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as Kogan v. Weaver Const. and Roofing, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-2323.]","paragraph_id":"para_1"},{"text":"COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO","paragraph_id":"para_2"},{"text":"EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT","paragraph_id":"para_3"},{"text":"COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA","paragraph_id":"para_4"},{"text":"TATIANA KOGAN, ET AL., :","paragraph_id":"para_5"},{"text":"Plaintiffs-Appellees, :","paragraph_id":"para_6"},{"text":"No. 115695","paragraph_id":"para_7"},{"text":"v. :","paragraph_id":"para_8"},{"text":"WEAVER CONSTRUCTION AND","paragraph_id":"para_9"},{"text":"ROOFING, LLC, ET AL., :","paragraph_id":"para_10"},{"text":"Defendants-Appellants. :","paragraph_id":"para_11"},{"text":"JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION","paragraph_id":"para_12"},{"text":"JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED","paragraph_id":"para_13"},{"text":"RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 18, 2026","paragraph_id":"para_14"},{"text":"Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas","paragraph_id":"para_15"},{"text":"Case No. CV-24-100965","paragraph_id":"para_16"},{"text":"Appearances:","paragraph_id":"para_17"},{"text":"N.P. Weiss Law and Rachel M. Kuhn, for appellees.","paragraph_id":"para_18"},{"text":"Lipson O’Shea Legal Group and Michael J. O’Shea, for","paragraph_id":"para_19"},{"text":"appellants.","paragraph_id":"para_20"},{"text":"DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:","paragraph_id":"para_21"},{"text":"Defendants-appellants Weaver Construction and Roofing, LLC, and Al","paragraph_id":"para_22"},{"text":"Weaver (“Weaver Construction,” “Al Weaver,” or jointly “appellants”) appeal from","paragraph_id":"para_23"},{"text":"the trial court’s final judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees Tatiana Kogan and","paragraph_id":"para_24"},{"text":"Nikolay Kutsenko (“Kogan,” “Kutsenko,” or jointly “appellees”) after the case was","paragraph_id":"para_25"},{"text":"tried to an advisory jury empaneled pursuant to Civ.R. 39(C)(1). Finding no merit","paragraph_id":"para_26"},{"text":"to the appeal, we affirm.","paragraph_id":"para_27"},{"text":"I. Background Facts and Procedural History","paragraph_id":"para_28"},{"text":"A. Background Facts","paragraph_id":"para_29"},{"text":"Because appellants have provided neither a transcript of the three-day","paragraph_id":"para_30"},{"text":"trial nor the exhibits offered and admitted at trial, we only briefly summarize the","paragraph_id":"para_31"},{"text":"underlying facts, drawing principally from the trial court’s final order.1 On June 28,","paragraph_id":"para_32"},{"text":"2022, appellees entered into a contract with Weaver Construction to replace the roof","paragraph_id":"para_33"},{"text":"on their Pepper Pike home at an agreed cost of $22,850 for both labor and materials.","paragraph_id":"para_34"},{"text":"Kogan issued a check in the amount of $12,650 as a down payment before work","paragraph_id":"para_35"},{"text":"began. The roof was to be red metal with exposed fasteners.","paragraph_id":"para_36"},{"text":"When the contract was executed, Weaver Construction was not","paragraph_id":"para_37"},{"text":"registered to do business in the municipality in compliance with Pepper Pike","paragraph_id":"para_38"},{"text":"Cod.Ord. 1448.02, which states: “No person shall engage in the business, perform","paragraph_id":"para_39"},{"text":"any work or act in the capacity of a contractor within the City without first being duly","paragraph_id":"para_40"},{"text":"licensed by the City to perform such work.” Pepper Pike Cod.Ord. 1448.01 defines","paragraph_id":"para_41"},{"text":"contractor as any person or entity that “constructs, alters, repairs, adds to, subtracts","paragraph_id":"para_42"},{"text":"from, reconstructs or remodels any building, structure or appurtenance thereto, or","paragraph_id":"para_43"},{"text":"who or which undertakes, offers to undertake, purports to have the capacity to","paragraph_id":"para_44"},{"text":"undertake or submits a bid to do so.”","paragraph_id":"para_45"},{"text":"1 See Pedra Properties, LLC v. Justmann, 2015-Ohio-5427, ¶ 1, fn. 1 (8th Dist.),","paragraph_id":"para_46"},{"text":"summarizing the facts “based on the factual findings set forth in the trial court’s . . . decision","paragraph_id":"para_47"},{"text":"and judgment entry”).","paragraph_id":"para_48"},{"text":"Prior to the commencement of work, neither Weaver Construction nor","paragraph_id":"para_49"},{"text":"appellees obtained a permit in accordance with Pepper Pike Cod.Ord. 1444.01,","paragraph_id":"para_50"},{"text":"which provides in pertinent part that “[b]efore proceeding with the construction,","paragraph_id":"para_51"},{"text":"enlargement, alteration, repair or removal of any building or other structure, a","paragraph_id":"para_52"},{"text":"permit shall first be obtained by the owner or his or her agent from the Inspector of","paragraph_id":"para_53"},{"text":"Buildings.” Moreover, neither appellees nor Weaver Construction had secured the","paragraph_id":"para_54"},{"text":"approval of the roofing project from Pepper Pike’s Architectural Board of Review.","paragraph_id":"para_55"},{"text":"Pepper Pike Cod.Ord. 1450.07(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o building","paragraph_id":"para_56"},{"text":"permit shall be issued for a project which . . . erects, reconstructs . . . a building in","paragraph_id":"para_57"},{"text":"any manner which materially affects the exterior appearance, design, or size of the","paragraph_id":"para_58"},{"text":"building or other structure unless the Board has granted final approval.”","paragraph_id":"para_59"},{"text":"Before work commenced, Weaver Construction or its designated","paragraph_id":"para_60"},{"text":"fabricator delivered custom red metal roofing materials to the home. On the","paragraph_id":"para_61"},{"text":"morning that construction began, however, Pepper Pike’s building inspector noticed","paragraph_id":"para_62"},{"text":"activity, determined that no permit had been obtained, and shut down the job","paragraph_id":"para_63"},{"text":"because of the lack of a permit and the lack of approval of the Architectural Board of","paragraph_id":"para_64"},{"text":"Review. The inspector also learned that Weaver Construction was not registered as","paragraph_id":"para_65"},{"text":"a contractor. According to the trial court, by that point “a significant portion of the","paragraph_id":"para_66"},{"text":"old roof had been removed and some of the new material had been installed.”","paragraph_id":"para_67"},{"text":"(Sept. 25, 2025 judgment entry at p. 3.)","paragraph_id":"para_68"},{"text":"Weaver Construction did subsequently register as a