "paragraph_id": "para_368" }, { "text": "“dut[ies],” or committed “malfeasance in office,” as the stat-", "paragraph_id": "para_369" }, { "text": "ute required. §41. He instead told them that their “contin-", "paragraph_id": "para_370" }, { "text": "ued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with [his] Admin-", "paragraph_id": "para_371" }, { "text": "istration’s priorities” and that they were removed from", "paragraph_id": "para_372" }, { "text": "office “pursuant to [his] authority under Article II of the", "paragraph_id": "para_373" }, { "text": "Constitution.” App. 28.", "paragraph_id": "para_374" }, { "text": "Slaughter promptly filed suit against the President and", "paragraph_id": "para_375" }, { "text": "other executive officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive", "paragraph_id": "para_376" }, { "text": "relief to restore her to office.1 She alleged that her removal", "paragraph_id": "para_377" }, { "text": "was ultra vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act,", "paragraph_id": "para_378" }, { "text": "and violated the Constitution.", "paragraph_id": "para_379" }, { "text": "The District Court agreed, granting Slaughter’s motion", "paragraph_id": "para_380" }, { "text": "for summary judgment. 791 F. Supp. 3d 1 (DC 2025). It", "paragraph_id": "para_381" }, { "text": "acknowledged that Myers generally permits the President", "paragraph_id": "para_382" }, { "text": "to remove “executive officers” at will, as part of his “general", "paragraph_id": "para_383" }, { "text": "administrative control of those executing the laws.” 791", "paragraph_id": "para_384" }, { "text": "F. Supp. 3d, at 11 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 164). But it", "paragraph_id": "para_385" }, { "text": "considered itself bound by Humphrey’s Executor v. United", "paragraph_id": "para_386" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_387" }, { "text": "1 Slaughter was initially joined in her lawsuit by Bedoya, who similarly", "paragraph_id": "para_388" }, { "text": "sought to be restored to office. After litigation commenced, however,", "paragraph_id": "para_389" }, { "text": "Bedoya formally resigned from his position on the FTC, and the District", "paragraph_id": "para_390" }, { "text": "Court dismissed his claims as moot. Thus only Slaughter’s claims are at", "paragraph_id": "para_391" }, { "text": "issue here.", "paragraph_id": "para_392" }, { "text": "4 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_393" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_394" }, { "text": "States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). That case, the District Court", "paragraph_id": "para_395" }, { "text": "explained, carved out an exception to Myers’s general rule", "paragraph_id": "para_396" }, { "text": "for the FTC, which the Humphrey’s Court described as a", "paragraph_id": "para_397" }, { "text": "multimember “expert” agency that exercised solely “quasi-", "paragraph_id": "para_398" }, { "text": "legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions. 791 F. Supp. 3d,", "paragraph_id": "para_399" }, { "text": "at 13, 17–18. The court declared the President’s “purported", "paragraph_id": "para_400" }, { "text": "removal” ultra vires and issued a permanent injunction", "paragraph_id": "para_401" }, { "text": "barring interference “with Ms. Slaughter’s right to perform", "paragraph_id": "para_402" }, { "text": "her lawful duties.” App. 90–91.", "paragraph_id": "para_403" }, { "text": "A divided Court of Appeals denied the Government’s mo-", "paragraph_id": "para_404" }, { "text": "tion for a stay pending appeal. 2025 WL 2551247 (CADC,", "paragraph_id": "para_405" }, { "text": "Sept. 2, 2025) (per curiam). The panel held that the Gov-", "paragraph_id": "para_406" }, { "text": "ernment has “no prospect of success on appeal,” as this very", "paragraph_id": "para_407" }, { "text": "issue had been settled by Humphrey’s Executor. 2025 WL", "paragraph_id": "para_408" }, { "text": "2551247, *3. Judge Rao dissented, explaining that Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_409" }, { "text": "rey’s Executor does not license a “headless fourth branch” of", "paragraph_id": "para_410" }, { "text": "independent agencies exercising “considerable executive", "paragraph_id": "para_411" }, { "text": "power.” 2025 WL 2551247, *13 (quoting Trump v. Wilcox,", "paragraph_id": "para_412" }, { "text": "605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 1)).", "paragraph_id": "para_413" }, { "text": "We stayed the District Court’s order and granted certio-", "paragraph_id": "para_414" }, { "text": "rari before judgment. 606 U. S. 1051 (2025).", "paragraph_id": "para_415" }, { "text": "II", "paragraph_id": "para_416" }, { "text": "A", "paragraph_id": "para_417" }, { "text": "The Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power” in a “Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_418" }, { "text": "ident of the United States of America” and instructs that he", "paragraph_id": "para_419" }, { "text": "“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II,", "paragraph_id": "para_420" }, { "text": "§§1, 3. To vest “the whole executive power” in just one per-", "paragraph_id": "para_421" }, { "text": "son was not to suggest that he could execute the laws alone", "paragraph_id": "para_422" }, { "text": "and unaided. The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison).", "paragraph_id": "para_423" }, { "text": "But it was to establish a hierarchy—a “Chief Magistrate”", "paragraph_id": "para_424" }, { "text": "with whom the buck stops, and below him various “assis-", "paragraph_id": "para_425" }, { "text": "tants or deputies” who “derive their offices from his ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_426" }, { "text": "pointment” and remain “subject to his superintendence.”", "paragraph_id": "para_427" }, { "text": "Id., No. 72, at 436 (A. Hamilton). To remain accountable to", "paragraph_id": "para_428" }, { "text": "5Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_429" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_430" }, { "text": "the President, those officers must be removable by the Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_431" }, { "text": "ident.", "paragraph_id": "para_432" }, { "text": "1", "paragraph_id": "para_433" }, { "text": "The idea that one President would be in charge was by no", "paragraph_id": "para_434", "court_paragraph": 1 }, { "text": "means a foregone conclusion in 1787. Just ten years earlier,", "paragraph_id": "para_435" }, { "text": "the colonists had “thrown off the Yoke” of King George III", "paragraph_id": "para_436" }, { "text": "and his colonial governors, 5 Papers of John Adams 26 (R.", "paragraph_id": "para_437" }, { "text": "Taylor ed. 1983) (S. Adams), who had laid a “[f]oundation", "paragraph_id": "para_438" }, { "text": "sufficient on which to erect a Tyranny,” J. Adams, Diary", "paragraph_id": "para_439" }, { "text": "and Autobiography of John Adams 260 (L. Butterfield ed.", "paragraph_id": "para_440" }, { "text": "1961). Now citizens, they had no intention of reestablishing", "paragraph_id": "para_441" }, { "text": "“the kingly office” by another name. 1 Papers of Thomas", "paragraph_id": "para_442" }, { "text": "Jefferson 337 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Thus the flurry of state", "paragraph_id": "para_443" }, { "text": "constitutions that followed the Declaration of Independence", "paragraph_id": "para_444" }, { "text": "“made of the gubernatorial magistrate a new kind of crea-", "paragraph_id": "para_445" }, { "text": "ture, a very pale reflection indeed of his regal ancestor.” G.", "paragraph_id": "para_446" }, { "text": "Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787,", "paragraph_id": "para_447" }, { "text": "p. 136 (1998) (Wood); see also J. Rakove, Original Meanings", "paragraph_id": "para_448" }, { "text": "250–252 (1996). Almost every State had but a nominal Gov-", "paragraph_id": "para_449" }, { "text": "ernor, who could act only with his council’s consent. These", "paragraph_id": "para_450" }, { "text": "early chief executives were “little more than chairmen of", "paragraph_id": "para_451" }, { "text": "their executive boards.” Wood 138.", "paragraph_id": "para_452" }, { "text": "The Framers chose to depart from this model, for they", "paragraph_id": "para_453" }, { "text": "had seen its flaws up close. Common was the complaint", "paragraph_id": "para_454" }, { "text": "that the States’ feeble and divided executives left no “effec-", "paragraph_id": "para_455" }, { "text": "tual check” for “the instability & encroachments” of legisla-", "paragraph_id": "para_456" }, { "text": "tures. See 2 Farrand’s Records 35 (J. Madison). For “fear”", "paragraph_id": "para_457" }, { "text": "of “monarchical . . . power,” William Livingston lamented,", "paragraph_id": "para_458" }, { "text": "the States “improvidently” devised executives “too weak &", "paragraph_id": "para_459" }, { "text": "inefficatious to operate with proper energy & vigour.” 5 Pa-", "paragraph_id": "para_460" }, { "text": "pers of William Livingston 56–57 (C. Prince, M. Lustig, &", "paragraph_id": "para_461" }, { "text": "D. Vorhees eds. 1988).", "paragraph_id": "para_462" }, { "text": "The Convention was determined not to make the same", "paragraph_id": "para_463" }, { "text": "mistake. See Wood 467. So when delegates objected to", "paragraph_id": "para_464" }, { "text": "“unity in the Executive magistracy” as “the foetus of", "paragraph_id": "para_465" }, { "text": "6 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_466" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_467" }, { "text": "monarchy,” 1 Farrand’s Records 66 (E. Randolph), others", "paragraph_id": "para_468" }, { "text": "could soundly reply that the concern was quite backward.", "paragraph_id": "para_469" }, { "text": "“[I]nstead of being the fetus of Monarchy,” they explained,", "paragraph_id": "para_470" }, { "text": "“[u]nity in the Executive” was “the best safeguard against”", "paragraph_id": "para_471" }, { "text": "it—for only a “single Person” could produce the “vigor and", "paragraph_id": "para_472" }, { "text": "activity” necessary to preserve the Constitution’s separa-", "paragraph_id": "para_473" }, { "text": "tion of powers, and only a “single Person” could make the", "paragraph_id": "para_474" }, { "text": "office “responsibl[e]” to the people. Id., at 66, 109 (J. Wil-", "paragraph_id": "para_475" }, { "text": "son). “Give him an able Council and it will thwart him; a", "paragraph_id": "para_476" }, { "text": "weak one and he will shelter himself under their sanction.”", "paragraph_id": "para_477" }, { "text": "2 id., at 329 (C. Pinckney). Any more than one person in", "paragraph_id": "para_478" }, { "text": "charge, as James Wilson put it, “oftener serves to cover,", "paragraph_id": "para_479" }, { "text": "than prevent malpractices.” 1 id., at 97.", "paragraph_id": "para_480" }, { "text": "That the Constitution forged a new path was not hidden", "paragraph_id": "para_481" }, { "text": "from those who ratified it. Hamilton frankly conceded that", "paragraph_id": "para_482" }, { "text": "only two States thus far “have intrusted the executive au-", "paragraph_id": "para_483" }, { "text": "thority wholly to single men,” The Federalist No. 70, at 424,", "paragraph_id": "para_484" }, { "text": "anticipating Roger Sherman’s critique of the Constitution", "paragraph_id": "para_485" }, { "text": "that every other government has “a Council of advice, with-", "paragraph_id": "para_486" }, { "text": "out which the first magistrate could not act,” 1 Farrand’s", "paragraph_id": "para_487" }, { "text": "Records 97. To Hamilton, however, that was the point. Un-", "paragraph_id": "para_488" }, { "text": "like most States, the Federal Government would have “a", "paragraph_id": "para_489" }, { "text": "vigorous executive” who could act with “secrecy . . . and dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_490" }, { "text": "patch”—and would not be able to “conceal [his] faults” be-", "paragraph_id": "para_491" }, { "text": "hind a council. The Federalist No. 70, at 423–424, 427. “[A]", "paragraph_id": "para_492" }, { "text": "plurality in the executive,” Hamilton argued, “tends to con-", "paragraph_id": "para_493" }, { "text": "ceal faults and destroy responsibility.” Id., at 427. “It often", "paragraph_id": "para_494" }, { "text": "becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to deter-", "paragraph_id": "para_495" }, { "text": "mine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious", "paragraph_id": "para_496" }, { "text": "measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to", "paragraph_id": "para_497" }, { "text": "fall.” Id., at 428. If the executive power were not placed in", "paragraph_id": "para_498" }, { "text": "a “single hand,” then “the people” would be “deprive[d] . . .", "paragraph_id": "para_499" }, { "text": "of the two greatest securities they can have for the faithful", "paragraph_id": "para_500" }, { "text": "exercise of any delegated power”—“the restraints of public", "paragraph_id": "para_501" }, { "text": "opinion” and the “opportunity of discovering with facility", "paragraph_id": "para_502" }, { "text": "Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026) 7", "paragraph_id": "para_503" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_504" }, { "text": "and clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust.”", "paragraph_id": "para_505" }, { "text": "Id., at 424, 428–429.", "paragraph_id": "para_506" }, { "text": "In opting for one President, however, the Framers did not", "paragraph_id": "para_507" }, { "text": "opt for the President to work alone. They knew (as our first", "paragraph_id": "para_508" }, { "text": "President would write) that it would be “impossib[le]” for", "paragraph_id": "para_509" }, { "text": "just “one man . . . to perform all the great business of the", "paragraph_id": "para_510" }, { "text": "State.” 30 Writings of George Washington 334 (J. Fitzpat-", "paragraph_id": "para_511" }, { "text": "rick ed. 1939). So they anticipated that Congress would “in-", "paragraph_id": "para_512" }, { "text": "stitut[e] the great Departments” and allow the President to", "paragraph_id": "para_513" }, { "text": "“appoint[ ] officers therein, to assist [him] in discharging the", "paragraph_id": "para_514" }, { "text": "duties of his trust.” Ibid. As James Wilson explained at the", "paragraph_id": "para_515" }, { "text": "Convention, “there can be no good Executive without a re-", "paragraph_id": "para_516" }, { "text": "sponsible appointment of officers to execute.” 2 Farrand’s", "paragraph_id": "para_517" }, { "text": "Records 538–539.", "paragraph_id": "para_518" }, { "text": "These officers were to serve as envoys of the President,", "paragraph_id": "para_519" }, { "text": "not his equals. Their very purpose, after all, was to assist", "paragraph_id": "para_520" }, { "text": "him “to discharge his arduous employment,” not theirs. 4", "paragraph_id": "para_521" }, { "text": "Debates on the Constitution 109 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1891) (J.", "paragraph_id": "para_522" }, { "text": "Iredell) (emphasis added). As such, the Government’s “min-", "paragraph_id": "para_523" }, { "text": "isters” were required to “exercise their functions in subor-", "paragraph_id": "para_524" }, { "text": "dination to the Executive,” whether their tasks were big or", "paragraph_id": "para_525" }, { "text": "small. 2 Farrand’s Records 54 (G. Morris). Hamilton made", "paragraph_id": "para_526" }, { "text": "the same point. “The persons . . . to whose immediate man-", "paragraph_id": "para_527" }, { "text": "agement” the President’s powers “are committed, ought to", "paragraph_id": "para_528" }, { "text": "be considered as the assistants or deputies of the Chief", "paragraph_id": "para_529" }, { "text": "Magistrate, and on this account, they ought to derive their", "paragraph_id": "para_530" }, { "text": "offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination,", "paragraph_id": "para_531" }, { "text": "and ought to be subject to his superintendence.” The Fed-", "paragraph_id": "para_532" }, { "text": "eralist No. 72, at 436. In so structuring the Government,", "paragraph_id": "para_533" }, { "text": "the Convention “rejected a committee-style Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_534" }, { "text": "Branch in favor of a unitary and accountable President,", "paragraph_id": "para_535" }, { "text": "standing under law, yet over” his department heads. A.", "paragraph_id": "para_536" }, { "text": "Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev.", "paragraph_id": "para_537" }, { "text": "647 (1996). It helped in reaching that conclusion, of course,", "paragraph_id": "para_538" }, { "text": "that everyone at the Convention knew who that President", "paragraph_id": "para_539" }, { "text": "would be—the Convention’s presiding officer, George", "paragraph_id": "para_540" }, { "text": "8 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_541" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_542" }, { "text": "Washington. See J. Flexner, George Washington and the", "paragraph_id": "para_543" }, { "text": "New Nation: 1783–1793, pp. 133–134 (1970).2", "paragraph_id": "para_544" }, { "text": "Because these officers were subject to the President’s su-", "paragraph_id": "para_545" }, { "text": "perintendence, they had to be removable by him at will. For", "paragraph_id": "para_546" }, { "text": "one, that was just part of what it meant to wield “the exec-", "paragraph_id": "para_547" }, { "text": "utive power,” as it was understood at the time of ratifica-", "paragraph_id": "para_548" }, { "text": "tion. Jefferson wrote as early as 1780 that “[t]he power of", "paragraph_id": "para_549" }, { "text": "appointing and removing executive officers [is] inherent in", "paragraph_id": "para_550" }, { "text": "[the] Executive,” as “[h]e who appoints may remove.” 4 Pa-", "paragraph_id": "para_551" }, { "text": "pers of Thomas Jefferson 281 (1951). And as to this power,", "paragraph_id": "para_552" }, { "text": "the Constitution’s words were chosen carefully—it was the", "paragraph_id": "para_553" }, { "text": "President who would “appoint” the principal “Officers of the", "paragraph_id": "para_554" }, { "text": "United States,” with the Senate providing “Advice and Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_555" }, { "text": "sent.” Art. II, §2, cl. 2; cf. The Federalist No. 66, at 404 (A.", "paragraph_id": "para_556" }, { "text": "Hamilton) (“[I]n all the governments with which we are ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_557" }, { "text": "quainted . . . those who hold offices during pleasure [are]", "paragraph_id": "para_558" }, { "text": "dependent on the pleasure of those who appoint them”). If", "paragraph_id": "para_559" }, { "text": "the Framers intended to depart from this convention, one", "paragraph_id": "para_560" }, { "text": "might have expected them to say so.", "paragraph_id": "para_561" }, { "text": "For another, the power to remove at will was a necessary", "paragraph_id": "para_562" }, { "text": "corollary of the Constitution’s design. The “unity” of the", "paragraph_id": "para_563" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_564" }, { "text": "2 Indeed, Washington himself was known to favor a capable, vigorous,", "paragraph_id": "para_565" }, { "text": "and unified Executive Branch. See G. Phelps, George Washington and", "paragraph_id": "para_566" }, { "text": "American Constitutionalism 56, 142–145 (1993). Throughout the Revo-", "paragraph_id": "para_567" }, { "text": "lutionary War, he had complained about the “vital and inherent Princi-", "paragraph_id": "para_568" }, { "text": "ple of Delay . . . in transacting Business” through the Continental Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_569" }, { "text": "gress’s multimember executive committees, 3 Writings of George", "paragraph_id": "para_570" }, { "text": "Washington 12 (W. Ford ed. 1889), which he felt led to “unpunishable", "paragraph_id": "para_571" }, { "text": "Neglect of Duty,” id., at 34. Even in peacetime, he saw the Confederation", "paragraph_id": "para_572" }, { "text": "Congress as “not only slow, debilitated, and liable to be thwarted by", "paragraph_id": "para_573" }, { "text": "every breath, but . . . defective in that secrecy, which for the accomplish-", "paragraph_id": "para_574" }, { "text": "ment of many of the most important national purposes is indispensably", "paragraph_id": "para_575" }, { "text": "necessary.” 29 id., at 153 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939). It is little wonder", "paragraph_id": "para_576" }, { "text": "then, that the Convention created a powerful Presidency, one fit for", "paragraph_id": "para_577" }, { "text": "Washington. As South Carolina delegate Pierce Butler put it, the Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_578" }, { "text": "vention’s members “cast their eyes towards General Washington as Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_579" }, { "text": "ident; and shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by", "paragraph_id": "para_580" }, { "text": "their opinions of his Virtue.” 3 Farrand’s Records 301–302.", "paragraph_id": "para_581" }, { "text": "9Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_582" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_583" }, { "text": "Executive Branch would be “destroyed,” Hamilton wrote, if", "paragraph_id": "para_584" }, { "text": "it were vested “ostensibly in one man, subject in whole or in", "paragraph_id": "para_585" }, { "text": "part to the control and co-operation of others, in the capac-", "paragraph_id": "para_586" }, { "text": "ity of counselors to him.” Id., No. 70, at 424. But that is", "paragraph_id": "para_587" }, { "text": "precisely what would occur if the President’s so-called as-", "paragraph_id": "para_588" }, { "text": "sistants could exercise his power against his wishes. Only", "paragraph_id": "para_589" }, { "text": "if the President’s deputies were removable at will would", "paragraph_id": "para_590" }, { "text": "they truly be “subordinate” to “the sole executive magis-", "paragraph_id": "para_591" }, { "text": "trate.” See id., No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison). And only then", "paragraph_id": "para_592" }, { "text": "could the Constitution live up to James Iredell’s boast that", "paragraph_id": "para_593" }, { "text": "“the President” would “be personally responsible for every-", "paragraph_id": "para_594" }, { "text": "thing.” Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_595" }, { "text": "stitution (1788), in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the", "paragraph_id": "para_596" }, { "text": "United States 348 (P. Ford ed. 1888); see also 1 Writings of", "paragraph_id": "para_597" }, { "text": "James Monroe 331 (S. Hamilton ed. 1898) (“I would repose", "paragraph_id": "para_598" }, { "text": "the whole trust of this department in one officer, so he alone", "paragraph_id": "para_599" }, { "text": "should be responsible for all its transactions”). Text and", "paragraph_id": "para_600" }, { "text": "structure thus both taught that the President had to be able", "paragraph_id": "para_601" }, { "text": "to remove those who fail to live up to their duties, lest he", "paragraph_id": "para_602" }, { "text": "fail to live up to his.", "paragraph_id": "para_603" }, { "text": "2", "paragraph_id": "para_604" }, { "text": "This aspect of the President’s role was confirmed in the", "paragraph_id": "para_605", "court_paragraph": 2 }, { "text": "Constitution’s first year—and in the years that followed.", "paragraph_id": "para_606" }, { "text": "The result was a “regular course of practice” that “liqui-", "paragraph_id": "para_607" }, { "text": "date[d] & settle[d]” the President’s power of removal, 8", "paragraph_id": "para_608" }, { "text": "Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908), a con-", "paragraph_id": "para_609" }, { "text": "struction followed by every branch of “the Genl. Govt, . . .", "paragraph_id": "para_610" }, { "text": "thro all the vicissitudes of Party,” 9 id., at 333 (1910). See", "paragraph_id": "para_611" }, { "text": "also The Federalist No. 37, at 228–229 (J. Madison).", "paragraph_id": "para_612" }, { "text": "That practice began in the First Congress. When it first", "paragraph_id": "para_613" }, { "text": "met in 1789, one of its first and most pressing tasks was to", "paragraph_id": "para_614" }, { "text": "establish the first executive departments—and with them", "paragraph_id": "para_615" }, { "text": "the first “Heads of Departments.” Art. II, §2, cl. 2. In doing", "paragraph_id": "para_616" }, { "text": "so, it debated how those officers should be removed. Some", "paragraph_id": "para_617" }, { "text": "felt that the Senate had to consent to all removals, as one", "paragraph_id": "para_618" }, { "text": "10 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_619" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_620" }, { "text": "of the two entities that “appoint[ed]” the official in the first", "paragraph_id": "para_621" }, { "text": "place. 1 Annals of Cong. 472–473 (Rep. Gerry). Others ar-", "paragraph_id": "para_622" }, { "text": "gued that the Constitution was silent on the question, giv-", "paragraph_id": "para_623" }, { "text": "ing Congress the “right” to select whether an officer may be", "paragraph_id": "para_624" }, { "text": "removed, and if so by whom—“the President, the President", "paragraph_id": "para_625" }, { "text": "and Senate, or the Legislature, or any other person whom", "paragraph_id": "para_626" }, { "text": "they might introduce into office, merely for that particular", "paragraph_id": "para_627" }, { "text": "purpose.” Id., at 521 (Rep. Sedgwick). And a third group", "paragraph_id": "para_628" }, { "text": "contended that removal was part of “the Executive power”", "paragraph_id": "para_629" }, { "text": "vested in the President, which “the Legislature has no right", "paragraph_id": "para_630" }, { "text": "to diminish or modify.” Id., at 463 (Rep. Madison).", "paragraph_id": "para_631" }, { "text": "By this point, the arguments made by the third group will", "paragraph_id": "para_632" }, { "text": "sound familiar. Madison led the charge. “I conceive that if", "paragraph_id": "para_633" }, { "text": "any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive,” and thus", "paragraph_id": "para_634" }, { "text": "vested in the President, “it is the power of appointing, over-", "paragraph_id": "para_635" }, { "text": "seeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_636" }, { "text": "And if that is so, he explained, then the “power of removal", "paragraph_id": "para_637" }, { "text": "from office” must follow. Id., at 499. For it is only with that", "paragraph_id": "para_638" }, { "text": "power that “the chain of dependence [can] be preserved”—", "paragraph_id": "para_639" }, { "text": "“the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest”", "paragraph_id": "para_640" }, { "text": "made to “depend, as they ought, on the President, and the", "paragraph_id": "para_641" }, { "text": "President on the community.” Ibid. Others agreed. Some", "paragraph_id": "para_642" }, { "text": "focused on text. “[T]he power of removal [is] an Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_643" }, { "text": "power,” Representative George Clymer said, “and as such", "paragraph_id": "para_644" }, { "text": "belong[s] to the President alone, by the express words of the", "paragraph_id": "para_645" }, { "text": "Constitution.” Id., at 382. Others focused on structure.", "paragraph_id": "para_646" }, { "text": "“The Constitution places all Executive power in the hands", "paragraph_id": "para_647" }, { "text": "of the President,” Representative Fisher Ames explained,", "paragraph_id": "para_648" }, { "text": "“and could he personally execute all the laws, there would", "paragraph_id": "para_649" }, { "text": "be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries.” Id., at 474.", "paragraph_id": "para_650" }, { "text": "“But in order that he may be responsible to his country,” he", "paragraph_id": "para_651" }, { "text": "continued, “he must have a choice in selecting his assis-", "paragraph_id": "para_652" }, { "text": "tants, a control over them, with power to remove them when", "paragraph_id": "para_653" }, { "text": "he finds the qualifications which induced their appointment", "paragraph_id": "para_654" }, { "text": "cease to exist.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_655" }, { "text": "11Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_656" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_657" }, { "text": "The third group emerged victorious. They successfully", "paragraph_id": "para_658" }, { "text": "convinced the House of Representatives to delete a clause", "paragraph_id": "para_659" }, { "text": "in the draft bill that said that the Secretary of Foreign Af-", "paragraph_id": "para_660" }, { "text": "fairs was “to be removable by the President,” for such lan-", "paragraph_id": "para_661" }, { "text": "guage would “ha[ve] the appearance of conferring the power", "paragraph_id": "para_662" }, { "text": "upon him” when in fact it was his all along. Id., at 505, 507", "paragraph_id": "para_663" }, { "text": "(Rep. Benson). What they favored instead—and what they", "paragraph_id": "para_664" }, { "text": "got—was a new clause that assumed “the power of removal", "paragraph_id": "para_665" }, { "text": "to be in the President,” so as to “establish a legislative con-", "paragraph_id": "para_666" }, { "text": "struction of the Constitution.” Id., at 578 (Rep. Benson).", "paragraph_id": "para_667" }, { "text": "The bill as amended passed the House, and then the Sen-", "paragraph_id": "para_668" }, { "text": "ate, a feat that was repeated first with laws establishing", "paragraph_id": "para_669" }, { "text": "the Department of War and then again with the Treasury.", "paragraph_id": "para_670" }, { "text": "These statutes thus “implicitly endorsed the view that the", "paragraph_id": "para_671" }, { "text": "President had a constitutional power to remove executive", "paragraph_id": "para_672" }, { "text": "officers.” A. Bamzai & S. Prakash, The Executive Power of", "paragraph_id": "para_673" }, { "text": "Removal, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 1756, 1793 (2023) (Bamzai &", "paragraph_id": "para_674" }, { "text": "Prakash).", "paragraph_id": "para_675" }, { "text": "Congress’s confirmation of the President’s power quickly", "paragraph_id": "para_676" }, { "text": "took hold—and even gained fame as “the Decision of 1789.”", "paragraph_id": "para_677" }, { "text": "“After very long debates,” Madison wrote to Jefferson, Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_678" }, { "text": "gress had endorsed the view that “the Executive function of", "paragraph_id": "para_679" }, { "text": "removal” was “vested in the President,” a decision “most", "paragraph_id": "para_680" }, { "text": "consonant to the text of the Constitution” and “to the requi-", "paragraph_id": "para_681" }, { "text": "site responsibility and harmony in the Executive Depart-", "paragraph_id": "para_682" }, { "text": "ment.” 16 Documentary History of the First Federal Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_683" }, { "text": "gress 893 (C. Bickford, K. Bowling, H. Veit, & W.", "paragraph_id": "para_684" }, { "text": "diGiacomantonio eds. 2004). Even those who opposed Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_685" }, { "text": "gress’s decision recognized that the decision had been", "paragraph_id": "para_686" }, { "text": "made. Take Representative Richard Bland Lee, who had", "paragraph_id": "para_687" }, { "text": "argued that the question of who may remove officers was", "paragraph_id": "para_688" }, { "text": "up to “[t]he Legislature,” as it could “create and establish", "paragraph_id": "para_689" }, { "text": "offices” as it saw fit. 1 Annals of Cong. 525. After the bills", "paragraph_id": "para_690" }, { "text": "had been enacted, Lee wrote that it “was determined in the", "paragraph_id": "para_691" }, { "text": "affirmative” that the President “had, or ought to have, from", "paragraph_id": "para_692" }, { "text": "a fair Construction of the constitution,” the power to remove", "paragraph_id": "para_693" }, { "text": "12 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_694" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_695" }, { "text": "his own appointees. 16 Documentary History of the First", "paragraph_id": "para_696" }, { "text": "Federal Congress, at 866–867. And even those far removed", "paragraph_id": "para_697" }, { "text": "from the debates saw the issue as settled, including Chief", "paragraph_id": "para_698" }, { "text": "Justice Marshall, see 5 J. Marshall, The Life of George", "paragraph_id": "para_699" }, { "text": "Washington 199–200 (1807) (Marshall) (the decision was “a", "paragraph_id": "para_700" }, { "text": "full expression of the sense of the legislature”), Chancellor", "paragraph_id": "para_701" }, { "text": "Kent, see 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 289–", "paragraph_id": "para_702" }, { "text": "290 (1826) (the decision “firmly and definitively settled” the", "paragraph_id": "para_703" }, { "text": "matter), and Justice Story, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the", "paragraph_id": "para_704" }, { "text": "Constitution of the United States §1537, p. 395 (1833)", "paragraph_id": "para_705" }, { "text": "(Story) (expressing doubts about the decision from first", "paragraph_id": "para_706" }, { "text": "principles, but noting that “[t]he public . . . acquiesced in", "paragraph_id": "para_707" }, { "text": "this decision” and that it “has not been questioned on many", "paragraph_id": "para_708" }, { "text": "other occasions”).", "paragraph_id": "para_709" }, { "text": "Early Presidents of all persuasions, too, hewed to the De-", "paragraph_id": "para_710" }, { "text": "cision of 1789. Washington saw it as his “indispensable", "paragraph_id": "para_711" }, { "text": "duty” to remove officers who failed to live up to his expecta-", "paragraph_id": "para_712" }, { "text": "tions. 36 Writings of George Washington 216 (1941). His", "paragraph_id": "para_713" }, { "text": "Cabinet agreed, taking the stance that the ability to “re-", "paragraph_id": "para_714" }, { "text": "move from office” was “an essential attribute of Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_715" }, { "text": "Power.” 20 Papers of George Washington: Presidential Se-", "paragraph_id": "para_716" }, { "text": "ries 355, 357, n. 2 (D. Hoth & W. Ferraro eds. 2019). The", "paragraph_id": "para_717" }, { "text": "first President Adams said the same. See 20 Papers of John", "paragraph_id": "para_718" }, { "text": "Adams 150–151 (S. Georgini et al. eds. 2020) (noting his", "paragraph_id": "para_719" }, { "text": "support for “the President[’s] Power of Removal, according", "paragraph_id": "para_720" }, { "text": "to the Constitution”). So did Jefferson. See 4 Papers of", "paragraph_id": "para_721" }, { "text": "Thomas Jefferson, at 281 (the power to “remov[e] executive", "paragraph_id": "para_722" }, { "text": "officers [is] inherent in [the] Executive”). So did Madison.", "paragraph_id": "para_723" }, { "text": "See 2 Papers of James Madison 192 (D. Mattern, J. Stagg,", "paragraph_id": "para_724" }, { "text": "M. Johnson, & A. Colony eds. 2013) (one of the “[c]onstitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_725" }, { "text": "tional attributes of the Executive” is to determine “[t]he", "paragraph_id": "para_726" }, { "text": "tenure of the office” of subordinates). So did Monroe, along", "paragraph_id": "para_727" }, { "text": "with the second President Adams. 7 Memoirs of John", "paragraph_id": "para_728" }, { "text": "Quincy Adams 424–425 (C. Adams ed. 1875) (citing Monroe", "paragraph_id": "para_729" }, { "text": "for the view that “the tenure of all subordinate executive", "paragraph_id": "para_730" }, { "text": "Offices” is “necessarily the pleasure of the chief by whom", "paragraph_id": "para_731" }, { "text": "13Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_732" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_733" }, { "text": "they were commissioned,” and agreeing with “the principle", "paragraph_id": "para_734" }, { "text": "established by Mr Monroe”).", "paragraph_id": "para_735" }, { "text": "And so did Jackson—much to Congress’s dismay. Unlike", "paragraph_id": "para_736" }, { "text": "his predecessors, who (except for Jefferson) utilized their", "paragraph_id": "para_737" }, { "text": "removal power sparingly, Jackson fired hundreds “of subor-", "paragraph_id": "para_738" }, { "text": "dinates for personal and partisan reasons.” L. White, The", "paragraph_id": "para_739" }, { "text": "Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–", "paragraph_id": "para_740" }, { "text": "1861, p. 33 (1954) (White); see also id., at 307–308. But", "paragraph_id": "para_741" }, { "text": "even Jackson’s most vehement critics acknowledged that he", "paragraph_id": "para_742" }, { "text": "had the power to do as he pleased. “I consider it . . . a set-", "paragraph_id": "para_743" }, { "text": "tled point,” Senator Daniel Webster said, “settled by con-", "paragraph_id": "para_744" }, { "text": "struction, settled by precedent, settled by the practice of the", "paragraph_id": "para_745" }, { "text": "Government, and settled by statute.” 11 Cong. Deb. 461", "paragraph_id": "para_746" }, { "text": "(1835). When Webster tried to unsettle the Decision of 1789", "paragraph_id": "para_747" }, { "text": "through new legislation, the effort failed, only further ce-", "paragraph_id": "para_748" }, { "text": "menting the President’s power. See White 41–44. As Web-", "paragraph_id": "para_749" }, { "text": "ster—still in the Senate—put it 15 years later:", "paragraph_id": "para_750" }, { "text": "“[S]ince the practice has become a settled practice,", "paragraph_id": "para_751" }, { "text": "since every Administration has indulged in it, and", "paragraph_id": "para_752" }, { "text": "since it must now be considered, as the legal construc-", "paragraph_id": "para_753" }, { "text": "tion of the Constitution, . . . it follows . . . that this", "paragraph_id": "para_754" }, { "text": "power, thus legally vested in the President, must be ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_755" }, { "text": "ercised by him as independently of our control as any", "paragraph_id": "para_756" }, { "text": "other power that is to be exercised by him under the", "paragraph_id": "para_757" }, { "text": "Constitution.” Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., 1126", "paragraph_id": "para_758" }, { "text": "(1850).", "paragraph_id": "para_759" }, { "text": "B", "paragraph_id": "para_760" }, { "text": "What text, history, and structure settle, our precedent", "paragraph_id": "para_761" }, { "text": "confirms—the President may remove his subordinates at", "paragraph_id": "para_762" }, { "text": "will.", "paragraph_id": "para_763" }, { "text": "1", "paragraph_id": "para_764" }, { "text": "Twice in the 19th century, we reaffirmed what the First", "paragraph_id": "para_765", "court_paragraph": 1 }, { "text": "Congress had held. The text of the Constitution “is silent", "paragraph_id": "para_766" }, { "text": "with respect to the power of removal from office,” we noted", "paragraph_id": "para_767" }, { "text": "14 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_768" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_769" }, { "text": "in our first case on the subject. Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet.", "paragraph_id": "para_770" }, { "text": "230, 258 (1839). But “it was very early adopted, as the prac-", "paragraph_id": "para_771" }, { "text": "tical construction of the Constitution,” that the power “to", "paragraph_id": "para_772" }, { "text": "remove, where the tenure of the office was not fixed by the", "paragraph_id": "para_773" }, { "text": "Constitution,” was “vested in the President alone.” Id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_774" }, { "text": "259. “And such would appear to have been the legislative", "paragraph_id": "para_775" }, { "text": "construction of the Constitution” too, given “the organiza-", "paragraph_id": "para_776" }, { "text": "tion of the three great departments” “in the year 1789.”", "paragraph_id": "para_777" }, { "text": "Ibid. Our second case was of a piece. “[T]he decision of", "paragraph_id": "para_778" }, { "text": "Congress in 1789, and the universal practice of the Govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_779" }, { "text": "ment under it,” we explained, “ha[s] settled the question be-", "paragraph_id": "para_780" }, { "text": "yond any power of alteration.” Parsons v. United States,", "paragraph_id": "para_781" }, { "text": "167 U. S. 324, 330 (1897).", "paragraph_id": "para_782" }, { "text": "Our landmark decision, however, came 100 years ago in", "paragraph_id": "para_783" }, { "text": "Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52. That case arose from", "paragraph_id": "para_784" }, { "text": "an unlikely source—a dispute over management of the post", "paragraph_id": "para_785" }, { "text": "office in Portland, Oregon. See id., at 106. Under an 1876", "paragraph_id": "para_786" }, { "text": "statute, the President had to receive the “advice and con-", "paragraph_id": "para_787" }, { "text": "sent of the Senate” not only to appoint postmasters but also", "paragraph_id": "para_788" }, { "text": "to remove them. §6, 19 Stat. 80. For reasons that are now", "paragraph_id": "para_789" }, { "text": "lost to history, President Wilson fired Portland’s postmas-", "paragraph_id": "para_790" }, { "text": "ter, Frank Myers, and did so without the Senate’s consent.", "paragraph_id": "para_791" }, { "text": "272 U. S., at 106–107. Myers sued for backpay. See id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_792" }, { "text": "106.", "paragraph_id": "para_793" }, { "text": "In a scholarly opinion, Chief Justice Taft rejected Myers’s", "paragraph_id": "para_794" }, { "text": "suit and reaffirmed the President’s power to fire his subor-", "paragraph_id": "para_795" }, { "text": "dinates at will. That power arose, he wrote for the Court,", "paragraph_id": "para_796" }, { "text": "from the Constitution’s text, history, and structure, just as", "paragraph_id": "para_797" }, { "text": "the First Congress had held in 1789. See id., at 136. “The", "paragraph_id": "para_798" }, { "text": "vesting of the executive power in the President was essen-", "paragraph_id": "para_799" }, { "text": "tially a grant of the power to execute the laws,” Chief Jus-", "paragraph_id": "para_800" }, { "text": "tice Taft explained. Id., at 117. “As he is charged specifi-", "paragraph_id": "para_801" }, { "text": "cally to take care that [the laws] be faithfully executed, the", "paragraph_id": "para_802" }, { "text": "reasonable implication,” he continued, “was that as part of", "paragraph_id": "para_803" }, { "text": "his executive power” he must be able to “remov[e] those for", "paragraph_id": "para_804" }, { "text": "whom he can not continue to be responsible.” Ibid. “Mr.", "paragraph_id": "para_805" }, { "text": "15Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_806" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_807" }, { "text": "Madison and his associates” made this same point, the", "paragraph_id": "para_808" }, { "text": "Chief Justice noted, and they “dwelt at length upon the ne-", "paragraph_id": "para_809" }, { "text": "cessity there was for construing Article II to give the Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_810" }, { "text": "dent the sole power of removal in his responsibility for the", "paragraph_id": "para_811" }, { "text": "conduct of the executive branch.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_812" }, { "text": "But Chief Justice Taft emphasized that it was not just", "paragraph_id": "para_813" }, { "text": "the First Congress that had come to this conclusion. The", "paragraph_id": "para_814" }, { "text": "First Congress supplied “a precedent upon which many fu-", "paragraph_id": "para_815" }, { "text": "ture laws . . . would be based”—and if it had erred, the next", "paragraph_id": "para_816" }, { "text": "Congresses would have “dissent[ed] and depart[ed]” from", "paragraph_id": "para_817" }, { "text": "its view. Id., at 136. Quite the opposite occurred, the Chief", "paragraph_id": "para_818" }, { "text": "Justice explained. The Decision of 1789 “was soon accepted", "paragraph_id": "para_819" }, { "text": "as a final decision of the question by all branches of the Gov-", "paragraph_id": "para_820" }, { "text": "ernment.” Ibid. For “74 years, there was no act of Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_821" }, { "text": "gress, no executive act, and no decision of this Court at var-", "paragraph_id": "para_822" }, { "text": "iance with the declaration of the First Congress.” Id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_823" }, { "text": "163.", "paragraph_id": "para_824" }, { "text": "In the wake of the Civil War, Chief Justice Taft noted,", "paragraph_id": "para_825" }, { "text": "Congress sought to “reverse this constitutional construc-", "paragraph_id": "para_826" }, { "text": "tion”—but in the end only confirmed it. Id., at 164. “This", "paragraph_id": "para_827" }, { "text": "reversal grew out of the serious political differences” be-", "paragraph_id": "para_828" }, { "text": "tween President Johnson—a Jacksonian Democrat—and", "paragraph_id": "para_829" }, { "text": "congressional Republicans, who boasted “a two-thirds ma-", "paragraph_id": "para_830" }, { "text": "jority” in both Houses of Congress. Id., at 165. Over John-", "paragraph_id": "para_831" }, { "text": "son’s veto, Congress sought to “curtail the then acknowl-", "paragraph_id": "para_832" }, { "text": "edged powers of the President” with the Tenure of Office", "paragraph_id": "para_833" }, { "text": "Act, which required him to receive the Senate’s consent be-", "paragraph_id": "para_834" }, { "text": "fore firing most officers. Id., at 165–166.", "paragraph_id": "para_835" }, { "text": "“[T]he injury and invalidity” of the law was “immediately", "paragraph_id": "para_836" }, { "text": "recognized by the Executive and objected to”—and not just", "paragraph_id": "para_837" }, { "text": "by Johnson. Id., at 167. “General Grant, succeeding Mr.", "paragraph_id": "para_838" }, { "text": "Johnson in the Presidency”—and no fan of Johnson or his", "paragraph_id": "para_839" }, { "text": "program—“earnestly recommended in his first message the", "paragraph_id": "para_840" }, { "text": "total repeal” of the law. Id., at 167–168. “What faith can", "paragraph_id": "para_841" }, { "text": "an Executive put in officials forced upon him?” Grant asked.", "paragraph_id": "para_842" }, { "text": "Id., at 168. “How will such officials be likely to serve an", "paragraph_id": "para_843" }, { "text": "16 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_844" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_845" }, { "text": "Administration which they know does not trust them?”", "paragraph_id": "para_846" }, { "text": "Ibid. Despite Grant’s efforts, “[t]he feeling growing out of", "paragraph_id": "para_847" }, { "text": "the controversy with President Johnson retained the act on", "paragraph_id": "para_848" }, { "text": "the statute book”—and led to one other such law, the one", "paragraph_id": "para_849" }, { "text": "for postmasters at issue in that very case—“until 1887,”", "paragraph_id": "para_850" }, { "text": "when the Tenure in Office Act was repealed. Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_851" }, { "text": "What these events revealed, Chief Justice Taft wrote,", "paragraph_id": "para_852" }, { "text": "was not Presidential “acquiescence” but resistance, a con-", "paragraph_id": "para_853" }, { "text": "sistent rejection of “the validity of such legislation” as in-", "paragraph_id": "para_854" }, { "text": "compatible with “the legislative action of 1789.” Id., at 172–", "paragraph_id": "para_855" }, { "text": "173. At issue in Myers, then, as the Chief Justice saw it,", "paragraph_id": "para_856" }, { "text": "was whether “to set aside” the First Congress’s “construc-", "paragraph_id": "para_857" }, { "text": "tion, thus buttressed, and adopt an adverse view,” contrary", "paragraph_id": "para_858" }, { "text": "to the Constitution’s text, history, and structure. Id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_859" }, { "text": "175. The Court refused to do so. It hewed instead to the", "paragraph_id": "para_860" }, { "text": "“constitutional construction . . . reached by the First Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_861" }, { "text": "gress of the United States . . . and acquiesced in by the", "paragraph_id": "para_862" }, { "text": "whole Government for three-quarters of a century.” Id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_863" }, { "text": "176. Any law to the contrary, the Court concluded, was “in", "paragraph_id": "para_864" }, { "text": "violation of the Constitution, and invalid.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_865" }, { "text": "2", "paragraph_id": "para_866" }, { "text": "While Myers was perhaps our best word on the subject, it", "paragraph_id": "para_867", "court_paragraph": 2 }, { "text": "was not our last.", "paragraph_id": "para_868" }, { "text": "a", "paragraph_id": "para_869" }, { "text": "Just nine years after Myers, we handed down Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_870" }, { "text": "Executor, 295 U. S. 602. The case arose out of President", "paragraph_id": "para_871" }, { "text": "Roosevelt’s decision to fire one of President Hoover’s ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_872" }, { "text": "pointees to the Federal Trade Commission, William", "paragraph_id": "para_873" }, { "text": "Humphrey, two years into Humphrey’s seven-year term.", "paragraph_id": "para_874" }, { "text": "Humphrey lauded Hoover “as the foremost figure of the", "paragraph_id": "para_875" }, { "text": "world,” a man who fought back against “the demagogue, the", "paragraph_id": "para_876" }, { "text": "fanatic, the reformer, and the fool.” Washington, D. C.,", "paragraph_id": "para_877" }, { "text": "Evening Star, Mar. 11, 1932, p. D11, col. 8. On the Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_878" }, { "text": "mission, Humphrey sought to do the same. He often spoke", "paragraph_id": "para_879" }, { "text": "17Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_880" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_881" }, { "text": "to the press, and described the FTC variously as “a publicity", "paragraph_id": "para_882" }, { "text": "bureau” used “to spread Socialistic propaganda,” Boston", "paragraph_id": "para_883" }, { "text": "Globe, Dec. 14, 1926, p. 5, cols. 3–4, a “bureaucracy gone", "paragraph_id": "para_884" }, { "text": "insane,” N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1929, p. 19, col. 1, and “an in-", "paragraph_id": "para_885" }, { "text": "strument of oppression and disturbance and injury,” Or-", "paragraph_id": "para_886" }, { "text": "lando Evening Star, Jan. 7, 1931, p. 3, col. 3. Roosevelt saw", "paragraph_id": "para_887" }, { "text": "matters differently, and requested Humphrey’s resigna-", "paragraph_id": "para_888" }, { "text": "tion. Humphrey refused, so Roosevelt fired him in a one-", "paragraph_id": "para_889" }, { "text": "line letter that did not specify a cause for his removal—", "paragraph_id": "para_890" }, { "text": "seemingly contrary to a statute permitting removal of Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_891" }, { "text": "missioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-", "paragraph_id": "para_892" }, { "text": "sance in office.” §1, 38 Stat. 718. Humphrey died soon", "paragraph_id": "para_893" }, { "text": "thereafter, and the executor of his estate sued for backpay.", "paragraph_id": "para_894" }, { "text": "See 295 U. S., at 618–619.", "paragraph_id": "para_895" }, { "text": "On a day that New Dealers would dub “Black Monday,”", "paragraph_id": "para_896" }, { "text": "the Court ruled unanimously against the President—as it", "paragraph_id": "para_897" }, { "text": "did in two other cases decided that same day, A. L. A.", "paragraph_id": "para_898" }, { "text": "Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495", "paragraph_id": "para_899" }, { "text": "(1935), and Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,", "paragraph_id": "para_900" }, { "text": "295 U. S. 555 (1935). See A. Schlesinger, The Politics of", "paragraph_id": "para_901" }, { "text": "Upheaval 279–290 (1960). Schechter and Radford were", "paragraph_id": "para_902" }, { "text": "quite a blow to the President, invalidating aspects of his", "paragraph_id": "para_903" }, { "text": "signature legislation. Schechter found an unconstitutional", "paragraph_id": "para_904" }, { "text": "delegation of legislative power in a statute that gave the", "paragraph_id": "para_905" }, { "text": "President free rein to prescribe “standards of fair competi-", "paragraph_id": "para_906" }, { "text": "tion” business was obliged to follow. 295 U. S., at 534, 542.", "paragraph_id": "para_907" }, { "text": "And Radford found a violation of the Takings Clause in a", "paragraph_id": "para_908" }, { "text": "statute that allowed farmers who defaulted on their mort-", "paragraph_id": "para_909" }, { "text": "gages to retain possession of their property for years on end.", "paragraph_id": "para_910" }, { "text": "295 U. S., at 575–576, 601–602.", "paragraph_id": "para_911" }, { "text": "Having to contend with Myers, Humphrey’s said far less.", "paragraph_id": "para_912" }, { "text": "Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, started by reaf-", "paragraph_id": "para_913" }, { "text": "firming that the President possesses “the exclusive and il-", "paragraph_id": "para_914" }, { "text": "limitable power” to remove “all purely executive officers,”", "paragraph_id": "para_915" }, { "text": "just as Myers held. 295 U. S., at 627–628. He then pivoted.", "paragraph_id": "para_916" }, { "text": "There are some presidentially appointed officials, he", "paragraph_id": "para_917" }, { "text": "18 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_918" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_919" }, { "text": "explained, who may perform “executive function[s]” but ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_920" }, { "text": "ercise “no part of the executive power.” Id., at 628. And for", "paragraph_id": "para_921" }, { "text": "those officials, “the decision in the Myers case cannot be ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_922" }, { "text": "cepted as controlling.” Id., at 627.", "paragraph_id": "para_923" }, { "text": "The Court held that William Humphrey was one such of-", "paragraph_id": "para_924" }, { "text": "ficial. That was because the FTC’s duties were very lim-", "paragraph_id": "para_925" }, { "text": "ited—they were “neither political nor executive, but pre-", "paragraph_id": "para_926" }, { "text": "dominantly quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative.” Id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_927" }, { "text": "624. When courts requested the FTC’s help as a “master in", "paragraph_id": "para_928" }, { "text": "chancery” to recommend appropriate remedies in antitrust", "paragraph_id": "para_929" }, { "text": "litigation, for instance, it acted solely as a judicial aid. Id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_930" }, { "text": "at 628. When Congress requested the FTC’s help to “mak[e]", "paragraph_id": "para_931" }, { "text": "investigations and reports” on certain topics, it acted solely", "paragraph_id": "para_932" }, { "text": "as a legislative aid. Ibid. And when it brought (and adju-", "paragraph_id": "para_933" }, { "text": "dicated) charges against corporations it suspected of using", "paragraph_id": "para_934" }, { "text": "“unfair methods of competition” in commerce, it acted “in", "paragraph_id": "para_935" }, { "text": "part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_936" }, { "text": "Because these quasi functions did not require the use of “ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_937" }, { "text": "ecutive power,” Justice Sutherland reasoned, Humphrey", "paragraph_id": "para_938" }, { "text": "needed to answer only to Congress and the courts. Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_939" }, { "text": "Although the President may be the “master in his own", "paragraph_id": "para_940" }, { "text": "house,” he warned, he may not “impos[e] his control in the", "paragraph_id": "para_941" }, { "text": "house of another.” Id., at 630.", "paragraph_id": "para_942" }, { "text": "b", "paragraph_id": "para_943" }, { "text": "From the start, Humphrey’s was tethered to a highly cir-", "paragraph_id": "para_944" }, { "text": "cumscribed and almost fictional view of the FTC’s role.", "paragraph_id": "para_945" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s by its terms applied only to agencies that oc-", "paragraph_id": "para_946" }, { "text": "cupy “no place in the executive department,” are “independ-", "paragraph_id": "para_947" }, { "text": "ent of executive authority,” and exercise “no part of the ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_948" }, { "text": "ecutive power.” Id., at 625, 628. Indeed, Justice Sutherland", "paragraph_id": "para_949" }, { "text": "took pains to emphasize that “the character of the office”—", "paragraph_id": "para_950" }, { "text": "executive or nonexecutive—would determine the result of", "paragraph_id": "para_951" }, { "text": "future cases, and to reiterate that the Court’s decision was", "paragraph_id": "para_952" }, { "text": "limited “to officers of the kind here under consideration.”", "paragraph_id": "para_953" }, { "text": "Id., at 631–632.", "paragraph_id": "para_954" }, { "text": "19Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_955" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_956" }, { "text": "In later cases, although Humphrey’s announced dividing", "paragraph_id": "para_957" }, { "text": "line remained intact, more and more functions, we con-", "paragraph_id": "para_958" }, { "text": "cluded, in fact fell on the executive side of that line—and", "paragraph_id": "para_959" }, { "text": "thus within the President’s exclusive control. Where", "paragraph_id": "para_960" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s suggested that the power to enforce the law", "paragraph_id": "para_961" }, { "text": "against particular parties could be merely “quasi-judicial,”", "paragraph_id": "para_962" }, { "text": "or “in aid” of federal courts, see id., at 628, we held the op-", "paragraph_id": "para_963" }, { "text": "posite. “A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the", "paragraph_id": "para_964" }, { "text": "law,” we explained in 1976, “and it is to the President, and", "paragraph_id": "para_965" }, { "text": "not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the re-", "paragraph_id": "para_966" }, { "text": "sponsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-", "paragraph_id": "para_967" }, { "text": "cuted.’ ” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 138 (per curiam)", "paragraph_id": "para_968" }, { "text": "(quoting Art. II, §3). And where Humphrey’s suggested that", "paragraph_id": "para_969" }, { "text": "the power to “fill[ ] in” “the details” of a “general standard”", "paragraph_id": "para_970" }, { "text": "could be merely “quasi-legislative,” or “in aid” of Congress,", "paragraph_id": "para_971" }, { "text": "295 U. S., at 628, we again held the opposite. Although", "paragraph_id": "para_972" }, { "text": "“some administrative agency action . . . may resemble ‘law-", "paragraph_id": "para_973" }, { "text": "making,’ ” we explained in 1983, when an agency exercises", "paragraph_id": "para_974" }, { "text": "“legislatively delegated authority” to regulate private con-", "paragraph_id": "para_975" }, { "text": "duct, it exercises “[e]xecutive” power. INS v. Chadha, 462", "paragraph_id": "para_976" }, { "text": "U. S. 919, 953, n. 16; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_977" }, { "text": "714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to", "paragraph_id": "para_978" }, { "text": "implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of", "paragraph_id": "para_979" }, { "text": "‘execution’ of the law.”).", "paragraph_id": "para_980" }, { "text": "Soon enough, we recognized that Humphrey’s flunked", "paragraph_id": "para_981" }, { "text": "even its own test. “[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers of", "paragraph_id": "para_982" }, { "text": "the FTC,” even “at the time of Humphrey’s Executor,” we", "paragraph_id": "para_983" }, { "text": "explained in 1988, “would at the present time be considered", "paragraph_id": "para_984" }, { "text": "‘executive,’ at least to some degree.” Morrison v. Olson, 487", "paragraph_id": "para_985" }, { "text": "U. S. 654, 690, n. 28. Not one for understatement, Justice", "paragraph_id": "para_986" }, { "text": "Scalia observed in dissent that the Court had “swept”", "paragraph_id": "para_987" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s “into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional", "paragraph_id": "para_988" }, { "text": "principles.” 487 U. S., at 725. The Court put the matter", "paragraph_id": "para_989" }, { "text": "more delicately, but no less definitively. “We undoubtedly", "paragraph_id": "para_990" }, { "text": "did rely on the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and ‘quasi-judicial’ ”", "paragraph_id": "para_991" }, { "text": "in Humphrey’s, the Court noted, “but our present", "paragraph_id": "para_992" }, { "text": "20 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_993" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_994" }, { "text": "considered view is that” the constitutional question “cannot", "paragraph_id": "para_995" }, { "text": "be made to turn on” such “rigid categories,” at least for in-", "paragraph_id": "para_996" }, { "text": "ferior officers. 487 U. S., at 689. Contra, post, at 7", "paragraph_id": "para_997" }, { "text": "(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (asserting that Morrison v. Ol-", "paragraph_id": "para_998" }, { "text": "son in fact “applied and expanded Humphrey’s”).", "paragraph_id": "para_999" }, { "text": "Fast forward another few decades, and Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_1000" }, { "text": "premises had been further undermined. In two cases, Free", "paragraph_id": "para_1001" }, { "text": "Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight", "paragraph_id": "para_1002" }, { "text": "Board, 561 U. S. 477 (2010), and Seila Law LLC v. Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1003" }, { "text": "sumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197 (2020),", "paragraph_id": "para_1004" }, { "text": "we again considered the permissibility of restrictions on the", "paragraph_id": "para_1005" }, { "text": "President’s power of removal. In both cases, we reiterated", "paragraph_id": "para_1006" }, { "text": "Myers’s rule that the President exercises “general adminis-", "paragraph_id": "para_1007" }, { "text": "trative control of those executing the laws” and thus must", "paragraph_id": "para_1008" }, { "text": "be able to “remov[e] those for whom he can not continue to", "paragraph_id": "para_1009" }, { "text": "be responsible.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 492–", "paragraph_id": "para_1010" }, { "text": "493 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 117, 164); Seila Law, 591", "paragraph_id": "para_1011" }, { "text": "U. S., at 214 (same). In both cases, we emphasized that", "paragraph_id": "para_1012" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s had to be read “on its own terms,” and thus ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_1013" }, { "text": "plies only to agencies that perform “ ‘specified duties as a", "paragraph_id": "para_1014" }, { "text": "legislative or as a judicial aid.’ ” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_1015" }, { "text": "215, 219, n. 4 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_1016" }, { "text": "628); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 493. And in", "paragraph_id": "para_1017" }, { "text": "both cases, we refused to extend Humphrey’s to a “new sit-", "paragraph_id": "para_1018" }, { "text": "uation”—in Free Enterprise Fund, two layers of for-cause", "paragraph_id": "para_1019" }, { "text": "removal within an agency, 561 U. S., at 483, and in Seila", "paragraph_id": "para_1020" }, { "text": "Law, for-cause removal protection for the sole head of an", "paragraph_id": "para_1021" }, { "text": "agency, 591 U. S., at 220. As we put it in Seila Law,", "paragraph_id": "para_1022" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s is not a “freestanding invitation for Congress”", "paragraph_id": "para_1023" }, { "text": "to limit the President’s constitutional power. 591 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_1024" }, { "text": "228.", "paragraph_id": "para_1025" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s framework, in short, has not withstood the", "paragraph_id": "para_1026" }, { "text": "test of time. While Humphrey’s was surely right to focus on", "paragraph_id": "para_1027" }, { "text": "“the character of the office” at issue, 295 U. S., at 631, and", "paragraph_id": "para_1028" }, { "text": "surely right to say that “purely executive” powers must be", "paragraph_id": "para_1029" }, { "text": "controlled by the President, id., at 632, we long ago", "paragraph_id": "para_1030" }, { "text": "21Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1031" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1032" }, { "text": "abandoned the notion that there are some powers that are", "paragraph_id": "para_1033" }, { "text": "only partly executive. Forty years have now passed, in fact,", "paragraph_id": "para_1034" }, { "text": "since we recognized that the FTC exercises executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1035" }, { "text": "power—and did so even in 1935, when Humphrey’s was de-", "paragraph_id": "para_1036" }, { "text": "cided. See Morrison, 487 U. S., at 690, n. 28; id., at 724–", "paragraph_id": "para_1037" }, { "text": "725 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Seila Law, 591 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_1038" }, { "text": "216, n. 2. And more than 200 years have passed since we", "paragraph_id": "para_1039" }, { "text": "recognized that the Constitution “vests the whole executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1040" }, { "text": "power in the President” alone. Osborn v. Bank of United", "paragraph_id": "para_1041" }, { "text": "States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819 (1824) (Marshall, C. J., for the", "paragraph_id": "para_1042" }, { "text": "Court).", "paragraph_id": "para_1043" }, { "text": "At this point, all that is left of Humphrey’s is its observa-", "paragraph_id": "para_1044" }, { "text": "tion that an agency that “exercises no part of the executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1045" }, { "text": "power” need not fall within the rule of Presidential removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_1046" }, { "text": "295 U. S., at 628; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_1047" }, { "text": "361, 423–425, and n. 3 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_1048" }, { "text": "plaining that Humphrey’s stands only for the proposition", "paragraph_id": "para_1049" }, { "text": "that there would be “no strict constitutional impediment to", "paragraph_id": "para_1050" }, { "text": "a ‘branchless’ agency” that exercises “no governmental", "paragraph_id": "para_1051" }, { "text": "power”). If Congress wishes to establish independent agen-", "paragraph_id": "para_1052" }, { "text": "cies to assist it with its functions, it may do so. Cf. Buckley,", "paragraph_id": "para_1053" }, { "text": "424 U. S., at 137–138. But it may not foist those agencies", "paragraph_id": "para_1054" }, { "text": "upon the President, and thus deprive him of “the executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1055" }, { "text": "power vested [in him] by the Constitution”—something", "paragraph_id": "para_1056" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s itself never purported to permit. Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_1057" }, { "text": "Executor, 295 U. S., at 628.", "paragraph_id": "para_1058" }, { "text": "c", "paragraph_id": "para_1059" }, { "text": "If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it.", "paragraph_id": "para_1060" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s has for decades been a result in search of a ra-", "paragraph_id": "para_1061" }, { "text": "tionale. As we have often said, stare decisis is not an “inex-", "paragraph_id": "para_1062" }, { "text": "orable command,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 828", "paragraph_id": "para_1063" }, { "text": "(1991), and is at its weakest in constitutional cases, where", "paragraph_id": "para_1064" }, { "text": "only we may readily fix our own mistakes, Agostini v. Fel-", "paragraph_id": "para_1065" }, { "text": "ton, 521 U. S. 203, 235 (1997). Our precedents about prec-", "paragraph_id": "para_1066" }, { "text": "edent teach that a number of factors are relevant. Here,", "paragraph_id": "para_1067" }, { "text": "22 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1068" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1069" }, { "text": "every factor—the “quality” of the decision’s reasoning, its", "paragraph_id": "para_1070" }, { "text": "“consistency” with our other cases, the “workability” of its", "paragraph_id": "para_1071" }, { "text": "rule, and the interests of those who have “reli[ed]” on it,", "paragraph_id": "para_1072" }, { "text": "Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 203 (2019)—", "paragraph_id": "para_1073" }, { "text": "counsels in favor of letting Humphrey’s go.", "paragraph_id": "para_1074" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s has been difficult to make sense of from the", "paragraph_id": "para_1075" }, { "text": "start. “[O]nly by blind feats of definition” could the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1076" }, { "text": "transform powers that are quintessentially executive—in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1077" }, { "text": "vestigative and prosecutorial alike—into nonexecutive", "paragraph_id": "para_1078" }, { "text": "“quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions. P.", "paragraph_id": "para_1079" }, { "text": "Strauss, The Places of Agencies in Government, 84 Colum.", "paragraph_id": "para_1080" }, { "text": "L. Rev. 573, 625 (1984). As Justice Jackson memorably put", "paragraph_id": "para_1081" }, { "text": "it, Humphrey’s “retreat to the qualifying ‘quasi’ is implicit", "paragraph_id": "para_1082" }, { "text": "with confession that all recognized classifications have bro-", "paragraph_id": "para_1083" }, { "text": "ken down, and ‘quasi’ is a smooth cover which we draw over", "paragraph_id": "para_1084" }, { "text": "our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a", "paragraph_id": "para_1085" }, { "text": "disordered bed.” FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 487–", "paragraph_id": "para_1086" }, { "text": "488 (1952) (dissenting opinion). When an agency “executes”", "paragraph_id": "para_1087" }, { "text": "a congressional mandate against private parties, it exer-", "paragraph_id": "para_1088" }, { "text": "cises executive power—no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.", "paragraph_id": "para_1089" }, { "text": "For that reason, Humphrey’s is now far out of step with", "paragraph_id": "para_1090" }, { "text": "our cases, which have all but limited it to its facts. See su-", "paragraph_id": "para_1091" }, { "text": "pra, at 18–20. We long ago retreated from Humphrey’s. We", "paragraph_id": "para_1092" }, { "text": "applied it only once, in 1958, to a solely adjudicatory body", "paragraph_id": "para_1093" }, { "text": "that dealt with a limited category of claims for compensa-", "paragraph_id": "para_1094" }, { "text": "tion from those imprisoned or interned in the Second World", "paragraph_id": "para_1095" }, { "text": "War. Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 355–356. And", "paragraph_id": "para_1096" }, { "text": "even then, our constitutional analysis spanned only one", "paragraph_id": "para_1097" }, { "text": "brisk paragraph, as the case focused on the question", "paragraph_id": "para_1098" }, { "text": "whether the statute limited the President’s power at all.", "paragraph_id": "para_1099" }, { "text": "See id., at 356. Since then, we have undermined Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_1100" }, { "text": "rey’s premises at every turn. To persist in Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_1101" }, { "text": "would require us to depart from almost every case on the", "paragraph_id": "para_1102" }, { "text": "subject we have decided since.", "paragraph_id": "para_1103" }, { "text": "Little surprise, then, that no one knows how to apply", "paragraph_id": "para_1104" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s in practice. Does it protect all multimember", "paragraph_id": "para_1105" }, { "text": "23Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1106" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1107" }, { "text": "agencies? See Wilcox v. Trump, 775 F. Supp. 3d 215, 234", "paragraph_id": "para_1108" }, { "text": "(DC 2025). Or only those that are balanced along partisan", "paragraph_id": "para_1109" }, { "text": "lines? See Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. NLRB,", "paragraph_id": "para_1110" }, { "text": "151 F. 4th 761, 777–778 (CA5 2025). Those that wield some", "paragraph_id": "para_1111" }, { "text": "executive power, but not a lot? See Consumers’ Research v.", "paragraph_id": "para_1112" }, { "text": "Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 98 F. 4th 646, 652 (CA5", "paragraph_id": "para_1113" }, { "text": "2024) (Oldham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en", "paragraph_id": "para_1114" }, { "text": "banc). Or only those that do not wield the President’s “con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1115" }, { "text": "clusive and preclusive” powers? See Brief for Respondent", "paragraph_id": "para_1116" }, { "text": "25–28. Or perhaps it is only those that are “materially in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1117" }, { "text": "distinguishable from the 1935 FTC”? See Harris v. Bessent,", "paragraph_id": "para_1118" }, { "text": "2025 WL 980278, *15 (CADC 2025) (Walker, J., concur-", "paragraph_id": "para_1119" }, { "text": "ring). With its indeterminacy and unpredictability,", "paragraph_id": "para_1120" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s “has undermined the very ‘rule of law’ values", "paragraph_id": "para_1121" }, { "text": "that stare decisis exists to secure.” Loper Bright Enterprises", "paragraph_id": "para_1122" }, { "text": "v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 411 (2024) (quoting Michigan", "paragraph_id": "para_1123" }, { "text": "v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 798 (2014));", "paragraph_id": "para_1124" }, { "text": "see also In re Aiken County, 645 F. 3d 428, 442–446, and", "paragraph_id": "para_1125" }, { "text": "nn. 3–4 (CADC 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).", "paragraph_id": "para_1126" }, { "text": "All that is left is reliance, upon which Slaughter (and the", "paragraph_id": "para_1127" }, { "text": "dissent) rely. Slaughter argues that Congress has relied", "paragraph_id": "para_1128" }, { "text": "upon Humphrey’s to create agencies that are “insulated", "paragraph_id": "para_1129" }, { "text": "from presidential control.” Brief for Respondent 15; see also", "paragraph_id": "para_1130" }, { "text": "post, at 34–40 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). That is pre-", "paragraph_id": "para_1131" }, { "text": "cisely the problem. Despite what Humphrey’s may say, in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1132" }, { "text": "dependent agencies are not “independent” in the sense that", "paragraph_id": "para_1133" }, { "text": "they are free of the President and thus responsive “only to", "paragraph_id": "para_1134" }, { "text": "the people of the United States.” 295 U. S., at 625. Inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_1135" }, { "text": "pendent agencies are insulated “from the President,” “not", "paragraph_id": "para_1136" }, { "text": "from politics.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556", "paragraph_id": "para_1137" }, { "text": "U. S. 502, 523 (2009) (plurality opinion). “As a practical", "paragraph_id": "para_1138" }, { "text": "matter, successful insulation of administration from the", "paragraph_id": "para_1139" }, { "text": "President—even if accomplished in the name of ‘independ-", "paragraph_id": "para_1140" }, { "text": "ence’—will tend to enhance Congress’s own authority over", "paragraph_id": "para_1141" }, { "text": "the insulated activities.” E. Kagan, Presidential Admin-", "paragraph_id": "para_1142" }, { "text": "istration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2271, n. 93 (2001).", "paragraph_id": "para_1143" }, { "text": "24 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1144" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1145" }, { "text": "Placing the power to administer laws in officers who enjoy", "paragraph_id": "para_1146" }, { "text": "“freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection),” in", "paragraph_id": "para_1147" }, { "text": "other words, does not deliver us to a promised land of tech-", "paragraph_id": "para_1148" }, { "text": "nocratic governance—it often results only in an “increased", "paragraph_id": "para_1149" }, { "text": "subservience to congressional direction.” Fox Television,", "paragraph_id": "para_1150" }, { "text": "556 U. S., at 523 (plurality opinion). Congress may well", "paragraph_id": "para_1151" }, { "text": "have relied on Humphrey’s in taking more power for itself,", "paragraph_id": "para_1152" }, { "text": "but that is hardly one of the “legitimate” reliance interests", "paragraph_id": "para_1153" }, { "text": "that our precedents contemplate. South Dakota v. Wayfair,", "paragraph_id": "para_1154" }, { "text": "Inc., 585 U. S. 162, 186 (2018) (internal quotation marks", "paragraph_id": "para_1155" }, { "text": "omitted); cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 571–572", "paragraph_id": "para_1156" }, { "text": "(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). No branch may", "paragraph_id": "para_1157" }, { "text": "rely on adverse possession to claim power that the Consti-", "paragraph_id": "para_1158" }, { "text": "tution vests elsewhere.3", "paragraph_id": "para_1159" }, { "text": "The dissent contends that we ignore the reliance inter-", "paragraph_id": "para_1160" }, { "text": "ests of “[o]rdinary Americans and regulated firms alike.”", "paragraph_id": "para_1161" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1162" }, { "text": "3 The dissent nevertheless insists that “[i]ndependence was centrally", "paragraph_id": "para_1163" }, { "text": "important to Congress in creating these agencies” and indeed that “[a]t", "paragraph_id": "para_1164" }, { "text": "no point was it proposed that a commission ought to be set up unless it", "paragraph_id": "para_1165" }, { "text": "be independent.” Post, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). To the", "paragraph_id": "para_1166" }, { "text": "extent that consideration is relevant, it is relevant only in the context of", "paragraph_id": "para_1167" }, { "text": "severability. In our prior cases, “when confronting a constitutional flaw", "paragraph_id": "para_1168" }, { "text": "in a statute” like the one before us, we have sought to limit “the solution", "paragraph_id": "para_1169" }, { "text": "to the problem,” severing the invalid removal provision “while leaving", "paragraph_id": "para_1170" }, { "text": "the remainder intact.” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Account-", "paragraph_id": "para_1171" }, { "text": "ing Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 508 (2010) (internal quotation marks", "paragraph_id": "para_1172" }, { "text": "omitted); see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bu-", "paragraph_id": "para_1173" }, { "text": "reau, 591 U. S. 197, 233–238 (2020) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J., joined by", "paragraph_id": "para_1174" }, { "text": "ALITO and KAVANAUGH, JJ.) (deeming a removal provision severable); id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_1175" }, { "text": "at 296–297 (KAGAN, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,", "paragraph_id": "para_1176" }, { "text": "concurring in judgment with respect to severability and dissenting in", "paragraph_id": "para_1177" }, { "text": "part) (same). If the dissent now disagrees with that approach, and be-", "paragraph_id": "para_1178" }, { "text": "lieves that Congress generally “would have preferred no [agency] at all", "paragraph_id": "para_1179" }, { "text": "to [an agency] whose members are removable at will,” Free Enterprise", "paragraph_id": "para_1180" }, { "text": "Fund, 561 U. S., at 509, it is free to urge as much in a case in which the", "paragraph_id": "para_1181" }, { "text": "severability question is before us. In any event, the solution to “an Ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_1182" }, { "text": "ecutive Branch that Congress never dreamed of establishing,” post, at 38", "paragraph_id": "para_1183" }, { "text": "(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting), is not a headless fourth branch that the", "paragraph_id": "para_1184" }, { "text": "Framers never dreamed of establishing.", "paragraph_id": "para_1185" }, { "text": "25Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1186" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1187" }, { "text": "Post, at 39. Quite the contrary. “In its valiant search for", "paragraph_id": "para_1188" }, { "text": "reliance interests,” it is “the dissent [that] somehow misses", "paragraph_id": "para_1189" }, { "text": "maybe the most important one: the reliance interests of the", "paragraph_id": "para_1190" }, { "text": "American people . . . in the preservation of our constitution-", "paragraph_id": "para_1191" }, { "text": "ally promised liberties.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83,", "paragraph_id": "para_1192" }, { "text": "110–111 (2020) (plurality opinion of GORSUCH, J., joined by,", "paragraph_id": "para_1193" }, { "text": "inter alios, SOTOMAYOR, J.). “The diffusion of power carries", "paragraph_id": "para_1194" }, { "text": "with it a diffusion of accountability.” Free Enterprise Fund,", "paragraph_id": "para_1195" }, { "text": "561 U. S., at 497. When power is exercised well, the people", "paragraph_id": "para_1196" }, { "text": "know whom to thank; when power is exercised poorly, they", "paragraph_id": "para_1197" }, { "text": "know whom to blame—and whom to fire. That is the very", "paragraph_id": "para_1198" }, { "text": "premise of our system of government. See The Federalist", "paragraph_id": "para_1199" }, { "text": "No. 70, at 424 (A. Hamilton) (“The ingredients which con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1200" }, { "text": "stitute safety in the republican sense are a due dependence", "paragraph_id": "para_1201" }, { "text": "on the people, and a due responsibility.”). We adhere to that", "paragraph_id": "para_1202" }, { "text": "system today not in spite of the reliance interests of all", "paragraph_id": "para_1203" }, { "text": "Americans but because of them.", "paragraph_id": "para_1204" }, { "text": "III", "paragraph_id": "para_1205" }, { "text": "A", "paragraph_id": "para_1206" }, { "text": "With these principles in mind, this is not a close case.", "paragraph_id": "para_1207" }, { "text": "The FTC’s for-cause removal provision violates the separa-", "paragraph_id": "para_1208" }, { "text": "tion of powers. In its present form, the FTC enforces and", "paragraph_id": "para_1209" }, { "text": "administers some 80 statutes, which cover almost every", "paragraph_id": "para_1210" }, { "text": "facet of our Nation’s economy. The tasks it undertakes are", "paragraph_id": "para_1211" }, { "text": "“the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law”—precisely the", "paragraph_id": "para_1212" }, { "text": "President’s constitutional role. Bowsher, 478 U. S., at 733.", "paragraph_id": "para_1213" }, { "text": "First, the FTC has the power to promulgate substantive", "paragraph_id": "para_1214" }, { "text": "rules that carry the force of law. In the consumer-protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_1215" }, { "text": "tion realm, for instance, the FTC is tasked with giving con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1216" }, { "text": "tent to the startlingly abstract idea of “acts or practices", "paragraph_id": "para_1217" }, { "text": "which are unfair or deceptive.” 15 U. S. C. §57a(a)(1)(B). In", "paragraph_id": "para_1218" }, { "text": "other areas, it must, for example, determine what “docu-", "paragraph_id": "para_1219" }, { "text": "mentary material and information” one company must pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_1220" }, { "text": "vide when it wishes to acquire another, §18a(d), decide", "paragraph_id": "para_1221" }, { "text": "when and how websites must seek “verifiable parental", "paragraph_id": "para_1222" }, { "text": "26 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1223" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1224" }, { "text": "consent” when their services collect children’s personal in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1225" }, { "text": "formation, §6502(b), and “prescribe as necessary or appro-", "paragraph_id": "para_1226" }, { "text": "priate in the public interest or for the protection of United", "paragraph_id": "para_1227" }, { "text": "States citizens” rules barring the use of any “manipulative”", "paragraph_id": "para_1228" }, { "text": "technique in the sale of gasoline, 42 U. S. C. §17301. The", "paragraph_id": "para_1229" }, { "text": "power to flesh out such statutory regimes—and to do so", "paragraph_id": "para_1230" }, { "text": "through discretionary actions, largely outside the remit of", "paragraph_id": "para_1231" }, { "text": "courts—is executive through and through. Seila Law, 591", "paragraph_id": "para_1232" }, { "text": "U. S., at 218–220.", "paragraph_id": "para_1233" }, { "text": "Second, the FTC not only investigates businesses to en-", "paragraph_id": "para_1234" }, { "text": "sure they comply with its statutes and rules, 15 U. S. C.", "paragraph_id": "para_1235" }, { "text": "§§43, 46(a), 49, but enforces those statutes and rules", "paragraph_id": "para_1236" }, { "text": "through in-house adjudications. Indeed, it may even place", "paragraph_id": "para_1237" }, { "text": "the onus on a private party to comply with its orders—on", "paragraph_id": "para_1238" }, { "text": "pain of monetary penalties—before the case reaches the", "paragraph_id": "para_1239" }, { "text": "courts. See §45(g)(2). This power, too, is executive. Seila", "paragraph_id": "para_1240" }, { "text": "Law, 591 U. S., at 219 (discussing the ability to “unilater-", "paragraph_id": "para_1241" }, { "text": "ally issue final decisions” in “administrative adjudica-", "paragraph_id": "para_1242" }, { "text": "tions”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1243" }, { "text": "And third, the FTC files civil suits on behalf of the United", "paragraph_id": "para_1244" }, { "text": "States in federal court. It may select its remedies freely—", "paragraph_id": "para_1245" }, { "text": "from injunctions, §53(b), to civil penalties, §45(m), to any", "paragraph_id": "para_1246" }, { "text": "relief “necessary to redress injury to consumers,” including", "paragraph_id": "para_1247" }, { "text": "the “refund of money or return of property,” §57b(b).4 As we", "paragraph_id": "para_1248" }, { "text": "have said many times, the “discretionary power to seek ju-", "paragraph_id": "para_1249" }, { "text": "dicial relief ” lies at the very core of executive authority.", "paragraph_id": "para_1250" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1251" }, { "text": "4 This is no empty threat. In just the last few years, the FTC has", "paragraph_id": "para_1252" }, { "text": "sought and secured civil penalties in the hundreds of millions and bil-", "paragraph_id": "para_1253" }, { "text": "lions of dollars. See, e.g., FTC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:23–cv–00932", "paragraph_id": "para_1254" }, { "text": "(WD Wash., Sept. 25, 2025), ECF Doc. 535, p. 8 (entering $2.5 billion", "paragraph_id": "para_1255" }, { "text": "judgment pursuant to the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act);", "paragraph_id": "para_1256" }, { "text": "United States v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 5:22–cv–00518 (EDNC, Feb. 7,", "paragraph_id": "para_1257" }, { "text": "2023), ECF Doc. 15, p. 28 (entering $550 million judgment pursuant to", "paragraph_id": "para_1258" }, { "text": "the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998); FTC v. Equifax,", "paragraph_id": "para_1259" }, { "text": "Inc., No. 1:19–cv–03297 (ND Ga., July 23, 2019), ECF Doc. 6, pp. 27–31", "paragraph_id": "para_1260" }, { "text": "(entering $425 million judgment pursuant to a rule issued under the", "paragraph_id": "para_1261" }, { "text": "Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).", "paragraph_id": "para_1262" }, { "text": "27Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1263" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1264" }, { "text": "Buckley, 424 U. S., at 138; see also, e.g., United States v.", "paragraph_id": "para_1265" }, { "text": "Texas, 599 U. S. 670, 678–679 (2023) (it is up to the Execu-", "paragraph_id": "para_1266" }, { "text": "tive to “decide how to prioritize and how aggressively to", "paragraph_id": "para_1267" }, { "text": "pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the", "paragraph_id": "para_1268" }, { "text": "law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That “quintes-", "paragraph_id": "para_1269" }, { "text": "sentially executive” power may not be cleaved off from the", "paragraph_id": "para_1270" }, { "text": "Executive Branch. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 219.", "paragraph_id": "para_1271" }, { "text": "The FTC unquestionably exercises executive power, and", "paragraph_id": "para_1272" }, { "text": "must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive, in", "paragraph_id": "para_1273" }, { "text": "whom such power is vested. It follows, then, that Slaughter", "paragraph_id": "para_1274" }, { "text": "served as the President’s subordinate at the FTC—and that", "paragraph_id": "para_1275" }, { "text": "the President was entitled to cut her tenure short.", "paragraph_id": "para_1276" }, { "text": "B", "paragraph_id": "para_1277" }, { "text": "Because the FTC’s activities fall well within the heart-", "paragraph_id": "para_1278" }, { "text": "land of executive power, we have no occasion today to define", "paragraph_id": "para_1279" }, { "text": "the bounds of what such power entails. As our precedents", "paragraph_id": "para_1280" }, { "text": "recognize, not all offices created by Congress necessarily", "paragraph_id": "para_1281" }, { "text": "come with executive or even sovereign power attached. See,", "paragraph_id": "para_1282" }, { "text": "e.g., Buckley, 424 U. S., at 137–138 (contrasting the “discre-", "paragraph_id": "para_1283" }, { "text": "tionary power to seek judicial relief ” with powers “of an in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1284" }, { "text": "vestigative and informative nature,” which may “be re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1285" }, { "text": "garded as merely in aid of the legislative function of", "paragraph_id": "para_1286" }, { "text": "Congress”). To suggest otherwise would come as a surprise", "paragraph_id": "para_1287" }, { "text": "to, among other congressionally chartered entities, the Boy", "paragraph_id": "para_1288" }, { "text": "Scouts of America, 112 Stat. 1325, the Society of American", "paragraph_id": "para_1289" }, { "text": "Florists and Ornamental Horticulturalists, ch. 876, 31 Stat.", "paragraph_id": "para_1290" }, { "text": "1453, and Georgetown University, ch. 70, 6 Stat. 152.", "paragraph_id": "para_1291" }, { "text": "Relatedly, we have left open the possibility that some", "paragraph_id": "para_1292" }, { "text": "functions traditionally handled outside the Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1293" }, { "text": "Branch may not be encompassed by Myers’s general rule.", "paragraph_id": "para_1294" }, { "text": "Indeed, Myers itself placed “the greatest weight” on the", "paragraph_id": "para_1295" }, { "text": "early Congresses’ (and early Presidents’) “contemporaneous", "paragraph_id": "para_1296" }, { "text": "legislative exposition” of the Executive’s constitutional role.", "paragraph_id": "para_1297" }, { "text": "272 U. S., at 174–175. And one example we have given of", "paragraph_id": "para_1298" }, { "text": "an entity that may have such a unique role is the Federal", "paragraph_id": "para_1299" }, { "text": "28 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1300" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1301" }, { "text": "Reserve, to the extent that it follows in the distinct histori-", "paragraph_id": "para_1302" }, { "text": "cal tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United", "paragraph_id": "para_1303" }, { "text": "States—both of which influenced monetary policy and nei-", "paragraph_id": "para_1304" }, { "text": "ther of which were subject to plenary Presidential control.", "paragraph_id": "para_1305" }, { "text": "See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8. Our prior cases do", "paragraph_id": "para_1306" }, { "text": "not necessarily implicate the constitutionality of such ar-", "paragraph_id": "para_1307" }, { "text": "rangements. Our opinion today should not be read to do so", "paragraph_id": "para_1308" }, { "text": "either.", "paragraph_id": "para_1309" }, { "text": "Nor do we determine the fate of officials not before us. In", "paragraph_id": "para_1310" }, { "text": "particular, as the Solicitor General recognized at argument,", "paragraph_id": "para_1311" }, { "text": "the permissibility of tenure protections for the judges of", "paragraph_id": "para_1312" }, { "text": "“non-Article III courts,” such as the Tax Court and the", "paragraph_id": "para_1313" }, { "text": "Court of Federal Claims, is not “presented” or “briefed” in", "paragraph_id": "para_1314" }, { "text": "this case and poses a “different set of questions.” Tr. of Oral", "paragraph_id": "para_1315" }, { "text": "Arg. 15, 28. We leave those questions for another day. All", "paragraph_id": "para_1316" }, { "text": "we do today is recognize what has been clear for a century—", "paragraph_id": "para_1317" }, { "text": "that those who fall within the President’s “general admin-", "paragraph_id": "para_1318" }, { "text": "istrative control” must be removable by the President at", "paragraph_id": "para_1319" }, { "text": "will. Myers, 272 U. S., at 135.", "paragraph_id": "para_1320" }, { "text": "IV", "paragraph_id": "para_1321" }, { "text": "Although she disagrees with our conclusion, Slaughter at", "paragraph_id": "para_1322" }, { "text": "least accepts many of our premises. She agrees, for in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1323" }, { "text": "stance, that officers with “purely executive functions,” like", "paragraph_id": "para_1324" }, { "text": "the “postmaster in Myers,” must be removable at will by the", "paragraph_id": "para_1325" }, { "text": "President. Tr. of Oral Arg. 93. She agrees that “Seila Law", "paragraph_id": "para_1326" }, { "text": "is correct.” Id., at 115. And she agrees that “the Vesting", "paragraph_id": "para_1327" }, { "text": "Clause of Article II . . . establish[es] a general default pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_1328" }, { "text": "idential removal power.” Id., at 136.", "paragraph_id": "para_1329" }, { "text": "The dissent, on the other hand, sweeps the chess pieces", "paragraph_id": "para_1330" }, { "text": "off the board, rejecting not only Free Enterprise Fund and", "paragraph_id": "para_1331" }, { "text": "Seila Law but Myers and the Decision of 1789 as well. On", "paragraph_id": "para_1332" }, { "text": "its view, “there is no evidence that those who shaped or rat-", "paragraph_id": "para_1333" }, { "text": "ified the Constitution adopted the . . . general rule of at-will", "paragraph_id": "para_1334" }, { "text": "removal,” post, at 14—no matter the view expressed by", "paragraph_id": "para_1335" }, { "text": "Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Hamilton in the first", "paragraph_id": "para_1336" }, { "text": "29Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1337" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1338" }, { "text": "years of the Republic; no matter the practice of the First", "paragraph_id": "para_1339" }, { "text": "Congress and all our early Presidents; and no matter the", "paragraph_id": "para_1340" }, { "text": "Convention’s insistence upon “[u]nity in the Executive,” 1", "paragraph_id": "para_1341" }, { "text": "Farrand’s Records 66 (J. Wilson).", "paragraph_id": "para_1342" }, { "text": "To support its own position, the dissent relies on two", "paragraph_id": "para_1343" }, { "text": "passing comments in The Federalist. See post, at 15–17.", "paragraph_id": "para_1344" }, { "text": "Neither one helps. In Federalist No. 39, Madison noted that", "paragraph_id": "para_1345" }, { "text": "the “tenure” of “ministerial offices . . . will be a subject of", "paragraph_id": "para_1346" }, { "text": "legal regulation,” The Federalist No. 39, at 242, but it beg-", "paragraph_id": "para_1347" }, { "text": "gars belief to suggest that he intended so obliquely to per-", "paragraph_id": "para_1348" }, { "text": "mit Congress to hem in the President—it is far more likely", "paragraph_id": "para_1349" }, { "text": "that he intended only to endorse “regulation” of “tenure” in", "paragraph_id": "para_1350" }, { "text": "the sense of a limited term for executive officers, subject to", "paragraph_id": "para_1351" }, { "text": "Presidential removal in the interim.5 And in Federalist No.", "paragraph_id": "para_1352" }, { "text": "77, Hamilton said that the Senate’s consent “would be nec-", "paragraph_id": "para_1353" }, { "text": "essary to displace as well as to appoint,” id., No. 77, at 459,", "paragraph_id": "para_1354" }, { "text": "but it remains a subject of scholarly debate whether Ham-", "paragraph_id": "para_1355" }, { "text": "ilton meant “displace” in the sense of “remove” or “replace.”", "paragraph_id": "para_1356" }, { "text": "Certainly the idea that the Senate could force a new Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_1357" }, { "text": "dent to keep his predecessor’s Cabinet Secretaries is at odds", "paragraph_id": "para_1358" }, { "text": "with Hamilton’s claim that the Senate “cannot themselves", "paragraph_id": "para_1359" }, { "text": "choose” who will fill an office, even “if they withheld their", "paragraph_id": "para_1360" }, { "text": "assent” to the President’s pick, id., No. 66, at 405; at odds", "paragraph_id": "para_1361" }, { "text": "with Hamilton’s claim that the executive power is vested in", "paragraph_id": "para_1362" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1363" }, { "text": "5 Indeed, that is precisely what Madison would propose a year later for", "paragraph_id": "para_1364" }, { "text": "the Comptroller of the Treasury. The dissent (quoting Humphrey’s) thus", "paragraph_id": "para_1365" }, { "text": "errs in asserting that Madison ever “suggested” that Congress may “for-", "paragraph_id": "para_1366" }, { "text": "bid Presidential removal” of the Comptroller. Post, at 5–6 (internal quo-", "paragraph_id": "para_1367" }, { "text": "tation marks omitted); see also post, at 22–23, 31, 43 (reiterating the", "paragraph_id": "para_1368" }, { "text": "point). As we have twice now explained, “Madison’s actual proposal, con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1369" }, { "text": "sistent with his view of the Constitution, was that the Comptroller hold", "paragraph_id": "para_1370" }, { "text": "office for a term of ‘years, unless sooner removed by the President’; he", "paragraph_id": "para_1371" }, { "text": "would thus be ‘dependent upon the President, because he can be removed", "paragraph_id": "para_1372" }, { "text": "by him,’ and also ‘dependent upon the Senate, because they must consent", "paragraph_id": "para_1373" }, { "text": "to his [reappointment] for every term of years.’ ” Free Enterprise Fund,", "paragraph_id": "para_1374" }, { "text": "561 U. S., at 500, n. 6 (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 612 (1789)); Seila Law,", "paragraph_id": "para_1375" }, { "text": "591 U. S., at 227, n. 10 (same).", "paragraph_id": "para_1376" }, { "text": "30 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1377" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1378" }, { "text": "“one man” and is not subject “to the control and co-operation", "paragraph_id": "para_1379" }, { "text": "of others,” id., No. 70, at 424; and at odds with Hamilton’s", "paragraph_id": "para_1380" }, { "text": "claim that executive officers are “the assistants or deputies", "paragraph_id": "para_1381" }, { "text": "of the Chief Magistrate” and thus must “derive their offices", "paragraph_id": "para_1382" }, { "text": "from his . . . nomination” and remain “subject to his super-", "paragraph_id": "para_1383" }, { "text": "intendence,” id., No. 72, at 436. Whatever Hamilton meant", "paragraph_id": "para_1384" }, { "text": "at first, by 1793 he had expressly recognized that “[t]he", "paragraph_id": "para_1385" }, { "text": "power of removal from office” forms part of “the EXECUTIVE", "paragraph_id": "para_1386" }, { "text": "POWER of the Nation . . . vested in the President.” Pacificus", "paragraph_id": "para_1387" }, { "text": "No. 1 (June 29, 1793), in 15 Papers of Alexander Hamilton", "paragraph_id": "para_1388" }, { "text": "39–40 (H. Syrett ed. 1969). We see little reason why one", "paragraph_id": "para_1389" }, { "text": "line (really one word) from Federalist No. 77 should take", "paragraph_id": "para_1390" }, { "text": "precedence over the logic of The Federalist as a whole.", "paragraph_id": "para_1391" }, { "text": "We certainly see no reason why it should take precedence", "paragraph_id": "para_1392" }, { "text": "over the Decision of 1789. When it comes to those debates,", "paragraph_id": "para_1393" }, { "text": "the dissent has little to offer, beyond its efforts to limit the", "paragraph_id": "para_1394" }, { "text": "decision’s scope. Says the dissent: “The House in 1789 did", "paragraph_id": "para_1395" }, { "text": "not address whether Congress could place any limits on the", "paragraph_id": "para_1396" }, { "text": "President’s power to remove,” for it debated only whether", "paragraph_id": "para_1397" }, { "text": "the President had such a power “at all.” Post, at 19. The", "paragraph_id": "para_1398" }, { "text": "two, however, are one and the same. In holding that the", "paragraph_id": "para_1399" }, { "text": "President has the power to remove his subordinates “with-", "paragraph_id": "para_1400" }, { "text": "out an express grant from Congress,” post, at 20 (opinion of", "paragraph_id": "para_1401" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J.), Congress held that “the power of removal”", "paragraph_id": "para_1402" }, { "text": "forms part of “the Executive power,” 1 Annals of Cong. 382", "paragraph_id": "para_1403" }, { "text": "(Rep. Clymer). And to the extent that the power of removal", "paragraph_id": "para_1404" }, { "text": "is part of the executive power, it is as much outside Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1405" }, { "text": "gress’s control as the President’s power to grant pardons,", "paragraph_id": "para_1406" }, { "text": "veto bills, and recognize foreign sovereigns. See Schick v.", "paragraph_id": "para_1407" }, { "text": "Reed, 419 U. S. 256, 266 (1974) (a Presidential power that", "paragraph_id": "para_1408" }, { "text": "“flows from the Constitution . . . cannot be modified,", "paragraph_id": "para_1409" }, { "text": "abridged, or diminished by the Congress”); Zivotofsky v.", "paragraph_id": "para_1410" }, { "text": "Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 29–32 (2015).", "paragraph_id": "para_1411" }, { "text": "That is why no one at the time saw the First Congress as", "paragraph_id": "para_1412" }, { "text": "having endorsed merely a “default” “Presidential removal", "paragraph_id": "para_1413" }, { "text": "power” (if such a thing is not a contradiction in terms). Post,", "paragraph_id": "para_1414" }, { "text": "31Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1415" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1416" }, { "text": "at 13, 21 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Madison, in fact, said", "paragraph_id": "para_1417" }, { "text": "just the opposite. Because “the Executive power” vested in", "paragraph_id": "para_1418" }, { "text": "the President includes the power “to remov[e] . . . from of-", "paragraph_id": "para_1419" }, { "text": "fice,” he explained, “the Legislature has no right to diminish", "paragraph_id": "para_1420" }, { "text": "or modify” that power. 1 Annals of Cong. 463. Chief Justice", "paragraph_id": "para_1421" }, { "text": "Marshall agreed, explaining that the Decision of 1789", "paragraph_id": "para_1422" }, { "text": "viewed the President’s “power of removal” as “fixed in the", "paragraph_id": "para_1423" }, { "text": "constitution” and thus free from “legislative instability.” 5", "paragraph_id": "para_1424" }, { "text": "Marshall 200. The same was true for Justice Story, who", "paragraph_id": "para_1425" }, { "text": "said that the decision “expressed the sense of the legisla-", "paragraph_id": "para_1426" }, { "text": "ture, that the power of removal by the executive [of princi-", "paragraph_id": "para_1427" }, { "text": "pal officers] could not be abridged by the legislature.”", "paragraph_id": "para_1428" }, { "text": "3 Story §1531, at 390, n. 1.6", "paragraph_id": "para_1429" }, { "text": "With no support in the First Congress’s actual debate on", "paragraph_id": "para_1430" }, { "text": "the subject, the dissent (this time joined by Slaughter)", "paragraph_id": "para_1431" }, { "text": "turns to three early agencies that it contends were “at least", "paragraph_id": "para_1432" }, { "text": "semi-independent.” Post, at 24–26; see also Brief for Re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1433" }, { "text": "spondent 14–16. But the members of these agencies, too,", "paragraph_id": "para_1434" }, { "text": "were removable by the President at will. Indeed, the first", "paragraph_id": "para_1435" }, { "text": "of the three, the Revolutionary War Debt Commission, was", "paragraph_id": "para_1436" }, { "text": "composed solely of Presidential appointees, with a statute", "paragraph_id": "para_1437" }, { "text": "that did not purport to limit the President’s power of", "paragraph_id": "para_1438" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1439" }, { "text": "6 Despite having led with Story, the dissent eventually tries to call it a", "paragraph_id": "para_1440" }, { "text": "draw. Compare post, at 2 (listing Story in the pantheon of jurists who", "paragraph_id": "para_1441" }, { "text": "supposedly would join today’s dissenters), with post, at 23 (describing", "paragraph_id": "para_1442" }, { "text": "Story’s position as “equivocal” and “unclear”). Story was in fact quite", "paragraph_id": "para_1443" }, { "text": "clear. He identified the very “question” at issue in this case: “[W]hether", "paragraph_id": "para_1444" }, { "text": "congress can give any duration of office in such cases [of principal offic-", "paragraph_id": "para_1445" }, { "text": "ers], not subject to the exercise of this [Presidential] power of removal?”", "paragraph_id": "para_1446" }, { "text": "3 Story §1531, at 389. He then gave the First Congress’s answer (as", "paragraph_id": "para_1447" }, { "text": "already quoted): “In the debate in 1789 . . . the very question was dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_1448" }, { "text": "cussed; and the final vote seems to have expressed the sense of the leg-", "paragraph_id": "para_1449" }, { "text": "islature, that the power of removal by the executive could not be abridged", "paragraph_id": "para_1450" }, { "text": "by the legislature; at least, not in cases, where the power to appoint was", "paragraph_id": "para_1451" }, { "text": "not subject to legislative delegation.” Id., §1531, at 390, n. 1. There is", "paragraph_id": "para_1452" }, { "text": "no shame in disagreeing with Story’s appraisal of the Decision of 1789,", "paragraph_id": "para_1453" }, { "text": "but that is the reality of the dissent’s position.", "paragraph_id": "para_1454" }, { "text": "32 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1455" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1456" }, { "text": "removal. See Act of Aug. 5, 1790, ch. 38, 1 Stat. 178.7 And", "paragraph_id": "para_1457" }, { "text": "the latter two, the Mint Board and the Sinking Fund Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_1458" }, { "text": "mission, were both composed mostly of Cabinet Secretaries,", "paragraph_id": "para_1459" }, { "text": "who (all agree) could be fired at any time. See Act of Apr.", "paragraph_id": "para_1460" }, { "text": "2, 1792, 1 Stat. 250 (Mint Board); Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch.", "paragraph_id": "para_1461" }, { "text": "47, 1 Stat. 186 (Sinking Fund Commission). The only ques-", "paragraph_id": "para_1462" }, { "text": "tion arises as to one member of the Mint Board (the Chief", "paragraph_id": "para_1463" }, { "text": "Justice) and two members of the Sinking Fund Commission", "paragraph_id": "para_1464" }, { "text": "(the Chief Justice and the Vice President). Of course the", "paragraph_id": "para_1465" }, { "text": "President could not fire either one from his underlying po-", "paragraph_id": "para_1466" }, { "text": "sition, but that did not mean that he was unable to oust", "paragraph_id": "para_1467" }, { "text": "them from service within the Executive Branch itself. See", "paragraph_id": "para_1468" }, { "text": "Bamzai & Prakash 1842–1843. It is true that the President", "paragraph_id": "para_1469" }, { "text": "could not “add a new Vice President or Chief Justice” to re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1470" }, { "text": "place them, post, at 25, n. 10 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.),", "paragraph_id": "para_1471" }, { "text": "but that poses no constitutional problem. Either way, the", "paragraph_id": "para_1472" }, { "text": "President remains responsible—if he chooses to keep them", "paragraph_id": "para_1473" }, { "text": "in office, he is responsible for their conduct; if he chooses to", "paragraph_id": "para_1474" }, { "text": "remove them, he is responsible for the conduct of those who", "paragraph_id": "para_1475" }, { "text": "are left. Certainly these examples do not show that the", "paragraph_id": "para_1476" }, { "text": "founding-era Congress thought that it could take away the", "paragraph_id": "para_1477" }, { "text": "President’s power and give it to someone else, much less the", "paragraph_id": "para_1478" }, { "text": "Chief Justice or the Vice President.", "paragraph_id": "para_1479" }, { "text": "With no support in the founding era as a whole, the dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_1480" }, { "text": "sent opts to skip ahead a century or two.8 See post, at 10–", "paragraph_id": "para_1481" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1482" }, { "text": "7 Quoting a letter from Hamilton in which he described the Commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_1483" }, { "text": "sioners as “ ‘distinct and Independant Officers,’ ” the dissent infers that", "paragraph_id": "para_1484" }, { "text": "they must not have been removable by the President. Post, at 25 (quoting", "paragraph_id": "para_1485" }, { "text": "16 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 145 (H. Syrett ed. 1972)). Hamilton,", "paragraph_id": "para_1486" }, { "text": "however, said only that the Commissioners were “distinct and Independ-", "paragraph_id": "para_1487" }, { "text": "ant” from “[t]he Treasury”—not the President. Id., at 145 (emphasis", "paragraph_id": "para_1488" }, { "text": "added).", "paragraph_id": "para_1489" }, { "text": "8 Searching for earlier precedents, the dissent attempts to enlist Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_1490" }, { "text": "ident Lincoln as an “active participa[nt]” in its cause. Post, at 11. It does", "paragraph_id": "para_1491" }, { "text": "so, however, based solely on a law “ ‘adopted without discussion’ during", "paragraph_id": "para_1492" }, { "text": "the heat of the Civil War and abandoned” only a year later, “before it", "paragraph_id": "para_1493" }, { "text": "could be ‘tested by executive or judicial inquiry.’ ” Seila Law, 591 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_1494" }, { "text": "33Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1495" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1496" }, { "text": "12. “Today,” the dissent notes, “dozens of agencies are", "paragraph_id": "para_1497" }, { "text": "headed by commissioners or board members removable", "paragraph_id": "para_1498" }, { "text": "only for cause,” and “this longstanding practice” (it con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1499" }, { "text": "tends) “should be entitled to significant weight.” Post, at", "paragraph_id": "para_1500" }, { "text": "11–12. We have never endorsed such a practice-makes-per-", "paragraph_id": "para_1501" }, { "text": "fect theory of congressional power, and in fact rejected it in", "paragraph_id": "para_1502" }, { "text": "INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983). At issue in Chadha", "paragraph_id": "para_1503" }, { "text": "were the nearly 300 legislative vetoes adopted by the polit-", "paragraph_id": "para_1504" }, { "text": "ical branches over the course of 50 years—with more and", "paragraph_id": "para_1505" }, { "text": "more enacted each year. See id., at 944–945. As we saw", "paragraph_id": "para_1506" }, { "text": "matters, however, the popularity of the congressional veto", "paragraph_id": "para_1507" }, { "text": "only “sharpened” our review. Id., at 944. Such “ ‘political", "paragraph_id": "para_1508" }, { "text": "inventions’ ” must remain subject to “the demands of the", "paragraph_id": "para_1509" }, { "text": "Constitution,” we said, lest the political branches amend by", "paragraph_id": "para_1510" }, { "text": "agreement “integral parts of the constitutional design.” Id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_1511" }, { "text": "at 945–946. We say the same today.", "paragraph_id": "para_1512" }, { "text": "To bolster its reliance on modern practice, the dissent fo-", "paragraph_id": "para_1513" }, { "text": "cuses on a modern case, Humphrey’s.9 But it defends a", "paragraph_id": "para_1514" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1515" }, { "text": "at 220 (quoting Myers, 272 U. S., at 165). It perhaps goes without saying,", "paragraph_id": "para_1516" }, { "text": "but Lincoln—whose contemporaries called him “Abraham Rex”; who", "paragraph_id": "para_1517" }, { "text": "called himself the “master” of his administration; and who told his ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_1518" }, { "text": "pointees that he “must . . . be the judge, how long to retain in, and when", "paragraph_id": "para_1519" }, { "text": "to remove any . . . from his position”—likely did not see Presidential", "paragraph_id": "para_1520" }, { "text": "power the same way the dissent does. 2 M. Burlingame, Abraham Lin-", "paragraph_id": "para_1521" }, { "text": "coln: A Life 55, 456, 657 (2008).", "paragraph_id": "para_1522" }, { "text": "9 The dissent also invokes Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),", "paragraph_id": "para_1523" }, { "text": "but that case has nothing to do with this one. It is true that Chief Justice", "paragraph_id": "para_1524" }, { "text": "Marshall held (as the dissent puts it) that “an office[r] with a 5-year", "paragraph_id": "para_1525" }, { "text": "fixed-term tenure was ‘not removable at the will of the executive,’ ” post,", "paragraph_id": "para_1526" }, { "text": "at 27–28 (quoting Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 162), but the dissent ignores", "paragraph_id": "para_1527" }, { "text": "the fact that the “officer” in question was a justice of the peace in the", "paragraph_id": "para_1528" }, { "text": "District of Columbia. Such justices do not exercise executive power.", "paragraph_id": "para_1529" }, { "text": "They instead exercise the judicial power of the District, just as territorial", "paragraph_id": "para_1530" }, { "text": "judges exercise the judicial power of their respective territories. See Sere", "paragraph_id": "para_1531" }, { "text": "v. Pitot, 6 Cranch 332, 336–337 (1810) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court);", "paragraph_id": "para_1532" }, { "text": "American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 545–546 (1828)", "paragraph_id": "para_1533" }, { "text": "(same); see also Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 619", "paragraph_id": "para_1534" }, { "text": "(1838). The fact that Congress may prohibit the President from firing", "paragraph_id": "para_1535" }, { "text": "the District’s judges (who do not exercise his power) says nothing about", "paragraph_id": "para_1536" }, { "text": "34 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1537" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1538" }, { "text": "version of Humphrey’s that does not exist. On the dissent’s", "paragraph_id": "para_1539" }, { "text": "telling, Humphrey’s makes this a “profoundly easy case,” as", "paragraph_id": "para_1540" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s squarely holds that Congress may “forbid Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_1541" }, { "text": "idential ‘removal’ ” “[f]or an agency of this ‘character.’ ”", "paragraph_id": "para_1542" }, { "text": "Post, at 2, 5 (quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 631); see", "paragraph_id": "para_1543" }, { "text": "also post, at 1–2, 5–12, 27–30, 34–46 (relying on Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_1544" }, { "text": "rey’s). Only halfway through a footnote does the dissent", "paragraph_id": "para_1545" }, { "text": "acknowledge that “Humphrey’s described the FTC [in 1935]", "paragraph_id": "para_1546" }, { "text": "as sharing ‘no part of the executive power,’ ” post, at 8, n. 1", "paragraph_id": "para_1547" }, { "text": "(quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 628), which presumably", "paragraph_id": "para_1548" }, { "text": "forms part of an agency’s “character.” Nowhere does the", "paragraph_id": "para_1549" }, { "text": "dissent argue, however, that the FTC today exercises “no", "paragraph_id": "para_1550" }, { "text": "part of the executive power” or (to quote further from", "paragraph_id": "para_1551" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s) that the FTC occupies “no place in the execu-", "paragraph_id": "para_1552" }, { "text": "tive department” and ought to be “independent of executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1553" }, { "text": "authority.” Id., at 625, 628. The dissent may not keep the", "paragraph_id": "para_1554" }, { "text": "parts of Humphrey’s it likes and discard the rest.", "paragraph_id": "para_1555" }, { "text": "Indeed, the dissent’s ode to stare decisis is hard to recon-", "paragraph_id": "para_1556" }, { "text": "cile with its reinvention of Humphrey’s and shabby treat-", "paragraph_id": "para_1557" }, { "text": "ment of Myers. At least we have accorded Humphrey’s a", "paragraph_id": "para_1558" }, { "text": "respectful burial; the dissent would cast Myers aside with-", "paragraph_id": "para_1559" }, { "text": "out a second thought. See post, at 29–30 (denigrating My-", "paragraph_id": "para_1560" }, { "text": "ers). It is entitled to propose as much, of course, but it can", "paragraph_id": "para_1561" }, { "text": "hardly claim the mantle of stare decisis in doing so.", "paragraph_id": "para_1562" }, { "text": "When it comes to its own proposal for how precisely", "paragraph_id": "para_1563" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s should work in practice, the dissent says very", "paragraph_id": "para_1564" }, { "text": "little. Slaughter, for her part, is left with the vague argu-", "paragraph_id": "para_1565" }, { "text": "ment that we should police Congress’s decisions for “reason-", "paragraph_id": "para_1566" }, { "text": "ableness.” “[I]f Congress reasonably decides that the Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_1567" }, { "text": "ident should be able to remove some duly appointed officers", "paragraph_id": "para_1568" }, { "text": "only for certain causes and through certain processes,” she", "paragraph_id": "para_1569" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1570" }, { "text": "whether Congress may prohibit the President from firing his subordi-", "paragraph_id": "para_1571" }, { "text": "nates (who do). Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall must have thought as", "paragraph_id": "para_1572" }, { "text": "much, for he felt free to write just four years after Marbury that “the", "paragraph_id": "para_1573" }, { "text": "power of removal by the president . . . was by fair construction, fixed in", "paragraph_id": "para_1574" }, { "text": "the constitution,” as determined by the Decision of 1789. 5 Marshall 200.", "paragraph_id": "para_1575" }, { "text": "35Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1576" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1577" }, { "text": "argues, the courts should respect that decision, and require", "paragraph_id": "para_1578" }, { "text": "that the President “discharge his obligations under the", "paragraph_id": "para_1579" }, { "text": "Take Care Clause by going through those processes when", "paragraph_id": "para_1580" }, { "text": "warranted.” Brief for Respondent 25 (internal quotation", "paragraph_id": "para_1581" }, { "text": "marks omitted).", "paragraph_id": "para_1582" }, { "text": "That supposed limiting principle is neither limiting nor", "paragraph_id": "para_1583" }, { "text": "much of a principle. On Slaughter’s view (and presumably", "paragraph_id": "para_1584" }, { "text": "the dissent’s), Congress could commandeer the Environ-", "paragraph_id": "para_1585" }, { "text": "mental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce,", "paragraph_id": "para_1586" }, { "text": "the Department of Education, the Department of Health", "paragraph_id": "para_1587" }, { "text": "and Human Services, most (if not at all) of the Department", "paragraph_id": "para_1588" }, { "text": "of Justice, and a number of other agencies besides. Indeed,", "paragraph_id": "para_1589" }, { "text": "it is not clear to us why Congress would need to allow the", "paragraph_id": "para_1590" }, { "text": "President any say in firings. If it is so “critical” for an", "paragraph_id": "para_1591" }, { "text": "agency “to have independence and to act with impartiality", "paragraph_id": "para_1592" }, { "text": "free from the suspicion of partisan direction,” Brief for Re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1593" }, { "text": "spondent 22 (alterations and internal quotation marks", "paragraph_id": "para_1594" }, { "text": "omitted), then why should the President have a role at all?", "paragraph_id": "para_1595" }, { "text": "Certainly those legislators who disagreed with the Decision", "paragraph_id": "para_1596" }, { "text": "of 1789 were happy to leave him out. See 1 Annals of Cong.", "paragraph_id": "para_1597" }, { "text": "521 (Rep. Sedgwick) (arguing that Congress may vest the", "paragraph_id": "para_1598" }, { "text": "removal power in “the President, the President and Senate,", "paragraph_id": "para_1599" }, { "text": "or the Legislature, or any other person whom they might", "paragraph_id": "para_1600" }, { "text": "introduce into office, merely for that particular purpose”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1601" }, { "text": "The answer, then as now, is that these officers exercise", "paragraph_id": "para_1602" }, { "text": "the President’s power, not their own, and thus must be re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1603" }, { "text": "sponsible to him. We do not allow intrusions on Article I", "paragraph_id": "para_1604" }, { "text": "nor on Article III. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919; Stern", "paragraph_id": "para_1605" }, { "text": "v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462 (2011). We see no reason to allow", "paragraph_id": "para_1606" }, { "text": "intrusions on Article II either.", "paragraph_id": "para_1607" }, { "text": "* * *", "paragraph_id": "para_1608" }, { "text": "Our Constitution creates three branches, but only one", "paragraph_id": "para_1609" }, { "text": "President. That President is not all powerful—not by any", "paragraph_id": "para_1610" }, { "text": "means. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866);", "paragraph_id": "para_1611" }, { "text": "Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579", "paragraph_id": "para_1612" }, { "text": "36 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1613" }, { "text": "Opinion of the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1614" }, { "text": "(1952); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). But he", "paragraph_id": "para_1615" }, { "text": "is not impotent either. He and he alone is vested with “[t]he", "paragraph_id": "para_1616" }, { "text": "executive Power” of the United States. Art. II, §1, cl. 1.", "paragraph_id": "para_1617" }, { "text": "To “discharg[e] the duties of his trust,” the President", "paragraph_id": "para_1618" }, { "text": "must have the assistance of officers he can trust. 30 Writ-", "paragraph_id": "para_1619" }, { "text": "ings of George Washington, at 334. Although it is up to the", "paragraph_id": "para_1620" }, { "text": "Senate to decide whether to confirm those with whom the", "paragraph_id": "para_1621" }, { "text": "President would prefer to work, neither Congress nor the", "paragraph_id": "para_1622" }, { "text": "courts may saddle him with those with whom he cannot", "paragraph_id": "para_1623" }, { "text": "work. Subordinates who exercise the President’s power are", "paragraph_id": "para_1624" }, { "text": "subject to removal by him. Then, and only then, can they", "paragraph_id": "para_1625" }, { "text": "remain accountable to the President, and the President to", "paragraph_id": "para_1626" }, { "text": "the people.", "paragraph_id": "para_1627" }, { "text": "The judgment of the United States District Court for the", "paragraph_id": "para_1628" }, { "text": "District of Columbia is reversed, and the case is remanded", "paragraph_id": "para_1629" }, { "text": "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.", "paragraph_id": "para_1630" }, { "text": "It is so ordered.", "paragraph_id": "para_1631" }, { "text": "_________________", "paragraph_id": "para_1632" }, { "text": "_________________", "paragraph_id": "para_1633" }, { "text": "1Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1634" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1635" }, { "text": "SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES", "paragraph_id": "para_1636" }, { "text": "No. 25–332", "paragraph_id": "para_1637" }, { "text": "DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED", "paragraph_id": "para_1638" }, { "text": "STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. REBECCA", "paragraph_id": "para_1639" }, { "text": "KELLY SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1640" }, { "text": "ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE", "paragraph_id": "para_1641" }, { "text": "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE", "paragraph_id": "para_1642" }, { "text": "DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT", "paragraph_id": "para_1643" }, { "text": "[June 29, 2026]", "paragraph_id": "para_1644" }, { "text": "JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring.", "paragraph_id": "para_1645" }, { "text": "To fulfill his constitutional duty to ensure the laws are", "paragraph_id": "para_1646" }, { "text": "faithfully executed, the Court holds, the President must", "paragraph_id": "para_1647" }, { "text": "have the ability to remove principal officers who exercise", "paragraph_id": "para_1648" }, { "text": "executive power in his name. That includes those who run", "paragraph_id": "para_1649" }, { "text": "independent agencies like the Federal Trade Commission", "paragraph_id": "para_1650" }, { "text": "(FTC). Ante, at 2. With all this, I agree.", "paragraph_id": "para_1651" }, { "text": "But neither can I ignore the implications that follow. To-", "paragraph_id": "para_1652" }, { "text": "day, independent agencies do not just exercise executive", "paragraph_id": "para_1653" }, { "text": "law-enforcement powers. Congress has also delegated to", "paragraph_id": "para_1654" }, { "text": "them vast legislative and judicial powers, effectively allow-", "paragraph_id": "para_1655" }, { "text": "ing these agencies to make laws and decide disputes under", "paragraph_id": "para_1656" }, { "text": "them. And, after today’s decision, the President can effec-", "paragraph_id": "para_1657" }, { "text": "tively exercise all those powers too.", "paragraph_id": "para_1658" }, { "text": "It’s a development that raises important questions, not", "paragraph_id": "para_1659" }, { "text": "least these: Would Congress have delegated so much", "paragraph_id": "para_1660" }, { "text": "power, including legislative and judicial power, to inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_1661" }, { "text": "pendent agencies had it known that the President would", "paragraph_id": "para_1662" }, { "text": "come to control them? How will Congress respond now—if", "paragraph_id": "para_1663" }, { "text": "realistically it can? And what, if anything, will this Court", "paragraph_id": "para_1664" }, { "text": "do about it?", "paragraph_id": "para_1665" }, { "text": "2 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1666" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1667" }, { "text": "I", "paragraph_id": "para_1668" }, { "text": "A", "paragraph_id": "para_1669" }, { "text": "Begin with how we got here. One strand of the story runs", "paragraph_id": "para_1670" }, { "text": "this way, and it starts in the academy. In the early 20th", "paragraph_id": "para_1671" }, { "text": "century, a group of scholars including Woodrow Wilson and", "paragraph_id": "para_1672" }, { "text": "James Landis came to the view that our “simple tripartite", "paragraph_id": "para_1673" }, { "text": "form of government” was “inadequa[te] . . . to deal with", "paragraph_id": "para_1674" }, { "text": "modern problems.” J. Landis, The Administrative Process", "paragraph_id": "para_1675" }, { "text": "1 (1938) (Landis). Really, they thought, our constitutional", "paragraph_id": "para_1676" }, { "text": "system had become “unworkable.” F. Goodnow, Politics and", "paragraph_id": "para_1677" }, { "text": "Administration 14 (1900) (Goodnow); see also H. Laski, Au-", "paragraph_id": "para_1678" }, { "text": "thority in the Modern State 70–71 (1919).", "paragraph_id": "para_1679" }, { "text": "To meet modern challenges, Wilson and others argued,", "paragraph_id": "para_1680" }, { "text": "American government needed to reorient itself around the", "paragraph_id": "para_1681" }, { "text": "goal of operating with the “utmost possible efficiency.” W.", "paragraph_id": "para_1682" }, { "text": "Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 197", "paragraph_id": "para_1683" }, { "text": "(1887) (Wilson, Study of Administration). Impressed by the", "paragraph_id": "para_1684" }, { "text": "perceived competence of the Prussian bureaucracy, they", "paragraph_id": "para_1685" }, { "text": "called on the Nation to stop “dogmatiz[ing] about the con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1686" }, { "text": "stitution of government.” Id., at 197–199 (emphasis de-", "paragraph_id": "para_1687" }, { "text": "leted); see also id., at 204, 217. In our changing world, they", "paragraph_id": "para_1688" }, { "text": "said, the project of “distinguish[ing] . . . between” legisla-", "paragraph_id": "para_1689" }, { "text": "tive, executive, and judicial powers had to “g[i]ve way . . . to", "paragraph_id": "para_1690" }, { "text": "the exigencies of governance.” Landis 1–2.", "paragraph_id": "para_1691" }, { "text": "All told, Wilson and his followers argued for an entirely", "paragraph_id": "para_1692" }, { "text": "new model of “[p]ublic administration.” Wilson, Study of", "paragraph_id": "para_1693" }, { "text": "Administration 212. To be sure, this model had its nuances,", "paragraph_id": "para_1694" }, { "text": "and its proponents their disagreements. But a few ideas", "paragraph_id": "para_1695" }, { "text": "were central to the project. First, new agencies needed to", "paragraph_id": "para_1696" }, { "text": "be created and staffed by scientific and technical “expert[s]”", "paragraph_id": "para_1697" }, { "text": "with the “technical skill” to translate “far-reaching . . . leg-", "paragraph_id": "para_1698" }, { "text": "islation into reality.” Landis 25–26; id., at 23–25 (empha-", "paragraph_id": "para_1699" }, { "text": "sizing the “need for expertness”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1700" }, { "text": "Second, these experts had to be insulated from political", "paragraph_id": "para_1701" }, { "text": "control. As Wilson put it, the Nation’s traditional commit-", "paragraph_id": "para_1702" }, { "text": "ment to “popular sovereignty” entrusted too much to a", "paragraph_id": "para_1703" }, { "text": "3Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1704" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1705" }, { "text": "“selfish, ignorant, timid, stubborn, or foolish” people. Wil-", "paragraph_id": "para_1706" }, { "text": "son, Study of Administration 207–208. And letting the pub-", "paragraph_id": "para_1707" }, { "text": "lic anywhere near the new bureaucracies would amount to", "paragraph_id": "para_1708" }, { "text": "letting “a rustic handl[e] delicate machinery.” Id., at 215;", "paragraph_id": "para_1709" }, { "text": "see also W. Wilson, Shorthand Diary, in 1 Papers of Wood-", "paragraph_id": "para_1710" }, { "text": "row Wilson 143 (A. Link ed. 1966) (“[U]niversal suffrage is", "paragraph_id": "para_1711" }, { "text": "at the foundation of every evil in this country”); cf. Goodnow", "paragraph_id": "para_1712" }, { "text": "85.", "paragraph_id": "para_1713" }, { "text": "Finally, to fulfill their new responsibilities, politically in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1714" }, { "text": "sulated agency experts needed power. Lots of it. Much", "paragraph_id": "para_1715" }, { "text": "more than just executive authority to enforce the laws Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_1716" }, { "text": "gress writes. They also required authority over “legislative", "paragraph_id": "para_1717" }, { "text": "and judicial acts.” W. Wilson, Notes for Lectures on Admin-", "paragraph_id": "para_1718" }, { "text": "istration at the Johns Hopkins (1891), in 7 Papers of Wood-", "paragraph_id": "para_1719" }, { "text": "row Wilson 136 (A. Link ed. 1969) (Wilson, Notes). All told,", "paragraph_id": "para_1720" }, { "text": "they needed “legislative power,” “executive power,” and—", "paragraph_id": "para_1721" }, { "text": "while they were at it—“whatever power might be required", "paragraph_id": "para_1722" }, { "text": "to achieve the desired results.” Landis 10; see also Wilson,", "paragraph_id": "para_1723" }, { "text": "Notes 138 (describing as “advantag[e]ous” the Prussian", "paragraph_id": "para_1724" }, { "text": "“union . . . of legislativ[e], administrative, and judicial func-", "paragraph_id": "para_1725" }, { "text": "tions”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1726" }, { "text": "B", "paragraph_id": "para_1727" }, { "text": "Influential as these ideas were, they met with some hard", "paragraph_id": "para_1728" }, { "text": "realities as they progressed from the academy into the halls", "paragraph_id": "para_1729" }, { "text": "of government. For an illustration, look no further than the", "paragraph_id": "para_1730" }, { "text": "FTC itself and the case at the center of today’s dispute,", "paragraph_id": "para_1731" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).", "paragraph_id": "para_1732" }, { "text": "Congress created the FTC in 1914 through legislation that", "paragraph_id": "para_1733" }, { "text": "by-then President Wilson signed into law. See ch. 311, 38", "paragraph_id": "para_1734" }, { "text": "Stat. 717. In establishing the agency, Congress endowed it", "paragraph_id": "para_1735" }, { "text": "with considerable power both to define and prosecute “un-", "paragraph_id": "para_1736" }, { "text": "fair methods of competition.” Id., at 719–720. And in the", "paragraph_id": "para_1737" }, { "text": "same breath, Congress insulated the agency’s leadership", "paragraph_id": "para_1738" }, { "text": "from democratic control, at least to a degree: Once leaders", "paragraph_id": "para_1739" }, { "text": "were appointed by the President and confirmed by the", "paragraph_id": "para_1740" }, { "text": "4 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1741" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1742" }, { "text": "Senate, Congress provided, the President could remove", "paragraph_id": "para_1743" }, { "text": "them only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance", "paragraph_id": "para_1744" }, { "text": "in office.” Id., at 718.", "paragraph_id": "para_1745" }, { "text": "Even so, the notion that the FTC and agencies like it", "paragraph_id": "para_1746" }, { "text": "would be led by technical experts who would neutrally and", "paragraph_id": "para_1747" }, { "text": "scientifically chart the Nation’s path soon began to look a", "paragraph_id": "para_1748" }, { "text": "bit “quaint.” See E. Kagan, Presidential Administration,", "paragraph_id": "para_1749" }, { "text": "114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2261 (2001). Maybe that was be-", "paragraph_id": "para_1750" }, { "text": "cause politicians remained in control of the appointment", "paragraph_id": "para_1751" }, { "text": "and confirmation processes. Maybe it was because they re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1752" }, { "text": "tained so many other ways to influence an agency’s actions.", "paragraph_id": "para_1753" }, { "text": "Maybe it was because policymaking, even when performed", "paragraph_id": "para_1754" }, { "text": "by technical experts, almost always requires tradeoffs be-", "paragraph_id": "para_1755" }, { "text": "tween competing values. Or maybe it was because of some", "paragraph_id": "para_1756" }, { "text": "combination of these and other factors. See N. Rao, Admin-", "paragraph_id": "para_1757" }, { "text": "istrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collec-", "paragraph_id": "para_1758" }, { "text": "tive Congress, 90 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1463, 1477–1484 (2015).", "paragraph_id": "para_1759" }, { "text": "Whatever the causes, it didn’t take long for the problem", "paragraph_id": "para_1760" }, { "text": "to surface. Just take William E. Humphrey. In 1925, about", "paragraph_id": "para_1761" }, { "text": "a decade after giving up his seat in Congress for a failed", "paragraph_id": "para_1762" }, { "text": "Senate bid, he landed a job as one of the FTC’s Commission-", "paragraph_id": "para_1763" }, { "text": "ers. See G. Davis, The Transformation of the Federal Trade", "paragraph_id": "para_1764" }, { "text": "Commission, 1914–1929, 49 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 437,", "paragraph_id": "para_1765" }, { "text": "445–448 (1962). It seems Humphrey’s primary qualifica-", "paragraph_id": "para_1766" }, { "text": "tion for the job wasn’t so much his technical expertise as his", "paragraph_id": "para_1767" }, { "text": "loyalty to the Republican party then holding the White", "paragraph_id": "para_1768" }, { "text": "House, along perhaps with his “close connection[s] with", "paragraph_id": "para_1769" }, { "text": "northwestern lumber interests, which had suffered the un-", "paragraph_id": "para_1770" }, { "text": "favorable publicity of [an FTC] investigation” in recent", "paragraph_id": "para_1771" }, { "text": "years. Id., at 445.", "paragraph_id": "para_1772" }, { "text": "If politics rather than neutral technical expertise landed", "paragraph_id": "para_1773" }, { "text": "Humphrey the job, they also soon made him a target for re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1774" }, { "text": "moval. Shortly after Democrats swept the election of 1932,", "paragraph_id": "para_1775" }, { "text": "President Franklin D. Roosevelt fired Humphrey. The", "paragraph_id": "para_1776" }, { "text": "President did not accuse him of inefficiency, neglect of duty,", "paragraph_id": "para_1777" }, { "text": "or malfeasance, the standard Congress had set for the", "paragraph_id": "para_1778" }, { "text": "5Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1779" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1780" }, { "text": "removal of FTC Commissioners. See 38 Stat. 718. Nor does", "paragraph_id": "para_1781" }, { "text": "it seem the President was especially concerned with", "paragraph_id": "para_1782" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s expertise (or lack of it). Instead, it appears", "paragraph_id": "para_1783" }, { "text": "that President Roosevelt could not tolerate the “ada-", "paragraph_id": "para_1784" }, { "text": "mant[ly] conservative” Humphrey holding influence over", "paragraph_id": "para_1785" }, { "text": "the FTC during “an important phase of the New Deal,” and", "paragraph_id": "para_1786" }, { "text": "he wanted someone more sympathetic for the job. W.", "paragraph_id": "para_1787" }, { "text": "Leuchtenburg, The Case of the Contentious Commissioner:", "paragraph_id": "para_1788" }, { "text": "Humphreys’ Executor v. U. S., in Freedom and Reform 305–", "paragraph_id": "para_1789" }, { "text": "306 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds. 1967); see also id., at 305", "paragraph_id": "para_1790" }, { "text": "(reciting Humphrey’s complaint that he had been fired for", "paragraph_id": "para_1791" }, { "text": "“ ‘purely political reasons’ ” (quoting Letter from W. Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_1792" }, { "text": "rey to G. Norris (Oct. 4, 1933))).", "paragraph_id": "para_1793" }, { "text": "C", "paragraph_id": "para_1794" }, { "text": "If the Wilsonian vision of agencies run by neutral experts", "paragraph_id": "para_1795" }, { "text": "began buckling under the weight of reality early on, an-", "paragraph_id": "para_1796" }, { "text": "other feature of the plan stuck. Those in charge of these", "paragraph_id": "para_1797" }, { "text": "new agencies often became very difficult to dislodge.", "paragraph_id": "para_1798" }, { "text": "Whether this result represented a faithful manifestation of", "paragraph_id": "para_1799" }, { "text": "the Wilsonian project or something else entirely poses an", "paragraph_id": "para_1800" }, { "text": "interesting question (political actors—like Humphrey—in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1801" }, { "text": "sulated from politics?). But that is how things unfolded,", "paragraph_id": "para_1802" }, { "text": "and once again Humphrey was at the center of it all. So", "paragraph_id": "para_1803" }, { "text": "was this Court.", "paragraph_id": "para_1804" }, { "text": "When President Roosevelt fired Humphrey, he had good", "paragraph_id": "para_1805" }, { "text": "reason to think he stood on firm legal ground. To be sure,", "paragraph_id": "para_1806" }, { "text": "Congress had imposed statutory restrictions on his removal", "paragraph_id": "para_1807" }, { "text": "authority and the President had not even pretended to com-", "paragraph_id": "para_1808" }, { "text": "ply with those restrictions when he dismissed Humphrey.", "paragraph_id": "para_1809" }, { "text": "But less than a decade earlier, this Court had held in Myers", "paragraph_id": "para_1810" }, { "text": "v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), that Article II of the", "paragraph_id": "para_1811" }, { "text": "Constitution extends to the President the power, un-", "paragraph_id": "para_1812" }, { "text": "bounded by contrary statutes, to remove presidentially ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_1813" }, { "text": "pointed officers like Humphrey. See id., at 163–176.", "paragraph_id": "para_1814" }, { "text": "6 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1815" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1816" }, { "text": "As it turned out, the President’s expectations proved mis-", "paragraph_id": "para_1817" }, { "text": "placed. When Humphrey sued to challenge his dismissal,", "paragraph_id": "para_1818" }, { "text": "this Court brushed Myers aside, upheld Congress’s removal", "paragraph_id": "para_1819" }, { "text": "restrictions, and declared Humphrey’s firing unlawful even", "paragraph_id": "para_1820" }, { "text": "though he was in no position to reclaim his post. He died", "paragraph_id": "para_1821" }, { "text": "during the course of the litigation, leaving his heirs as the", "paragraph_id": "para_1822" }, { "text": "only immediate winners; the decision paved the way for", "paragraph_id": "para_1823" }, { "text": "them to secure his backpay. See Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_1824" }, { "text": "618, 632. But the broader implications of the Court’s deci-", "paragraph_id": "para_1825" }, { "text": "sion were unmistakable and met with mixed reactions.", "paragraph_id": "para_1826" }, { "text": "James Landis greeted the decision with “deligh[t].” J. Lan-", "paragraph_id": "para_1827" }, { "text": "dis, Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Law Clerk’s View, 46 Publica-", "paragraph_id": "para_1828" }, { "text": "tions of the Am. Jewish Hist. Soc. 467, 472 (1957). No won-", "paragraph_id": "para_1829" }, { "text": "der. The Supreme Court, after all, had just signed off on at", "paragraph_id": "para_1830" }, { "text": "least one aspect of his new model of public administration", "paragraph_id": "para_1831" }, { "text": "by permitting Congress to insulate agency leaders from di-", "paragraph_id": "para_1832" }, { "text": "rect presidential control. Meanwhile, and for exactly the", "paragraph_id": "para_1833" }, { "text": "same reason, President Roosevelt reportedly “saw in the de-", "paragraph_id": "para_1834" }, { "text": "cision the most direct of all possible trespasses on his pow-", "paragraph_id": "para_1835" }, { "text": "ers as Chief Executive” and “was completely infuriated.” J.", "paragraph_id": "para_1836" }, { "text": "Alsop & T. Catledge, The 168 Days 14 (1938). So much so", "paragraph_id": "para_1837" }, { "text": "that “[i]t may very well have been [Humphrey’s], even more", "paragraph_id": "para_1838" }, { "text": "than the other decisions of 1935, which provided the motive", "paragraph_id": "para_1839" }, { "text": "for” President Roosevelt’s subsequent attempt to pack the", "paragraph_id": "para_1840" }, { "text": "Court. R. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt 392 (1957).", "paragraph_id": "para_1841" }, { "text": "But if Humphrey’s invited very different reactions, there", "paragraph_id": "para_1842" }, { "text": "was perhaps one thing nearly everyone could agree on. Af-", "paragraph_id": "para_1843" }, { "text": "ter the Court’s ruling, Congress rolled out one new “inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_1844" }, { "text": "pendent” agency after another. Of course, the term “inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_1845" }, { "text": "pendent” was always a bit of a misnomer. As we’ve seen,", "paragraph_id": "para_1846" }, { "text": "these agencies were never truly independent from politics", "paragraph_id": "para_1847" }, { "text": "or even the influence of the President’s appointment pow-", "paragraph_id": "para_1848" }, { "text": "ers. But the leadership of these new agencies at least en-", "paragraph_id": "para_1849" }, { "text": "joyed protection against at-will presidential removal. And", "paragraph_id": "para_1850" }, { "text": "Congress turned out so many new independent agencies", "paragraph_id": "para_1851" }, { "text": "that a committee President Roosevelt assembled a few", "paragraph_id": "para_1852" }, { "text": "7Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1853" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1854" }, { "text": "years later complained of the rise of a new “headless ‘fourth", "paragraph_id": "para_1855" }, { "text": "branch’ of the Government, a haphazard deposit of irre-", "paragraph_id": "para_1856" }, { "text": "sponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers,” one that did", "paragraph_id": "para_1857" }, { "text": "“violence to the basic theory of the American Constitution.”", "paragraph_id": "para_1858" }, { "text": "President’s Committee on Administrative Management,", "paragraph_id": "para_1859" }, { "text": "Report on Administrative Management in the Government", "paragraph_id": "para_1860" }, { "text": "of the United States 36 (1937) (Roosevelt Committee). In", "paragraph_id": "para_1861" }, { "text": "all, the Committee found, Congress had already created “a", "paragraph_id": "para_1862" }, { "text": "dozen” agencies “independent” of the President. Id., at 36,", "paragraph_id": "para_1863" }, { "text": "40; see also Investigation of Executive Agencies of the Gov-", "paragraph_id": "para_1864" }, { "text": "ernment, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 85 (S. Comm. Print 1937,", "paragraph_id": "para_1865" }, { "text": "prepared by the Brookings Inst.) (describing “vast and ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_1866" }, { "text": "tremely important fields of Government activity almost re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1867" }, { "text": "moved from the President’s direct administrative control”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1868" }, { "text": "D", "paragraph_id": "para_1869" }, { "text": "Congress’s newfound ability to insulate agencies from di-", "paragraph_id": "para_1870" }, { "text": "rect presidential control may have encouraged it to lean", "paragraph_id": "para_1871" }, { "text": "into the last essential pillar of Wilson’s design too. In", "paragraph_id": "para_1872" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s wake, Congress increasingly assigned broad", "paragraph_id": "para_1873" }, { "text": "powers to the agencies it created, including legislative and", "paragraph_id": "para_1874" }, { "text": "judicial powers. Before Humphrey’s, delegating those sorts", "paragraph_id": "para_1875" }, { "text": "of authorities to an agency risked “merely increasing” the", "paragraph_id": "para_1876" }, { "text": "President’s own power—he might remove agency heads and", "paragraph_id": "para_1877" }, { "text": "seek new ones who would do his bidding. Landis 46; see", "paragraph_id": "para_1878" }, { "text": "also I. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission: A", "paragraph_id": "para_1879" }, { "text": "Study in Administrative Law and Procedure, pt. 2, p. 453", "paragraph_id": "para_1880" }, { "text": "(1931). But Humphrey’s changed the equation, making in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1881" }, { "text": "dependent agencies more tempting repositories for dele-", "paragraph_id": "para_1882" }, { "text": "gated powers that the President could not access with quite", "paragraph_id": "para_1883" }, { "text": "such ease.", "paragraph_id": "para_1884" }, { "text": "The result? Independent agencies today hold tremendous", "paragraph_id": "para_1885" }, { "text": "sway over the Nation’s affairs. They regulate our busi-", "paragraph_id": "para_1886" }, { "text": "nesses, 15 U. S. C. §57a, and our financial markets, §78w.", "paragraph_id": "para_1887" }, { "text": "They set the rules for the internet and airwaves. 47 U. S. C.", "paragraph_id": "para_1888" }, { "text": "§303. They decide how we light our homes, 42 U. S. C.", "paragraph_id": "para_1889" }, { "text": "8 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1890" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1891" }, { "text": "§§7171–7172, how we run our elections, 52 U. S. C. §30106,", "paragraph_id": "para_1892" }, { "text": "and the manner of our employment, 29 U. S. C. §§153, 160.", "paragraph_id": "para_1893" }, { "text": "They determine what toys our children will play with, 15", "paragraph_id": "para_1894" }, { "text": "U. S. C. §§2063(a)(2), (3), (d)(2), and how we interact with", "paragraph_id": "para_1895" }, { "text": "each other at work, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5. And, as the dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_1896" }, { "text": "sent explains, so much more. See post, at 38 (opinion of", "paragraph_id": "para_1897" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J.).1", "paragraph_id": "para_1898" }, { "text": "Often, these agencies do all this with hardly any statu-", "paragraph_id": "para_1899" }, { "text": "tory guidance, based on broad grants of legislative author-", "paragraph_id": "para_1900" }, { "text": "ity. The FTC, for example, enjoys what the Court calls the", "paragraph_id": "para_1901" }, { "text": "“startlin[g]” power to define, outlaw, and prosecute any", "paragraph_id": "para_1902" }, { "text": "“ ‘acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive.’ ” Ante, at", "paragraph_id": "para_1903" }, { "text": "25 (quoting 15 U. S. C. §57a(a)(1)(B)). The Securities and", "paragraph_id": "para_1904" }, { "text": "Exchange Commission (SEC) may “make such rules and", "paragraph_id": "para_1905" }, { "text": "regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to imple-", "paragraph_id": "para_1906" }, { "text": "ment,” 15 U. S. C. §78w(a)(1), its mandate “to insure the", "paragraph_id": "para_1907" }, { "text": "maintenance of fair and honest markets,” §78b. The Fed-", "paragraph_id": "para_1908" }, { "text": "eral Communications Commission (FCC) has “exclusive au-", "paragraph_id": "para_1909" }, { "text": "thority to grant licenses” to broadcasters “ ‘based on ‘public", "paragraph_id": "para_1910" }, { "text": "convenience, interest, or necessity.’ ” Metro Broadcasting,", "paragraph_id": "para_1911" }, { "text": "Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 553 (1990) (quoting 47 U. S. C.", "paragraph_id": "para_1912" }, { "text": "§303). One could go on.", "paragraph_id": "para_1913" }, { "text": "Nor have these agencies hesitated to employ the powers", "paragraph_id": "para_1914" }, { "text": "Congress has given them. Take a few examples from just", "paragraph_id": "para_1915" }, { "text": "the past two years. In 2024, the SEC took on climate", "paragraph_id": "para_1916" }, { "text": "change. See 89 Fed. Reg. 21668, 21683 (requiring “Climate-", "paragraph_id": "para_1917" }, { "text": "Related Disclosures” in SEC filings). That same year, the", "paragraph_id": "para_1918" }, { "text": "FTC sought to ban nearly all employee noncompete agree-", "paragraph_id": "para_1919" }, { "text": "ments nationwide. 89 Fed. Reg. 38342. And then there’s", "paragraph_id": "para_1920" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_1921" }, { "text": "1 Some of these agencies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission", "paragraph_id": "para_1922" }, { "text": "and the Federal Election Commission, do not even have formal statutory", "paragraph_id": "para_1923" }, { "text": "removal protections. But in practice, that has generally proved no bar to", "paragraph_id": "para_1924" }, { "text": "their independence until today. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fi-", "paragraph_id": "para_1925" }, { "text": "nancial Protection Bureau, 881 F. 3d 75, 90 (CADC 2018) (en banc) (tak-", "paragraph_id": "para_1926" }, { "text": "ing for granted the “traditional for-cause protection enjoyed by the SEC", "paragraph_id": "para_1927" }, { "text": "Commissioners”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1928" }, { "text": "9Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_1929" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1930" }, { "text": "late-night comedy. Last year, taking objection to a network", "paragraph_id": "para_1931" }, { "text": "host’s on-air remarks, the Chairman of the FCC suggested", "paragraph_id": "para_1932" }, { "text": "there would be “additional work . . . ahead” for the agency", "paragraph_id": "para_1933" }, { "text": "if broadcasting companies did not “find ways to . . . take ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_1934" }, { "text": "tion.” The Benny Show, Sept. 17, 2025 (“[W]e can do this", "paragraph_id": "para_1935" }, { "text": "the easy way or the hard way”).", "paragraph_id": "para_1936" }, { "text": "Some independent agencies even have de facto authority", "paragraph_id": "para_1937" }, { "text": "to create new crimes. By the 1990s, one scholar estimated", "paragraph_id": "para_1938" }, { "text": "that “over 300,000 federal regulations,” many of them", "paragraph_id": "para_1939" }, { "text": "adopted by independent agencies, “may be enforced crimi-", "paragraph_id": "para_1940" }, { "text": "nally.” J. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:", "paragraph_id": "para_1941" }, { "text": "Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in", "paragraph_id": "para_1942" }, { "text": "American Law, 71 B. U. L. Rev. 193, 216 (1991). More re-", "paragraph_id": "para_1943" }, { "text": "cent and exact totals are hard to come by—some say there", "paragraph_id": "para_1944" }, { "text": "may be simply too many regulatory crimes to count. See", "paragraph_id": "para_1945" }, { "text": "id., at 218.", "paragraph_id": "para_1946" }, { "text": "Over time, Congress has afforded agencies not just", "paragraph_id": "para_1947" }, { "text": "sweeping legislative powers but judicial ones as well, in-", "paragraph_id": "para_1948" }, { "text": "cluding the power to decide cases and controversies affect-", "paragraph_id": "para_1949" }, { "text": "ing Americans’ private rights. We have recently begun ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_1950" }, { "text": "dressing whether some of these schemes comply with", "paragraph_id": "para_1951" }, { "text": "Article III’s assurance of an independent judge, the Seventh", "paragraph_id": "para_1952" }, { "text": "Amendment’s promise of a jury trial, and the Due Process", "paragraph_id": "para_1953" }, { "text": "Clause’s guarantee of a fair trial before a fair tribunal. See", "paragraph_id": "para_1954" }, { "text": "SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S. 109, 123–126 (2024); see also id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_1955" }, { "text": "at 141 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). Even so, certain of those", "paragraph_id": "para_1956" }, { "text": "schemes persist. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-", "paragraph_id": "para_1957" }, { "text": "tional Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U. S. 442,", "paragraph_id": "para_1958" }, { "text": "447–450, 461 (1977).", "paragraph_id": "para_1959" }, { "text": "Would Congress have gone so far down this road, delegat-", "paragraph_id": "para_1960" }, { "text": "ing so much legislative and judicial power to agencies, with-", "paragraph_id": "para_1961" }, { "text": "out Humphrey’s assurance that their leaders would enjoy", "paragraph_id": "para_1962" }, { "text": "protection against at-will presidential removal? Maybe.", "paragraph_id": "para_1963" }, { "text": "After all, Congress has also granted expansive authorities", "paragraph_id": "para_1964" }, { "text": "to various “executive” agencies whose heads have been sub-", "paragraph_id": "para_1965" }, { "text": "ject to at-will presidential removal all along. But very", "paragraph_id": "para_1966" }, { "text": "10 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_1967" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_1968" }, { "text": "possibly not. Humphrey’s itself described removal protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_1969" }, { "text": "tions as “essential” to the FTC’s structure. 295 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_1970" }, { "text": "625. Ms. Slaughter cites evidence that “ ‘[a]t no point was", "paragraph_id": "para_1971" }, { "text": "it proposed that [an FTC] ought to be set up unless it be", "paragraph_id": "para_1972" }, { "text": "independent.’ ” Brief for Respondent 5 (quoting R. Cush-", "paragraph_id": "para_1973" }, { "text": "man, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 188", "paragraph_id": "para_1974" }, { "text": "(1941)). Over the years, many commentators have offered", "paragraph_id": "para_1975" }, { "text": "similar assessments. See, e.g., Landis 111 (noting “a corre-", "paragraph_id": "para_1976" }, { "text": "lation between the creation of the independent agency and", "paragraph_id": "para_1977" }, { "text": "broad grants of administrative power”); M. Bernstein, Reg-", "paragraph_id": "para_1978" }, { "text": "ulating Business by Independent Commission 148–149", "paragraph_id": "para_1979" }, { "text": "(1955) (observing that many delegations “might not have", "paragraph_id": "para_1980" }, { "text": "been enacted if Congress had not been able to delegate reg-", "paragraph_id": "para_1981" }, { "text": "ulatory duties to agencies somewhat removed from contin-", "paragraph_id": "para_1982" }, { "text": "uing presidential guidance”). My dissenting colleagues", "paragraph_id": "para_1983" }, { "text": "share the same view too. See post, at 35–36.", "paragraph_id": "para_1984" }, { "text": "II", "paragraph_id": "para_1985" }, { "text": "A", "paragraph_id": "para_1986" }, { "text": "The Court’s decision today may take aim at removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_1987" }, { "text": "tections and, in that way, one part of Wilson’s vision. But,", "paragraph_id": "para_1988" }, { "text": "as we have seen, other parts never fully materialized. It", "paragraph_id": "para_1989" }, { "text": "was never the case that neutral experts alone led the agen-", "paragraph_id": "para_1990" }, { "text": "cies Congress created. And it was never true that those", "paragraph_id": "para_1991" }, { "text": "agencies were entirely insulated from politics or even pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_1992" }, { "text": "idential influence. Nor can the demise of one more vestige", "paragraph_id": "para_1993" }, { "text": "of Wilson’s ambitions come as a surprise. As the Court per-", "paragraph_id": "para_1994" }, { "text": "suasively explains, Myers was right all along and so was", "paragraph_id": "para_1995" }, { "text": "President Roosevelt: Humphrey’s did “violence to the basic", "paragraph_id": "para_1996" }, { "text": "theory of the American Constitution,” which leaves no room", "paragraph_id": "para_1997" }, { "text": "for a “headless ‘fourth branch.’ ” Roosevelt Committee 36.", "paragraph_id": "para_1998" }, { "text": "Instead, those who exercise executive power must be ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_1999" }, { "text": "countable through a “chain of dependence” running from", "paragraph_id": "para_2000" }, { "text": "the “lowest officers” to “the President,” and from him to the", "paragraph_id": "para_2001" }, { "text": "sovereign American people. 1 Annals of Cong. 499 (1789)", "paragraph_id": "para_2002" }, { "text": "(J. Madison). As even Wilson and Landis acknowledged,", "paragraph_id": "para_2003" }, { "text": "11Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2004" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_2005" }, { "text": "their plans for a new scheme of “public administration” al-", "paragraph_id": "para_2006" }, { "text": "ways stood in more than a little tension with the Constitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2007" }, { "text": "tion’s design.", "paragraph_id": "para_2008" }, { "text": "But if today’s decision represents an important step back", "paragraph_id": "para_2009" }, { "text": "toward the Constitution, it’s also worth considering the im-", "paragraph_id": "para_2010" }, { "text": "plications it holds for the last remaining pillar of Wilson’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2011" }, { "text": "plan. Apparently relying on the assumption that it can af-", "paragraph_id": "para_2012" }, { "text": "ford their leaders some protection against presidential re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2013" }, { "text": "moval, Congress has not just assigned executive law-en-", "paragraph_id": "para_2014" }, { "text": "forcement power to independent agencies. It has delegated", "paragraph_id": "para_2015" }, { "text": "extensive lawmaking and adjudicative functions to them as", "paragraph_id": "para_2016" }, { "text": "well. Today’s decision may not have occasion to address", "paragraph_id": "para_2017" }, { "text": "those delegations directly, but it carries weighty conse-", "paragraph_id": "para_2018" }, { "text": "quences for them. Open-ended delegations of legislative", "paragraph_id": "para_2019" }, { "text": "power have not gone away; now they will just be exercised", "paragraph_id": "para_2020" }, { "text": "by agency officials who answer to the President. The power", "paragraph_id": "para_2021" }, { "text": "to write new regulatory crimes still exists, but now the pen", "paragraph_id": "para_2022" }, { "text": "ultimately rests in the President’s hand. The ability to", "paragraph_id": "para_2023" }, { "text": "judge disputes in-house remains, but now the house is", "paragraph_id": "para_2024" }, { "text": "white.", "paragraph_id": "para_2025" }, { "text": "The whole of the President’s authority also may be", "paragraph_id": "para_2026" }, { "text": "greater than the sum of its parts. It would be one thing if", "paragraph_id": "para_2027" }, { "text": "today’s decision afforded the White House more control over", "paragraph_id": "para_2028" }, { "text": "the airwaves. Or financial markets. Or energy. But Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_2029" }, { "text": "idents now will enjoy waxing authority over all those areas", "paragraph_id": "para_2030" }, { "text": "and more. A business out of favor with the party in control", "paragraph_id": "para_2031" }, { "text": "of the White House might be able to stave off an FCC inves-", "paragraph_id": "para_2032" }, { "text": "tigation. But can it survive a subsequent FTC rule declar-", "paragraph_id": "para_2033" }, { "text": "ing unlawful one of its longstanding trade practices? What", "paragraph_id": "para_2034" }, { "text": "about an in-house adjudication by OSHA? Or a prosecution", "paragraph_id": "para_2035" }, { "text": "for a new crime the SEC announces? Not to mention what", "paragraph_id": "para_2036" }, { "text": "these now-coordinated powers could do to disfavored indi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2037" }, { "text": "viduals who lack the resources needed to fend off such at-", "paragraph_id": "para_2038" }, { "text": "tacks. It may be true that after today there is no more", "paragraph_id": "para_2039" }, { "text": "“fourth branch” of government. But the fourth branch’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2040" }, { "text": "12 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2041" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_2042" }, { "text": "powers still exist; they have just been reassigned to the", "paragraph_id": "para_2043" }, { "text": "President.", "paragraph_id": "para_2044" }, { "text": "If all that weren’t enough, Presidents have many other", "paragraph_id": "para_2045" }, { "text": "ways to consolidate their influence over agencies—both tra-", "paragraph_id": "para_2046" }, { "text": "ditional executive agencies and now-formerly independent", "paragraph_id": "para_2047" }, { "text": "ones. Take just a couple examples. For decades, Presidents", "paragraph_id": "para_2048" }, { "text": "have employed the Office of Information and Regulatory Af-", "paragraph_id": "para_2049" }, { "text": "fairs (OIRA) to oversee proposed executive agency actions", "paragraph_id": "para_2050" }, { "text": "that carry significant economic impacts. See, e.g., Exec. Or-", "paragraph_id": "para_2051" }, { "text": "der No. 12291, 3 CFR 127 (1981 Comp.); Exec. Order No.", "paragraph_id": "para_2052" }, { "text": "12866, 3 CFR 638 (1993 Comp.). And even before today’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2053" }, { "text": "decision, the President has extended OIRA review to many", "paragraph_id": "para_2054" }, { "text": "independent agencies. Exec. Order No. 14215, 90 Fed. Reg.", "paragraph_id": "para_2055" }, { "text": "10447 (2025). Separately, Presidents can sometimes adjust", "paragraph_id": "para_2056" }, { "text": "the reach of the civil service laws. While those laws ordi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2057" }, { "text": "narily afford rank-and-file agency employees considerable", "paragraph_id": "para_2058" }, { "text": "protection against removal, see 5 U. S. C. §§7511–7513,", "paragraph_id": "para_2059" }, { "text": "they do not apply to certain employees who hold positions", "paragraph_id": "para_2060" }, { "text": "“of a confidential policy-determining, policy-making or pol-", "paragraph_id": "para_2061" }, { "text": "icy-advocating character,” §7511(b)(2). And by classifying", "paragraph_id": "para_2062" }, { "text": "more and more positions as subject to this exception, Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_2063" }, { "text": "idents can seek to exert greater control over not just agency", "paragraph_id": "para_2064" }, { "text": "leaders but their subordinates as well. See, e.g., 91", "paragraph_id": "para_2065" }, { "text": "Fed. Reg. 5580, 5628, 5650 (2026) (subjecting “tens of thou-", "paragraph_id": "para_2066" }, { "text": "sands” of additional positions, in both executive and inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_2067" }, { "text": "pendent agencies, to this exception).", "paragraph_id": "para_2068" }, { "text": "So, yes, those who exercise executive power must be ulti-", "paragraph_id": "para_2069" }, { "text": "mately answerable to the President and, through him, to", "paragraph_id": "para_2070" }, { "text": "the American people. But while electoral accountability is", "paragraph_id": "para_2071" }, { "text": "a good thing, it cannot be the only thing. And allowing Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_2072" }, { "text": "idents to control not only executive functions, but also vast", "paragraph_id": "para_2073" }, { "text": "new reservoirs of legislative and judicial powers, risks in-", "paragraph_id": "para_2074" }, { "text": "viting exactly what those who framed our Constitution", "paragraph_id": "para_2075" }, { "text": "feared: the “accumulation of all powers . . . in the same", "paragraph_id": "para_2076" }, { "text": "hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether heredi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2077" }, { "text": "tary, self appointed, or elective.” The Federalist No. 47,", "paragraph_id": "para_2078" }, { "text": "13Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2079" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_2080" }, { "text": "p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (emphasis added).", "paragraph_id": "para_2081" }, { "text": "No nation, after all, can expect happy results when “the leg-", "paragraph_id": "para_2082" }, { "text": "islative and executive powers are united in the same per-", "paragraph_id": "para_2083" }, { "text": "son”—or, one might add, when judicial powers are added to", "paragraph_id": "para_2084" }, { "text": "that union. Id., at 325 (internal quotation marks omitted).", "paragraph_id": "para_2085" }, { "text": "B", "paragraph_id": "para_2086" }, { "text": "If allowing so much legislative and judicial power to ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_2087" }, { "text": "cumulate in the President’s hands invites real risks, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2088" }, { "text": "question becomes: Who will address them?", "paragraph_id": "para_2089" }, { "text": "At first blush, the most natural answer might seem Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2090" }, { "text": "gress. Aware now that the premise on which it apparently", "paragraph_id": "para_2091" }, { "text": "proceeded was flawed—independent agencies are not so in-", "paragraph_id": "para_2092" }, { "text": "dependent after all—Congress might wish to reconsider", "paragraph_id": "para_2093" }, { "text": "how much power should remain in the President’s hands.", "paragraph_id": "para_2094" }, { "text": "But if that seems a straightforward solution, there’s a", "paragraph_id": "para_2095" }, { "text": "straightforward problem with it. Of course, Congress still", "paragraph_id": "para_2096" }, { "text": "possesses tools—most notably its appropriations author-", "paragraph_id": "para_2097" }, { "text": "ity—to “influence how the President exercises” his legisla-", "paragraph_id": "para_2098" }, { "text": "tive and judicial functions. Learning Resources v. Trump,", "paragraph_id": "para_2099" }, { "text": "607 U. S. 229, 271 (2026) (GORSUCH, J., concurring). But", "paragraph_id": "para_2100" }, { "text": "“[a]ny President keen on his own authority . . . will have a", "paragraph_id": "para_2101" }, { "text": "strong incentive to veto” any effort to reclaim those powers.", "paragraph_id": "para_2102" }, { "text": "Id., at 270–271. The consequence is a ratchet effect: Au-", "paragraph_id": "para_2103" }, { "text": "thorities Congress once delegated by a simple majority may", "paragraph_id": "para_2104" }, { "text": "now require a veto-proof supermajority to retrieve.", "paragraph_id": "para_2105" }, { "text": "Perhaps, then, if any real response is to come it will have", "paragraph_id": "para_2106" }, { "text": "to come from this Court. And that’s hardly unfair. To be", "paragraph_id": "para_2107" }, { "text": "sure, Congress had a hand in creating the problem we now", "paragraph_id": "para_2108" }, { "text": "face. But this Court bears responsibility as well. It was", "paragraph_id": "para_2109" }, { "text": "this Court that decided Humphrey’s. It was this Court that", "paragraph_id": "para_2110" }, { "text": "sat by while Congress delegated vast legislative and judi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2111" }, { "text": "cial powers to one independent agency after another. And", "paragraph_id": "para_2112" }, { "text": "it is this Court that today allows the President to remove", "paragraph_id": "para_2113" }, { "text": "those agencies’ leaders and exercise effective control over", "paragraph_id": "para_2114" }, { "text": "14 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2115" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_2116" }, { "text": "all their powers. If the task of fixing a problem belongs to", "paragraph_id": "para_2117" }, { "text": "those who made it, this Court has some work to do.", "paragraph_id": "para_2118" }, { "text": "Fortunately, the Constitution provides the blueprint for", "paragraph_id": "para_2119" }, { "text": "the job ahead. That charter provides a far surer and more", "paragraph_id": "para_2120" }, { "text": "democratically legitimate scheme of “public administra-", "paragraph_id": "para_2121" }, { "text": "tion” than anything Wilson conjured up. With the assent of", "paragraph_id": "para_2122" }, { "text": "the governed, and subject to amendment by them alone, our", "paragraph_id": "para_2123" }, { "text": "Constitution created three branches of government—not", "paragraph_id": "para_2124" }, { "text": "four, and not just one led by the President either. Each", "paragraph_id": "para_2125" }, { "text": "branch bears the authority and responsibility to exercise", "paragraph_id": "para_2126" }, { "text": "distinct powers. Congress must make the laws that govern", "paragraph_id": "para_2127" }, { "text": "us, the executive branch must faithfully execute those laws,", "paragraph_id": "para_2128" }, { "text": "and independent judges and juries must decide disputes", "paragraph_id": "para_2129" }, { "text": "that arise under them.", "paragraph_id": "para_2130" }, { "text": "Fortunately, too, this Court already has many doctrines", "paragraph_id": "para_2131" }, { "text": "designed to protect the Constitution’s separation of powers.", "paragraph_id": "para_2132" }, { "text": "Just as today’s decision holds that Article II requires those", "paragraph_id": "para_2133" }, { "text": "who exercise executive power to answer to an elected Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_2134" }, { "text": "ident, this Court’s nondelegation doctrine recognizes that", "paragraph_id": "para_2135" }, { "text": "Article I vests “[a]ll” federal legislative power in Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_2136" }, { "text": "and no one else. See Art. I, §1. Of course, Congress can", "paragraph_id": "para_2137" }, { "text": "enlist experts to advise it in its work and leave implemen-", "paragraph_id": "para_2138" }, { "text": "tation details to others, but the doctrine holds that Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2139" }, { "text": "gress alone can make laws regulating private conduct. See,", "paragraph_id": "para_2140" }, { "text": "e.g., Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935). By", "paragraph_id": "para_2141" }, { "text": "that doctrine’s side stands the major questions doctrine,", "paragraph_id": "para_2142" }, { "text": "which teaches that, to sustain a claim that Congress has", "paragraph_id": "para_2143" }, { "text": "delegated to it some “[e]xtraordinary” regulatory power, an", "paragraph_id": "para_2144" }, { "text": "agency must identify “clear” statutory authority for that", "paragraph_id": "para_2145" }, { "text": "power. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022) (in-", "paragraph_id": "para_2146" }, { "text": "ternal quotation marks omitted). Vagueness doctrine can", "paragraph_id": "para_2147" }, { "text": "contribute too, with its lesson that “Congress, rather than", "paragraph_id": "para_2148" }, { "text": "the executive or judicial branch, [must] define what conduct", "paragraph_id": "para_2149" }, { "text": "is sanctionable and what is not.” Sessions v. Dimaya, 584", "paragraph_id": "para_2150" }, { "text": "U. S. 148, 156 (2018) (opinion of KAGAN, J.). And our doc-", "paragraph_id": "para_2151" }, { "text": "trines addressing Article III, the Due Process Clause, and", "paragraph_id": "para_2152" }, { "text": "15Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2153" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_2154" }, { "text": "the Seventh Amendment can help ensure that adjudica-", "paragraph_id": "para_2155" }, { "text": "tions of private rights take place where they belong, before", "paragraph_id": "para_2156" }, { "text": "independent judges and juries. See Jarkesy, 603 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_2157" }, { "text": "141 (GORSUCH, J., concurring).", "paragraph_id": "para_2158" }, { "text": "We have, then, no shortage of tools. The only real ques-", "paragraph_id": "para_2159" }, { "text": "tion is whether we will use them. Yes, we often recite, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2160" }, { "text": "Constitution contains “a bar on [the] delegation” of “[l]egis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2161" }, { "text": "lative power” to agencies. FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606", "paragraph_id": "para_2162" }, { "text": "U. S. 656, 672 (2025). But we have sometimes shrunk from", "paragraph_id": "para_2163" }, { "text": "applying that rule, worried that “our increasingly complex", "paragraph_id": "para_2164" }, { "text": "society” cannot manage unless someone else assumes Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2165" }, { "text": "gress’s job of making the laws that govern us. Mistretta v.", "paragraph_id": "para_2166" }, { "text": "United States, 488 U. S. 361, 372 (1989). Yes, we say, when", "paragraph_id": "para_2167" }, { "text": "agencies claim “[e]xtraordinary” delegated power, they", "paragraph_id": "para_2168" }, { "text": "“must point to clear congressional authorization for” it.", "paragraph_id": "para_2169" }, { "text": "West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723 (internal quotation marks", "paragraph_id": "para_2170" }, { "text": "omitted). But some have also suggested the major ques-", "paragraph_id": "para_2171" }, { "text": "tions doctrine might be tainted by an “anti-administrative-", "paragraph_id": "para_2172" }, { "text": "state stance,” one that could prevent the “people . . . found", "paragraph_id": "para_2173" }, { "text": "in agencies” “from doing important work.” Id., at 779–781", "paragraph_id": "para_2174" }, { "text": "(KAGAN, J., dissenting). And, yes, all agree that the Sev-", "paragraph_id": "para_2175" }, { "text": "enth Amendment guarantees a jury in suits at common law.", "paragraph_id": "para_2176" }, { "text": "But it can also seem to some that Congress occasionally has", "paragraph_id": "para_2177" }, { "text": "“good reaso[n]” to let agencies decide cases anyway given", "paragraph_id": "para_2178" }, { "text": "their “greater efficiency and expertise.” Jarkesy, 603 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2179" }, { "text": "at 202 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).", "paragraph_id": "para_2180" }, { "text": "Whatever merit these objections once might have held,", "paragraph_id": "para_2181" }, { "text": "they now speak to a bygone era. As my dissenting col-", "paragraph_id": "para_2182" }, { "text": "leagues see it, removal protections were “centrally im-", "paragraph_id": "para_2183" }, { "text": "portant,” or perhaps even “ ‘essential,’ ” to Congress when it", "paragraph_id": "para_2184" }, { "text": "decided to create so many independent agencies and dele-", "paragraph_id": "para_2185" }, { "text": "gate so much legislative and judicial power to them. Post,", "paragraph_id": "para_2186" }, { "text": "at 36 (quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 625). On their ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_2187" }, { "text": "count, Congress gave all that power to “specialists” in inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_2188" }, { "text": "pendent agencies “precisely because [they were] not fully", "paragraph_id": "para_2189" }, { "text": "controlled by the White House.” Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_2190" }, { "text": "16 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2191" }, { "text": "GORSUCH, J., concurring", "paragraph_id": "para_2192" }, { "text": "___, ___ (2025) (KAGAN, J., dissenting from grant of appli-", "paragraph_id": "para_2193" }, { "text": "cation for stay) (slip op., at 6). But now removal protections", "paragraph_id": "para_2194" }, { "text": "are a thing of the past, and the President enjoys direct con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2195" }, { "text": "trol over independent and executive agencies alike. So even", "paragraph_id": "para_2196" }, { "text": "if entrusting legislative and judicial powers to insulated, in-", "paragraph_id": "para_2197" }, { "text": "dependent agencies once seemed a good idea to some, it’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2198" }, { "text": "simply not an option anymore. Now, we face only two ways", "paragraph_id": "para_2199" }, { "text": "forward: Let Presidents exercise all those powers or begin", "paragraph_id": "para_2200" }, { "text": "subjecting them to the Constitution’s constraints.", "paragraph_id": "para_2201" }, { "text": "*", "paragraph_id": "para_2202" }, { "text": "The Court today takes a notable step back toward the", "paragraph_id": "para_2203" }, { "text": "Constitution. By recognizing that the President is entitled", "paragraph_id": "para_2204" }, { "text": "to remove a principal officer who exercises executive power", "paragraph_id": "para_2205" }, { "text": "in his name, the Court does much to vindicate what Frank-", "paragraph_id": "para_2206" }, { "text": "lin D. Roosevelt and James Madison both understood: Un-", "paragraph_id": "para_2207" }, { "text": "der our Constitution, executive power does not belong to a", "paragraph_id": "para_2208" }, { "text": "“headless ‘fourth branch,’ ” Roosevelt Committee 36, but", "paragraph_id": "para_2209" }, { "text": "must be exercised through a “chain of dependence” running", "paragraph_id": "para_2210" }, { "text": "from “the lowest officers” to “the President,” and from him", "paragraph_id": "para_2211" }, { "text": "to the American people, 1 Annals of Cong. 499 (J. Madison).", "paragraph_id": "para_2212" }, { "text": "At the same time, it would be a grave mistake to think", "paragraph_id": "para_2213" }, { "text": "that step is enough on its own. The fact remains that Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2214" }, { "text": "gress has endowed formerly independent agencies not just", "paragraph_id": "para_2215" }, { "text": "with executive authority, but with enormous legislative and", "paragraph_id": "para_2216" }, { "text": "judicial powers as well. And now the President enjoys con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2217" }, { "text": "trol over all those powers too. From here, the only sure path", "paragraph_id": "para_2218" }, { "text": "is to finish the journey we start today and restore legislative", "paragraph_id": "para_2219" }, { "text": "and judicial powers to where they belong: in Congress and", "paragraph_id": "para_2220" }, { "text": "the courts. We have tolerated adventurous theories long", "paragraph_id": "para_2221" }, { "text": "enough. It is time to return, all the way, to the Constitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2222" }, { "text": "tion.", "paragraph_id": "para_2223" }, { "text": "_________________", "paragraph_id": "para_2224" }, { "text": "_________________", "paragraph_id": "para_2225" }, { "text": "1Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2226" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2227" }, { "text": "SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES", "paragraph_id": "para_2228" }, { "text": "No. 25–332", "paragraph_id": "para_2229" }, { "text": "DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED", "paragraph_id": "para_2230" }, { "text": "STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. REBECCA", "paragraph_id": "para_2231" }, { "text": "KELLY SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2232" }, { "text": "ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE", "paragraph_id": "para_2233" }, { "text": "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE", "paragraph_id": "para_2234" }, { "text": "DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT", "paragraph_id": "para_2235" }, { "text": "[June 29, 2026]", "paragraph_id": "para_2236" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and", "paragraph_id": "para_2237" }, { "text": "JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.", "paragraph_id": "para_2238" }, { "text": "For most of this Nation’s history, Congress and the Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_2239" }, { "text": "ident together have decided that some Government func-", "paragraph_id": "para_2240" }, { "text": "tions should operate at a distance from partisan politics.", "paragraph_id": "para_2241" }, { "text": "Those include the management of nuclear energy; the secu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2242" }, { "text": "rity of the monetary supply; and the safety of American", "paragraph_id": "para_2243" }, { "text": "workplaces, consumer products, and chemical hazards. In", "paragraph_id": "para_2244" }, { "text": "these and many other areas, the wisdom of the centuries", "paragraph_id": "para_2245" }, { "text": "has taught that some decisions should depend not only on", "paragraph_id": "para_2246" }, { "text": "who is in office—much less on who is disfavored or owed a", "paragraph_id": "para_2247" }, { "text": "favor by those in office—but also on judgment, expertise,", "paragraph_id": "para_2248" }, { "text": "and the public good.", "paragraph_id": "para_2249" }, { "text": "Since the founding, Congress has created agencies that", "paragraph_id": "para_2250" }, { "text": "in various ways have embodied this goal of independence.", "paragraph_id": "para_2251" }, { "text": "Over the last 140 years especially, the political branches", "paragraph_id": "para_2252" }, { "text": "have done so by establishing agencies like the Federal", "paragraph_id": "para_2253" }, { "text": "Trade Commission (FTC): bipartisan, multimember bodies", "paragraph_id": "para_2254" }, { "text": "with “for-cause” removal protections. This structure allows", "paragraph_id": "para_2255" }, { "text": "the agencies to address complex problems while enjoying", "paragraph_id": "para_2256" }, { "text": "some independence from Presidential removal and thus ab-", "paragraph_id": "para_2257" }, { "text": "solute partisan control. More than 90 years ago, this Court", "paragraph_id": "para_2258" }, { "text": "affirmed, as to the FTC specifically, that the", "paragraph_id": "para_2259" }, { "text": "2 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2260" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2261" }, { "text": "constitutionality of its members’ “for cause” removal protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_2262" }, { "text": "tions “cannot well be doubted.” Humphrey’s Executor v.", "paragraph_id": "para_2263" }, { "text": "United States, 295 U. S. 602, 629 (1935). Ever since, Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2264" }, { "text": "gress and more than a dozen Presidents have relied on", "paragraph_id": "para_2265" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s to construct a workable Government, creating", "paragraph_id": "para_2266" }, { "text": "many other agencies in the FTC’s tradition.", "paragraph_id": "para_2267" }, { "text": "Today, this Court undoes centuries of political practice", "paragraph_id": "para_2268" }, { "text": "and concludes that all three branches of Government have", "paragraph_id": "para_2269" }, { "text": "been acting in open defiance of the Constitution all this", "paragraph_id": "para_2270" }, { "text": "time. Its conclusion is wrong. The text of the Constitution,", "paragraph_id": "para_2271" }, { "text": "along with its history, the longstanding practices of the po-", "paragraph_id": "para_2272" }, { "text": "litical branches, and the precedents of this Court, make", "paragraph_id": "para_2273" }, { "text": "clear that Congress may limit the causes for which the", "paragraph_id": "para_2274" }, { "text": "heads of Commissions like the FTC can be removed by the", "paragraph_id": "para_2275" }, { "text": "President. In holding otherwise, the Court gives the Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2276" }, { "text": "dent a power unknown even to the English Crown against", "paragraph_id": "para_2277" }, { "text": "which the Founders revolted, elevating him above his once-", "paragraph_id": "para_2278" }, { "text": "coequal branches by transforming a duty to take care that", "paragraph_id": "para_2279" }, { "text": "the laws be faithfully executed into a license to act in defi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2280" }, { "text": "ance of those very laws. If nothing else, the doctrine of stare", "paragraph_id": "para_2281" }, { "text": "decisis, which today’s decision cursorily dismisses, should", "paragraph_id": "para_2282" }, { "text": "have made this a profoundly easy case under Humphrey’s.", "paragraph_id": "para_2283" }, { "text": "Perhaps worst of all, the Court today forgets its place.", "paragraph_id": "para_2284" }, { "text": "For most of our history, the Court has rightly left the re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2285" }, { "text": "moval question primarily to its coequal branches. Today’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2286" }, { "text": "majority, however, decides that it knows better: better than", "paragraph_id": "para_2287" }, { "text": "members of the founding generation who created agencies,", "paragraph_id": "para_2288" }, { "text": "like the Sinking Fund Commission and the Bank of the", "paragraph_id": "para_2289" }, { "text": "United States, free from unfettered Presidential control;", "paragraph_id": "para_2290" }, { "text": "better than a century and a half of Congresses and Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2291" }, { "text": "dents, starting with Grover Cleveland and continuing into", "paragraph_id": "para_2292" }, { "text": "the 21st century, who created agencies in the FTC’s mold;", "paragraph_id": "para_2293" }, { "text": "better than even Hamilton, Story, Webster, Holmes,", "paragraph_id": "para_2294" }, { "text": "Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Rehnquist. These great states-", "paragraph_id": "para_2295" }, { "text": "men and Justices knew something that today’s majority ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_2296" }, { "text": "parently does not: that fealty to the Constitution means", "paragraph_id": "para_2297" }, { "text": "3Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2298" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2299" }, { "text": "respecting not just what it says, but what it does not say", "paragraph_id": "para_2300" }, { "text": "and by its silence leaves to others to decide. It also means", "paragraph_id": "para_2301" }, { "text": "respecting precedent—not as a wooden exercise, but out of", "paragraph_id": "para_2302" }, { "text": "a recognition that, whatever our confidence in the theories", "paragraph_id": "para_2303" }, { "text": "of the present moment, the wisdom of our founding docu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2304" }, { "text": "ment does not belong to today’s Justices alone. Because the", "paragraph_id": "para_2305" }, { "text": "Court ignores these foundational tenets, and in doing so up-", "paragraph_id": "para_2306" }, { "text": "ends rather than upholds the separation of powers, I re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2307" }, { "text": "spectfully dissent.", "paragraph_id": "para_2308" }, { "text": "I", "paragraph_id": "para_2309" }, { "text": "In 1914, Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2310" }, { "text": "sion Act, which established the FTC primarily to prevent", "paragraph_id": "para_2311" }, { "text": "“unfair methods of competition in commerce.” 38 Stat. 719,", "paragraph_id": "para_2312" }, { "text": "as amended, 15 U. S. C. §41 et seq. Then, as today, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2313" }, { "text": "Commission included five Commissioners appointed by the", "paragraph_id": "para_2314" }, { "text": "President and confirmed by the Senate; no more than three", "paragraph_id": "para_2315" }, { "text": "Commissioners at a given time could be from the same po-", "paragraph_id": "para_2316" }, { "text": "litical party; the Commissioners generally served staggered", "paragraph_id": "para_2317" }, { "text": "7-year terms; and, central here, the Commissioners could", "paragraph_id": "para_2318" }, { "text": "be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect", "paragraph_id": "para_2319" }, { "text": "of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 38 Stat. 717–718, 15", "paragraph_id": "para_2320" }, { "text": "U. S. C. §41. At the time of enactment, the Commissioners", "paragraph_id": "para_2321" }, { "text": "elected their own Chair from among their membership. 38", "paragraph_id": "para_2322" }, { "text": "Stat. 718. Today, the President appoints the Chair. See", "paragraph_id": "para_2323" }, { "text": "§41; 16 CFR §0.8 (2025).", "paragraph_id": "para_2324" }, { "text": "In 2018, President Trump nominated, and the Senate", "paragraph_id": "para_2325" }, { "text": "unanimously confirmed, Democrat Rebecca Slaughter to", "paragraph_id": "para_2326" }, { "text": "serve as an FTC Commissioner. In 2024, Slaughter was re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2327" }, { "text": "confirmed to serve a second term. In January 2025, soon", "paragraph_id": "para_2328" }, { "text": "upon assuming office, President Trump exercised his stat-", "paragraph_id": "para_2329" }, { "text": "utory authority to designate Andrew Ferguson as the new", "paragraph_id": "para_2330" }, { "text": "FTC Chair, 15 U. S. C. §41, and (as is customary) the for-", "paragraph_id": "para_2331" }, { "text": "mer Chair who had served under President Biden resigned", "paragraph_id": "para_2332" }, { "text": "her seat. At that point, the FTC was split down the middle", "paragraph_id": "para_2333" }, { "text": "with two Democratic and two Republican Commissioners.", "paragraph_id": "para_2334" }, { "text": "4 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2335" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2336" }, { "text": "While the nomination of the President’s choice to replace", "paragraph_id": "para_2337" }, { "text": "the Chair was pending before the Senate in March 2025, he", "paragraph_id": "para_2338" }, { "text": "fired the two remaining Democratic Commissioners, includ-", "paragraph_id": "para_2339" }, { "text": "ing Slaughter, leaving only the two Republican Commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2340" }, { "text": "sioners. He did not identify any “inefficiency, neglect of", "paragraph_id": "para_2341" }, { "text": "duty, or malfeasance in office” on either removed Commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2342" }, { "text": "sioner’s part. Ibid. Instead, he simply asserted that these", "paragraph_id": "para_2343" }, { "text": "Commissioners were removed pursuant to the President’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2344" }, { "text": "“authority under Article II of the Constitution.” App. 28.", "paragraph_id": "para_2345" }, { "text": "Slaughter sued, and the District Court granted her mo-", "paragraph_id": "para_2346" }, { "text": "tion for summary judgment, holding that “the law on the", "paragraph_id": "para_2347" }, { "text": "removal of FTC Commissioners is clear” under Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2348" }, { "text": "and prohibits Slaughter’s removal without cause. 791", "paragraph_id": "para_2349" }, { "text": "F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (DC 2025). The Court of Appeals denied", "paragraph_id": "para_2350" }, { "text": "the Government’s request for a stay, holding it “highly un-", "paragraph_id": "para_2351" }, { "text": "likely to succeed on appeal because th[e] exact question”", "paragraph_id": "para_2352" }, { "text": "presented in this case “was already asked and unanimously", "paragraph_id": "para_2353" }, { "text": "answered by the Supreme Court adversely to the govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_2354" }, { "text": "ment’s position 90 years ago in Humphrey’s Executor.” 2025", "paragraph_id": "para_2355" }, { "text": "WL 2551247, *2 (CADC, Sept. 2, 2025). This Court, how-", "paragraph_id": "para_2356" }, { "text": "ever, granted a stay and then certiorari before judgment,", "paragraph_id": "para_2357" }, { "text": "permitting Slaughter’s removal. 606 U. S. 1051 (2025). To-", "paragraph_id": "para_2358" }, { "text": "day, the FTC has only two remaining Commissioners.", "paragraph_id": "para_2359" }, { "text": "II", "paragraph_id": "para_2360" }, { "text": "Six years ago, this Court announced that the President", "paragraph_id": "para_2361" }, { "text": "generally must be able to fire executive officials “at will”", "paragraph_id": "para_2362" }, { "text": "(that is, for any reason or even no reason at all). Seila Law", "paragraph_id": "para_2363" }, { "text": "LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_2364" }, { "text": "197, 204–205 (2020). In so holding, the Court recognized", "paragraph_id": "para_2365" }, { "text": "“two exceptions” to that “general rule” of “unrestricted re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2366" }, { "text": "moval power,” id., at 215: one for inferior officers and one", "paragraph_id": "para_2367" }, { "text": "that allowed Congress to “create expert agencies led by a", "paragraph_id": "para_2368" }, { "text": "group of principal officers removable by the President only", "paragraph_id": "para_2369" }, { "text": "for good cause,” id., at 204 (emphasis deleted). Today, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2370" }, { "text": "Court doubles back on the second exception for agencies like", "paragraph_id": "para_2371" }, { "text": "5Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2372" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2373" }, { "text": "the FTC, and doubles down on its “general rule” that the", "paragraph_id": "para_2374" }, { "text": "President’s removal power cannot be cabined in any way.", "paragraph_id": "para_2375" }, { "text": "Its decision is grievously wrong.", "paragraph_id": "para_2376" }, { "text": "A", "paragraph_id": "para_2377" }, { "text": "1", "paragraph_id": "para_2378" }, { "text": "This case should have begun and ended with this Court’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2379", "court_paragraph": 1 }, { "text": "unanimous decision from almost a century ago: Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2380" }, { "text": "Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602. Humphrey’s ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_2381" }, { "text": "dressed the very statute at issue here, which allows the", "paragraph_id": "para_2382" }, { "text": "President to remove FTC Commissioners only “ ‘for ineffi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2383" }, { "text": "ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,’ ” and up-", "paragraph_id": "para_2384" }, { "text": "held its constitutionality against the very same challenge", "paragraph_id": "para_2385" }, { "text": "levied in this case. Id., at 620; see id., at 629, 631–632.", "paragraph_id": "para_2386" }, { "text": "In reaching that conclusion, the Court focused on the", "paragraph_id": "para_2387" }, { "text": "FTC’s “character.” Id., at 629, 631. The FTC, the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_2388" }, { "text": "explained, is a “body of experts” tasked with “carry[ing] into", "paragraph_id": "para_2389" }, { "text": "effect legislative policies embodied in the [FTC Act] in ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_2390" }, { "text": "cordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed,”", "paragraph_id": "para_2391" }, { "text": "including by determining what constitutes “ ‘unfair meth-", "paragraph_id": "para_2392" }, { "text": "ods of competition.’ ” Id., at 624, 628. The agency thus was", "paragraph_id": "para_2393" }, { "text": "not purely executive; instead, it “act[ed] in part quasi-legis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2394" }, { "text": "latively and in part quasi-judicially” by “filling in and ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_2395" }, { "text": "ministering the details embodied [in the law’s] general", "paragraph_id": "para_2396" }, { "text": "standard.” Id., at 628. “[F]rom the very nature of its du-", "paragraph_id": "para_2397" }, { "text": "ties,” it was clear that the FTC “must . . . act with entire", "paragraph_id": "para_2398" }, { "text": "impartiality,” as “[i]t is charged with the enforcement of no", "paragraph_id": "para_2399" }, { "text": "policy except the policy of the law.” Id., at 624; see id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_2400" }, { "text": "625 (relying on legislative history emphasizing the “ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_2401" }, { "text": "vantage” to be found in the FTC’s “independence” and im-", "paragraph_id": "para_2402" }, { "text": "munity from “suspicion of partisan direction”).", "paragraph_id": "para_2403" }, { "text": "For an agency of this “character,” the Court held that", "paragraph_id": "para_2404" }, { "text": "Congress permissibly could forbid Presidential “removal ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_2405" }, { "text": "cept for cause.” Id., at 631–632. Given the FTC’s role in", "paragraph_id": "para_2406" }, { "text": "“carrying into operation” Congress’s legislative goals, it", "paragraph_id": "para_2407" }, { "text": "needed some independence from Presidential domination.", "paragraph_id": "para_2408" }, { "text": "6 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2409" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2410" }, { "text": "Id., at 630. It was “quite evident” to the Court, moreover,", "paragraph_id": "para_2411" }, { "text": "“that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of", "paragraph_id": "para_2412" }, { "text": "another . . . cannot be depended upon to maintain an atti-", "paragraph_id": "para_2413" }, { "text": "tude of independence against the latter’s will.” Id., at 629.", "paragraph_id": "para_2414" }, { "text": "Indeed, the Court explained, James Madison had suggested", "paragraph_id": "para_2415" }, { "text": "much the same thing when discussing the office of the", "paragraph_id": "para_2416" }, { "text": "Comptroller of the Treasury in 1789. See id., at 631 (citing", "paragraph_id": "para_2417" }, { "text": "1 Annals of Cong. 611–612 (1789)). For executive officers", "paragraph_id": "para_2418" }, { "text": "whose duties “partak[e] strongly of the judicial character,”", "paragraph_id": "para_2419" }, { "text": "Madison explained, “there may be strong reasons why an", "paragraph_id": "para_2420" }, { "text": "officer of this kind should not hold his office at the pleasure", "paragraph_id": "para_2421" }, { "text": "of the Executive branch.” 1 Annals of Cong. 612. For the", "paragraph_id": "para_2422" }, { "text": "FTC too, the Court held, removal protections complied with", "paragraph_id": "para_2423" }, { "text": "the Constitution. Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 631–632.", "paragraph_id": "para_2424" }, { "text": "As Congress constructed a variety of agencies to serve the", "paragraph_id": "para_2425" }, { "text": "public’s needs over the decades that followed, see infra,", "paragraph_id": "para_2426" }, { "text": "at 10–11, this Court repeatedly applied and expanded the", "paragraph_id": "para_2427" }, { "text": "rule announced in Humphrey’s. In Youngstown Sheet &", "paragraph_id": "para_2428" }, { "text": "Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952), Humphrey’s was", "paragraph_id": "para_2429" }, { "text": "the only example Justice Jackson provided of a case in", "paragraph_id": "para_2430" }, { "text": "which the President’s “power [wa]s at its lowest ebb” and", "paragraph_id": "para_2431" }, { "text": "the President was thus prevented from “tak[ing] measures", "paragraph_id": "para_2432" }, { "text": "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2433" }, { "text": "gress.” 343 U. S., at 637–638, and n. 4 (concurring opinion).", "paragraph_id": "para_2434" }, { "text": "Later, in Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), Jus-", "paragraph_id": "para_2435" }, { "text": "tice Frankfurter’s opinion for a unanimous Court relied on", "paragraph_id": "para_2436" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s (describing it as a “cause célèbre”) to approve", "paragraph_id": "para_2437" }, { "text": "removal protections for the War Claims Commission, which", "paragraph_id": "para_2438" }, { "text": "settled claims by American prisoners of war and civil in-", "paragraph_id": "para_2439" }, { "text": "ternees who suffered harm during World War II. 357 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2440" }, { "text": "at 350, 353, 356. The Court explained that “the essence of", "paragraph_id": "para_2441" }, { "text": "the decision in Humphrey’s case” was that certain Govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_2442" }, { "text": "ment officials, depending on their “function,” require and", "paragraph_id": "para_2443" }, { "text": "may be given independence “ ‘to exercise [their] judgment", "paragraph_id": "para_2444" }, { "text": "without the leave or hindrance of any other official.’ ” Id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2445" }, { "text": "at 353 (quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 625–626).", "paragraph_id": "para_2446" }, { "text": "7Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2447" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2448" }, { "text": "In later decades, the Court reaffirmed Humphrey’s rule", "paragraph_id": "para_2449" }, { "text": "that certain executive officers may enjoy for-cause protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_2450" }, { "text": "tions. In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988), Chief Jus-", "paragraph_id": "para_2451" }, { "text": "tice Rehnquist, writing for a 7-to-1 Court, applied and ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_2452" }, { "text": "panded Humphrey’s in a new context, approving removal", "paragraph_id": "para_2453" }, { "text": "protections for an independent counsel tasked with investi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2454" }, { "text": "gating allegations of crime by high executive officers. 487", "paragraph_id": "para_2455" }, { "text": "U. S., at 688–691. Rejecting the idea that the only officers", "paragraph_id": "para_2456" }, { "text": "who could permissibly be granted removal protections were", "paragraph_id": "para_2457" }, { "text": "those who exercised “ ‘quasi-legislative’ ” or “ ‘quasi-judicial’", "paragraph_id": "para_2458" }, { "text": "powers,” the Court held that the more fundamental ques-", "paragraph_id": "para_2459" }, { "text": "tion was whether removal protections unduly “interfere[d]", "paragraph_id": "para_2460" }, { "text": "with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power.’ ” Id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2461" }, { "text": "at 688–690. Still, the Court explained, Humphrey’s “analy-", "paragraph_id": "para_2462" }, { "text": "sis of the functions served by the officials at issue” remains", "paragraph_id": "para_2463" }, { "text": "“[r]elevant” to answering that question. 487 U. S., at 691.", "paragraph_id": "para_2464" }, { "text": "Considering the “functions of the” independent counsel,", "paragraph_id": "para_2465" }, { "text": "alongside the President’s remaining ability to exercise con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2466" }, { "text": "trol over the office, the Court held that the for-cause re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2467" }, { "text": "moval statute at issue was constitutional. Id., at 691–692.", "paragraph_id": "para_2468" }, { "text": "Even in more recent cases in which the Court has de-", "paragraph_id": "para_2469" }, { "text": "clined to “extend Humphrey’s to a ‘new situation,’ ” ante,", "paragraph_id": "para_2470" }, { "text": "at 20, the Court has underscored that Humphrey’s remains", "paragraph_id": "para_2471" }, { "text": "good law in its core application to multimember bodies like", "paragraph_id": "para_2472" }, { "text": "the FTC, see Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 215–218; Free Enter-", "paragraph_id": "para_2473" }, { "text": "prise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2474" }, { "text": "561 U. S. 477, 483 (2010). In Seila Law, for instance, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2475" }, { "text": "Court held that removal protections were incompatible with", "paragraph_id": "para_2476" }, { "text": "an agency headed by a single director (rather than a multi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2477" }, { "text": "member commission). 591 U. S., at 218–219. Even so, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2478" }, { "text": "principal opinion explicitly suggested that Congress could", "paragraph_id": "para_2479" }, { "text": "fix that problem by “converting” the single-headed Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2480" }, { "text": "sumer Financial Protection Bureau, with all of the powers", "paragraph_id": "para_2481" }, { "text": "it possessed, “into a multimember agency” just like the FTC", "paragraph_id": "para_2482" }, { "text": "that Humphrey’s had addressed. 591 U. S., at 237 (opinion", "paragraph_id": "para_2483" }, { "text": "of ROBERTS, C. J., joined by ALITO and KAVANAUGH, JJ.).", "paragraph_id": "para_2484" }, { "text": "8 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2485" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2486" }, { "text": "Searching for a distinction, the Government (echoed by", "paragraph_id": "para_2487" }, { "text": "the majority) contends that Humphrey’s should not control", "paragraph_id": "para_2488" }, { "text": "as to the present-day FTC because the FTC’s powers have", "paragraph_id": "para_2489" }, { "text": "expanded over the years since Humphrey’s was decided.", "paragraph_id": "para_2490" }, { "text": "See Brief for Petitioners 25–28; ante, at 25–27. The premise", "paragraph_id": "para_2491" }, { "text": "that the FTC has fundamentally changed, however, is un-", "paragraph_id": "para_2492" }, { "text": "true: Contrary to the Government’s assertions, the FTC of", "paragraph_id": "para_2493" }, { "text": "1935, like today’s FTC, had the power to conduct investiga-", "paragraph_id": "para_2494" }, { "text": "tions, make rules, and bring enforcement actions. See Fed-", "paragraph_id": "para_2495" }, { "text": "eral Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719–723.1 To the ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_2496" }, { "text": "tent the FTC has gained power since 1914 (for example, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2497" }, { "text": "Government cites its ability to seek civil penalties, see Brief", "paragraph_id": "para_2498" }, { "text": "for Petitioners 25–26), those changes at the margins do not", "paragraph_id": "para_2499" }, { "text": "so transform the “character of the office” as to bring the", "paragraph_id": "para_2500" }, { "text": "agency outside of Humphrey’s rule. 295 U. S., at 631. If, it", "paragraph_id": "para_2501" }, { "text": "was true that the political branches went too far in assign-", "paragraph_id": "para_2502" }, { "text": "ing certain powers to the FTC over the years, moreover, it", "paragraph_id": "para_2503" }, { "text": "is unclear why the appropriate remedy at this point would", "paragraph_id": "para_2504" }, { "text": "not be to sever these additional, objectionable powers. Cf.", "paragraph_id": "para_2505" }, { "text": "United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U. S. 1, 24–25 (2021)", "paragraph_id": "para_2506" }, { "text": "(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (remedying Appointments", "paragraph_id": "para_2507" }, { "text": "Clause violation by altering the officers’ powers); see also", "paragraph_id": "para_2508" }, { "text": "id., at 44 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment in part and", "paragraph_id": "para_2509" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2510" }, { "text": "1 Humphrey’s did not explicitly identify each power, but the idea that", "paragraph_id": "para_2511" }, { "text": "“a court including Charles Evans Hughes, Louis Brandeis, Benjamin", "paragraph_id": "para_2512" }, { "text": "Cardozo, and Harlan Stone somehow misunderstood [the FTC’s] powers", "paragraph_id": "para_2513" }, { "text": "lacks all plausibility.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection", "paragraph_id": "para_2514" }, { "text": "Bureau, 591 U. S. 197, 287, n. 10 (2020) (KAGAN, J., concurring in judg-", "paragraph_id": "para_2515" }, { "text": "ment with respect to severability and dissenting in part) (citation omit-", "paragraph_id": "para_2516" }, { "text": "ted). It is also true that, despite these powers existing at the time,", "paragraph_id": "para_2517" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s described the FTC as sharing “no part of the executive", "paragraph_id": "para_2518" }, { "text": "power.” 295 U. S., at 625, 628; see ante, at 18–19, 21, 33–34 (highlighting", "paragraph_id": "para_2519" }, { "text": "this point). For decades, however, this Court has recognized that even", "paragraph_id": "para_2520" }, { "text": "for agencies exercising powers that “would at the present time be consid-", "paragraph_id": "para_2521" }, { "text": "ered ‘executive,’ ” Humphrey’s rule applies. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_2522" }, { "text": "654, 689–690, and n. 28 (1988). Congress, even before Morrison, exten-", "paragraph_id": "para_2523" }, { "text": "sively legislated, creating many agencies like the FTC, based on that un-", "paragraph_id": "para_2524" }, { "text": "derstanding. See infra, at 10–11, 35–38.", "paragraph_id": "para_2525" }, { "text": "9Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2526" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2527" }, { "text": "dissenting in part) (joining this remedial holding). There", "paragraph_id": "para_2528" }, { "text": "then would be no need to adopt a sweeping new rule that", "paragraph_id": "para_2529" }, { "text": "will transform the balance of power across the Federal Gov-", "paragraph_id": "para_2530" }, { "text": "ernment and deprive the public of Government impartiality", "paragraph_id": "para_2531" }, { "text": "in serving the public’s needs. See infra, at 35–38.", "paragraph_id": "para_2532" }, { "text": "Far from the minimal impact that the majority imagines", "paragraph_id": "para_2533" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s to have had, ante, at 18–21, Humphrey’s has", "paragraph_id": "para_2534" }, { "text": "sat at the center of this Court’s separation-of-powers juris-", "paragraph_id": "para_2535" }, { "text": "prudence for nearly a century. If precedent were any guide,", "paragraph_id": "para_2536" }, { "text": "this case would be open and shut: The FTC’s removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_2537" }, { "text": "tections, as the Court has long held and repeatedly recog-", "paragraph_id": "para_2538" }, { "text": "nized, are constitutional.2", "paragraph_id": "para_2539" }, { "text": "2", "paragraph_id": "para_2540" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s is not just a longstanding precedent of this", "paragraph_id": "para_2541", "court_paragraph": 2 }, { "text": "Court. It also reflects a “deeply rooted tradition” embraced", "paragraph_id": "para_2542" }, { "text": "by all three branches of Government and the American peo-", "paragraph_id": "para_2543" }, { "text": "ple. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,", "paragraph_id": "para_2544" }, { "text": "881 F. 3d 75, 177 (CADC 2018) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).", "paragraph_id": "para_2545" }, { "text": "Such “longstanding practice” is entitled to “ ‘great", "paragraph_id": "para_2546" }, { "text": "weight’ ” in separation-of-powers cases like this one. Trump", "paragraph_id": "para_2547" }, { "text": "v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U. S. 848, 862 (2020). On “doubt-", "paragraph_id": "para_2548" }, { "text": "ful question[s]” regarding the meaning of the Constitution,", "paragraph_id": "para_2549" }, { "text": "historical practice, when “deliberately established” through", "paragraph_id": "para_2550" }, { "text": "“legislative acts,” can “put at rest” the Constitution’s mean-", "paragraph_id": "para_2551" }, { "text": "ing. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); see", "paragraph_id": "para_2552" }, { "text": "ante, at 9. That is so even for practices that “began after", "paragraph_id": "para_2553" }, { "text": "the founding era.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513,", "paragraph_id": "para_2554" }, { "text": "525 (2014).3 As Justice Scalia explained, constitutional", "paragraph_id": "para_2555" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2556" }, { "text": "2 The majority also attacks Humphrey’s reasoning and compatibility", "paragraph_id": "para_2557" }, { "text": "with later decisions. See ante, at 16–21. These arguments, flawed as", "paragraph_id": "para_2558" }, { "text": "they are, may be relevant to the stare decisis analysis, see infra, at 34–", "paragraph_id": "para_2559" }, { "text": "47, but they cannot change the fact that, until now, Humphrey’s squarely", "paragraph_id": "para_2560" }, { "text": "controlled.", "paragraph_id": "para_2561" }, { "text": "3 See, e.g., Noel Canning, 573 U. S., at 528–529 (relying on practices", "paragraph_id": "para_2562" }, { "text": "beginning after the Civil War); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,", "paragraph_id": "para_2563" }, { "text": "10 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2564" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2565" }, { "text": "interpretation should reflect “the principles adhered to,", "paragraph_id": "para_2566" }, { "text": "over time, by the American people, rather than those fa-", "paragraph_id": "para_2567" }, { "text": "vored by the personal (and necessarily shifting) philosophi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2568" }, { "text": "cal dispositions of a majority of this Court.” Rutan v. Re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2569" }, { "text": "publican Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 96 (1990) (dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2570" }, { "text": "opinion). Like a “more democratic” form of stare decisis, re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2571" }, { "text": "specting historical practice “promotes . . . stability, equal-", "paragraph_id": "para_2572" }, { "text": "ity, and predictability.” M. McConnell, Time, Institutions,", "paragraph_id": "para_2573" }, { "text": "and Interpretation, 95 B. U. L. Rev. 1745, 1776 (2015).", "paragraph_id": "para_2574" }, { "text": "These principles apply with full force here. Today’s deci-", "paragraph_id": "para_2575" }, { "text": "sion addresses one of the oldest, most vigorously debated", "paragraph_id": "para_2576" }, { "text": "questions in constitutional law. See infra, at 18–24. Fifty", "paragraph_id": "para_2577" }, { "text": "years before Humphrey’s was decided, Congress and the", "paragraph_id": "para_2578" }, { "text": "President began to reach a settled answer to that question,", "paragraph_id": "para_2579" }, { "text": "at least as to multimember agencies like the FTC. In 1887,", "paragraph_id": "para_2580" }, { "text": "as the railroads grew in strength across the American econ-", "paragraph_id": "para_2581" }, { "text": "omy, Congress responded by creating the Interstate Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_2582" }, { "text": "merce Commission (ICC), a powerful new agency with five", "paragraph_id": "para_2583" }, { "text": "Commissioners, appointed by the President by and with the", "paragraph_id": "para_2584" }, { "text": "consent of the Senate, who were removable only “for ineffi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2585" }, { "text": "ciency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Act of Feb.", "paragraph_id": "para_2586" }, { "text": "4, 1887, 24 Stat. 383. Three years later, Congress estab-", "paragraph_id": "para_2587" }, { "text": "lished the nine-member Board of General Appraisers to reg-", "paragraph_id": "para_2588" }, { "text": "ulate American customs and granted it the same form of", "paragraph_id": "para_2589" }, { "text": "removal protection. Act of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 136; see", "paragraph_id": "para_2590" }, { "text": "A. Bamzai, Taft, Frankfurter, and the First Presidential", "paragraph_id": "para_2591" }, { "text": "For-Cause Removal, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 691, 694–695", "paragraph_id": "para_2592" }, { "text": "(2018) (describing this Board as “one of the most powerful", "paragraph_id": "para_2593" }, { "text": "entities within the federal government” at the time). The", "paragraph_id": "para_2594" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2595" }, { "text": "390 (1989) (relying on “more than a century” of experience); Ex parte", "paragraph_id": "para_2596" }, { "text": "Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 118 (1925) (relying on “long practice” since", "paragraph_id": "para_2597" }, { "text": "1841); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_2598" }, { "text": "304, 327–328 (1936) (explaining that “[a] legislative practice . . . marked", "paragraph_id": "para_2599" }, { "text": "by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a half of time goes", "paragraph_id": "para_2600" }, { "text": "a long way in the direction of proving the presence of an unassailable", "paragraph_id": "para_2601" }, { "text": "ground for the constitutionality of the practice”).", "paragraph_id": "para_2602" }, { "text": "11Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2603" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2604" }, { "text": "Federal Reserve Board followed with similar removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_2605" }, { "text": "tections in 1913. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, 38 Stat. 260–261.", "paragraph_id": "para_2606" }, { "text": "The next year, Congress created the FTC with removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_2607" }, { "text": "tections aimed at ensuring “a continuous policy,” “free from", "paragraph_id": "para_2608" }, { "text": "the effect of . . . changing [White House] incumbency.” 51", "paragraph_id": "para_2609" }, { "text": "Cong. Rec. 10376 (1914).", "paragraph_id": "para_2610" }, { "text": "From here, “many more . . . for-cause removal provisions", "paragraph_id": "para_2611" }, { "text": "followed.” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 275–276 (opinion of", "paragraph_id": "para_2612" }, { "text": "KAGAN, J.). Today, dozens of agencies are headed by com-", "paragraph_id": "para_2613" }, { "text": "missioners or board members removable only for cause. Id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2614" }, { "text": "at 276; see J. Manners & L. Menand, The Three Permis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2615" }, { "text": "sions: Presidential Removal and the Statutory Limits of", "paragraph_id": "para_2616" }, { "text": "Agency Independence, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 74–79 (2021)", "paragraph_id": "para_2617" }, { "text": "(Manners & Menand) (collecting additional agencies).", "paragraph_id": "para_2618" }, { "text": "Thus, unlike in other recent cases, in which the Court con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2619" }, { "text": "sidered agencies that it deemed “historical anomal[ies]”", "paragraph_id": "para_2620" }, { "text": "with “no foothold in history or tradition,” here history and", "paragraph_id": "para_2621" }, { "text": "tradition point in the opposite direction. Seila Law, 591", "paragraph_id": "para_2622" }, { "text": "U. S., at 222; see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 505.", "paragraph_id": "para_2623" }, { "text": "Congress, moreover, has taken this action not only with", "paragraph_id": "para_2624" }, { "text": "the Executive Branch’s “acquiesce[nce],” but also with the", "paragraph_id": "para_2625" }, { "text": "active participation of Presidents across the ideological", "paragraph_id": "para_2626" }, { "text": "spectrum. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 23 (2015); see", "paragraph_id": "para_2627" }, { "text": "also, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459,", "paragraph_id": "para_2628" }, { "text": "473 (1915) (endorsing the “wise and quieting rule that in", "paragraph_id": "para_2629" }, { "text": "determining . . . the existence of a power, weight shall be", "paragraph_id": "para_2630" }, { "text": "given to the usage itself—even when the validity of the", "paragraph_id": "para_2631" }, { "text": "practice is the subject of investigation”). President Lincoln,", "paragraph_id": "para_2632" }, { "text": "even before the creation of the ICC in 1887, “asked Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2633" }, { "text": "gress to establish” a Comptroller of the Currency and then", "paragraph_id": "para_2634" }, { "text": "signed the bill enacting that office into law even though it", "paragraph_id": "para_2635" }, { "text": "restricted the President’s power to remove the Comptroller.", "paragraph_id": "para_2636" }, { "text": "12 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2637" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2638" }, { "text": "Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 274 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).4 In fact,", "paragraph_id": "para_2639" }, { "text": "other than Humphrey’s own removal, the Government", "paragraph_id": "para_2640" }, { "text": "struggles to find any Presidential objections to, let alone re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2641" }, { "text": "pudiations of, for-cause removal protections like the FTC’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2642" }, { "text": "since they came into existence in the late 1800s. See Reply", "paragraph_id": "para_2643" }, { "text": "Brief 10–11 (noting one Presidential signing statement", "paragraph_id": "para_2644" }, { "text": "“questioning” removal protections but still signing them", "paragraph_id": "para_2645" }, { "text": "into law). Even if Humphrey’s had never been decided, this", "paragraph_id": "para_2646" }, { "text": "longstanding practice, jointly undertaken by Congresses", "paragraph_id": "para_2647" }, { "text": "and Presidents, should be entitled to significant weight.", "paragraph_id": "para_2648" }, { "text": "The majority’s only response is INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_2649" }, { "text": "919 (1983), which held unconstitutional a 50-year-old pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_2650" }, { "text": "cedure by which a single House of Congress could override", "paragraph_id": "para_2651" }, { "text": "an executive action. See ante, at 33. Chadha, however, is", "paragraph_id": "para_2652" }, { "text": "no model for today’s decision. For one thing, Chadha did", "paragraph_id": "para_2653" }, { "text": "not involve a practice that had been repeatedly approved by", "paragraph_id": "para_2654" }, { "text": "this Court for nearly a century. Moreover, Chadha rested", "paragraph_id": "para_2655" }, { "text": "on “[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2656" }, { "text": "tion” (specifically, Article I’s bicameralism and present-", "paragraph_id": "para_2657" }, { "text": "ment requirements) in disapproving the challenged prac-", "paragraph_id": "para_2658" }, { "text": "tice. 462 U. S., at 945. The majority here, by contrast,", "paragraph_id": "para_2659" }, { "text": "identifies no constitutional provision referencing or requir-", "paragraph_id": "para_2660" }, { "text": "ing an unfettered removal power. See infra, at 14–18. In-", "paragraph_id": "para_2661" }, { "text": "stead, it rests heavily on structural inferences, legislative", "paragraph_id": "para_2662" }, { "text": "inaction, congressional debates, legal commentary, and pri-", "paragraph_id": "para_2663" }, { "text": "vate correspondence. See ante, at 9–13. Thus, unlike", "paragraph_id": "para_2664" }, { "text": "Chadha, this case does not ask whether 50 years of practice", "paragraph_id": "para_2665" }, { "text": "can overcome plain constitutional text. It asks whether the", "paragraph_id": "para_2666" }, { "text": "Constitution privileges the majority’s flawed historical ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_2667" }, { "text": "count as the final word on the subject, impervious to more", "paragraph_id": "para_2668" }, { "text": "than a century of later historical development.", "paragraph_id": "para_2669" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2670" }, { "text": "4 The majority suggests that it is unlikely that President Lincoln would", "paragraph_id": "para_2671" }, { "text": "have supported a bill limiting his own removal power, see ante, at 32,", "paragraph_id": "para_2672" }, { "text": "n. 8, but that flies in the face of the fact that he did sign this bill into law", "paragraph_id": "para_2673" }, { "text": "without objection. Nor does the fact that Congress later repealed this", "paragraph_id": "para_2674" }, { "text": "law erase the historical record of Lincoln’s actions. Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_2675" }, { "text": "13Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2676" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2677" }, { "text": "The answer is no. Although the majority suggests that", "paragraph_id": "para_2678" }, { "text": "its view reflects a settled construction of the Constitution,", "paragraph_id": "para_2679" }, { "text": "the opposite is true. For more than a century, the Nation", "paragraph_id": "para_2680" }, { "text": "has firmly rejected the majority’s view and has recognized", "paragraph_id": "para_2681" }, { "text": "that Congress, not this Court, has primary say over", "paragraph_id": "para_2682" }, { "text": "whether multimember commissions like the FTC should", "paragraph_id": "para_2683" }, { "text": "have some insulation from direct Presidential control. It is", "paragraph_id": "para_2684" }, { "text": "thus the majority, not Humphrey’s or the FTC, that improp-", "paragraph_id": "para_2685" }, { "text": "erly “transform[s] the ‘established practice’ of the political", "paragraph_id": "para_2686" }, { "text": "branches.” Mazars, 591 U. S., at 867.", "paragraph_id": "para_2687" }, { "text": "B", "paragraph_id": "para_2688" }, { "text": "Ninety years of precedent and 140 years of consistent po-", "paragraph_id": "para_2689" }, { "text": "litical practice should have been more than enough to re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2690" }, { "text": "solve this case. They are not enough, however, for the ma-", "paragraph_id": "para_2691" }, { "text": "jority. Instead, the majority disregards “a venerable and", "paragraph_id": "para_2692" }, { "text": "accepted tradition” after placing it “on the examining table”", "paragraph_id": "para_2693" }, { "text": "and “scrutiniz[ing] its conformity to” the majority’s own “ab-", "paragraph_id": "para_2694" }, { "text": "stract” theory of unitary executive control. Rutan, 497 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_2695" }, { "text": "62, at 95–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).", "paragraph_id": "para_2696" }, { "text": "There is no need for this renewed analysis, but even if we", "paragraph_id": "para_2697" }, { "text": "must return to fundamentals, the majority remains deeply", "paragraph_id": "para_2698" }, { "text": "wrong. Until 2010, this Court had generally allowed Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2699" }, { "text": "gress to impose reasonable limits on the President’s default", "paragraph_id": "para_2700" }, { "text": "power to remove Executive Branch officials if doing so did", "paragraph_id": "para_2701" }, { "text": "not impair his ability to perform his constitutional duties.", "paragraph_id": "para_2702" }, { "text": "See Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 515–516, 532–533", "paragraph_id": "para_2703" }, { "text": "(Breyer, J., dissenting). Recently, however, the Court has", "paragraph_id": "para_2704" }, { "text": "seized the issue from the political branches by fashioning a", "paragraph_id": "para_2705" }, { "text": "“general rule” of mandatory, illimitable at-will Presidential", "paragraph_id": "para_2706" }, { "text": "removal. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 215. From the start, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2707" }, { "text": "majority’s theory rested on shaky ground. Over time, its", "paragraph_id": "para_2708" }, { "text": "arguments have grown weaker still, as historical evidence", "paragraph_id": "para_2709" }, { "text": "has undermined key pillars of its theory. Today, the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_2710" }, { "text": "faced a choice: plow ahead, or acknowledge that the foun-", "paragraph_id": "para_2711" }, { "text": "dations on which the “general rule” of illimitable removal", "paragraph_id": "para_2712" }, { "text": "14 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2713" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2714" }, { "text": "power rests are less stable than the Court has previously", "paragraph_id": "para_2715" }, { "text": "asserted. Unfortunately, the Court repeats and expands", "paragraph_id": "para_2716" }, { "text": "upon several prior errors that require correction.", "paragraph_id": "para_2717" }, { "text": "1", "paragraph_id": "para_2718" }, { "text": "Beginning at the founding, there is no evidence that those", "paragraph_id": "para_2719", "court_paragraph": 1 }, { "text": "who shaped or ratified the Constitution adopted the major-", "paragraph_id": "para_2720" }, { "text": "ity’s general rule of at-will removal. Indeed, the Court has", "paragraph_id": "para_2721" }, { "text": "long noted that, for the most part, “[t]he Constitution is si-", "paragraph_id": "para_2722" }, { "text": "lent with respect to the power of removal from office, where", "paragraph_id": "para_2723" }, { "text": "the tenure is not fixed.” Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 258", "paragraph_id": "para_2724" }, { "text": "(1839). The one exception, and only explicit removal power", "paragraph_id": "para_2725" }, { "text": "granted in the Constitution, is for impeachment of the", "paragraph_id": "para_2726" }, { "text": "“President, Vice President, and all Civil Officers,” a power", "paragraph_id": "para_2727" }, { "text": "placed in Congress’s hands, not the President’s. See Art. I,", "paragraph_id": "para_2728" }, { "text": "§3, cls. 6–7; Art. II, §4.", "paragraph_id": "para_2729" }, { "text": "Still, the majority begins by claiming that its theory of", "paragraph_id": "para_2730" }, { "text": "Presidential removal comes from Article II’s “vest[ing of]", "paragraph_id": "para_2731" }, { "text": "‘[t]he executive Power’ ” in the President. Ante, at 1, 4 (quot-", "paragraph_id": "para_2732" }, { "text": "ing Art. II, §1, cl. 1). That assertion begs the question. Does", "paragraph_id": "para_2733" }, { "text": "the “executive Power,” in fact, contain an illimitable re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2734" }, { "text": "moval power beyond Congress’s power to “establis[h] by", "paragraph_id": "para_2735" }, { "text": "Law” certain offices, as “necessary and proper” to structure", "paragraph_id": "para_2736" }, { "text": "the Executive Branch? Art. I, §8, cl. 18; Art. II, §2, cl. 2.", "paragraph_id": "para_2737" }, { "text": "After all, agencies like the FTC would not even exist if not", "paragraph_id": "para_2738" }, { "text": "for Congress’s exercise of its Article I power to create them.", "paragraph_id": "para_2739" }, { "text": "There is little to suggest that “executive Power,” as un-", "paragraph_id": "para_2740" }, { "text": "derstood at the time of the founding, was as capacious as", "paragraph_id": "para_2741" }, { "text": "the Court today asserts. The powers held by the English", "paragraph_id": "para_2742" }, { "text": "Crown and state governors before ratification did not in-", "paragraph_id": "para_2743" }, { "text": "clude a removal power that the legislature could not modify.", "paragraph_id": "para_2744" }, { "text": "Instead, Parliament often restricted the Crown’s ability to", "paragraph_id": "para_2745" }, { "text": "remove even high-level royal officers, and States with vest-", "paragraph_id": "para_2746" }, { "text": "ing clauses like the Constitution’s similarly allowed for lim-", "paragraph_id": "para_2747" }, { "text": "its on gubernatorial removal powers. See Seila Law, 591", "paragraph_id": "para_2748" }, { "text": "15Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2749" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2750" }, { "text": "U. S., at 267–268 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Recent, post-Seila", "paragraph_id": "para_2751" }, { "text": "Law scholarship overwhelmingly confirms this point.5", "paragraph_id": "para_2752" }, { "text": "Nor is there evidence that the Constitution was intended", "paragraph_id": "para_2753" }, { "text": "to give the President more expansive removal powers than", "paragraph_id": "para_2754" }, { "text": "those enjoyed by the Crown. For good reason: Doing so", "paragraph_id": "para_2755" }, { "text": "would have been inconsistent with the Constitution’s very", "paragraph_id": "para_2756" }, { "text": "foundation. The Framers “never intended” to give the Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_2757" }, { "text": "ident “the complete set of powers” that the English Crown", "paragraph_id": "para_2758" }, { "text": "held, let alone more. C. Chabot, Interring the Unitary Ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_2759" }, { "text": "ecutive, 98 Notre Dame L. Rev. 129, 140 (2022) (Chabot).", "paragraph_id": "para_2760" }, { "text": "They carefully parsed the “ ‘royal prerogative[s]’ ” and as-", "paragraph_id": "para_2761" }, { "text": "signed many, including the power of office creation, to Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2762" }, { "text": "gress. Ibid.; see G. Lawson, Command and Control: Oper-", "paragraph_id": "para_2763" }, { "text": "ationalizing the Unitary Executive, 92 Ford. L. Rev. 441,", "paragraph_id": "para_2764" }, { "text": "442–443 (2023) (Lawson) (explaining that the Constitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2765" }, { "text": "tion’s vesting of the power to create offices in Congress was", "paragraph_id": "para_2766" }, { "text": "a “monumental change from English practice”).", "paragraph_id": "para_2767" }, { "text": "Removal also “was not discussed in the Constitutional", "paragraph_id": "para_2768" }, { "text": "Convention,” Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 109–110", "paragraph_id": "para_2769" }, { "text": "(1926), making an expansion of preratification executive", "paragraph_id": "para_2770" }, { "text": "power unlikely. Alexander Hamilton, then writing to sup-", "paragraph_id": "para_2771" }, { "text": "port the States’ ratification of the Constitution, explained", "paragraph_id": "para_2772" }, { "text": "that because the power to remove traditionally followed the", "paragraph_id": "para_2773" }, { "text": "power to appoint, “[t]he consent of [the Senate] would be", "paragraph_id": "para_2774" }, { "text": "necessary to displace as well as to appoint.” The Federalist", "paragraph_id": "para_2775" }, { "text": "No. 77, p. 458 (C. Rossiter & C. Kesler eds. 1999). This was", "paragraph_id": "para_2776" }, { "text": "a selling point for the Constitution, as it meant that “[a]", "paragraph_id": "para_2777" }, { "text": "change of the [President] would not occasion so violent or so", "paragraph_id": "para_2778" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2779" }, { "text": "5 See, e.g., A. Bamzai & S. Prakash, The Executive Power of Removal,", "paragraph_id": "para_2780" }, { "text": "136 Harv. L. Rev. 1756, 1790 (2023) (acknowledging that “parliamentary", "paragraph_id": "para_2781" }, { "text": "laws [could] nullify the common backdrop of at-pleasure removal”); Man-", "paragraph_id": "para_2782" }, { "text": "ners & Menand 18–21 (collecting English and early American removal", "paragraph_id": "para_2783" }, { "text": "limits); J. Shugerman, Venality: A Strangely Practical History of Unre-", "paragraph_id": "para_2784" }, { "text": "movable Offices and Limited Executive Power, 100 Notre Dame L. Rev.", "paragraph_id": "para_2785" }, { "text": "213, 216–218 (2024) (In England, “many high offices, and even ‘great of-", "paragraph_id": "para_2786" }, { "text": "fices,’ department heads, and cabinet-level offices were unremovable” by", "paragraph_id": "para_2787" }, { "text": "the Crown).", "paragraph_id": "para_2788" }, { "text": "16 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2789" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2790" }, { "text": "general a revolution in the officers of the government as", "paragraph_id": "para_2791" }, { "text": "might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices.”", "paragraph_id": "para_2792" }, { "text": "Ibid.6 Madison also explained that “[t]he tenure of the min-", "paragraph_id": "para_2793" }, { "text": "isterial offices, generally, will be a subject of legal regula-", "paragraph_id": "para_2794" }, { "text": "tion, conformably to the reason of the case and the example", "paragraph_id": "para_2795" }, { "text": "of the State constitutions.” Id., No. 39, at 238.", "paragraph_id": "para_2796" }, { "text": "The Constitution may have been intended, as the major-", "paragraph_id": "para_2797" }, { "text": "ity argues at length, to “forg[e] a new path,” in contrast to", "paragraph_id": "para_2798" }, { "text": "some state governments at the time, by “opting for one", "paragraph_id": "para_2799" }, { "text": "President” and not a “ ‘committee-style’ ” Presidency. See", "paragraph_id": "para_2800" }, { "text": "ante, at 1–2, 4–9. This new path, however, does not lead", "paragraph_id": "para_2801" }, { "text": "where the majority wishes to go. Whether executive power", "paragraph_id": "para_2802" }, { "text": "vests in a single President or a council, the question re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2803" }, { "text": "mains whether the Vesting Clause forecloses any limita-", "paragraph_id": "para_2804" }, { "text": "tions on that person’s (or body’s) power to remove subordi-", "paragraph_id": "para_2805" }, { "text": "nate officials. For proof, look no further than Hamilton,", "paragraph_id": "para_2806" }, { "text": "who certainly agreed that executive power ought to be", "paragraph_id": "para_2807" }, { "text": "“placed in a ‘single hand.’ ” Ante, at 6 (quoting The", "paragraph_id": "para_2808" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2809" }, { "text": "6 Far from a “passing commen[t]” by Hamilton that the majority ima-", "paragraph_id": "para_2810" }, { "text": "gines this to have been, ante, at 29, Joseph Story later wrote that Feder-", "paragraph_id": "para_2811" }, { "text": "alist No. 77 “den[ied] the existence of the [unlimited presidential re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2812" }, { "text": "moval] power” and, in doing so, “had a most material tendency to quiet", "paragraph_id": "para_2813" }, { "text": "the just alarms of the overwhelming influence, and arbitrary exercise of", "paragraph_id": "para_2814" }, { "text": "this prerogative of the executive, which might prove fatal to the personal", "paragraph_id": "para_2815" }, { "text": "independence, and freedom of opinion of public officers, as well as to the", "paragraph_id": "para_2816" }, { "text": "public liberties of the country.” 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of", "paragraph_id": "para_2817" }, { "text": "the United States §§1533–1534, pp. 390, 392 (1833) (Story). When the", "paragraph_id": "para_2818" }, { "text": "political branches ultimately concluded that, contrary to Hamilton, the", "paragraph_id": "para_2819" }, { "text": "President did have authority to remove officials without the Senate’s con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2820" }, { "text": "sent, James Kent marveled at the “striking fact” that they did so based", "paragraph_id": "para_2821" }, { "text": "“upon inference merely” and “in opposition to the high authority of the", "paragraph_id": "para_2822" }, { "text": "Federalist.” 1 Commentaries on American Law 290 (1826) (Kent). The", "paragraph_id": "para_2823" }, { "text": "majority’s suggestion that Hamilton might have meant something en-", "paragraph_id": "para_2824" }, { "text": "tirely different in Federalist No. 77, ante, at 29, is also doubtful given", "paragraph_id": "para_2825" }, { "text": "Story’s and Kent’s understandings. Moreover, to the extent the majority", "paragraph_id": "para_2826" }, { "text": "identifies other later statements by Hamilton arguably in tension with", "paragraph_id": "para_2827" }, { "text": "his initial view in The Federalist, see ante, at 29–30, “changing minds", "paragraph_id": "para_2828" }, { "text": "and inconstant opinions don’t usually prove the existence of constitu-", "paragraph_id": "para_2829" }, { "text": "tional rules.” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 270, n. 4 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).", "paragraph_id": "para_2830" }, { "text": "17Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2831" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2832" }, { "text": "Federalist No. 70, p. 424 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). Yet Ham-", "paragraph_id": "para_2833" }, { "text": "ilton also saw this choice as entirely compatible with his", "paragraph_id": "para_2834" }, { "text": "view that “[t]he consent of ” the Senate would be necessary", "paragraph_id": "para_2835" }, { "text": "“to displace as well as to appoint” officers. The Federalist", "paragraph_id": "para_2836" }, { "text": "No. 77, at 458 (Rossiter & Kessler eds. 1999). He plainly", "paragraph_id": "para_2837" }, { "text": "did not view “the power to remove at will [a]s a necessary", "paragraph_id": "para_2838" }, { "text": "corollary of the Constitution’s design,” ante, at 8, and the", "paragraph_id": "para_2839" }, { "text": "majority is wrong to assume that a unitary Presidency im-", "paragraph_id": "para_2840" }, { "text": "plies an unlimited removal power.", "paragraph_id": "para_2841" }, { "text": "The majority relatedly places undue weight on the notion", "paragraph_id": "para_2842" }, { "text": "that “ ‘[t]he power of appointing and removing executive of-", "paragraph_id": "para_2843" }, { "text": "ficers [is] inherent in [the] Executive.’ ” Ibid. Under the", "paragraph_id": "para_2844" }, { "text": "Constitution, the President does not have unlimited ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_2845" }, { "text": "pointment powers either. His power is to “nominate”; only", "paragraph_id": "para_2846" }, { "text": "“by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate” may he", "paragraph_id": "para_2847" }, { "text": "“appoint” the “Officers of the United States.” Art. II, §2,", "paragraph_id": "para_2848" }, { "text": "cl. 2. What is more, the President can appoint officers only", "paragraph_id": "para_2849" }, { "text": "to offices “established by Law”—that is, by Congress. Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_2850" }, { "text": "Any link between appointment and removal thus under-", "paragraph_id": "para_2851" }, { "text": "mines the existence of any inherent illimitable executive re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2852" }, { "text": "moval power. See, e.g., Lawson 452–453. Given that the", "paragraph_id": "para_2853" }, { "text": "Constitution did not grant the President alone an illimita-", "paragraph_id": "para_2854" }, { "text": "ble power to appoint, it is all the less likely that it silently", "paragraph_id": "para_2855" }, { "text": "vested in the President an unbounded power to remove.", "paragraph_id": "para_2856" }, { "text": "Nor does the Take Care Clause serve as a plausible", "paragraph_id": "para_2857" }, { "text": "source for the expansive removal power the majority posits.", "paragraph_id": "para_2858" }, { "text": "Contra, ante, at 4. “[T]he provision—‘he shall take Care", "paragraph_id": "para_2859" }, { "text": "that the Laws be faithfully executed’—speaks of duty, not", "paragraph_id": "para_2860" }, { "text": "power.” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 268 (opinion of KAGAN, J.)", "paragraph_id": "para_2861" }, { "text": "(quoting Art. II, §3). As recent scholarship has explained,", "paragraph_id": "para_2862" }, { "text": "“ ‘[f]aithful execution’ was proto-fiduciary legal language", "paragraph_id": "para_2863" }, { "text": "from centuries of English law that limited the discretion of", "paragraph_id": "para_2864" }, { "text": "executive officials” and did “not expan[d] their power.” J.", "paragraph_id": "para_2865" }, { "text": "Shugerman, The Misuse of Ratification-Era Sources by", "paragraph_id": "para_2866" }, { "text": "Unitary Executive Theorists, 58 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 591,", "paragraph_id": "para_2867" }, { "text": "603–604 (2025); see A. Kent, E. Leib, & J. Shugerman,", "paragraph_id": "para_2868" }, { "text": "18 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2869" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2870" }, { "text": "Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111,", "paragraph_id": "para_2871" }, { "text": "2120 (2019) (explaining that the original public meaning of", "paragraph_id": "para_2872" }, { "text": "the Take Care Clause “supports readings of Article II that", "paragraph_id": "para_2873" }, { "text": "tend to subordinate presidential power to congressional di-", "paragraph_id": "para_2874" }, { "text": "rection”). At-will removal might be one good way of ful-", "paragraph_id": "para_2875" }, { "text": "filling those duties. There is no evidence, however, that an-", "paragraph_id": "para_2876" }, { "text": "yone understood the Take Care Clause at or near the", "paragraph_id": "para_2877" }, { "text": "founding to imply a mandatory, inflexible rule of at-will re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2878" }, { "text": "moval that Congress could never modify.", "paragraph_id": "para_2879" }, { "text": "In sum, nothing in the text of the Constitution, as under-", "paragraph_id": "para_2880" }, { "text": "stood at the time of the founding by those who ratified it,", "paragraph_id": "para_2881" }, { "text": "suggests the illimitable removal power the Court today en-", "paragraph_id": "para_2882" }, { "text": "dorses. The majority can shut its eyes to this evidence and", "paragraph_id": "para_2883" }, { "text": "point back to its past mistakes as support for the new ones", "paragraph_id": "para_2884" }, { "text": "of today. See ante, at 20 (citing Seila Law and Free Enter-", "paragraph_id": "para_2885" }, { "text": "prise Fund). To the extent “ ‘[o]riginal history’ ” is seen as", "paragraph_id": "para_2886" }, { "text": "“generally dispositive,” however, see United States v.", "paragraph_id": "para_2887" }, { "text": "Rahimi, 602 U. S. 680, 738 (2024) (BARRETT, J., concur-", "paragraph_id": "para_2888" }, { "text": "ring), this background should have prevented the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_2889" }, { "text": "from continuing to build on the uncertain foundation of a", "paragraph_id": "para_2890" }, { "text": "general rule of illimitable Presidential removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_2891" }, { "text": "2", "paragraph_id": "para_2892" }, { "text": "The majority quibbles with some of the evidence dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_2893", "court_paragraph": 2 }, { "text": "cussed above, but in the end cites nothing from the ratifica-", "paragraph_id": "para_2894" }, { "text": "tion debates or the Constitution’s text endorsing its view of", "paragraph_id": "para_2895" }, { "text": "unbounded removal power. Instead, the majority rests", "paragraph_id": "para_2896" }, { "text": "mostly on postratification commentary and congressional", "paragraph_id": "para_2897" }, { "text": "inaction. On this score, though, the majority also comes up", "paragraph_id": "para_2898" }, { "text": "short. Presidential removal has long evoked strong, con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2899" }, { "text": "flicting views from American political leaders, but the avail-", "paragraph_id": "para_2900" }, { "text": "able evidence from 1789 through the end of the 19th cen-", "paragraph_id": "para_2901" }, { "text": "tury reflects that the political branches have long believed,", "paragraph_id": "para_2902" }, { "text": "and acted upon the belief, that Congress has the power to", "paragraph_id": "para_2903" }, { "text": "set limits on the President’s removal authority and that the", "paragraph_id": "para_2904" }, { "text": "President was not free to flout such limits when enacted.", "paragraph_id": "para_2905" }, { "text": "19Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2906" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2907" }, { "text": "a", "paragraph_id": "para_2908" }, { "text": "Starting where the majority starts, the debates of the", "paragraph_id": "para_2909" }, { "text": "First Congress over the removal process for early depart-", "paragraph_id": "para_2910" }, { "text": "ment heads (which culminated in the “Decision of 1789”) in", "paragraph_id": "para_2911" }, { "text": "no way resolve the question presented here. See ante, at 9–", "paragraph_id": "para_2912" }, { "text": "11. To begin, the majority’s own theory is inconsistent. If", "paragraph_id": "para_2913" }, { "text": "“[t]ext and structure” already “taught that the President", "paragraph_id": "para_2914" }, { "text": "had to be able to remove” all of his inferiors in order to “ ‘be", "paragraph_id": "para_2915" }, { "text": "personally responsible for everything’ ” within the Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_2916" }, { "text": "Branch, ante, at 9, then it is unclear what was left for the", "paragraph_id": "para_2917" }, { "text": "First Congress to “decide,” much less spend days debating.", "paragraph_id": "para_2918" }, { "text": "The very need for a Decision of 1789 suggests that the re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2919" }, { "text": "moval question was still unanswered by 1789.", "paragraph_id": "para_2920" }, { "text": "In any event, the debates from 1789 do not support the", "paragraph_id": "para_2921" }, { "text": "majority’s understanding of executive power. The House in", "paragraph_id": "para_2922" }, { "text": "1789 did not address whether Congress could place limits", "paragraph_id": "para_2923" }, { "text": "on the President’s power to remove; it debated whether the", "paragraph_id": "para_2924" }, { "text": "President could remove officers at all without Senate con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2925" }, { "text": "sent. “[T]he great question” in 1789 “was whether the re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2926" }, { "text": "moval was to be by the President alone, or with the concur-", "paragraph_id": "para_2927" }, { "text": "rence of the Senate.” Hennen, 13 Pet., at 259. Some, as the", "paragraph_id": "para_2928" }, { "text": "majority explains, believed (as Hamilton did) that the Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2929" }, { "text": "stitution required Senate consent for all removals; another", "paragraph_id": "para_2930" }, { "text": "group believed that Congress could choose whether to give", "paragraph_id": "para_2931" }, { "text": "the Senate a say; and a third believed the Constitution pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_2932" }, { "text": "hibited all Senate involvement in the removal process (out-", "paragraph_id": "para_2933" }, { "text": "side of impeachment). Ante, at 9–10.7", "paragraph_id": "para_2934" }, { "text": "The one “ ‘[d]ecision’ ” that emerged from this debate was", "paragraph_id": "para_2935" }, { "text": "that “a congressional role in the removal process was re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2936" }, { "text": "jected.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723 (1986). To be", "paragraph_id": "para_2937" }, { "text": "clear on this, given the majority’s elliptical treatment of", "paragraph_id": "para_2938" }, { "text": "what took place in the summer of 1789, here is what", "paragraph_id": "para_2939" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_2940" }, { "text": "7 A fourth, smaller group believed that impeachment alone, without re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2941" }, { "text": "served power to the President, was the only way to remove an executive", "paragraph_id": "para_2942" }, { "text": "officer. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 456–457 (1789) (Rep. Smith).", "paragraph_id": "para_2943" }, { "text": "20 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_2944" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2945" }, { "text": "actually happened: The bill the House initially debated pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_2946" }, { "text": "vided that the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs", "paragraph_id": "para_2947" }, { "text": "would “be removable by the President.” 1 Annals of Cong.", "paragraph_id": "para_2948" }, { "text": "370–371. Madison and his allies at first argued that this", "paragraph_id": "para_2949" }, { "text": "language should be “retain[ed] . . . in the bill” because it", "paragraph_id": "para_2950" }, { "text": "was “explanatory of the meaning of the Constitution” (that", "paragraph_id": "para_2951" }, { "text": "is, they thought it confirmed the President’s power to re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2952" }, { "text": "move), id., at 464 (Madison), while the other camps opposed", "paragraph_id": "para_2953" }, { "text": "this language. Several days later, however, Madison and", "paragraph_id": "para_2954" }, { "text": "his allies “reversed course,” arguing that the language they", "paragraph_id": "para_2955" }, { "text": "originally favored might wrongly suggest that the President", "paragraph_id": "para_2956" }, { "text": "lacked any removal power unless Congress provided for it", "paragraph_id": "para_2957" }, { "text": "by statute. J. Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Incon-", "paragraph_id": "para_2958" }, { "text": "stant Originalism and Strategic Ambiguity, 171 U. Pa.", "paragraph_id": "para_2959" }, { "text": "L. Rev. 753, 760 (2023); 1 Annals of Cong. 578 (Madison’s", "paragraph_id": "para_2960" }, { "text": "ally, Egbert Benson, moving to amend the bill for these rea-", "paragraph_id": "para_2961" }, { "text": "sons). Ultimately, the House settled on a vague clause de-", "paragraph_id": "para_2962" }, { "text": "tailing who would have custody of certain books and records", "paragraph_id": "para_2963" }, { "text": "“whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from", "paragraph_id": "para_2964" }, { "text": "office by the President.” Act of July 27, 1789, 1 Stat. 29.", "paragraph_id": "para_2965" }, { "text": "This language assumes that the President can remove of-", "paragraph_id": "para_2966" }, { "text": "ficers without an express grant from Congress and without", "paragraph_id": "para_2967" }, { "text": "Senate involvement. No version of the bill debated or voted", "paragraph_id": "para_2968" }, { "text": "upon, however, suggested that Congress was prohibited en-", "paragraph_id": "para_2969" }, { "text": "tirely from limiting the causes for such removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_2970" }, { "text": "As a result, nearly every scholar to have studied this ep-", "paragraph_id": "para_2971" }, { "text": "isode, even those broadly supportive of the majority’s view,", "paragraph_id": "para_2972" }, { "text": "has come to agree that “the Decision of 1789 did not endorse", "paragraph_id": "para_2973" }, { "text": "the view that Congress lacked authority to modify the Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2974" }, { "text": "stitution’s grant of removal power to the President.” S. Pra-", "paragraph_id": "para_2975" }, { "text": "kash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev.", "paragraph_id": "para_2976" }, { "text": "1021, 1073 (2006); see J. Manning, Separation of Powers as", "paragraph_id": "para_2977" }, { "text": "Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1964–", "paragraph_id": "para_2978" }, { "text": "1965, n. 135 (2011); see also Shugerman, 171 U. Pa. L. Rev.,", "paragraph_id": "para_2979" }, { "text": "at 759–762. Instead, Congress in 1789 left that question to", "paragraph_id": "para_2980" }, { "text": "later generations.", "paragraph_id": "para_2981" }, { "text": "21Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_2982" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_2983" }, { "text": "Fumbling for a response, the majority asserts that there", "paragraph_id": "para_2984" }, { "text": "is no constitutional difference between a rule against con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2985" }, { "text": "gressional participation in removals, on the one hand, and", "paragraph_id": "para_2986" }, { "text": "a rule against tenure protections, on the other. See ante,", "paragraph_id": "para_2987" }, { "text": "at 30 (arguing that these are “one and the same”). That is", "paragraph_id": "para_2988" }, { "text": "not how the Court has understood matters. The Court has", "paragraph_id": "para_2989" }, { "text": "long distinguished between impermissible efforts by Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_2990" }, { "text": "gress to “reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer", "paragraph_id": "para_2991" }, { "text": "charged with the execution of the laws except by impeach-", "paragraph_id": "para_2992" }, { "text": "ment” (the issue decided in 1789), and the permissible", "paragraph_id": "para_2993" }, { "text": "“power of Congress to limit the President’s powers of re-", "paragraph_id": "para_2994" }, { "text": "moval of a” principal officer. Bowsher, 478 U. S., at 724–", "paragraph_id": "para_2995" }, { "text": "726. “Madison’s position ultimately prevailed” in “urg[ing]", "paragraph_id": "para_2996" }, { "text": "rejection of a congressional role in the removal of Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_2997" }, { "text": "Branch officers,” id., at 723, but Humphrey’s “involved an", "paragraph_id": "para_2998" }, { "text": "issue not presented” by that triumph, 478 U. S., at 724.", "paragraph_id": "para_2999" }, { "text": "The majority also compares the President’s removal", "paragraph_id": "para_3000" }, { "text": "power to the pardon and veto powers, suggesting that once", "paragraph_id": "para_3001" }, { "text": "Congress rejected the Senate’s role in removals, that power", "paragraph_id": "para_3002" }, { "text": "became “as much outside Congress’s control as” these other", "paragraph_id": "para_3003" }, { "text": "powers and so now “ ‘cannot be modified, abridged, or dimin-", "paragraph_id": "para_3004" }, { "text": "ished by the Congress.’ ” Ante, at 30 (quoting Schick v.", "paragraph_id": "para_3005" }, { "text": "Reed, 419 U. S. 256, 266 (1974)). The comparison is inapt.", "paragraph_id": "para_3006" }, { "text": "Schick’s conclusion that the pardon power is not subject to", "paragraph_id": "para_3007" }, { "text": "modification by Congress rested on the “history of the Eng-", "paragraph_id": "para_3008" }, { "text": "lish pardoning power,” the text of the Constitution, and “un-", "paragraph_id": "para_3009" }, { "text": "broken practice since 1790.” 419 U. S., at 266. As explained", "paragraph_id": "para_3010" }, { "text": "throughout this opinion, the majority’s version of the re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3011" }, { "text": "moval power, by contrast, draws no support from any of", "paragraph_id": "para_3012" }, { "text": "those sources. The majority’s rule breaks from English", "paragraph_id": "para_3013" }, { "text": "practice; it derives from no constitutional text speaking of a", "paragraph_id": "para_3014" }, { "text": "Presidential removal power (instead, it is Congress that has", "paragraph_id": "para_3015" }, { "text": "power over office creation); and it is inconsistent with the", "paragraph_id": "para_3016" }, { "text": "bulk of the American historical tradition.", "paragraph_id": "para_3017" }, { "text": "22 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3018" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3019" }, { "text": "b", "paragraph_id": "para_3020" }, { "text": "The majority attempts to shore up its view of the Decision", "paragraph_id": "para_3021" }, { "text": "of 1789 with commentary from the years that followed, but", "paragraph_id": "para_3022" }, { "text": "several of its own sources show its errors. The first slew of", "paragraph_id": "para_3023" }, { "text": "citations shows only that Senate consent was unnecessary", "paragraph_id": "para_3024" }, { "text": "for removal. See ante, at 11–12. The debate that was, in", "paragraph_id": "para_3025" }, { "text": "James Kent’s words, “firmly and definitively settled” in", "paragraph_id": "para_3026" }, { "text": "1789, was not whether at-will removal was constitutionally", "paragraph_id": "para_3027" }, { "text": "required, as the majority suggests; it was whether “partici-", "paragraph_id": "para_3028" }, { "text": "pation in [the removal] authority by the senate” was neces-", "paragraph_id": "para_3029" }, { "text": "sary or permitted. 1 Kent 289–290. Joseph Story confirmed", "paragraph_id": "para_3030" }, { "text": "that the decision in which “[t]he public . . . acquiesced” was", "paragraph_id": "para_3031" }, { "text": "Congress’s “affirm[ance] of the power of removal in the", "paragraph_id": "para_3032" }, { "text": "[P]resident, without any co-operation of the [S]enate.” 3", "paragraph_id": "para_3033" }, { "text": "Story §§1536–1537, at 394–395. Daniel Webster, too, de-", "paragraph_id": "para_3034" }, { "text": "cried the Decision of 1789 as wrongly allowing the Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3035" }, { "text": "dent to remove independently, rather than “concurrently”", "paragraph_id": "para_3036" }, { "text": "with the Senate. 11 Cong. Deb. 466 (1835) (1835 Debates).", "paragraph_id": "para_3037" }, { "text": "Contrary to the majority, even by 1835, Webster still “be-", "paragraph_id": "para_3038" }, { "text": "lieve[d] it to be within the just power of Congress to reverse", "paragraph_id": "para_3039" }, { "text": "the decision of 1789.” Id., at 468.", "paragraph_id": "para_3040" }, { "text": "The power of the President to remove without Senate con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3041" }, { "text": "sent does not, however, mean that Congress was forbidden", "paragraph_id": "para_3042" }, { "text": "from placing any restraints on that power. Even Madison", "paragraph_id": "para_3043" }, { "text": "seems to have agreed. In 1789, he argued that for officers", "paragraph_id": "para_3044" }, { "text": "who “partak[e] strongly of the judicial character,” “there", "paragraph_id": "para_3045" }, { "text": "may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not", "paragraph_id": "para_3046" }, { "text": "hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive [B]ranch.” 1", "paragraph_id": "para_3047" }, { "text": "Annals of Cong. 611–612; see Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 631", "paragraph_id": "para_3048" }, { "text": "(describing Madison’s view). Others thought similarly.", "paragraph_id": "para_3049" }, { "text": "Asked by President Monroe whether at-will removal was", "paragraph_id": "para_3050" }, { "text": "permitted without explicit statutory authorization, Attor-", "paragraph_id": "para_3051" }, { "text": "ney General William Wirt answered in the affirmative, but", "paragraph_id": "para_3052" }, { "text": "only because “[w]henever Congress intend[s] a more perma-", "paragraph_id": "para_3053" }, { "text": "nent tenure . . . they take care to express that intention", "paragraph_id": "para_3054" }, { "text": "clearly and explicitly.” 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 212, 213 (1818).", "paragraph_id": "para_3055" }, { "text": "23Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3056" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3057" }, { "text": "This shows both that Monroe did not assume an at-will re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3058" }, { "text": "moval power and that Wirt believed it could be curtailed.", "paragraph_id": "para_3059" }, { "text": "Story did note, in 1833, that Congress had until then gen-", "paragraph_id": "para_3060" }, { "text": "erally left the President free to remove officers at will. It is", "paragraph_id": "para_3061" }, { "text": "unclear, however, if he believed Congress could provide", "paragraph_id": "para_3062" }, { "text": "more durable tenures of office. As the majority observes,", "paragraph_id": "para_3063" }, { "text": "Story suggested in a footnote that the vote in 1789 “seems", "paragraph_id": "para_3064" }, { "text": "to have expressed the sense of the legislature, that the", "paragraph_id": "para_3065" }, { "text": "power of removal by the executive could not be abridged by", "paragraph_id": "para_3066" }, { "text": "the legislature.” 3 Story §1531, at 390, n. 1. On the prior", "paragraph_id": "para_3067" }, { "text": "page, though, Story identified, as an open question,", "paragraph_id": "para_3068" }, { "text": "“whether congress can give any duration of office . . . not", "paragraph_id": "para_3069" }, { "text": "subject to the exercise of this power of removal.” Id., §1531,", "paragraph_id": "para_3070" }, { "text": "at 389. Given Story’s view that the “vote finally taken” in", "paragraph_id": "para_3071" }, { "text": "1789 was merely “affirmative of the power of removal in the", "paragraph_id": "para_3072" }, { "text": "president, without any co-operation of the senate,” id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3073" }, { "text": "§1536, at 394, it is most likely that the “sense of the legis-", "paragraph_id": "para_3074" }, { "text": "lature” described in his footnote was the view that Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_3075" }, { "text": "could not insert itself into removal decisions by requiring", "paragraph_id": "para_3076" }, { "text": "Senate consent. The majority thus mischaracterizes Story", "paragraph_id": "para_3077" }, { "text": "when it attempts to enlist his equivocal presentation of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3078" }, { "text": "issues as an authoritative endorsement of its position.8", "paragraph_id": "para_3079" }, { "text": "Webster was much clearer. In 1835, “proceed[ing] upon", "paragraph_id": "para_3080" }, { "text": "the admission that [the President’s power to remove with-", "paragraph_id": "para_3081" }, { "text": "out Senate consent] does at present exist,” he urged that", "paragraph_id": "para_3082" }, { "text": "Congress nonetheless retained the authority to “regulat[e]", "paragraph_id": "para_3083" }, { "text": ". . . the tenure of office.” 1835 Debates 468. In his view, “no", "paragraph_id": "para_3084" }, { "text": "one could doubt [the] constitutional validity” of a law “de-", "paragraph_id": "para_3085" }, { "text": "claring that district attorneys, or collectors of customs,”", "paragraph_id": "para_3086" }, { "text": "could be “removed [only] on conviction for misbehaviour,” or", "paragraph_id": "para_3087" }, { "text": "even of an “unwise” law imposing a similar removal re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3088" }, { "text": "striction on “the Attorney General, or the Secretary of", "paragraph_id": "para_3089" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3090" }, { "text": "8 Story, after all, was no enthusiast of a muscular executive removal", "paragraph_id": "para_3091" }, { "text": "power. See supra, at 16, n. 6 (detailing the “ ‘just alarms’ ” raised over", "paragraph_id": "para_3092" }, { "text": "the prospect of such power); infra, at 31, 48 (similar).", "paragraph_id": "para_3093" }, { "text": "24 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3094" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3095" }, { "text": "State.” Id., at 468–469. He was not alone. Henry Clay and", "paragraph_id": "para_3096" }, { "text": "John C. Calhoun, often rivals to each other and to Webster,", "paragraph_id": "para_3097" }, { "text": "also agreed: Clay argued at length that “the legislative au-", "paragraph_id": "para_3098" }, { "text": "thority is competent to regulate the exercise of the power of", "paragraph_id": "para_3099" }, { "text": "dismission” (that is, removal), id., at 524, and Calhoun con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3100" }, { "text": "fessed that, although he had once believed the issue settled", "paragraph_id": "para_3101" }, { "text": "in favor of the President’s power to remove, he had changed", "paragraph_id": "para_3102" }, { "text": "his mind and was “forced to conclude that the power of dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_3103" }, { "text": "missing is not lodged in the President, but is subject to be", "paragraph_id": "para_3104" }, { "text": "controlled and regulated by Congress,” id., at 554–555.9", "paragraph_id": "para_3105" }, { "text": "Far from “settled” in 1789, these continuing discussions", "paragraph_id": "para_3106" }, { "text": "show that the removal issue remained an open, contested", "paragraph_id": "para_3107" }, { "text": "question long after the founding. See, e.g., Hennen, 13 Pet.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3108" }, { "text": "at 259 (describing the “power of removal” as “a subject much", "paragraph_id": "para_3109" }, { "text": "disputed, and upon which a great diversity of opinion was", "paragraph_id": "para_3110" }, { "text": "entertained in the early history of this government”).", "paragraph_id": "para_3111" }, { "text": "c", "paragraph_id": "para_3112" }, { "text": "Even as the President’s ability to remove executive offic-", "paragraph_id": "para_3113" }, { "text": "ers was the subject of spirited debate in the early republic,", "paragraph_id": "para_3114" }, { "text": "limitations on Presidential removal nevertheless were en-", "paragraph_id": "para_3115" }, { "text": "acted. The majority is correct that Presidents generally", "paragraph_id": "para_3116" }, { "text": "“utilized their removal power” when not limited by law, see", "paragraph_id": "para_3117" }, { "text": "ante, at 13, but the 19th-century history of Presidential re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3118" }, { "text": "moval is not as absolute as the majority suggests.", "paragraph_id": "para_3119" }, { "text": "To start, the First Congress itself created administrative", "paragraph_id": "para_3120" }, { "text": "bodies that, although not identical to agencies like the FTC,", "paragraph_id": "para_3121" }, { "text": "enjoyed significant independence in ways that undermine", "paragraph_id": "para_3122" }, { "text": "the majority’s simplistic history of uniform at-will removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_3123" }, { "text": "For instance, in 1790 Congress enacted (and President", "paragraph_id": "para_3124" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3125" }, { "text": "9 The majority has no response regarding Clay and Calhoun, but notes", "paragraph_id": "para_3126" }, { "text": "that Webster, in 1850, may have come around to the majority’s view of", "paragraph_id": "para_3127" }, { "text": "the Decision of 1789. See ante, at 13. If the majority’s case depends on", "paragraph_id": "para_3128" }, { "text": "the shifting views of individual Senators between 1835 and 1850, it is", "paragraph_id": "para_3129" }, { "text": "unclear why Congress similarly was not free, a mere 37 years later in", "paragraph_id": "para_3130" }, { "text": "1887, to change course again and impose modest limitations on the Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_3131" }, { "text": "ident’s removal power like those at issue in this case. See infra, at 27.", "paragraph_id": "para_3132" }, { "text": "25Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3133" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3134" }, { "text": "Washington signed) a law creating the Sinking Fund Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_3135" }, { "text": "mission, a five-member agency responsible for stabilizing", "paragraph_id": "para_3136" }, { "text": "the Nation’s debt. See Act of Aug. 12, 1790, 1 Stat. 186;", "paragraph_id": "para_3137" }, { "text": "Chabot 172–173. Three Cabinet Secretaries, the Vice Pres-", "paragraph_id": "para_3138" }, { "text": "ident, and the Chief Justice headed the Commission, and", "paragraph_id": "para_3139" }, { "text": "the latter two could not be removed by the President—mak-", "paragraph_id": "para_3140" }, { "text": "ing the body at least semi-independent.10 It is true that the", "paragraph_id": "para_3141" }, { "text": "other three members were removable at will, see ante, at", "paragraph_id": "para_3142" }, { "text": "32, but the independence of some members meant that", "paragraph_id": "para_3143" }, { "text": "Presidential control of the fund was not complete. This", "paragraph_id": "para_3144" }, { "text": "structure did not stand alone: In 1790, Congress included", "paragraph_id": "para_3145" }, { "text": "the Chief Justice as a member of the Mint Board, again al-", "paragraph_id": "para_3146" }, { "text": "lowing an independent individual to carry out important", "paragraph_id": "para_3147" }, { "text": "Treasury functions and partake in the exercise of executive", "paragraph_id": "para_3148" }, { "text": "power. See Act of Apr. 2, 1792, 1 Stat. 250.", "paragraph_id": "para_3149" }, { "text": "Nor was this the only way in which the First Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_3150" }, { "text": "legislated to achieve agency independence. It also estab-", "paragraph_id": "para_3151" }, { "text": "lished the Revolutionary War Debt Commission: a board of", "paragraph_id": "para_3152" }, { "text": "“three commissioners” created “to settle the accounts be-", "paragraph_id": "para_3153" }, { "text": "tween the United States, and the individual states,” whose", "paragraph_id": "para_3154" }, { "text": "decisions would be “final and conclusive” without further", "paragraph_id": "para_3155" }, { "text": "review. Act of Aug. 5, 1790, ch. 38, 1 Stat. 178. Hamilton", "paragraph_id": "para_3156" }, { "text": "would later describe the Commission as made up of “dis-", "paragraph_id": "para_3157" }, { "text": "tinct and Independant Officers.” 