contractor. The","paragraph_id":"para_69"},{"text":"Architectural Board of Review, however, refused to approve the metal roof with","paragraph_id":"para_70"},{"text":"exposed fasteners. “At that point, Weaver Construction left the job site and a","paragraph_id":"para_71"},{"text":"permissible shingle roof was ultimately installed by a different contractor.”","paragraph_id":"para_72"},{"text":"(Sept. 25, 2025 judgment entry at p. 3.)","paragraph_id":"para_73"},{"text":"B. The Complaint","paragraph_id":"para_74"},{"text":"In their complaint filed July 22, 2024, appellees alleged that appellants","paragraph_id":"para_75"},{"text":"removed all the original roofing materials from the property and, despite demand,","paragraph_id":"para_76"},{"text":"did not provide any refund. Appellees further alleged that a different contractor","paragraph_id":"para_77"},{"text":"quoted the sum of $34,000 to remove and replace the roof on the home. Their four-","paragraph_id":"para_78"},{"text":"count complaint asserted breach of contract, violations of the Consumer Sales","paragraph_id":"para_79"},{"text":"Practices Act (“CSPA”), negligence, and unjust enrichment.","paragraph_id":"para_80"},{"text":"Appellants were initially in default of an answer or other response to","paragraph_id":"para_81"},{"text":"the complaint but received leave to answer prior to an entry of default. Appellants","paragraph_id":"para_82"},{"text":"separately answered on January 14, 2025, and the parties engaged in discovery,","paragraph_id":"para_83"},{"text":"including exchanging initial disclosures pursuant to Civ.R. 26(B)(3).","paragraph_id":"para_84"},{"text":"C. Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Court’s","paragraph_id":"para_85"},{"text":"Interlocutory Ruling","paragraph_id":"para_86"},{"text":"On June 11, 2025, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment","paragraph_id":"para_87"},{"text":"supported by affidavits and accompanying exhibits, including discovery responses","paragraph_id":"para_88"},{"text":"provided by appellants. Appellants timely opposed the motion, attaching the","paragraph_id":"para_89"},{"text":"affidavit of Al Weaver, meeting minutes of the Pepper Pike Architectural Board of","paragraph_id":"para_90"},{"text":"Review, printouts of Pepper Pike ordinances, and other exhibits documenting","paragraph_id":"para_91"},{"text":"Architectural Board of Review procedures. Appellees filed a reply, and more briefing","paragraph_id":"para_92"},{"text":"followed.","paragraph_id":"para_93"},{"text":"On September 2, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting in","paragraph_id":"para_94"},{"text":"part and denying in part appellees’ motion for summary judgment. It granted","paragraph_id":"para_95"},{"text":"summary judgment on appellees’ claim for breach of contract, finding that the","paragraph_id":"para_96"},{"text":"“when a contractor commences work in a city where he cannot lawfully perform the","paragraph_id":"para_97"},{"text":"work, that is a breach of the duty to perform in a workmanlike manner.” It found","paragraph_id":"para_98"},{"text":"that appellants were “liable for any damages proximately caused” by the breach. The","paragraph_id":"para_99"},{"text":"trial court then concluded that appellees “paid $12,650 and got nothing in return,","paragraph_id":"para_100"},{"text":"and that breach occurred because Weaver Construction breached its promise that it","paragraph_id":"para_101"},{"text":"was able to do the work at” the Pepper Pike property.","paragraph_id":"para_102"},{"text":"The trial court further granted summary judgment in appellees’ favor,","paragraph_id":"para_103"},{"text":"in part, on their CSPA claim, finding that Weaver Construction’s failure to register","paragraph_id":"para_104"},{"text":"as required by local ordinance violated R.C. 1345.02(A) and 1345.02(G). The trial","paragraph_id":"para_105"},{"text":"court denied summary judgment as to the home solicitation component of appellees’","paragraph_id":"para_106"},{"text":"claim, however, finding the record “bare of any facts that would demonstrate that","paragraph_id":"para_107"},{"text":"there is no genuine issue of material facts about whether the contract between the","paragraph_id":"para_108"},{"text":"parties was the fruit of a ‘home solicitation sale’” as defined by statute.","paragraph_id":"para_109"},{"text":"The trial court further denied summary judgment on appellees’","paragraph_id":"para_110"},{"text":"negligence claim, finding no actionable duty “to perform in a workmanlike manner”","paragraph_id":"para_111"},{"text":"where that duty was “an express part of the contract.” It denied appellees’ motion","paragraph_id":"para_112"},{"text":"for summary judgment on their unjust-enrichment claim on the same basis, i.e.,","paragraph_id":"para_113"},{"text":"because “the subject matter of that claim is governed by an express contract.”","paragraph_id":"para_114"},{"text":"Finally, the trial court found that although it had determined both the","paragraph_id":"para_115"},{"text":"“duty” and “breach” elements of the CSPA and contract claim in favor of appellees,","paragraph_id":"para_116"},{"text":"genuine issues of material fact remained regarding their damages proximately","paragraph_id":"para_117"},{"text":"caused by the breach of contract and violation of the statute. In short, it found that","paragraph_id":"para_118"},{"text":"while appellees could recover the $12,650 paid to appellants, the evidence of","paragraph_id":"para_119"},{"text":"damages premised on amounts paid to the substitute contractor was “not detailed","paragraph_id":"para_120"},{"text":"enough to rule out any issue of material fact because the record does not show what","paragraph_id":"para_121"},{"text":"work Weaver Construction performed and exactly what work the replacement","paragraph_id":"para_122"},{"text":"contractor performed.” It found that there were several “genuine issues of material","paragraph_id":"para_123"},{"text":"fact . . . on the amount of any damages proximately caused[.]” The trial court","paragraph_id":"para_124"},{"text":"likewise found that the same fact issues precluded a calculation of CSPA damages at","paragraph_id":"para_125"},{"text":"the summary-judgment stage.","paragraph_id":"para_126"},{"text":"Finally, the trial court found that there was a genuine issue of fact","paragraph_id":"para_127"},{"text":"concerning Al Weaver’s personal liability for any CSPA violations.","paragraph_id":"para_128"},{"text":"D. Trial to the Bench with an Advisory Jury Pursuant to Civ.R.","paragraph_id":"para_129"},{"text":"39(C)(1)","paragraph_id":"para_130"},{"text":"The parties waived trial by jury. The case proceeded to a bench trial","paragraph_id":"para_131"},{"text":"with a Civ.R. 39(C)(1) advisory jury beginning September 8, 2025. Trial court","paragraph_id":"para_132"},{"text":"journal entries indicate that the trial took place over three days, i.e., September 8, 9,","paragraph_id":"para_133"},{"text":"and 10. This court has not been provided with a transcript of the trial, the parties’","paragraph_id":"para_134"},{"text":"trial exhibits, an App.R. 9(C) statement, or an App.R. 9(D) agreed statement of the","paragraph_id":"para_135"},{"text":"proceedings.","paragraph_id":"para_136"},{"text":"After trial concluded, the trial court docketed an entry indicating that","paragraph_id":"para_137"},{"text":"the jury had deliberated and returned interrogatories and verdict forms. It marked","paragraph_id":"para_138"},{"text":"the matter “heard and submitted” and stated that a judgment entry would be","paragraph_id":"para_139"},{"text":"forthcoming.","paragraph_id":"para_140"},{"text":"E. The Trial Court’s Final Judgment Entry","paragraph_id":"para_141"},{"text":"The trial court docketed an entry captioned “final judgment entry upon","paragraph_id":"para_142"},{"text":"a bench trial” on September 25, 2025. The trial court explicitly structured its","paragraph_id":"para_143"},{"text":"opinion as findings of fact and conclusions of law. Its findings included that Weaver","paragraph_id":"para_144"},{"text":"Construction was required by ordinance to register as a contractor to do business in","paragraph_id":"para_145"},{"text":"Pepper Pike but had failed to do so, that neither Weaver Construction nor the","paragraph_id":"para_146"},{"text":"appellees had applied for and received a permit from Pepper Pike’s Architectural","paragraph_id":"para_147"},{"text":"Board of Review as required by ordinance, and that for these reasons a Pepper Pike","paragraph_id":"para_148"},{"text":"building inspector shut down the job site the day construction began. It further","paragraph_id":"para_149"},{"text":"found that “[b]y that point, a significant portion of the old roof had been removed","paragraph_id":"para_150"},{"text":"and some of the new material had been installed.” The trial court further found that","paragraph_id":"para_151"},{"text":"while Weaver Construction subsequently registered as a contractor, the","paragraph_id":"para_152"},{"text":"Architectural Board of Review never approved the material selected for the job, that","paragraph_id":"para_153"},{"text":"“Weaver Construction left the job site[,]” and that “a permissible shingle roof was","paragraph_id":"para_154"},{"text":"ultimately installed by a different contractor.”","paragraph_id":"para_155"},{"text":"In its conclusions of law, the trial court noted that it had entered","paragraph_id":"para_156"},{"text":"summary judgment in appellees’ favor as to the “breach” elements of their contract","paragraph_id":"para_157"},{"text":"claim but had left causation, damages, and aspects of the CSPA claim for trial:","paragraph_id":"para_158"},{"text":"That summary judgment, however, was almost certainly not a final","paragraph_id":"para_159"},{"text":"appealable order under R.C. 2505.02 because it did not resolve the","paragraph_id":"para_160"},{"text":"causation and damages elements of the breach of contract claim, nor","paragraph_id":"para_161"},{"text":"did it resolve the CSPA claims. Still, the evidence at trial did nothing","paragraph_id":"para_162"},{"text":"to persuade the court, as a finder of fact in a non-jury trial, that","paragraph_id":"para_163"},{"text":"Weaver Construction did not breach its promise to perform in a","paragraph_id":"para_164"},{"text":"workmanlike duty [sic, manner] by never bothering to verify whether","paragraph_id":"para_165"},{"text":"it was legally able to work as a contractor in Pepper Pike, thus the","paragraph_id":"para_166"},{"text":"breach found as a matter of law on summary judgment is also found","paragraph_id":"para_167"},{"text":"as a matter of fact on the trial evidence of record.","paragraph_id":"para_168"},{"text":"(Emphasis added.) After a brief diversion to explain that its conclusions on breach","paragraph_id":"para_169"},{"text":"of contract differed from those of the advisory jury, the trial court found:","paragraph_id":"para_170"},{"text":"“Ultimately, based upon all of the evidence of record,” Weaver construction had","paragraph_id":"para_171"},{"text":"“violated the contractual duty to perform in a workmanlike manner.” It deferred its","paragraph_id":"para_172"},{"text":"discussion of the “elements of causation and damages” for later in its opinion.","paragraph_id":"para_173"},{"text":"With respect to appellees’ CSPA claim, the trial court found that","paragraph_id":"para_174"},{"text":"Weaver Construction had committed a per se deceptive trade practice by failing to","paragraph_id":"para_175"},{"text":"register with Pepper Pike. It further found that Weaver Construction violated the","paragraph_id":"para_176"},{"text":"CSPA by failing to provide a receipt for the deposit appellees provided.","paragraph_id":"para_177"},{"text":"The trial court concluded, consistent with the advisory jury, that the","paragraph_id":"para_178"},{"text":"receipt violation “was not a proximate cause of economic loss to the plaintiffs.” It","paragraph_id":"para_179"},{"text":"found, however, that appellees proved both proximate cause and damages with","paragraph_id":"para_180"},{"text":"respect to the CSPA failure-to-register claim. For example, it found that one purpose","paragraph_id":"para_181"},{"text":"of Pepper Pike’s registration ordinance was “to ensure that the contractor is","paragraph_id":"para_182"},{"text":"conversant with Pepper Pike’s building codes.” It then found that “Weaver","paragraph_id":"para_183"},{"text":"Construction had no idea that construction which ‘affects the exterior appearance’","paragraph_id":"para_184"},{"text":"of a house could only be done” upon approval by the Architectural Board of Review.","paragraph_id":"para_185"},{"text":"The trial court concluded that Weaver Construction was prevented","paragraph_id":"para_186"},{"text":"from performing the promised work “by its own neglect of the registration","paragraph_id":"para_187"},{"text":"ordinance, because the act of registering would have provided some assurance that","paragraph_id":"para_188"},{"text":"the defendants knew that the project required permission from the Board.” It","paragraph_id":"para_189"},{"text":"continued:","paragraph_id":"para_190"},{"text":"This is true even in the face of Weaver Construction’s argument to the","paragraph_id":"para_191"},{"text":"effect that the breach of the contract was caused by Kogan because she","paragraph_id":"para_192"},{"text":"is the one who asked Weaver to install a roof — red in color and made","paragraph_id":"para_193"},{"text":"of metal with exposed fasteners — that the city would never have","paragraph_id":"para_194"},{"text":"approved even if the parties had gone to the Board before beginning","paragraph_id":"para_195"},{"text":"construction. If Weaver Construction had been registered in