16 Papers of Alexander", "paragraph_id": "para_3158" }, { "text": "Hamilton 145 (H. Syrett ed. 1972). The majority correctly", "paragraph_id": "para_3159" }, { "text": "notes that the statute did not expressly speak of removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_3160" }, { "text": "See ante, at 31–32. It did, however, specify that the Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_3161" }, { "text": "missioners would “continue” in office “until the first day of", "paragraph_id": "para_3162" }, { "text": "July [1792].” 1 Stat. 179. Scholarship has recently shown,", "paragraph_id": "para_3163" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3164" }, { "text": "10 The majority hypothesizes that the President, though he could not", "paragraph_id": "para_3165" }, { "text": "fire the Chief Justice or Vice President from their principal jobs, could", "paragraph_id": "para_3166" }, { "text": "remove them from their positions on the Commission. Ante, at 32. There", "paragraph_id": "para_3167" }, { "text": "is no evidence of this ever occurring, however; and even if it could have", "paragraph_id": "para_3168" }, { "text": "happened, that would have just left the Commission down a member,", "paragraph_id": "para_3169" }, { "text": "since the President could not add a new Vice President or Chief Justice", "paragraph_id": "para_3170" }, { "text": "on his own.", "paragraph_id": "para_3171" }, { "text": "26 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3172" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3173" }, { "text": "consistent with precedent, infra, at 27–28, that at the", "paragraph_id": "para_3174" }, { "text": "founding, such fixed-term tenures were broadly understood", "paragraph_id": "para_3175" }, { "text": "to preclude removal “before the end of th[e] ter[m].” Man-", "paragraph_id": "para_3176" }, { "text": "ners & Menand 5. On this understanding, the Commission-", "paragraph_id": "para_3177" }, { "text": "ers truly were, as Hamilton claimed, independent.11", "paragraph_id": "para_3178" }, { "text": "As the years went by, Congress continued to implement", "paragraph_id": "para_3179" }, { "text": "forms of tenure protection. In 1791 and then 1816, it cre-", "paragraph_id": "para_3180" }, { "text": "ated the First and Second Banks of the United States, the", "paragraph_id": "para_3181" }, { "text": "former run by directors accountable only to private stock-", "paragraph_id": "para_3182" }, { "text": "holders and the latter with only 5 (out of 25 total) removable", "paragraph_id": "para_3183" }, { "text": "directors. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, 1 Stat. 192–193 (First", "paragraph_id": "para_3184" }, { "text": "Bank); Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 269–270 (Second Bank);", "paragraph_id": "para_3185" }, { "text": "see Trump v. Cook, 609 U. S. ___, ___–___, ___–___ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3186" }, { "text": "(slip op., at 3–4, 22–23) (charting development of the Banks", "paragraph_id": "para_3187" }, { "text": "of the United States and emphasizing the importance of", "paragraph_id": "para_3188" }, { "text": "their “independence”). In 1820, it passed a law making", "paragraph_id": "para_3189" }, { "text": "clear that a wide swath of executive officials “shall be ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_3190" }, { "text": "pointed for the term of four years, but shall be removable", "paragraph_id": "para_3191" }, { "text": "from office at pleasure”—with the use of “but” suggesting", "paragraph_id": "para_3192" }, { "text": "that the 4-year fixed-term appointment otherwise would", "paragraph_id": "para_3193" }, { "text": "not have permitted at-will removal. Act of May 15, 1820,", "paragraph_id": "para_3194" }, { "text": "ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582. In 1867, Congress enacted the Tenure", "paragraph_id": "para_3195" }, { "text": "of Office Act, which (most recognize today) overstepped by", "paragraph_id": "para_3196" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3197" }, { "text": "11 Other executive officers, who may not have been given formal re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3198" }, { "text": "moval protections, nevertheless enjoyed forms of independence from", "paragraph_id": "para_3199" }, { "text": "Presidential control. JUSTICE KAGAN has explained, for example, how the", "paragraph_id": "para_3200" }, { "text": "Comptroller of the Treasury, also created by the First Congress, was un-", "paragraph_id": "para_3201" }, { "text": "derstood to “exercis[e] independent judgment.” Seila Law, 591 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3202" }, { "text": "at 272. Thomas Jefferson, while President, declared that he had “ ‘no", "paragraph_id": "para_3203" }, { "text": "right to interfere in the least’ ” with the Comptroller’s activities within", "paragraph_id": "para_3204" }, { "text": "the Treasury, explaining that the Comptroller “ ‘would no more receive a", "paragraph_id": "para_3205" }, { "text": "direction from me’ than would ‘one of the judges of the supreme court.’ ”", "paragraph_id": "para_3206" }, { "text": "Ibid., n. 5 (quoting Letter from T. Jefferson to B. Latrobe (June 2, 1808),", "paragraph_id": "para_3207" }, { "text": "in Thomas Jefferson and the National Capital 429, 431 (S. Padover ed.", "paragraph_id": "para_3208" }, { "text": "1946)); see also Brief for Professor Victoria Nourse et al. as Amici Curiae", "paragraph_id": "para_3209" }, { "text": "25–36 (collecting other agencies and offices created by Presidents John", "paragraph_id": "para_3210" }, { "text": "Adams and Jefferson that in practice enjoyed significant independence", "paragraph_id": "para_3211" }, { "text": "from Presidential control).", "paragraph_id": "para_3212" }, { "text": "27Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3213" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3214" }, { "text": "requiring Senate consent to the removals of many officers", "paragraph_id": "para_3215" }, { "text": "until its repeal in 1887. See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14", "paragraph_id": "para_3216" }, { "text": "Stat. 430. Even so, “the two-decade-long existence of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3217" }, { "text": "Tenure of Office Act reveals the 19th-century political sys-", "paragraph_id": "para_3218" }, { "text": "tem’s comfort with expansive restrictions on presidential", "paragraph_id": "para_3219" }, { "text": "removal.” Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 275, n. 6 (opinion of", "paragraph_id": "para_3220" }, { "text": "KAGAN, J.).", "paragraph_id": "para_3221" }, { "text": "Finally, in 1887, Congress created the ICC with removal", "paragraph_id": "para_3222" }, { "text": "protections that would later serve as the template for those", "paragraph_id": "para_3223" }, { "text": "of many other agencies, including the Federal Reserve and", "paragraph_id": "para_3224" }, { "text": "the FTC. See supra, at 10–11. For the next century and a", "paragraph_id": "para_3225" }, { "text": "half, that model would go on to be embraced by Congress", "paragraph_id": "para_3226" }, { "text": "and Presidents alike, quickly built upon, and ultimately", "paragraph_id": "para_3227" }, { "text": "ratified by this Court’s decision in Humphrey’s.", "paragraph_id": "para_3228" }, { "text": "Against this backdrop, the majority at most can point to", "paragraph_id": "para_3229" }, { "text": "the paucity of many removal protections enacted during", "paragraph_id": "para_3230" }, { "text": "most of the 19th century. The majority’s view thus appears", "paragraph_id": "para_3231" }, { "text": "to be that Congress’s inaction, in declining to impose provi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3232" }, { "text": "sions identical to the FTC’s until 1887, forfeited its ability", "paragraph_id": "para_3233" }, { "text": "ever to do so in the future. If that is how the majority sees", "paragraph_id": "para_3234" }, { "text": "things, then it is the majority that endorses an unsup-", "paragraph_id": "para_3235" }, { "text": "ported, use-it-or-lose-it “adverse possession” theory of con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3236" }, { "text": "stitutional powers. Ante, at 24.", "paragraph_id": "para_3237" }, { "text": "3", "paragraph_id": "para_3238" }, { "text": "Even before Humphrey’s, the Court’s precedents likewise", "paragraph_id": "para_3239", "court_paragraph": 3 }, { "text": "made clear that it is the majority’s radical theory of unitary", "paragraph_id": "para_3240" }, { "text": "executive power, not the sustained practice of the political", "paragraph_id": "para_3241" }, { "text": "branches over the centuries, that is out of step with tradi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3242" }, { "text": "tional notions of separation of powers in this country.", "paragraph_id": "para_3243" }, { "text": "No case before the turn of the 20th century suggested", "paragraph_id": "para_3244" }, { "text": "that the President’s removal power was not regulable by", "paragraph_id": "para_3245" }, { "text": "Congress. In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),", "paragraph_id": "para_3246" }, { "text": "Chief Justice Marshall approvingly recognized that an of-", "paragraph_id": "para_3247" }, { "text": "fice with a 5-year fixed-term tenure was “not removable at", "paragraph_id": "para_3248" }, { "text": "the will of the executive” and thus was “independent of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3249" }, { "text": "28 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3250" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3251" }, { "text": "executive.” Id., at 162, 172. That protection meant that,", "paragraph_id": "para_3252" }, { "text": "“having once made [a fixed-term] appointment, [the Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3253" }, { "text": "dent’s] power over the office [was] terminated in all cases.”", "paragraph_id": "para_3254" }, { "text": "Id., at 162. Indeed, the historic dispute in that case, over", "paragraph_id": "para_3255" }, { "text": "whether Marbury had been commissioned to his office as a", "paragraph_id": "para_3256" }, { "text": "justice of the peace, would have been academic if President", "paragraph_id": "para_3257" }, { "text": "Jefferson could have removed Marbury at pleasure once", "paragraph_id": "para_3258" }, { "text": "commissioned. It mattered only if Marbury, at that point,", "paragraph_id": "para_3259" }, { "text": "was safe from removal.12", "paragraph_id": "para_3260" }, { "text": "The majority cites Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, which in 1839 ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_3261" }, { "text": "dressed a territorial court’s power to remove a clerk of that", "paragraph_id": "para_3262" }, { "text": "court. Id., at 258. In discussing background removal prin-", "paragraph_id": "para_3263" }, { "text": "ciples supporting such power, Hennen recognized that the", "paragraph_id": "para_3264" }, { "text": "power to remove Presidential appointees was generally", "paragraph_id": "para_3265" }, { "text": "“vested in the President alone,” i.e., “the concurrence of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3266" }, { "text": "Senate” was not required. Id., at 259. It also made clear,", "paragraph_id": "para_3267" }, { "text": "however, that the tenure of offices could vary if “limited by", "paragraph_id": "para_3268" }, { "text": "law.” Ibid. A case the majority ignores, United States v.", "paragraph_id": "para_3269" }, { "text": "Perkins, 116 U. S. 483 (1886), held that Congress “ ‘no", "paragraph_id": "para_3270" }, { "text": "doubt’ ” may “ ‘limit and restrict the power of removal’ ” as", "paragraph_id": "para_3271" }, { "text": "to inferior officers and expressly left open the question", "paragraph_id": "para_3272" }, { "text": "whether Congress may do the same as to principal officers.", "paragraph_id": "para_3273" }, { "text": "Id., at 484–485. The majority also cites Parsons v. United", "paragraph_id": "para_3274" }, { "text": "States, 167 U. S. 324 (1897), which addressed whether Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3275" }, { "text": "gress had, in fact, granted a district attorney an unremov-", "paragraph_id": "para_3276" }, { "text": "able tenure in office. Id., at 342–343. Parsons carries little", "paragraph_id": "para_3277" }, { "text": "weight here because the Court there construed the statute", "paragraph_id": "para_3278" }, { "text": "at issue “to concede to the President the power of removal,”", "paragraph_id": "para_3279" }, { "text": "id., at 343, making it “unnecessary” to decide any “question", "paragraph_id": "para_3280" }, { "text": "of constitutional power” regarding removals, id., at 335. In", "paragraph_id": "para_3281" }, { "text": "short, the 19th century closed with no judicial endorsement", "paragraph_id": "para_3282" }, { "text": "of an illimitable removal power.", "paragraph_id": "para_3283" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3284" }, { "text": "12 The majority argues that the office at issue in Marbury (a justice of", "paragraph_id": "para_3285" }, { "text": "the peace) may not have exercised executive power at all, ante, at 33,", "paragraph_id": "para_3286" }, { "text": "n. 9, but even assuming that assertion is correct, nothing in Marbury’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3287" }, { "text": "reasoning relied upon the distinctions the majority draws.", "paragraph_id": "para_3288" }, { "text": "29Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3289" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3290" }, { "text": "That brings us to Myers, authored by former-President", "paragraph_id": "para_3291" }, { "text": "and then-Chief Justice Taft. If Myers is the “best” support", "paragraph_id": "para_3292" }, { "text": "for the majority’s position, ante, at 16, its theory is a castle", "paragraph_id": "para_3293" }, { "text": "built on sand. For one thing, as the majority admits, Myers", "paragraph_id": "para_3294" }, { "text": "did not address for-cause removal protection; the chal-", "paragraph_id": "para_3295" }, { "text": "lenged statute instead required Senate consent to removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_3296" }, { "text": "See ante, at 14. Thus, despite the grand pretentions of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3297" }, { "text": "opinion, it decided no more than that the President could", "paragraph_id": "para_3298" }, { "text": "“remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice", "paragraph_id": "para_3299" }, { "text": "and consent of the Senate.” Humphrey’s, 295 U. S., at 626.", "paragraph_id": "para_3300" }, { "text": "Even in doing so, Myers managed to get a great many", "paragraph_id": "para_3301" }, { "text": "things wrong. Its expansive reading of Article II lacked any", "paragraph_id": "para_3302" }, { "text": "mooring in text or preratification history, conceding the", "paragraph_id": "para_3303" }, { "text": "lack of any “express provision respecting removals in the", "paragraph_id": "para_3304" }, { "text": "Constitution” or “discuss[ion] in the Constitutional Conven-", "paragraph_id": "para_3305" }, { "text": "tion” and instead leaping to the Decision of 1789. 272 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3306" }, { "text": "at 109–111. Further, “[m]ost contemporary scholars agree", "paragraph_id": "para_3307" }, { "text": "that Taft’s account of the Decision of 1789 is tendentious", "paragraph_id": "para_3308" }, { "text": "and historically inaccurate”; in Myers’s own time, moreover,", "paragraph_id": "para_3309" }, { "text": "“scholars and jurists attacked its historical arguments.” A.", "paragraph_id": "para_3310" }, { "text": "Katz & N. Rosenblum, Becoming the Administrator-in-", "paragraph_id": "para_3311" }, { "text": "Chief, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 2153, 2239, and nn. 642–643", "paragraph_id": "para_3312" }, { "text": "(2023) (collecting sources). In addition, Myers’s claim that", "paragraph_id": "para_3313" }, { "text": "there was “no act of Congress . . . at variance” with its view", "paragraph_id": "para_3314" }, { "text": "of an illimitable removal power for the Nation’s first 74", "paragraph_id": "para_3315" }, { "text": "years, see 272 U. S., at 163, is at best incomplete, see supra,", "paragraph_id": "para_3316" }, { "text": "at 24–27. That is not to mention the Myers dissenters (Jus-", "paragraph_id": "para_3317" }, { "text": "tices Holmes, Brandeis, and McReynolds), who demon-", "paragraph_id": "para_3318" }, { "text": "strated at great length the majority’s many other errors.", "paragraph_id": "para_3319" }, { "text": "See 272 U. S., at 177–295.", "paragraph_id": "para_3320" }, { "text": "Perhaps for those reasons, and despite the majority’s con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3321" }, { "text": "trary presentation, it is Myers that had little impact when", "paragraph_id": "para_3322" }, { "text": "it was decided and has only waned in influence since.", "paragraph_id": "para_3323" }, { "text": "Within a decade, and with four Justices from the Myers ma-", "paragraph_id": "para_3324" }, { "text": "jority still on the Court, the Court in Humphrey’s “reex-", "paragraph_id": "para_3325" }, { "text": "amined the precedents referred to in the Myers case, and", "paragraph_id": "para_3326" }, { "text": "30 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3327" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3328" }, { "text": "f[ou]nd nothing in them to justify a conclusion contrary to”", "paragraph_id": "para_3329" }, { "text": "the one it reached as to the FTC. 295 U. S., at 630. The", "paragraph_id": "para_3330" }, { "text": "Court unanimously abandoned Myers’s expansive dicta, ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_3331" }, { "text": "proving only “the narrow point actually decided” on the re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3332" }, { "text": "movability of postmasters “without the advice and consent", "paragraph_id": "para_3333" }, { "text": "of the Senate.” 295 U. S., at 626. All other statements “out", "paragraph_id": "para_3334" }, { "text": "of harmony” with Humphrey’s were “disapproved.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_3335" }, { "text": "For decades after that, the Court continued to cabin My-", "paragraph_id": "para_3336" }, { "text": "ers to its “essence,” explaining that it stands only for the", "paragraph_id": "para_3337" }, { "text": "proposition that “Congress [may not] ‘dra[w] to itself ’ ” the", "paragraph_id": "para_3338" }, { "text": "power to remove, Morrison, 487 U. S., at 686, and says", "paragraph_id": "para_3339" }, { "text": "nothing about provisions merely “limit[ing] the President’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3340" }, { "text": "powers of removal,” Bowsher, 478 U. S., at 724. As Justice", "paragraph_id": "para_3341" }, { "text": "Frankfurter put it in Wiener, Myers’s “assumption” of “the", "paragraph_id": "para_3342" }, { "text": "President’s inherent constitutional power to remove offi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3343" }, { "text": "cials, no matter what the relation of the executive to the", "paragraph_id": "para_3344" }, { "text": "discharge of their duties and no matter what restrictions", "paragraph_id": "para_3345" }, { "text": "Congress may have imposed regarding the nature of their", "paragraph_id": "para_3346" }, { "text": "tenure,” was “short-lived.” 357 U. S., at 352. The majority", "paragraph_id": "para_3347" }, { "text": "is thus free to complain about the “shabby treatment” Myers", "paragraph_id": "para_3348" }, { "text": "has received, ante, at 34, but it has decades of precedent to", "paragraph_id": "para_3349" }, { "text": "blame for that, not this dissent. From Humphrey’s to Wie-", "paragraph_id": "para_3350" }, { "text": "ner to Bowsher to Morrison, Myers had been left on the side-", "paragraph_id": "para_3351" }, { "text": "lines long before today, at least until the Court reinvigor-", "paragraph_id": "para_3352" }, { "text": "ated a maximalist view of Presidential power a few years", "paragraph_id": "para_3353" }, { "text": "ago. Humphrey’s approval of removal protections for agen-", "paragraph_id": "para_3354" }, { "text": "cies like the FTC, to the contrary, has supplied the rule that", "paragraph_id": "para_3355" }, { "text": "governed the creation of the modern state over the course", "paragraph_id": "para_3356" }, { "text": "of the following century. See supra, at 6–7.", "paragraph_id": "para_3357" }, { "text": "4", "paragraph_id": "para_3358" }, { "text": "The majority thus has very little support in text, history,", "paragraph_id": "para_3359", "court_paragraph": 4 }, { "text": "or precedent. What it does have is a theory. As the majority", "paragraph_id": "para_3360" }, { "text": "sees things, “the buck stops” with the President, ante, at 4,", "paragraph_id": "para_3361" }, { "text": "who holds all executive power and thus can be “ ‘blame[d]’ ”", "paragraph_id": "para_3362" }, { "text": "or held “ ‘responsib[le]’ ” for all executive conduct, ante, at", "paragraph_id": "para_3363" }, { "text": "31Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3364" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3365" }, { "text": "1–2. Yet the President cannot “execute the laws alone and", "paragraph_id": "para_3366" }, { "text": "unaided.” Ante, at 4. To ensure that the President can", "paragraph_id": "para_3367" }, { "text": "carry out his job and remain responsible for all exercises of", "paragraph_id": "para_3368" }, { "text": "executive power, the majority says, his inferiors must “re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3369" }, { "text": "main accountable to [him].” Ibid. The only way for that", "paragraph_id": "para_3370" }, { "text": "accountability to exist, according to the majority, is for", "paragraph_id": "para_3371" }, { "text": "“those officers [to] be removable by the President” at will,", "paragraph_id": "para_3372" }, { "text": "for any reason or no reason at all. Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_3373" }, { "text": "Responsiveness and responsibility are certainly valuable,", "paragraph_id": "para_3374" }, { "text": "but they are not the only values countenanced by our Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3375" }, { "text": "stitution. Others are the continuity and stability of Gov-", "paragraph_id": "para_3376" }, { "text": "ernment, see, e.g., The Federalist No. 77, at 458 (explaining", "paragraph_id": "para_3377" }, { "text": "that limitations on removal would prevent the “violent", "paragraph_id": "para_3378" }, { "text": "or . . . general . . . revolution in the officers of the govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_3379" }, { "text": "ment” at every election), and the impartiality and fair ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_3380" }, { "text": "ministration of justice, see, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 612", "paragraph_id": "para_3381" }, { "text": "(Madison) (arguing that some executive officials with judi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3382" }, { "text": "cial functions “ought to hold . . . office by such a tenure as", "paragraph_id": "para_3383" }, { "text": "will make him responsible to the public generally,” not just", "paragraph_id": "para_3384" }, { "text": "the President). Depending on the situation, one value or", "paragraph_id": "para_3385" }, { "text": "another may be more or less important. Today, the major-", "paragraph_id": "para_3386" }, { "text": "ity places accountability to the President above all else.", "paragraph_id": "para_3387" }, { "text": "Yet the accountability prized by the majority is not an", "paragraph_id": "para_3388" }, { "text": "unalloyed good. From the start, Americans distrusted the", "paragraph_id": "para_3389" }, { "text": "“arbitrary authority” that could result from a broad re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3390" }, { "text": "moval power, citing the “baleful influence of the royal pre-", "paragraph_id": "para_3391" }, { "text": "rogative when officers h[e]ld their commission during the", "paragraph_id": "para_3392" }, { "text": "pleasure of the Crown.” Id., at 488 (Jackson). Story saw", "paragraph_id": "para_3393" }, { "text": "unchecked removal authority as carrying a “monarchical", "paragraph_id": "para_3394" }, { "text": "and arbitrary” danger, risking the “conver[sion of] all the", "paragraph_id": "para_3395" }, { "text": "officers of the country into the mere tools and creatures of", "paragraph_id": "para_3396" }, { "text": "the president.” 3 Story §1533, at 391. He also feared that", "paragraph_id": "para_3397" }, { "text": "unrestrained Presidential removal would “deter [those] of", "paragraph_id": "para_3398" }, { "text": "high and honourable minds from engaging in the public ser-", "paragraph_id": "para_3399" }, { "text": "vice.” Ibid. Webster, too, observed the “obvious” risk that", "paragraph_id": "para_3400" }, { "text": "such a power would breed “complaisance,” “indiscriminate", "paragraph_id": "para_3401" }, { "text": "32 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3402" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3403" }, { "text": "support of executive measures,” “pliant subserviancy, and", "paragraph_id": "para_3404" }, { "text": "gross adulation” in place of “patriotic labors,” “toils for the", "paragraph_id": "para_3405" }, { "text": "public good,” “independence, and public spirit.” 1835 De-", "paragraph_id": "para_3406" }, { "text": "bates 459; see also Cook, 609 U. S., at ___ (KAVANAUGH, J.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3407" }, { "text": "concurring) (slip op., at 2) (arguing that “political influ-", "paragraph_id": "para_3408" }, { "text": "ences” can “jeopardize” administrative “efficacy”).", "paragraph_id": "para_3409" }, { "text": "Balancing all these concerns, and the tradeoffs they en-", "paragraph_id": "para_3410" }, { "text": "tail, has historically fallen to those who know the most", "paragraph_id": "para_3411" }, { "text": "about them: the political branches. This Court, on the other", "paragraph_id": "para_3412" }, { "text": "hand, has proven itself time and again to be the least com-", "paragraph_id": "para_3413" }, { "text": "petent branch to make these judgments. Consider just one", "paragraph_id": "para_3414" }, { "text": "(highly salient) example: the Court’s fixation on removal.", "paragraph_id": "para_3415" }, { "text": "As others have explained, a “wealth of features” other than", "paragraph_id": "para_3416" }, { "text": "at-will removal in fact determines an agency’s responsive-", "paragraph_id": "para_3417" }, { "text": "ness to the President. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 283 (opinion", "paragraph_id": "para_3418" }, { "text": "of KAGAN, J.); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 524", "paragraph_id": "para_3419" }, { "text": "(Breyer, J., dissenting). The President often names the", "paragraph_id": "para_3420" }, { "text": "Chair. See, e.g., §41. He also, through the White House", "paragraph_id": "para_3421" }, { "text": "Office of Management and Budget, can “frequently” use the", "paragraph_id": "para_3422" }, { "text": "budget process to “ ‘influence [agencies’] policies.’ ” Seila", "paragraph_id": "para_3423" }, { "text": "Law, 591 U. S., at 226; see also Brief for Bipartisan Former", "paragraph_id": "para_3424" }, { "text": "Chairs of the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae", "paragraph_id": "para_3425" }, { "text": "14–22 (discussing additional mechanisms). Even with the", "paragraph_id": "para_3426" }, { "text": "removal protections the Court today holds unconstitutional,", "paragraph_id": "para_3427" }, { "text": "the President can still remove an FTC Commissioner who", "paragraph_id": "para_3428" }, { "text": "fails to perform her duties adequately or commits malfea-", "paragraph_id": "para_3429" }, { "text": "sance in office.", "paragraph_id": "para_3430" }, { "text": "In sum, agencies like the FTC do enjoy some measure of", "paragraph_id": "para_3431" }, { "text": "independence by virtue of removal protections, but they", "paragraph_id": "para_3432" }, { "text": "also remain accountable in other ways. No one can seri-", "paragraph_id": "para_3433" }, { "text": "ously doubt, for instance, that the FTC’s priorities shifted", "paragraph_id": "para_3434" }, { "text": "between the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administra-", "paragraph_id": "para_3435" }, { "text": "tions. See, e.g., K. Rozga & D. Gossett, Major Leadership", "paragraph_id": "para_3436" }, { "text": "and Policy Changes at the FTC, Davis Wright Tremaine", "paragraph_id": "para_3437" }, { "text": "LLP (July 14, 2021), https://www.dwt.com/insights/2021/", "paragraph_id": "para_3438" }, { "text": "07/biden-ftc-archive-antitrust-initiatives (archived at https:", "paragraph_id": "para_3439" }, { "text": "33Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3440" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3441" }, { "text": "//perma.cc/E24P-48DF) (detailing “potential sea change”", "paragraph_id": "para_3442" }, { "text": "and “major policy shifts” at the FTC between administra-", "paragraph_id": "para_3443" }, { "text": "tions). There are also a variety of ways in which the Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3444" }, { "text": "dent (and Congress) remain accountable for the conduct of", "paragraph_id": "para_3445" }, { "text": "executive officials, even without at-will removal. See, e.g.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3446" }, { "text": "Arthrex, 594 U. S., at 12 (explaining that the Appointments", "paragraph_id": "para_3447" }, { "text": "Clause “guarantees accountability” for poorly performing", "paragraph_id": "para_3448" }, { "text": "officers). In no way, then, does the FTC’s structure, in pur-", "paragraph_id": "para_3449" }, { "text": "pose or effect, do away completely with Presidential influ-", "paragraph_id": "para_3450" }, { "text": "ence. Instead, Congress’s design (approved by many Presi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3451" }, { "text": "dents over decades) balances that influence with other", "paragraph_id": "para_3452" }, { "text": "values equally cognizable under the Constitution. The ma-", "paragraph_id": "para_3453" }, { "text": "jority’s rigid, inflexible rule goes badly astray by declaring", "paragraph_id": "para_3454" }, { "text": "one side of this balance constitutionally irrelevant.13", "paragraph_id": "para_3455" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3456" }, { "text": "13 The Government argues, in the alternative, that even if Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3457" }, { "text": "remains enforceable, the courts still lack power to provide effective relief", "paragraph_id": "para_3458" }, { "text": "by reinstating Slaughter to her position. That is incorrect. If the Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3459" }, { "text": "stitution permits Congress to adopt modest removal protections like the", "paragraph_id": "para_3460" }, { "text": "FTC’s, there is no additional Article II barrier to courts enforcing them.", "paragraph_id": "para_3461" }, { "text": "The Government also argues that, at common law, equitable relief like", "paragraph_id": "para_3462" }, { "text": "an injunction was unavailable to provide reinstatement. That argument", "paragraph_id": "para_3463" }, { "text": "neglects that a “critical reason” for that rule was that “nonequitable rem-", "paragraph_id": "para_3464" }, { "text": "edies,” like mandamus and declaratory relief, were available “to vindi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3465" }, { "text": "cate the rights at issue.” S. Bray, Remedies in the Officer Removal", "paragraph_id": "para_3466" }, { "text": "Cases, 17 J. Legal Analysis 236, and n. 2, 246, 255 (2025); see 3 W. Black-", "paragraph_id": "para_3467" }, { "text": "stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 110 (1768); see also Trump", "paragraph_id": "para_3468" }, { "text": "v. Cook, 609 U. S. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op., at 15) (explaining that, at", "paragraph_id": "para_3469" }, { "text": "common law, “a court of law could settle” title to public office “by quo", "paragraph_id": "para_3470" }, { "text": "warranto or mandamus”). In any event, this Court also has long affirmed", "paragraph_id": "para_3471" }, { "text": "“injunction[s] requiring [an executive officer’s] reinstatement.” Vitarelli", "paragraph_id": "para_3472" }, { "text": "v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535, 537, 546 (1959). The District Court here cor-", "paragraph_id": "para_3473" }, { "text": "rectly found each form of relief appropriate.", "paragraph_id": "para_3474" }, { "text": "Finally, the Government argues that Congress displaced any remedy", "paragraph_id": "para_3475" }, { "text": "here by enacting the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA). That is quite a", "paragraph_id": "para_3476" }, { "text": "claim, given that the CSRA explicitly “does not apply to” principal offic-", "paragraph_id": "para_3477" }, { "text": "ers like Slaughter. 5 U. S. C. §§7511(b)(1), (3). In any event, this novel", "paragraph_id": "para_3478" }, { "text": "theory is not properly before this Court, as the Government failed to raise", "paragraph_id": "para_3479" }, { "text": "it in any proceedings below or even in its initial application here.", "paragraph_id": "para_3480" }, { "text": "34 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3481" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3482" }, { "text": "III", "paragraph_id": "para_3483" }, { "text": "Nothing in the text, history, or values of the Constitution", "paragraph_id": "para_3484" }, { "text": "shows that Humphrey’s was wrong or that FTC Commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_3485" }, { "text": "sioners cannot enjoy for-cause removal protection. Yet even", "paragraph_id": "para_3486" }, { "text": "if the majority were right about all of that, it still would not", "paragraph_id": "para_3487" }, { "text": "be enough to justify today’s destabilizing decision.", "paragraph_id": "para_3488" }, { "text": "The reason, of course, is stare decisis, which the majority", "paragraph_id": "para_3489" }, { "text": "all but disregards. Faithful “[a]dherence to precedent is a", "paragraph_id": "para_3490" }, { "text": "‘foundation stone of the rule of law.’ ” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588", "paragraph_id": "para_3491" }, { "text": "U. S. 558, 586 (2019). Stare decisis “contributes to the ac-", "paragraph_id": "para_3492" }, { "text": "tual and perceived integrity of the judicial process” by pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_3493" }, { "text": "moting “the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent devel-", "paragraph_id": "para_3494" }, { "text": "opment of legal principles,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_3495" }, { "text": "808, 827 (1991), and ensuring that decisions are “founded", "paragraph_id": "para_3496" }, { "text": "in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,”", "paragraph_id": "para_3497" }, { "text": "Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986). At bottom,", "paragraph_id": "para_3498" }, { "text": "this doctrine recognizes that, even if today’s Justices might", "paragraph_id": "para_3499" }, { "text": "decide an issue differently than their predecessors did,", "paragraph_id": "para_3500" }, { "text": "greater institutional values usually counsel “sticking to", "paragraph_id": "para_3501" }, { "text": "some wrong decisions.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,", "paragraph_id": "para_3502" }, { "text": "LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 455 (2015).", "paragraph_id": "para_3503" }, { "text": "Along every metric that the Court usually considers in", "paragraph_id": "para_3504" }, { "text": "this context, Humphrey’s should have survived. Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3505" }, { "text": "rey’s is not wrong, let alone egregiously so. The majority", "paragraph_id": "para_3506" }, { "text": "hardly “even acknowledge[s] the important reliance inter-", "paragraph_id": "para_3507" }, { "text": "ests that [Humphrey’s] ha[s] generated.” Students for Fair", "paragraph_id": "para_3508" }, { "text": "Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Col-", "paragraph_id": "para_3509" }, { "text": "lege, 600 U. S. 181, 376 (2023) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).", "paragraph_id": "para_3510" }, { "text": "It “discards a known, workable, and predictable standard", "paragraph_id": "para_3511" }, { "text": "in favor of something novel and probably far more compli-", "paragraph_id": "para_3512" }, { "text": "cated,” with revolutionary consequences for our Govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_3513" }, { "text": "ment. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597", "paragraph_id": "para_3514" }, { "text": "U. S. 215, 394 (2022) (joint opinion of Breyer, SOTOMAYOR,", "paragraph_id": "para_3515" }, { "text": "and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting). In the end, it is the majority’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3516" }, { "text": "rule, not Humphrey’s, that “short-circuit[s] the democratic", "paragraph_id": "para_3517" }, { "text": "process” by eliminating an option for the political branches", "paragraph_id": "para_3518" }, { "text": "35Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3519" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3520" }, { "text": "that has existed at least since Humphrey’s was decided in", "paragraph_id": "para_3521" }, { "text": "1935. 597 U. S., at 269 (majority opinion).", "paragraph_id": "para_3522" }, { "text": "A", "paragraph_id": "para_3523" }, { "text": "Begin with a consideration the majority all but ignores:", "paragraph_id": "para_3524" }, { "text": "the tremendous reliance interests engendered by Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3525" }, { "text": "rey’s. “Stare decisis has added force when the legislature,", "paragraph_id": "para_3526" }, { "text": "in the public sphere, and citizens, in the private realm, have", "paragraph_id": "para_3527" }, { "text": "acted in reliance upon a previous decision.” Hilton v. South", "paragraph_id": "para_3528" }, { "text": "Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202", "paragraph_id": "para_3529" }, { "text": "(1991). When overruling a prior decision would “require an", "paragraph_id": "para_3530" }, { "text": "extensive legislative response” or “dislodge settled rights", "paragraph_id": "para_3531" }, { "text": "and expectations,” ibid., the force of stare decisis is “at [its]", "paragraph_id": "para_3532" }, { "text": "acme,” Payne, 501 U. S., at 828.", "paragraph_id": "para_3533" }, { "text": "Few cases implicate these concerns to a greater degree", "paragraph_id": "para_3534" }, { "text": "than Humphrey’s. For the better part of the last century,", "paragraph_id": "para_3535" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s has guided Congress in constructing the mod-", "paragraph_id": "para_3536" }, { "text": "ern system of Government, including dozens of independent", "paragraph_id": "para_3537" }, { "text": "agencies that remain central to protecting the Nation’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3538" }, { "text": "economy, health, safety, and more. At times, Congress has", "paragraph_id": "para_3539" }, { "text": "done so in express reliance upon the rule stated in Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3540" }, { "text": "rey’s. Within weeks of Humphrey’s being decided, for in-", "paragraph_id": "para_3541" }, { "text": "stance, the House amended the bill establishing the Na-", "paragraph_id": "para_3542" }, { "text": "tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to include removal", "paragraph_id": "para_3543" }, { "text": "protections, with the express aim of “provid[ing] that the", "paragraph_id": "para_3544" }, { "text": "decision of the Supreme Court in the recent Humphreys", "paragraph_id": "para_3545" }, { "text": "case shall be embodied in the statute.” H. R. Rep. No. 1147,", "paragraph_id": "para_3546" }, { "text": "74th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1935). Similarly, after Myers,", "paragraph_id": "para_3547" }, { "text": "Congress was reconsidering removal protections for the", "paragraph_id": "para_3548" }, { "text": "Federal Reserve Board of Governors. After first being ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_3549" }, { "text": "vised to await the decision in Humphrey’s, but then assured", "paragraph_id": "para_3550" }, { "text": "by witnesses that Humphrey’s “provide[d] ample legal", "paragraph_id": "para_3551" }, { "text": "grounds for the incorporation” of removal protections, Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3552" }, { "text": "gress promptly reaffirmed for-cause removal protections for", "paragraph_id": "para_3553" }, { "text": "the Federal Reserve Governors. Hearings on S. 1715 before", "paragraph_id": "para_3554" }, { "text": "the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy, Banking, and", "paragraph_id": "para_3555" }, { "text": "36 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3556" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3557" }, { "text": "Deposit Insurance of the Senate Committee on Banking", "paragraph_id": "para_3558" }, { "text": "and Currency, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, pp. 397, 998", "paragraph_id": "para_3559" }, { "text": "(1935) (Hearings on S. 1715); see Banking Act of 1935, 49", "paragraph_id": "para_3560" }, { "text": "Stat. 704–705. Although not always in terms quite so ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_3561" }, { "text": "press, over the decades that followed, Congress would go on", "paragraph_id": "para_3562" }, { "text": "to enact dozens of laws creating similar independent agen-", "paragraph_id": "para_3563" }, { "text": "cies premised on the validity of the FTC structure that this", "paragraph_id": "para_3564" }, { "text": "Court blessed in Humphrey’s. See supra, at 10–11.", "paragraph_id": "para_3565" }, { "text": "Independence was centrally important to Congress in cre-", "paragraph_id": "para_3566" }, { "text": "ating these agencies. “[I]t was essential that the[se] com-", "paragraph_id": "para_3567" }, { "text": "mission[s]” were not “open to the suspicion of partisan di-", "paragraph_id": "para_3568" }, { "text": "rection” and thus possessed the independence “necessary to", "paragraph_id": "para_3569" }, { "text": "the effective and fair administration of the law.” Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3570" }, { "text": "rey’s, 295 U. S., at 624–625. In creating and empowering", "paragraph_id": "para_3571" }, { "text": "administrative agencies throughout the late-19th and 20th", "paragraph_id": "para_3572" }, { "text": "centuries, Congress recognized not only the need for effi-", "paragraph_id": "para_3573" }, { "text": "cient and effective regulation of the increasingly complex", "paragraph_id": "para_3574" }, { "text": "American economy, but also the risks of concentrating such", "paragraph_id": "para_3575" }, { "text": "power in the hands of the President with no check against", "paragraph_id": "para_3576" }, { "text": "the influence of partisan control. For the FTC, “[t]he two", "paragraph_id": "para_3577" }, { "text": "ideas, a commission and independence for the commission,", "paragraph_id": "para_3578" }, { "text": "were inextricably bound together. At no point was it pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_3579" }, { "text": "posed that a commission ought to be set up unless it be in-", "paragraph_id": "para_3580" }, { "text": "dependent.” R. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory", "paragraph_id": "para_3581" }, { "text": "Commissions 188 (1941). For the NLRB, which was pat-", "paragraph_id": "para_3582" }, { "text": "terned expressly on the FTC, “complete independence was", "paragraph_id": "para_3583" }, { "text": "necessary to insure complete impartiality.” Id., at 363. In", "paragraph_id": "para_3584" }, { "text": "hearings considering new powers to be granted to the Fed-", "paragraph_id": "para_3585" }, { "text": "eral Reserve Board, witnesses emphasized the need for", "paragraph_id": "para_3586" }, { "text": "“protective safeguards of the strongest character” against", "paragraph_id": "para_3587" }, { "text": "“ ‘political control’ ” and the “danger[s]” of allowing the Fed-", "paragraph_id": "para_3588" }, { "text": "eral Reserve to become “a political instrumentality of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3589" }, { "text": "party in power.” Hearings on S. 1715, at 687, 998; see Cook,", "paragraph_id": "para_3590" }, { "text": "609 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (explaining that “[n]ot only", "paragraph_id": "para_3591" }, { "text": "the fact of independence but also the appearance of inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_3592" }, { "text": "pendence is key to the Federal Reserve’s design”).", "paragraph_id": "para_3593" }, { "text": "37Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3594" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3595" }, { "text": "The checks the political branches devised—bipartisan", "paragraph_id": "para_3596" }, { "text": "membership requirements, the multimember structure,", "paragraph_id": "para_3597" }, { "text": "lengthy fixed terms, and for-cause removal protections—", "paragraph_id": "para_3598" }, { "text": "struck an essential balance in this respect. Creating these", "paragraph_id": "para_3599" }, { "text": "agencies under the President gave the Executive Branch", "paragraph_id": "para_3600" }, { "text": "the tools needed to execute the law and accomplish the mod-", "paragraph_id": "para_3601" }, { "text": "ern work of Government, preserving “ample authority” for", "paragraph_id": "para_3602" }, { "text": "the President to ensure the “competen[t] perform[ance]” of", "paragraph_id": "para_3603" }, { "text": "the officers leading the agency. Morrison, 487 U. S., at 692.", "paragraph_id": "para_3604" }, { "text": "At the same time, ensuring expertise, bipartisanship, and", "paragraph_id": "para_3605" }, { "text": "limiting the causes of removal guarded against these new", "paragraph_id": "para_3606" }, { "text": "agencies becoming mere political instruments, which could", "paragraph_id": "para_3607" }, { "text": "be turned against political enemies with one hand and used", "paragraph_id": "para_3608" }, { "text": "to grant favors to allies with the other.", "paragraph_id": "para_3609" }, { "text": "Indeed, without removal protections, many of the other", "paragraph_id": "para_3610" }, { "text": "features of these agencies’ structures risk losing their force.", "paragraph_id": "para_3611" }, { "text": "Bipartisan-appointment requirements can easily be evaded", "paragraph_id": "para_3612" }, { "text": "simply by firing all Commissioners of the opposite party.", "paragraph_id": "para_3613" }, { "text": "Just look at the FTC today. See supra, at 3–4. Lengthy", "paragraph_id": "para_3614" }, { "text": "fixed terms, aimed at ensuring stability, continuity, and the", "paragraph_id": "para_3615" }, { "text": "development of expertise within an agency, can also be cut", "paragraph_id": "para_3616" }, { "text": "short at the President’s will. Again, look at today’s FTC.", "paragraph_id": "para_3617" }, { "text": "Ibid. With the most extreme exercises of at-will removal,", "paragraph_id": "para_3618" }, { "text": "the multimember structure itself could be eliminated, by", "paragraph_id": "para_3619" }, { "text": "executive fiat, with sufficient arbitrary firings to winnow a", "paragraph_id": "para_3620" }, { "text": "commission down to a sole remaining chair. Cf. Cook, 609", "paragraph_id": "para_3621" }, { "text": "U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 2) (not-", "paragraph_id": "para_3622" }, { "text": "ing the “upheaval” that could result from “[e]ven temporary", "paragraph_id": "para_3623" }, { "text": "uncertainty” about agency independence in the wake of", "paragraph_id": "para_3624" }, { "text": "such firings). The very existence of independent commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_3625" }, { "text": "sions like the FTC thus depended on (and Congress’s deci-", "paragraph_id": "para_3626" }, { "text": "sion to create the agencies relied upon) the premise that", "paragraph_id": "para_3627" }, { "text": "these agencies would exist at some remove from partisan", "paragraph_id": "para_3628" }, { "text": "politics and enjoy the removal protections necessary to", "paragraph_id": "para_3629" }, { "text": "achieve that goal.", "paragraph_id": "para_3630" }, { "text": "38 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3631" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3632" }, { "text": "Today’s decision profoundly undermines this reliance", "paragraph_id": "para_3633" }, { "text": "and, as a result, undercuts one side of the balance that the", "paragraph_id": "para_3634" }, { "text": "political branches struck. Put simply, today the majority", "paragraph_id": "para_3635" }, { "text": "reshapes our Government. Dozens of independent commis-", "paragraph_id": "para_3636" }, { "text": "sions are now likely to become purely executive agencies,", "paragraph_id": "para_3637" }, { "text": "shifting tremendous power over broad swaths of American", "paragraph_id": "para_3638" }, { "text": "life into the President’s hands: the Federal Energy Regula-", "paragraph_id": "para_3639" }, { "text": "tory Commission, with responsibility for managing the Na-", "paragraph_id": "para_3640" }, { "text": "tion’s energy supply, see 42 U. S. C. §7171(b)(1); the Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3641" }, { "text": "sumer Product Safety Commission, which protects", "paragraph_id": "para_3642" }, { "text": "Americans against harms caused by dangerous goods, see", "paragraph_id": "para_3643" }, { "text": "15 U. S. C. §2053(a); the Chemical Safety Board, tasked", "paragraph_id": "para_3644" }, { "text": "with investigating chemical disasters, see 42 U. S. C.", "paragraph_id": "para_3645" }, { "text": "§7412(r)(6)(B); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3646" }, { "text": "sponsible for the regulation of nuclear power, see 42", "paragraph_id": "para_3647" }, { "text": "U. S. C. §§5841(a), (c), (e); and the Merit Systems Protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_3648" }, { "text": "tion Board (MSPB), charged with ensuring the integrity of", "paragraph_id": "para_3649" }, { "text": "the civil service, see 5 U. S. C. §1202. The list of agencies", "paragraph_id": "para_3650" }, { "text": "potentially modified by today’s decision goes on.", "paragraph_id": "para_3651" }, { "text": "Seldom, if ever, has this Court worked such a profound", "paragraph_id": "para_3652" }, { "text": "bait and switch on a coequal branch: For more than 90", "paragraph_id": "para_3653" }, { "text": "years, Congress believed, with this Court’s express ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_3654" }, { "text": "proval, that it was allowed to create a workable Govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_3655" }, { "text": "ment, including by granting certain agencies tasked with", "paragraph_id": "para_3656" }, { "text": "certain responsibilities some independence from Presiden-", "paragraph_id": "para_3657" }, { "text": "tial control. In rejecting that project, after decades of prom-", "paragraph_id": "para_3658" }, { "text": "ising the political branches that structures like the FTC’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3659" }, { "text": "were permissible, the Court creates an Executive Branch", "paragraph_id": "para_3660" }, { "text": "that Congress never dreamed of establishing and that it", "paragraph_id": "para_3661" }, { "text": "now has little hope of ever reining in. Cf. Learning Re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3662" }, { "text": "sources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U. S. 229, 244–245 (2026) (opin-", "paragraph_id": "para_3663" }, { "text": "ion of ROBERTS, C. J.) (emphasizing Congress’s difficulty in", "paragraph_id": "para_3664" }, { "text": "paring back executive power once granted, given the need", "paragraph_id": "para_3665" }, { "text": "for a veto-proof supermajority). The concurrence acknowl-", "paragraph_id": "para_3666" }, { "text": "edges the “real risks” implicated by the Court’s abandon-", "paragraph_id": "para_3667" }, { "text": "ment of Humphrey’s. Ante, at 13 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.).", "paragraph_id": "para_3668" }, { "text": "39Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3669" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3670" }, { "text": "The majority’s responses fail across the board. It first as-", "paragraph_id": "para_3671" }, { "text": "serts that congressional reliance “is relevant only in the", "paragraph_id": "para_3672" }, { "text": "context of severability,” ante, at 24, n. 3, but this Court has", "paragraph_id": "para_3673" }, { "text": "been clear that “[s]tare decisis has added force when the leg-", "paragraph_id": "para_3674" }, { "text": "islature, in the public sphere, . . . ha[s] acted in reliance", "paragraph_id": "para_3675" }, { "text": "upon a previous decision,” Hilton, 502 U. S., at 202; see", "paragraph_id": "para_3676" }, { "text": "Payne, 501 U. S., at 828. None of the majority’s severability", "paragraph_id": "para_3677" }, { "text": "cases overruled any precedent, see ante, at 24, n. 3, and so", "paragraph_id": "para_3678" }, { "text": "say nothing about the role of congressional reliance in the", "paragraph_id": "para_3679" }, { "text": "stare decisis analysis. The majority also suggests that Con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3680" }, { "text": "gress’s reliance interests are somehow not “ ‘legitimate’ ”", "paragraph_id": "para_3681" }, { "text": "here because Humphrey’s recognized congressional power", "paragraph_id": "para_3682" }, { "text": "at the President’s expense. Ante, at 24. This assertion is", "paragraph_id": "para_3683" }, { "text": "perplexing. Humphrey’s endorsed Congress’s authority to", "paragraph_id": "para_3684" }, { "text": "create agencies “to carry into effect legislative policies em-", "paragraph_id": "para_3685" }, { "text": "bodied in the statute,” with “independence against [the", "paragraph_id": "para_3686" }, { "text": "President’s] will.” 295 U. S., at 628–629. It was that hold-", "paragraph_id": "para_3687" }, { "text": "ing on which Congress has reasonably relied. If the major-", "paragraph_id": "para_3688" }, { "text": "ity means to say that this reliance was improper because", "paragraph_id": "para_3689" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s was wrong, it gets stare decisis backwards.", "paragraph_id": "para_3690" }, { "text": "The doctrine’s entire point is to recognize that greater insti-", "paragraph_id": "para_3691" }, { "text": "tutional values can support adhering to past decisions, even", "paragraph_id": "para_3692" }, { "text": "if a later majority might think them mistaken.", "paragraph_id": "para_3693" }, { "text": "Finally, and equally important, the reliance interests", "paragraph_id": "para_3694" }, { "text": "here are not limited to Congress. Ordinary Americans and", "paragraph_id": "para_3695" }, { "text": "regulated firms alike have organized their affairs under-", "paragraph_id": "para_3696" }, { "text": "standing that some Government decisions will depend not", "paragraph_id": "para_3697" }, { "text": "on political favoritism or partisan advantage (or at least not", "paragraph_id": "para_3698" }, { "text": "only on those considerations), but on expertise, adherence", "paragraph_id": "para_3699" }, { "text": "to law, judgment, and the public good. See, e.g., Cook, 609", "paragraph_id": "para_3700" }, { "text": "U. S., at ___ (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 2) (ar-", "paragraph_id": "para_3701" }, { "text": "guing that uncertainty about agency independence would", "paragraph_id": "para_3702" }, { "text": "“risk destabilizing the U. S. economy”). America’s economy", "paragraph_id": "para_3703" }, { "text": "works in large part due to the “stability” and predictability", "paragraph_id": "para_3704" }, { "text": "fostered by such expectations. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).", "paragraph_id": "para_3705" }, { "text": "Today, by demanding unmediated, unmitigated", "paragraph_id": "para_3706" }, { "text": "40 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3707" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3708" }, { "text": "Presidential control of agency decisionmaking, the majority", "paragraph_id": "para_3709" }, { "text": "upends all of that. The majority responds by announcing,", "paragraph_id": "para_3710" }, { "text": "in short, that it knows best and that its abrupt destruction", "paragraph_id": "para_3711" }, { "text": "of a century and a half of precedent is broadly supportive of", "paragraph_id": "para_3712" }, { "text": "“ ‘constitutionally promised liberties.’ ” Ante, at 24–25.", "paragraph_id": "para_3713" }, { "text": "Never mind that the elected officials representing the", "paragraph_id": "para_3714" }, { "text": "American people (including over a dozen Presidents) have", "paragraph_id": "para_3715" }, { "text": "consistently understood the people to be best served, includ-", "paragraph_id": "para_3716" }, { "text": "ing in their liberty interests, by agencies that are not en-", "paragraph_id": "para_3717" }, { "text": "tirely subject to Presidential whim. Because today’s major-", "paragraph_id": "para_3718" }, { "text": "ity has come to believe that the American people are better", "paragraph_id": "para_3719" }, { "text": "off without independent agencies, it does not matter how", "paragraph_id": "para_3720" }, { "text": "much anyone has relied on that arrangement.", "paragraph_id": "para_3721" }, { "text": "B", "paragraph_id": "para_3722" }, { "text": "1", "paragraph_id": "para_3723" }, { "text": "The majority’s assertion that Humphrey’s has proved un-", "paragraph_id": "para_3724", "court_paragraph": 1 }, { "text": "workable also blinks reality. Ante, at 22–23. As just shown,", "paragraph_id": "para_3725" }, { "text": "for over 90 years Congress has legislated, and the Govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_3726" }, { "text": "ment ably functioned, against the “commonly understood”", "paragraph_id": "para_3727" }, { "text": "rule that heads of certain multimember agencies can enjoy", "paragraph_id": "para_3728" }, { "text": "modest tenure protections from at-will Presidential re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3729" }, { "text": "moval. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Over-", "paragraph_id": "para_3730" }, { "text": "sight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667, 695 (CADC 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3731" }, { "text": "dissenting). These agencies, in short, have become ubiqui-", "paragraph_id": "para_3732" }, { "text": "tous over the last century and a half.", "paragraph_id": "para_3733" }, { "text": "To be sure, independent agencies are not carbon copies of", "paragraph_id": "para_3734" }, { "text": "one another, and there is some variation among their struc-", "paragraph_id": "para_3735" }, { "text": "tures. Given the sensitive regulatory interests at stake and", "paragraph_id": "para_3736" }, { "text": "Congress’s general flexibility in designing federal offices,", "paragraph_id": "para_3737" }, { "text": "that nuance should come as no surprise. By and large, how-", "paragraph_id": "para_3738" }, { "text": "ever, these agencies follow a remarkably consistent pattern:", "paragraph_id": "para_3739" }, { "text": "multimember commissions, with a chair selected by the", "paragraph_id": "para_3740" }, { "text": "President, often with bipartisan membership require-", "paragraph_id": "para_3741" }, { "text": "ments, sometimes with a background-expertise require-", "paragraph_id": "para_3742" }, { "text": "ment, and, often, with a restriction permitting removal only", "paragraph_id": "para_3743" }, { "text": "41Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3744" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3745" }, { "text": "“for cause” or for specified causes. So too do these agencies", "paragraph_id": "para_3746" }, { "text": "generally carry out functions like the FTC’s: rulemaking,", "paragraph_id": "para_3747" }, { "text": "in-house adjudications, investigations, and occasional en-", "paragraph_id": "para_3748" }, { "text": "forcement actions in court. In establishing agencies like the", "paragraph_id": "para_3749" }, { "text": "FTC, Congress has thus shown little difficulty applying the", "paragraph_id": "para_3750" }, { "text": "rule the majority today finds too murky.14", "paragraph_id": "para_3751" }, { "text": "Nor has this Court had trouble applying Humphrey’s over", "paragraph_id": "para_3752" }, { "text": "the course of the past century. It is true that, at times over", "paragraph_id": "para_3753" }, { "text": "those decades, disputes have arisen over the principles at", "paragraph_id": "para_3754" }, { "text": "play in Humphrey’s. That is to be expected for any legal", "paragraph_id": "para_3755" }, { "text": "doctrine. If anything, however, those disputes have been", "paragraph_id": "para_3756" }, { "text": "remarkably few and far between. As to multimember com-", "paragraph_id": "para_3757" }, { "text": "missions, this Court has returned to the issue only once,", "paragraph_id": "para_3758" }, { "text": "making clear that “[t]he philosophy of Humphrey’s” plainly", "paragraph_id": "para_3759" }, { "text": "supported protections for members of the War Claims Com-", "paragraph_id": "para_3760" }, { "text": "mission. Wiener, 357 U. S., at 356. The majority claims", "paragraph_id": "para_3761" }, { "text": "that this paucity of cases marks a “retrea[t] from Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3762" }, { "text": "rey’s.” Ante, at 22. The reality, however, is that the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_3763" }, { "text": "has seldom needed to address these issues because disputes", "paragraph_id": "para_3764" }, { "text": "have seldom arisen. That is so even though Congress all", "paragraph_id": "para_3765" }, { "text": "the while, and with minimal objection (and no vetoes) from", "paragraph_id": "para_3766" }, { "text": "over a dozen Presidents, has constructed the Executive", "paragraph_id": "para_3767" }, { "text": "Branch in reliance upon Humphrey’s and its progeny. See", "paragraph_id": "para_3768" }, { "text": "supra, at 10–11, 35–38.", "paragraph_id": "para_3769" }, { "text": "——————", "paragraph_id": "para_3770" }, { "text": "14 The majority suggests that its rule is necessary because, without it,", "paragraph_id": "para_3771" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s might permit Congress to turn the Environmental Protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_3772" }, { "text": "tion Agency into a multimember commission with removal protections.", "paragraph_id": "para_3773" }, { "text": "Ante, at 35. Humphrey’s, however, has been the law for nearly 100 years", "paragraph_id": "para_3774" }, { "text": "and this (apparently intolerable) result has not come to pass. In any", "paragraph_id": "para_3775" }, { "text": "event, the Constitution does not prohibit every unwise policy choice, even", "paragraph_id": "para_3776" }, { "text": "when it comes to structural questions. If, moreover, Congress at some", "paragraph_id": "para_3777" }, { "text": "point did pass a law preventing the President from “carrying out his own", "paragraph_id": "para_3778" }, { "text": "constitutionally assigned functions in areas like war or foreign affairs,”", "paragraph_id": "para_3779" }, { "text": "Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 275, n. 6 (opinion of KAGAN, J.), nothing in", "paragraph_id": "para_3780" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s would stop the Court from ensuring that the President can", "paragraph_id": "para_3781" }, { "text": "“accomplish his constitutional role,” Morrison, 487 U. S., at 690.", "paragraph_id": "para_3782" }, { "text": "42 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3783" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3784" }, { "text": "No other decisions of this Court, as to other agency struc-", "paragraph_id": "para_3785" }, { "text": "tures, suggest any inability to police the bounds established", "paragraph_id": "para_3786" }, { "text": "by Humphrey’s. Contra, ante, at 19–20. In fact, they show", "paragraph_id": "para_3787" }, { "text": "the opposite. Morrison accepted and broadened Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3788" }, { "text": "rey’s functionalist approach, clarifying only that the exer-", "paragraph_id": "para_3789" }, { "text": "cise is not meant to “define rigid categories” of officials who", "paragraph_id": "para_3790" }, { "text": "exercise executive power or perform executive functions,", "paragraph_id": "para_3791" }, { "text": "“but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the", "paragraph_id": "para_3792" }, { "text": "President’s” constitutional duties. Morrison, 487 U. S., at", "paragraph_id": "para_3793" }, { "text": "689–690. As to the officer at issue in Morrison, the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_3794" }, { "text": "held that the removal protections left the President with", "paragraph_id": "para_3795" }, { "text": "“ample” control. Id., at 692. Free Enterprise Fund recog-", "paragraph_id": "para_3796" }, { "text": "nized Humphrey’s rule, accepted it as to the Securities and", "paragraph_id": "para_3797" }, { "text": "Exchange Commission (SEC), and held that a second layer", "paragraph_id": "para_3798" }, { "text": "of protection for a subsidiary Board (a “novel structure”", "paragraph_id": "para_3799" }, { "text": "never considered before) was unconstitutional. 561 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3800" }, { "text": "at 496; see id., at 487. Seila Law also took Humphrey’s as", "paragraph_id": "para_3801" }, { "text": "a given and held that a different structure (a single-director", "paragraph_id": "para_3802" }, { "text": "agency head) was an “almost wholly unprecedented” “his-", "paragraph_id": "para_3803" }, { "text": "torical anomaly” that fell outside Humphrey’s scope. 591", "paragraph_id": "para_3804" }, { "text": "U. S., at 217, 220–223. These conclusions were, to be sure,", "paragraph_id": "para_3805" }, { "text": "subject to vigorous disagreement at the time. See, e.g., id.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3806" }, { "text": "at 269–296 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Far from showing", "paragraph_id": "para_3807" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s to be unworkable, however, those cases show", "paragraph_id": "para_3808" }, { "text": "how legal precedents work: They extend to some situations,", "paragraph_id": "para_3809" }, { "text": "but not to others, and Justices sometimes disagree about", "paragraph_id": "para_3810" }, { "text": "where to draw the lines. Whatever its outer limits, Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3811" }, { "text": "rey’s core holding as to the FTC and multimember bodies", "paragraph_id": "para_3812" }, { "text": "like it has never proven too difficult for courts to apply.", "paragraph_id": "para_3813" }, { "text": "The majority points to a handful of recent lower court de-", "paragraph_id": "para_3814" }, { "text": "cisions from the past year or so that purportedly show that", "paragraph_id": "para_3815" }, { "text": "“no one knows how to apply Humphrey’s in practice.” Ante,", "paragraph_id": "para_3816" }, { "text": "at 22–23. That tumult, though, is more fairly attributed to", "paragraph_id": "para_3817" }, { "text": "the Court’s recent emergency-docket abandonment of", "paragraph_id": "para_3818" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s. See, e.g., Space Exploration Technologies", "paragraph_id": "para_3819" }, { "text": "Corp. v. NLRB, 151 F. 4th 761, 776–777 (CA5 2025); see", "paragraph_id": "para_3820" }, { "text": "43Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3821" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3822" }, { "text": "also Trump v. Wilcox, 605 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (KAGAN, J.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3823" }, { "text": "dissenting) (slip op., at 2) (criticizing the majority for using", "paragraph_id": "para_3824" }, { "text": "the “emergency docket . . . to overrule or revise existing", "paragraph_id": "para_3825" }, { "text": "law”). When the Court fails to adhere to its own precedents", "paragraph_id": "para_3826" }, { "text": "in a principled manner, it is hard to expect consistency from", "paragraph_id": "para_3827" }, { "text": "the lower courts that must keep up with the Court’s rapidly", "paragraph_id": "para_3828" }, { "text": "shifting views. For decades before this Court upended the", "paragraph_id": "para_3829" }, { "text": "doctrine, however, Humphrey’s was a stable, easily under-", "paragraph_id": "para_3830" }, { "text": "stood precedent of this Court.", "paragraph_id": "para_3831" }, { "text": "Last, the majority takes aim at Humphrey’s use of the", "paragraph_id": "para_3832" }, { "text": "terms “ ‘quasi-legislative’ ” and “ ‘quasi-judicial.’ ” Ante, at", "paragraph_id": "para_3833" }, { "text": "22. Humphrey’s, however, did not draw these terms from", "paragraph_id": "para_3834" }, { "text": "thin air. They were “well-established term[s]-of-art,” recog-", "paragraph_id": "para_3835" }, { "text": "nized by figures from Madison to Taft by the time Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3836" }, { "text": "rey’s was decided. See Brief for Legal Historian N. Rosen-", "paragraph_id": "para_3837" }, { "text": "blum et al. as Amici Curiae 14; see id., at 4–5, 13, 20–21.", "paragraph_id": "para_3838" }, { "text": "Madison, recall, recognized that even executive officers may", "paragraph_id": "para_3839" }, { "text": "“partak[e] strongly of the judicial character” and that such", "paragraph_id": "para_3840" }, { "text": "officers raise distinct considerations when it comes to re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3841" }, { "text": "moval. 1 Annals of Cong. 612. By the early-19th century,", "paragraph_id": "para_3842" }, { "text": "courts, too, were using the term “ ‘quasi-judicial’ to describe", "paragraph_id": "para_3843" }, { "text": "the duties of specialist officers whose work bore functional", "paragraph_id": "para_3844" }, { "text": "and procedural similarities with that of the judiciary” and", "paragraph_id": "para_3845" }, { "text": "the term “quasi-legislative” to refer to functions served by", "paragraph_id": "para_3846" }, { "text": "“ ‘subordinate agencies’ ” tasked with filling in the details", "paragraph_id": "para_3847" }, { "text": "left open by general laws. Brief for Legal Historian N. Ros-", "paragraph_id": "para_3848" }, { "text": "enblum et al. as Amici Curiae 10, 15; see id., at 9–11, 15–", "paragraph_id": "para_3849" }, { "text": "18 (collecting cases developing these categories); see also B.", "paragraph_id": "para_3850" }, { "text": "Baumann & J. Shugerman, Quasi-Judicial: A History and", "paragraph_id": "para_3851" }, { "text": "Tradition, 127 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2026) (manu-", "paragraph_id": "para_3852" }, { "text": "script, at 4) (tracing the “deep historical pedigree” of inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_3853" }, { "text": "pendence for “quasi-judicial” officers). The majority can", "paragraph_id": "para_3854" }, { "text": "feign ignorance and deem these terms devoid of meaning,", "paragraph_id": "para_3855" }, { "text": "but it cannot change the historical record: Independence", "paragraph_id": "para_3856" }, { "text": "has long been associated with, and accepted as to, executive", "paragraph_id": "para_3857" }, { "text": "officers who carry out functions like the FTC’s.", "paragraph_id": "para_3858" }, { "text": "44 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3859" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3860" }, { "text": "In the end, this Court has not “been forced to clarify the", "paragraph_id": "para_3861" }, { "text": "doctrine” in this arena “again and again.” Loper Bright En-", "paragraph_id": "para_3862" }, { "text": "terprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 409 (2024). Nor has", "paragraph_id": "para_3863" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s spurred major “confusion and disagreement” in", "paragraph_id": "para_3864" }, { "text": "the lower courts, or “generated a long list of Circuit con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3865" }, { "text": "flicts.” Dobbs, 597 U. S., at 283–284. Instead, the Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3866" }, { "text": "rey’s rule is long established and has been easily applied for", "paragraph_id": "para_3867" }, { "text": "decades.", "paragraph_id": "para_3868" }, { "text": "2", "paragraph_id": "para_3869" }, { "text": "The case for retaining Humphrey’s becomes even stronger", "paragraph_id": "para_3870", "court_paragraph": 2 }, { "text": "when compared against the majority’s theory, which itself", "paragraph_id": "para_3871" }, { "text": "promises to unleash only chaos. With remarkable stead-", "paragraph_id": "para_3872" }, { "text": "fastness, the majority simply refuses to explain where its", "paragraph_id": "para_3873" }, { "text": "theory leads or where it ends. See, e.g., ante, at 27. Alt-", "paragraph_id": "para_3874" }, { "text": "hough declining to consider the consequences of its decision", "paragraph_id": "para_3875" }, { "text": "might make it easier for the majority to cast Humphrey’s", "paragraph_id": "para_3876" }, { "text": "aside, it leaves courts, agencies, and Congress with little", "paragraph_id": "para_3877" }, { "text": "guidance, and many new questions, on how they are sup-", "paragraph_id": "para_3878" }, { "text": "posed to assess removal questions going forward.", "paragraph_id": "para_3879" }, { "text": "The majority, for example, suggests that its rule might", "paragraph_id": "para_3880" }, { "text": "not apply to adjudicatory agencies, including non-Article III", "paragraph_id": "para_3881" }, { "text": "courts like the Tax Court. See ante, at 28. That is welcome", "paragraph_id": "para_3882" }, { "text": "news, but why is it so? As the majority explains, it cannot", "paragraph_id": "para_3883" }, { "text": "be because such agencies are exercising judicial power. Ad-", "paragraph_id": "para_3884" }, { "text": "judications by Executive Branch agencies “are exercises", "paragraph_id": "para_3885" }, { "text": "of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be", "paragraph_id": "para_3886" }, { "text": "exercises of—the ‘executive Power.’ ” Arlington v. FCC, 569", "paragraph_id": "para_3887" }, { "text": "U. S. 290, 305, n. 4 (2013); see ante, at 19. Nor, after today,", "paragraph_id": "para_3888" }, { "text": "is it obvious that such agencies could safely depend on a", "paragraph_id": "para_3889" }, { "text": "precedent like Wiener, which did address an adjudicatory", "paragraph_id": "para_3890" }, { "text": "agency but rested squarely on “[t]he philosophy of Humph-", "paragraph_id": "para_3891" }, { "text": "rey’s.” 357 U. S., at 356. Still, the majority says, a narrow", "paragraph_id": "para_3892" }, { "text": "exception for non-Article III adjudicators might yet survive.", "paragraph_id": "para_3893" }, { "text": "If that is true, questions immediately arise: What, exactly,", "paragraph_id": "para_3894" }, { "text": "is the “ ‘different set of questions’ ” raised by these agencies?", "paragraph_id": "para_3895" }, { "text": "45Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3896" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3897" }, { "text": "Ante, at 28. Do they depend on such entities’ quasi-judicial", "paragraph_id": "para_3898" }, { "text": "functions? How should bodies like the MSPB or NLRB,", "paragraph_id": "para_3899" }, { "text": "which are mostly adjudicatory but may also possess some", "paragraph_id": "para_3900" }, { "text": "other functions, be treated? See, e.g., Brief for Cathy Harris", "paragraph_id": "para_3901" }, { "text": "as Amicus Curiae 3 (distinguishing “legislative courts,” in-", "paragraph_id": "para_3902" }, { "text": "cluding the MSPB, from the FTC); Brief for Gwynne Wilcox", "paragraph_id": "para_3903" }, { "text": "as Amicus Curiae 2 (similar for the NLRB). More ques-", "paragraph_id": "para_3904" }, { "text": "tions, which have long been at rest under Humphrey’s, are", "paragraph_id": "para_3905" }, { "text": "sure to follow.", "paragraph_id": "para_3906" }, { "text": "Today’s decision may also have major implications for in-", "paragraph_id": "para_3907" }, { "text": "ferior officers and civil-service employees, which the major-", "paragraph_id": "para_3908" }, { "text": "ity studiously ignores. The Court’s precedents, to date, con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3909" }, { "text": "tinue to support removal protections for such individuals.", "paragraph_id": "para_3910" }, { "text": "See, e.g., Perkins, 116 U. S., at 484–485 (holding, in 1886,", "paragraph_id": "para_3911" }, { "text": "that inferior officers appointed by a department head could", "paragraph_id": "para_3912" }, { "text": "be protected against at-will removal). Until today, how-", "paragraph_id": "para_3913" }, { "text": "ever, Perkins and Humphrey’s were the “two exceptions to", "paragraph_id": "para_3914" }, { "text": "the President’s unrestricted removal power” this Court had", "paragraph_id": "para_3915" }, { "text": "recognized. Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 204. With one of those", "paragraph_id": "para_3916" }, { "text": "exceptions now wiped away, the majority’s silence on the", "paragraph_id": "para_3917" }, { "text": "other one provides cold comfort. Nor is there much in the", "paragraph_id": "para_3918" }, { "text": "majority’s logic that supports drawing a line at principal of-", "paragraph_id": "para_3919" }, { "text": "ficers. Inferior officers (and likely many employees within", "paragraph_id": "para_3920" }, { "text": "the civil service) wield some executive power. Regardless of", "paragraph_id": "para_3921" }, { "text": "their rank, if the President cannot have such individuals", "paragraph_id": "para_3922" }, { "text": "removed at will, then there is a break in “ ‘the chain of de-", "paragraph_id": "para_3923" }, { "text": "pendence’ ” all the same (which, the majority emphasizes,", "paragraph_id": "para_3924" }, { "text": "must reach down all the way to the “ ‘lowest officers’ ”).", "paragraph_id": "para_3925" }, { "text": "Ante, at 10. The Government, at least, has the candor not", "paragraph_id": "para_3926" }, { "text": "to deny that the “logic” of its position “extends to inferior", "paragraph_id": "para_3927" }, { "text": "officers” and, perhaps, career civil servants, too. Tr. of Oral", "paragraph_id": "para_3928" }, { "text": "Arg. 23–24. The majority, however, at best consigns these", "paragraph_id": "para_3929" }, { "text": "issues to years of future uncertainty and at worst risks the", "paragraph_id": "para_3930" }, { "text": "end of the employment protections that apply to members", "paragraph_id": "para_3931" }, { "text": "of the civil service.", "paragraph_id": "para_3932" }, { "text": "46 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_3933" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3934" }, { "text": "Perhaps most strikingly, the Court today also makes", "paragraph_id": "para_3935" }, { "text": "clear that, whatever the logic of its decision, there are some", "paragraph_id": "para_3936" }, { "text": "ad hoc historical exceptions to its totalizing view of Article", "paragraph_id": "para_3937" }, { "text": "II, at least for the Federal Reserve. See ante, at 27–28;", "paragraph_id": "para_3938" }, { "text": "Cook, 609 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 22–23). For most", "paragraph_id": "para_3939" }, { "text": "agencies, the majority here says, removal protections like", "paragraph_id": "para_3940" }, { "text": "the FTC’s make the President’s job “ ‘impossible’ ” and so are", "paragraph_id": "para_3941" }, { "text": "unlawful. Ante, at 2. For agencies that follow in the “line-", "paragraph_id": "para_3942" }, { "text": "age” of the First and Second Banks of the United States,", "paragraph_id": "para_3943" }, { "text": "however, the Court recognizes that the Founders were", "paragraph_id": "para_3944" }, { "text": "acutely aware “of the calamities that could arise from even", "paragraph_id": "para_3945" }, { "text": "the ‘suspicion’ of political manipulation of monetary policy”", "paragraph_id": "para_3946" }, { "text": "and that they therefore “guaranteed [such agencies] inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_3947" }, { "text": "pendence from Presidential control.” Cook, 609 U. S., at ___", "paragraph_id": "para_3948" }, { "text": "(slip op., at 22). As a result, the Court holds, removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_3949" }, { "text": "tections remain permissible (perhaps even indispensable)", "paragraph_id": "para_3950" }, { "text": "for agencies, including the Federal Reserve, that follow in", "paragraph_id": "para_3951" }, { "text": "“this tradition.” Ibid.", "paragraph_id": "para_3952" }, { "text": "As discussed above, this is all partly right. Yes, the", "paragraph_id": "para_3953" }, { "text": "Founders did “kn[ow] from experience” that some Govern-", "paragraph_id": "para_3954" }, { "text": "ment functions “should not be subject to political interfer-", "paragraph_id": "para_3955" }, { "text": "ence.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 22–23); see supra, at 24–", "paragraph_id": "para_3956" }, { "text": "26. Yes, this tradition need not remain “ ‘trapped in amber’ ”", "paragraph_id": "para_3957" }, { "text": "while Congress continues to devise new agencies and struc-", "paragraph_id": "para_3958" }, { "text": "tures to “manag[e] a vastly more complex economy in a", "paragraph_id": "para_3959" }, { "text": "vastly more complex world.” Cook, 609 U. S., at ___–___", "paragraph_id": "para_3960" }, { "text": "(slip op., at 22); see supra, at 26–27. What is unclear is why", "paragraph_id": "para_3961" }, { "text": "these principles should be limited only to agencies, like the", "paragraph_id": "para_3962" }, { "text": "Federal Reserve, that in some respects influence “monetary", "paragraph_id": "para_3963" }, { "text": "policy.” Ante, at 28.", "paragraph_id": "para_3964" }, { "text": "Even assuming the majority is right that the Federal Re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3965" }, { "text": "serve’s historical pedigree gives it a special place in the con-", "paragraph_id": "para_3966" }, { "text": "stitutional structure, that just leaves the majority with yet", "paragraph_id": "para_3967" }, { "text": "additional workability problems. How close is close enough", "paragraph_id": "para_3968" }, { "text": "for a historical analogue of this kind? Does any agency that", "paragraph_id": "para_3969" }, { "text": "“influence[s] monetary policy” qualify? Ibid. Is it relevant", "paragraph_id": "para_3970" }, { "text": "47Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_3971" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_3972" }, { "text": "that the modern agency, like the Bank of the United States,", "paragraph_id": "para_3973" }, { "text": "is “quasi-private”? Wilcox, 605 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2).", "paragraph_id": "para_3974" }, { "text": "What happens if Congress adds new functions beyond the", "paragraph_id": "para_3975" }, { "text": "historical baseline? See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §504 (granting the", "paragraph_id": "para_3976" }, { "text": "Federal Reserve authority to secure civil penalties of up to", "paragraph_id": "para_3977" }, { "text": "$1 million per day); see also A. Bamzai & A. Nielson, Article", "paragraph_id": "para_3978" }, { "text": "II and the Federal Reserve, 109 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 863,", "paragraph_id": "para_3979" }, { "text": "887 (2024) (describing executive powers of the Federal Re-", "paragraph_id": "para_3980" }, { "text": "serve). In short: When, exactly is our law “ ‘trapped in am-", "paragraph_id": "para_3981" }, { "text": "ber,’ ” and when is it not? See Cook, 609 U. S., at ___ (slip", "paragraph_id": "para_3982" }, { "text": "op., at 22).", "paragraph_id": "para_3983" }, { "text": "These line-drawing problems are the inevitable result of", "paragraph_id": "para_3984" }, { "text": "the majority’s ruling, yet never arose under Humphrey’s.", "paragraph_id": "para_3985" }, { "text": "Today, the majority replaces 90 years of proven, workable", "paragraph_id": "para_3986" }, { "text": "practice with a half-baked theory of executive power that is", "paragraph_id": "para_3987" }, { "text": "simultaneously all encompassing yet also subject to neces-", "paragraph_id": "para_3988" }, { "text": "sary but undefined exceptions. The one thing that does ap-", "paragraph_id": "para_3989" }, { "text": "pear to be clear going forward is that chaos will follow.", "paragraph_id": "para_3990" }, { "text": "C", "paragraph_id": "para_3991" }, { "text": "Finally, the majority suggests that Humphrey’s has been", "paragraph_id": "para_3992" }, { "text": "“undermined” by later cases. Ante, at 20, 22. That is incor-", "paragraph_id": "para_3993" }, { "text": "rect. See supra, at 6–7 (collecting cases reaffirming", "paragraph_id": "para_3994" }, { "text": "Humphrey’s). Morrison did not “ ‘repudiat[e]’ ” Humphrey’s.", "paragraph_id": "para_3995" }, { "text": "Ante, at 19. It extended its holding to uphold removal pro-", "paragraph_id": "para_3996" }, { "text": "tections for a distinct, inferior officer. Morrison, 487 U. S.,", "paragraph_id": "para_3997" }, { "text": "at 687–691. The case that Morrison repudiated was Myers.", "paragraph_id": "para_3998" }, { "text": "See 487 U. S., at 687 (rejecting “the implication of some", "paragraph_id": "para_3999" }, { "text": "dicta in Myers” that “the President’s power to remove . . .", "paragraph_id": "para_4000" }, { "text": "was . . . ‘all-inclusive’ ”). In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court", "paragraph_id": "para_4001" }, { "text": "accepted the lawfulness of “one level of good-cause protec-", "paragraph_id": "para_4002" }, { "text": "tion” for the SEC. 561 U. S., at 484. Although Seila Law", "paragraph_id": "para_4003" }, { "text": "criticized Humphrey’s at times, its conclusion was simply", "paragraph_id": "para_4004" }, { "text": "that Humphrey’s could not resolve the distinct question at", "paragraph_id": "para_4005" }, { "text": "issue. 591 U. S., at 215–216, and n. 2, 229. Each of these", "paragraph_id": "para_4006" }, { "text": "cases left Humphrey’s firmly in place, until today.", "paragraph_id": "para_4007" }, { "text": "48 TRUMP v. SLAUGHTER", "paragraph_id": "para_4008" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_4009" }, { "text": "IV", "paragraph_id": "para_4010" }, { "text": "Not two years ago, I wrote of a “disconcerting trend” in", "paragraph_id": "para_4011" }, { "text": "this Court’s cases: “When it comes to the separation of pow-", "paragraph_id": "para_4012" }, { "text": "ers, this Court tells the American public and its coordinate", "paragraph_id": "para_4013" }, { "text": "branches that it knows best.” SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U. S.", "paragraph_id": "para_4014" }, { "text": "109, 201 (2024) (dissenting opinion). Matters that for cen-", "paragraph_id": "para_4015" }, { "text": "turies had been left to the political branches have been sub-", "paragraph_id": "para_4016" }, { "text": "ordinated, one after another, to this recent Court’s rigid", "paragraph_id": "para_4017" }, { "text": "theories of how Government should operate. See id., at", "paragraph_id": "para_4018" }, { "text": "201–202 (collecting cases).", "paragraph_id": "para_4019" }, { "text": "The majority’s decision continuing that trend today is", "paragraph_id": "para_4020" }, { "text": "egregiously wrong. In this case, the Court takes one of the", "paragraph_id": "para_4021" }, { "text": "oldest debates in American history and decides that the six", "paragraph_id": "para_4022" }, { "text": "Justices in the majority, alone, ought to be the ones to settle", "paragraph_id": "para_4023" }, { "text": "it for all time. That decision does not just overrule prece-", "paragraph_id": "para_4024" }, { "text": "dent; it all but ignores that precedent exists. It does not", "paragraph_id": "para_4025" }, { "text": "just hamstring the political branches’ ability to respond to", "paragraph_id": "para_4026" }, { "text": "new challenges; it rewinds the clock nearly 150 years, hold-", "paragraph_id": "para_4027" }, { "text": "ing that a common agency structure is, and always has", "paragraph_id": "para_4028" }, { "text": "been, forbidden. It is true that today’s decision does not", "paragraph_id": "para_4029" }, { "text": "eliminate the FTC or the many other agencies whose struc-", "paragraph_id": "para_4030" }, { "text": "tures are implicated by overruling Humphrey’s. It is unde-", "paragraph_id": "para_4031" }, { "text": "niable, however, that those agencies will be transformed in", "paragraph_id": "para_4032" }, { "text": "ways that those who created them never could have ex-", "paragraph_id": "para_4033" }, { "text": "pected and actively sought to avoid, fundamentally recali-", "paragraph_id": "para_4034" }, { "text": "brating the balance of power in this country in the process.", "paragraph_id": "para_4035" }, { "text": "Will these transformations yield the benefits, sounding in", "paragraph_id": "para_4036" }, { "text": "responsiveness and accountability, that the majority touts?", "paragraph_id": "para_4037" }, { "text": "Or will they risk placing “in the hands of a bold and design-", "paragraph_id": "para_4038" }, { "text": "ing man, of high ambition, . . . an instrument of the worst", "paragraph_id": "para_4039" }, { "text": "oppression,” which will “sacrific[e] every principle of inde-", "paragraph_id": "para_4040" }, { "text": "pendence to the will of the [President]”? 3 Story §1533, at", "paragraph_id": "para_4041" }, { "text": "390–392. Neither I, nor the majority, knows with certainty.", "paragraph_id": "para_4042" }, { "text": "That is exactly why the Constitution leaves decisions like", "paragraph_id": "para_4043" }, { "text": "this one, involving sensitive tradeoffs and difficult", "paragraph_id": "para_4044" }, { "text": "49Cite as: 609 U. S. ____ (2026)", "paragraph_id": "para_4045" }, { "text": "SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting", "paragraph_id": "para_4046" }, { "text": "judgment calls, to those best positioned to make them, and", "paragraph_id": "para_4047" }, { "text": "then to be held accountable for doing so: the political", "paragraph_id": "para_4048" }, { "text": "branches.", "paragraph_id": "para_4049" }, { "text": "Today, the Court discards that democratic regime in fa-", "paragraph_id": "para_4050" }, { "text": "vor of one that distorts the structure of Government to fit", "paragraph_id": "para_4051" }, { "text": "the majority’s theory of unitary, total executive control.", "paragraph_id": "para_4052" }, { "text": "The result is a President who emerges with far greater", "paragraph_id": "para_4053" }, { "text": "power than ever before. It is a power, however, that neither", "paragraph_id": "para_4054" }, { "text": "the People, nor Congress, nor the Constitution bestowed", "paragraph_id": "para_4055" }, { "text": "upon him. In granting the President this unbridled author-", "paragraph_id": "para_4056" }, { "text": "ity, the Court upends its precedent, misconstrues our his-", "paragraph_id": "para_4057" }, { "text": "tory, and sheds any pretense of judicial modesty. 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