Pepper","paragraph_id":"para_196"},{"text":"Pike and familiar with its procedures, then Kogan — with or without","paragraph_id":"para_197"},{"text":"assistance from Weaver Construction — would have had the chance to","paragraph_id":"para_198"},{"text":"go to the Board, and her choice of materials would have been","paragraph_id":"para_199"},{"text":"disapproved before any money was spent or work was started. In short,","paragraph_id":"para_200"},{"text":"the ultimate rejection by Pepper Pike was precipitated by Weaver","paragraph_id":"para_201"},{"text":"Construction’s intentional decision to ignore Pepper Pike’s ordinances.","paragraph_id":"para_202"},{"text":"Upon finding that Weaver Construction had breached the contract","paragraph_id":"para_203"},{"text":"and committed a per se violation of the CSPA, the court further found, “as a matter","paragraph_id":"para_204"},{"text":"of fact, that both breaches proximately caused damages to the plaintiffs.” (Emphasis","paragraph_id":"para_205"},{"text":"added.)","paragraph_id":"para_206"},{"text":"Turning to damages, the trial court noted the $12,650 deposit for","paragraph_id":"para_207"},{"text":"which appellees “got nothing in return directly from Weaver Construction.” It","paragraph_id":"para_208"},{"text":"noted, however, that “[t]he trial evidence . . . did reveal that Kogan was paid $10,000","paragraph_id":"para_209"},{"text":"under a performance bond[.]” The trial court ultimately concluded that payment on","paragraph_id":"para_210"},{"text":"the bond functioned as mitigation but left $2,650 still owing in contract damages.","paragraph_id":"para_211"},{"text":"The trial court found the same damages applied to the CSPA","paragraph_id":"para_212"},{"text":"violations. It explicitly relied on evidence adduced at trial:","paragraph_id":"para_213"},{"text":"On the CSPA, the plaintiffs would never have given Weaver","paragraph_id":"para_214"},{"text":"Construction any money if the contractor had complied with the","paragraph_id":"para_215"},{"text":"registration and permit process set out in the Pepper Pike ordinances","paragraph_id":"para_216"},{"text":"because the trial evidence that the city would never have approved the","paragraph_id":"para_217"},{"text":"chosen materials was convincing. But because Weaver Construction","paragraph_id":"para_218"},{"text":"ignored its obligations under the ordinance, the plaintiffs lost the","paragraph_id":"para_219"},{"text":"chance to either enter into a completely different contract with another","paragraph_id":"para_220"},{"text":"contractor or to amend the contract with Weaver Construction to","paragraph_id":"para_221"},{"text":"conform with the ordinances, including the Board’s review process. As","paragraph_id":"para_222"},{"text":"a result, the plaintiffs lost the same compensatory damages of $2,650","paragraph_id":"para_223"},{"text":"incurred by the breach of contract.","paragraph_id":"para_224"},{"text":"(Emphasis added.) The trial court rejected appellees’ request for treble damages","paragraph_id":"para_225"},{"text":"under R.C. 1345.09(B) and further rejected any claim for noneconomic damages","paragraph_id":"para_226"},{"text":"under R.C. 1345.09(A). With respect to the latter, it noted the lack of any claim of","paragraph_id":"para_227"},{"text":"intangible loss and that “[t]here was little, if any, testimony on the mental anguish","paragraph_id":"para_228"},{"text":"inflicted on the plaintiffs by the defendants’ conduct.” The trial court specifically","paragraph_id":"para_229"},{"text":"awarded only economic damages of $2,650.","paragraph_id":"para_230"},{"text":"The trial court found an award of attorney fees appropriate, as","paragraph_id":"para_231"},{"text":"authorized by R.C. 1345.09(F)(2). It found:","paragraph_id":"para_232"},{"text":"Here, Weaver Construction knowingly proceeded to take on a","paragraph_id":"para_233"},{"text":"construction job in Pepper Pike without registering there as a","paragraph_id":"para_234"},{"text":"contractor, without obtaining a building permit (or assuring itself that","paragraph_id":"para_235"},{"text":"the homeowner had procured a permit), and without undertaking the","paragraph_id":"para_236"},{"text":"required process before the Architectural Board of Review, and","paragraph_id":"para_237"},{"text":"attorney’s fees may therefore be awarded under R.C. 1345.09(F)(2).","paragraph_id":"para_238"},{"text":"Next, the trial court cited Eighth District authority and found Al","paragraph_id":"para_239"},{"text":"Weaver personally liable, along with Weaver Construction, for damages stemming","paragraph_id":"para_240"},{"text":"from the CSPA violation, explaining that its conclusion rested “not on a traditional","paragraph_id":"para_241"},{"text":"claim of piercing the corporate veil[]” but instead on liability of corporate officers","paragraph_id":"para_242"},{"text":"under the CSPA for their personal actions.","paragraph_id":"para_243"},{"text":"The trial court entered final judgment against Weaver Construction","paragraph_id":"para_244"},{"text":"for breach of contract in the compensatory amount of $2,650 and against appellants","paragraph_id":"para_245"},{"text":"jointly and severally on the CSPA violations in the compensatory amount of $2,650","paragraph_id":"para_246"},{"text":"plus attorney fees of $21,692. The trial court referenced only “Plaintiffs’ trial exhibit","paragraph_id":"para_247"},{"text":"H” in awarding fees.","paragraph_id":"para_248"},{"text":"This timely appeal followed.","paragraph_id":"para_249"},{"text":"F. The Record on Appeal","paragraph_id":"para_250"},{"text":"While the record on appeal in this matter includes the parties’ filings","paragraph_id":"para_251"},{"text":"and the exhibits to those filings (e.g., exhibits attached to the complaint and the","paragraph_id":"para_252"},{"text":"exhibits accompanying the parties’ summary judgment briefs), it does not contain","paragraph_id":"para_253"},{"text":"either a transcript of the three-day trial or any of the exhibits offered and admitted","paragraph_id":"para_254"},{"text":"at trial. In their introduction to the statement of facts in their opening briefs,","paragraph_id":"para_255"},{"text":"appellants write:","paragraph_id":"para_256"},{"text":"Weaver Construction and Weaver have not ordered and filed a","paragraph_id":"para_257"},{"text":"transcript of the trial. This case was tried to the bench, an [sic] the Trial","paragraph_id":"para_258"},{"text":"Court Verdict attempted to summarize the facts presented at trial. So,","paragraph_id":"para_259"},{"text":"no need for the transcript in this appeal. In that regard, the parties, for","paragraph_id":"para_260"},{"text":"purposes of this appeal, are constrained to the filings with the trial","paragraph_id":"para_261"},{"text":"court with respect to the SJ Motion, the actual SJ Ruling, the admitted","paragraph_id":"para_262"},{"text":"exhibits at trial and the Trial Court Verdict factual findings. In that","paragraph_id":"para_263"},{"text":"regard, the following are the facts for purposes of this appeal gained","paragraph_id":"para_264"},{"text":"from those documents.","paragraph_id":"para_265"},{"text":"(Appellants’ brief at p. 8.)","paragraph_id":"para_266"},{"text":"II. Assignments of Error","paragraph_id":"para_267"},{"text":"Appellants present four assignments of error for our review:","paragraph_id":"para_268"},{"text":"Assignment of Error No. 1.","paragraph_id":"para_269"},{"text":"The doctrine of unclean hands and/or estoppel should bar any recovery","paragraph_id":"para_270"},{"text":"by the Appellees.","paragraph_id":"para_271"},{"text":"Assignment of Error No. 2.","paragraph_id":"para_272"},{"text":"The accidental, temporary and technical failure to register as a","paragraph_id":"para_273"},{"text":"contractor is not even remotely the proximate cause of any damages to","paragraph_id":"para_274"},{"text":"the Appellees.","paragraph_id":"para_275"},{"text":"Assignment of Error No. 3.","paragraph_id":"para_276"},{"text":"Even if there was a technical CSPA violation, there is no personal","paragraph_id":"para_277"},{"text":"liability for Weaver.","paragraph_id":"para_278"},{"text":"Assignment of Error No. 4.","paragraph_id":"para_279"},{"text":"The award of attorney fees for any technical CSPA violation is an abuse","paragraph_id":"para_280"},{"text":"of discretion, and is not supported by the required proof.","paragraph_id":"para_281"},{"text":"We find no merit to appellants’ assignments of error.","paragraph_id":"para_282"},{"text":"III. Analysis","paragraph_id":"para_283"},{"text":"A. The Absence of a Complete and Adequate Record","paragraph_id":"para_284"},{"text":"We noted above that the record on appeal contains no transcript of","paragraph_id":"para_285"},{"text":"the three-day trial and none of the exhibits offered and admitted at trial. Nor is there","paragraph_id":"para_286"},{"text":"an App.R. 9(C) statement of the evidence or proceedings or an App.R. 9(D) agreed","paragraph_id":"para_287"},{"text":"statement. The absence of these record materials is essentially dispositive as to","paragraph_id":"para_288"},{"text":"appellants’ four assignments of error.","paragraph_id":"para_289"},{"text":"As appellants, Weaver Construction and Al Weaver were “responsible","paragraph_id":"para_290"},{"text":"for providing this court with the complete record of the facts, testimony and","paragraph_id":"para_291"},{"text":"evidentiary matters necessary to support [their] assignment[s] of error so that we","paragraph_id":"para_292"},{"text":"can properly evaluate the trial court’s decision.” Pedra Properties, LLC, 2015-Ohio-","paragraph_id":"para_293"},{"text":"5427, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing App.R. 9, Urban Partnership Bank v. Mosezit","paragraph_id":"para_294"},{"text":"Academy, Inc., 2014-Ohio-3721, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), and Sagert v. Elden Props. L.P.,","paragraph_id":"para_295"},{"text":"2008-Ohio-1861, ¶ 17 (6th Dist.). This obligation also “includes the exhibits that","paragraph_id":"para_296"},{"text":"were submitted to the trial court.” Urban Partnership Bank at ¶ 20, citing Freedom","paragraph_id":"para_297"},{"text":"Mtge. Corp. v. Petty, 2011-Ohio-3067, ¶ 68 (8th Dist.) and App.R. 9(A). This duty","paragraph_id":"para_298"},{"text":"rests with appellants because they “bear[] the burden of showing error by reference","paragraph_id":"para_299"},{"text":"to matters in the record.” Pedra Properties, LLC at ¶ 15, citing App.R. 9(B),","paragraph_id":"para_300"},{"text":"12(A)(2), and 16(A).","paragraph_id":"para_301"},{"text":"“Where the record has no transcript or an appropriate substitute for","paragraph_id":"para_302"},{"text":"the transcript under App.R. 9(C) or (D), the appellate court ‘must presume","paragraph_id":"para_303"},{"text":"regularity in the proceedings on any finding of fact made by the trial court.’” Pedra","paragraph_id":"para_304"},{"text":"Properties, LLC, at ¶ 15, quoting Calabrese v. Zmijewski, 2006-Ohio-2322, ¶ 10","paragraph_id":"para_305"},{"text":"(8th Dist.), citing Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197 (1980). More","paragraph_id":"para_306"},{"text":"specifically, “[i]n the absence of evidence that is necessary to resolve an assignment","paragraph_id":"para_307"},{"text":"of error, a reviewing court must presume the regularity of the trial court’s","paragraph_id":"para_308"},{"text":"proceedings and affirm the trial court’s judgment.” Urban Partnership Bank at","paragraph_id":"para_309"},{"text":"¶ 20, citing Tabbaa v. Raslan, 2012-Ohio-367, ¶ 10-12 (8th Dist.). In such cases,","paragraph_id":"para_310"},{"text":"“the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors,","paragraph_id":"para_311"},{"text":"the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings,","paragraph_id":"para_312"},{"text":"and affirm.” Knapp at 199. See also K&D Mgt. LLC v. Marshall, 2025-Ohio-1736,","paragraph_id":"para_313"},{"text":"¶ 12 (8th Dist.); In re D.B., 2025-Ohio-1371, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). “This means that we","paragraph_id":"para_314"},{"text":"must ‘presume that the trial court considered all the evidence and arguments raised’","paragraph_id":"para_315"},{"text":"and that sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court’s decision.” V.C.","paragraph_id":"para_316"},{"text":"v. O.C., 2021-Ohio-1491, ¶ 65 (8th Dist.), quoting Miranda v. Saratoga Diagnostics,","paragraph_id":"para_317"},{"text":"2012-Ohio-2633, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.).","paragraph_id":"para_318"},{"text":"Here, as in Pedra Properties, LLC, appellants contend that no","paragraph_id":"para_319"},{"text":"transcript is required because their appeal is based on purely legal issues. In that","paragraph_id":"para_320"},{"text":"case, this court agreed that it could review purely legal issues even “in the absence","paragraph_id":"para_321"},{"text":"of a transcript or transcript alternative[.]” Pedra Properties, LLC at ¶ 16. It further","paragraph_id":"para_322"},{"text":"observed, however, that the case before it required it to apply the governing law “to","paragraph_id":"para_323"},{"text":"the underlying facts in order to determine the merits” of the appeal and that “[t]he","paragraph_id":"para_324"},{"text":"trial court’s factual findings are integral to the evaluation of the legal error","paragraph_id":"para_325"},{"text":"[appellant] claims the trial court made.” (Emphasis added.) Id. This court","paragraph_id":"para_326"},{"text":"ultimately applied the presumption of regularity and relied on the trial court’s","paragraph_id":"para_327"},{"text":"specific findings in affirming the trial court’s judgment. Id. at ¶ 23. Here, we are","paragraph_id":"para_328"},{"text":"likewise required to apply the law to the underlying facts as found by the trial court.","paragraph_id":"para_329"},{"text":"As to those facts, we likewise presume regularity.","paragraph_id":"para_330"},{"text":"We reject appellants’ contention that we can rely on summary","paragraph_id":"para_331"},{"text":"judgment submissions or exhibits attached thereto to review the trial court’s final","paragraph_id":"para_332"},{"text":"judgment. The trial court granted only partial summary judgment. It then","paragraph_id":"para_333"},{"text":"proceeded to hold a three-day bench trial with an advisory jury. Both sides agree","paragraph_id":"para_334"},{"text":"that the trial court’s summary-judgment ruling was interlocutory and not a final,","paragraph_id":"para_335"},{"text":"appealable order. “An interlocutory order is subject to revision by the trial court at","paragraph_id":"para_336"},{"text":"any time prior to the entering of a final judgment in the case[,]” and “[o]nce a final","paragraph_id":"para_337"},{"text":"judgment is entered, all interlocutory orders are merged into the final judgment of","paragraph_id":"para_338"},{"text":"the court and become appealable.” (Emphasis added.) Marc Glassman, Inc. v.","paragraph_id":"para_339"},{"text":"Fagan, 2006-Ohio-5577, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Civ.R. 54(B), Kocijan v. S & N, 2002-","paragraph_id":"para_340"},{"text":"Ohio-3775 (8th Dist.), and MacConnell v. Safeco Property, 2006-Ohio-2910 (2d","paragraph_id":"para_341"},{"text":"Dist.). Indeed, “an interlocutory order, such as granting partial summary judgment,","paragraph_id":"para_342"},{"text":"is subject to” reconsideration prior to final judgment. Assunta Rossi Personalty","paragraph_id":"para_343"},{"text":"Revocable Living v. Keehan, 2023-Ohio-3710, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing Maddox Def.,","paragraph_id":"para_344"},{"text":"Inc. v. GeoData Sys. Mgmt., 2019-Ohio-1778, ¶ 74 (8th Dist.), citing Pitts v. Ohio","paragraph_id":"para_345"},{"text":"Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 378 (1981). See also Hoenigman v. Ruiz, 2021-","paragraph_id":"para_346"},{"text":"Ohio-2029, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.) (reiterating the same rule in the context of a grant of","paragraph_id":"para_347"},{"text":"partial summary judgment). Compare Renner, Otto, Boisselle & Sklar, L.L.P. v.","paragraph_id":"para_348"},{"text":"Estate of Siegel, 2015-Ohio-1839, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (de novo review of ruling on","paragraph_id":"para_349"},{"text":"partial summary judgment on appeal where trial court had not subsequently","paragraph_id":"para_350"},{"text":"proceeded to trial).","paragraph_id":"para_351"},{"text":"Here, even though the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment","paragraph_id":"para_352"},{"text":"merged into the final judgment and became reviewable, appellants are still faced","paragraph_id":"para_353"},{"text":"with the final judgment actually entered, which to a very large degree reconsidered","paragraph_id":"para_354"},{"text":"aspects of the summary-judgment decision based on evidence elicited at trial. The","paragraph_id":"para_355"},{"text":"final judgment is explicit in this respect. It was not merely an adoption of the Civ.R.","paragraph_id":"para_356"},{"text":"56 ruling, but rather revisited that ruling in light of trial evidence. After a three-day","paragraph_id":"para_357"},{"text":"bench trial with an advisory jury, the trial court made detailed findings with respect","paragraph_id":"para_358"},{"text":"to breach, proximate cause, damages, knowledge, personal liability, and attorney","paragraph_id":"para_359"},{"text":"fees. It even wrote that the breach previously found at the summary-judgment stage","paragraph_id":"para_360"},{"text":"was “found as a matter of fact on the trial evidence of record.” Appellants cannot","paragraph_id":"para_361"},{"text":"challenge those findings without providing this court with the trial evidence, i.e., the","paragraph_id":"para_362"},{"text":"transcript of proceedings and admitted exhibits.","paragraph_id":"para_363"},{"text":"Appellants therefore cannot avoid the requirement of a trial transcript","paragraph_id":"para_364"},{"text":"by reframing this as an appeal from a summary judgment ruling. The case","paragraph_id":"para_365"},{"text":"proceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court made independent findings based on","paragraph_id":"para_366"},{"text":"trial evidence. Appellants even repeatedly refer in their brief to purported trial","paragraph_id":"para_367"},{"text":"evidence. Footnote 4 of their opening brief, for example, refers to what “the trial","paragraph_id":"para_368"},{"text":"facts showed” and even claimed that specific exhibits “clearly show that the","paragraph_id":"para_369"},{"text":"[Architectural Board of Review] was never going to approve a red metal roof[.]” At","paragraph_id":"para_370"},{"text":"page 9 of their brief, appellants refer to meeting minutes identified as exhibit No. 11.","paragraph_id":"para_371"},{"text":"They later refer to exhibit No. 12, which they claim proves the date that Weaver","paragraph_id":"para_372"},{"text":"Construction registered as a contractor with Pepper Pike. They reference exhibit","paragraph_id":"para_373"},{"text":"No. 6, purportedly an order to stop work. Pages 12-13 of their opening brief refer to","paragraph_id":"para_374"},{"text":"exhibit Nos. 7B, 12, 9A, 9B, 8, and 25. Not one of these exhibits is contained in the","paragraph_id":"para_375"},{"text":"appellate record.","paragraph_id":"para_376"},{"text":"Moreover, even if this court had the exhibits admitted into evidence","paragraph_id":"para_377"},{"text":"at trial, the lack of a transcript leaves us with no way to determine how those exhibits","paragraph_id":"para_378"},{"text":"were used to support, contradict, or otherwise explain trial testimony. In V.C., 2021-","paragraph_id":"para_379"},{"text":"Ohio-1491, the appellant argued that certain exhibits purportedly offered at a","paragraph_id":"para_380"},{"text":"hearing, along with the trial court’s “docketing statements,” were sufficient for this","paragraph_id":"para_381"},{"text":"court’s review. Id. at ¶ 67. This court rejected that contention:","paragraph_id":"para_382"},{"text":"[T]he trial court’s “docketing statements” do not demonstrate what","paragraph_id":"para_383"},{"text":"evidence was presented below. And without the transcript, we do not","paragraph_id":"para_384"},{"text":"know which of the parties’ “tendered” exhibits were admitted into","paragraph_id":"para_385"},{"text":"evidence at the hearing. Further, without access to a transcript of the","paragraph_id":"para_386"},{"text":"testimony presented at the hearing, including any testimony that may","paragraph_id":"para_387"},{"text":"have been given explaining the parties’ exhibits or supplementing,","paragraph_id":"para_388"},{"text":"contradicting or modifying information contained in those exhibits,","paragraph_id":"para_389"},{"text":"we cannot say that any of the trial court’s factual findings are against","paragraph_id":"para_390"},{"text":"the manifest weight of the evidence.","paragraph_id":"para_391"},{"text":"(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 67.","paragraph_id":"para_392"},{"text":"In light of these fundamental precepts, we disagree with appellants’","paragraph_id":"para_393"},{"text":"framing of the consequences of their failure to file a trial transcript and exhibits.","paragraph_id":"para_394"},{"text":"While both sides, and this court, are indeed “constrained” to the limited paper","paragraph_id":"para_395"},{"text":"record (to employ appellants’ term), this does not create a stalemate. The missing","paragraph_id":"para_396"},{"text":"record materials were appellants’ responsibility and are now appellants’ problem.","paragraph_id":"para_397"},{"text":"There is no cross-appeal, and appellees are not required to demonstrate regularity.","paragraph_id":"para_398"},{"text":"Appellants alone have the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error by reference to","paragraph_id":"para_399"},{"text":"the record. The absence of the record evidence necessary to evaluate their","paragraph_id":"para_400"},{"text":"assignments of error requires this court to presume the regularity of the trial court’s","paragraph_id":"para_401"},{"text":"proceedings, i.e., we must accept the trial court’s findings as correct and presume","paragraph_id":"para_402"},{"text":"that the evidence supported them.","paragraph_id":"para_403"},{"text":"To the extent an assignment of error presents a purely legal issue","paragraph_id":"para_404"},{"text":"capable of resolution from the existing App.R. 9(A) record, the absence of a","paragraph_id":"para_405"},{"text":"transcript would not be dispositive. All of appellants’ remaining assignments of","paragraph_id":"para_406"},{"text":"error, however — their challenges to the trial court’s findings and conclusions","paragraph_id":"para_407"},{"text":"regarding the affirmative defense of unclean hands, causation, damages, knowledge,","paragraph_id":"para_408"},{"text":"personal liability, and the award of attorney fees — are inextricably tied to trial","paragraph_id":"para_409"},{"text":"evidence. Those issues cannot be resolved, at least not in appellants’ favor, on an","paragraph_id":"para_410"},{"text":"incomplete record.","paragraph_id":"para_411"},{"text":"B. First Assignment of Error","paragraph_id":"para_412"},{"text":"In their first assignment of error, appellants argue that the doctrine of","paragraph_id":"para_413"},{"text":"unclean hands or equitable estoppel should bar any recovery by appellees. We find","paragraph_id":"para_414"},{"text":"no merit to this assignment of error.","paragraph_id":"para_415"},{"text":"The doctrine of unclean hands “concerns grossly inequitable behavior","paragraph_id":"para_416"},{"text":"in the underlying transaction which is the subject matter of the suit. . . . A party’s","paragraph_id":"para_417"},{"text":"conduct in the litigation itself may cause it to suffer sanctions, but it will not invoke","paragraph_id":"para_418"},{"text":"the ‘clean hands’ doctrine.” N. Coast Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations, Inc., 16","paragraph_id":"para_419"},{"text":"Ohio App.3d 342, 344, fn. 1 (8th Dist. 1984). This court has described “[t]he unclean","paragraph_id":"para_420"},{"text":"hands doctrine is a defense against claims in equity[]” and has stated that it","paragraph_id":"para_421"},{"text":"“requires a showing that the party seeking relief engaged in reprehensible conduct","paragraph_id":"para_422"},{"text":"with respect to the subject matter of the action.” Downie-Gombach v. Laurie, 2015-","paragraph_id":"para_423"},{"text":"Ohio-3584, ¶ 46 (8th Dist.). Similarly, a core requirement for invocation of","paragraph_id":"para_424"},{"text":"equitable estoppel is a factual misrepresentation that “induces actual reliance” by","paragraph_id":"para_425"},{"text":"the opposing party. N. Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Farro, 2019-Ohio-5344, ¶ 25 (8th","paragraph_id":"para_426"},{"text":"Dist.). See also Barcy v. St. Vincent Charity Med. Ctr., 2022-Ohio-1064, ¶ 62 (8th","paragraph_id":"para_427"},{"text":"Dist.).","paragraph_id":"para_428"},{"text":"Appellants’ arguments here are unusual because they relate not to","paragraph_id":"para_429"},{"text":"circumstances surrounding the underlying transaction or to any alleged","paragraph_id":"para_430"},{"text":"representations that they relied upon, but rather to allegations of bad behavior by","paragraph_id":"para_431"},{"text":"appellees’ counsel during litigation, which would more typically be framed as","paragraph_id":"para_432"},{"text":"justification for sanctions. We nevertheless address their arguments.","paragraph_id":"para_433"},{"text":"Appellants first contend that appellees, through counsel, misled the","paragraph_id":"para_434"},{"text":"trial court in summary judgment briefing by failing to disclose payment on a bond","paragraph_id":"para_435"},{"text":"in at least partial satisfaction of any claimed damages. In their June 11, 2025 motion","paragraph_id":"para_436"},{"text":"for summary judgment, however, appellees expressly referenced payment on the","paragraph_id":"para_437"},{"text":"bond. It is likewise mentioned in counsel’s affidavit filed the same day. The affidavit","paragraph_id":"para_438"},{"text":"even includes a release from the bonding company.","paragraph_id":"para_439"},{"text":"Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the pertinent affidavit, and","paragraph_id":"para_440"},{"text":"the referenced release all specified payment on the bond in the amount of $12,650.","paragraph_id":"para_441"},{"text":"The trial court’s final judgment entry, however, states that $10,000 was collected on","paragraph_id":"para_442"},{"text":"the bond, and this is the figure referenced by both appellants and appellees on","paragraph_id":"para_443"},{"text":"appeal. This discrepancy actually highlights that the trial court apparently heard","paragraph_id":"para_444"},{"text":"evidence on this issue — evidence that we cannot review because of the lack of a","paragraph_id":"para_445"},{"text":"transcript and exhibits. Indeed, appellants contend in their brief that this purported","paragraph_id":"para_446"},{"text":"“fraud by omission” was fully revealed “only at trial[.]” (Emphasis in original.)","paragraph_id":"para_447"},{"text":"(Appellants’ brief at p. 13.) They continue: “[I]t was not until the parties were in","paragraph_id":"para_448"},{"text":"trial in this matter that this functional fraud was discovered.” (Appellants’ brief at","paragraph_id":"para_449"},{"text":"p. 14.)","paragraph_id":"para_450"},{"text":"More fundamentally, while appellants argue that these affirmative","paragraph_id":"para_451"},{"text":"defenses were preserved by being listed in their answers and that the “functional","paragraph_id":"para_452"},{"text":"fraud” was discovered during trial, they provide nothing demonstrating that either","paragraph_id":"para_453"},{"text":"defense was argued to the trial court and ultimately rejected. Ohio courts","paragraph_id":"para_454"},{"text":"distinguish between pleading a defense and actually placing it before the trial court","paragraph_id":"para_455"},{"text":"for decision. See, e.g., Murgu v. Lakewood City School Dist., Bd. of Edn., 2018-","paragraph_id":"para_456"},{"text":"Ohio-4643, ¶ 12-13 (8th Dist.), citing O’Brien v. Olmsted Falls, 2008-Ohio-2658,","paragraph_id":"para_457"},{"text":"¶ 13 (8th Dist.).","paragraph_id":"para_458"},{"text":"“In general, affirmative defenses must be ‘timely asserted and","paragraph_id":"para_459"},{"text":"maintained,’ meaning the party seeking to benefit from a doctrine has the obligation","paragraph_id":"para_460"},{"text":"to raise and argue it, not merely set it forth in an answer.” (Emphasis added.)","paragraph_id":"para_461"},{"text":"Cosgrove v. Omni Manor, 2016-Ohio-8481, ¶ 45 (7th Dist.), quoting Dworning v.","paragraph_id":"para_462"},{"text":"Euclid, 2008-Ohio-3318, ¶ 11 and Jones v. Chagrin Falls, 77 Ohio St.3d 456 (1997),","paragraph_id":"para_463"},{"text":"syllabus. “In other words, the answer is not self-executing.” Cosgrove at ¶ 46, citing","paragraph_id":"para_464"},{"text":"Parkstone Capital Partners v. Solon, 2013-Ohio-3149, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). In","paragraph_id":"para_465"},{"text":"Cosgrove, the employer’s answer in a workers’ compensation case raised, as an","paragraph_id":"para_466"},{"text":"affirmative defense, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over a condition not","paragraph_id":"para_467"},{"text":"adjudicated administratively. Relying on the precepts above, the Seventh District","paragraph_id":"para_468"},{"text":"explained that even though raised in the answer,","paragraph_id":"para_469"},{"text":"this defense was not “maintained” thereafter. The employer filed no","paragraph_id":"para_470"},{"text":"pretrial motion. For instance, the employer did not seek partial","paragraph_id":"para_471"},{"text":"summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 as to this medical condition. The","paragraph_id":"para_472"},{"text":"employer did not seek a ruling in limine on the evidence of","paragraph_id":"para_473"},{"text":"herniation/extrusion. The employer did not raise the issue at trial","paragraph_id":"para_474"},{"text":"during presentation of testimony on herniation and extrusion or during","paragraph_id":"para_475"},{"text":"closing arguments. No objection was raised to the jury instructions or","paragraph_id":"para_476"},{"text":"the jury verdict forms containing this medical condition. The employer","paragraph_id":"para_477"},{"text":"waited to raise the issue until after trial in its objections to the","paragraph_id":"para_478"},{"text":"magistrate’s decision which memorialized the jury verdict on this","paragraph_id":"para_479"},{"text":"medical condition.","paragraph_id":"para_480"},{"text":". . .","paragraph_id":"para_481"},{"text":"The employer forfeited the argument (about which medical conditions","paragraph_id":"para_482"},{"text":"could be submitted to the jury) by allowing the case to proceed through","paragraph_id":"para_483"},{"text":"trial without properly raising the matter.","paragraph_id":"para_484"},{"text":"Cosgrove at ¶ 47 and 53. See also Hollish v. Maners, 2011-Ohio-4823, ¶ 26 (5th","paragraph_id":"para_485"},{"text":"Dist.) (declining to consider affirmative defenses preserved in an answer but not","paragraph_id":"para_486"},{"text":"addressed at the trial-court level during bench trial); Buckeye Hoya, LLC v. Brown","paragraph_id":"para_487"},{"text":"Gibbons Lang & Co. LLC, 2023-Ohio-2177, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.); Gallagher v. Cleveland","paragraph_id":"para_488"},{"text":"Browns Football Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 427, 433 (1996). In short, affirmative defenses","paragraph_id":"para_489"},{"text":"raised in an answer but not further prosecuted are “effectively waived.” Leibson v.","paragraph_id":"para_490"},{"text":"Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 84 Ohio App.3d","paragraph_id":"para_491"},{"text":"751, 761 (8th Dist. 1992).","paragraph_id":"para_492"},{"text":"Thus, even if these defenses of unclean hands or estoppel were","paragraph_id":"para_493"},{"text":"properly pleaded, without a transcript we cannot determine whether, or to what","paragraph_id":"para_494"},{"text":"extent, those defenses were argued, supported by evidence, or otherwise","paragraph_id":"para_495"},{"text":"maintained, especially where the trial court’s final judgment is silent as to these","paragraph_id":"para_496"},{"text":"defenses. Given the trial court’s “silence on the issue, it would be highly speculative","paragraph_id":"para_497"},{"text":"to construe” its final judgment entry “as an implicit ruling” on these affirmative","paragraph_id":"para_498"},{"text":"defenses. Lycan v. Cleveland, 2016-Ohio-422, ¶ 25.","paragraph_id":"para_499"},{"text":"Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled.","paragraph_id":"para_500"},{"text":"C. Second Assignment of Error","paragraph_id":"para_501"},{"text":"In their second assignment of error, appellants argue that the failure","paragraph_id":"para_502"},{"text":"to register as a contractor with Pepper Pike “is not even remotely the proximate","paragraph_id":"para_503"},{"text":"cause of any damages” to appellees. They argue that a plaintiff is required to “prove","paragraph_id":"para_504"},{"text":"that any CSPA violation or breach is the proximate cause of identifiable damages.”","paragraph_id":"para_505"},{"text":"(Appellants’ brief at p. 14.) They further argue that “[g]laringly absent from the Trial","paragraph_id":"para_506"},{"text":"Court Verdict is any objective or rational relation of the failure-to-register conduct","paragraph_id":"para_507"},{"text":"to any damages suffered” by appellees. (Appellants’ brief at p. 14.)","paragraph_id":"para_508"},{"text":"Appellants are correct that appellees were required to prove that any","paragraph_id":"para_509"},{"text":"violation of the CSPA was the proximate cause of damages. R.C. 1345.02(G) makes","paragraph_id":"para_510"},{"text":"“the failure of a supplier to obtain or maintain any registration, license, bond, or","paragraph_id":"para_511"},{"text":"insurance required by state law or local ordinance for the supplier to engage in the","paragraph_id":"para_512"},{"text":"supplier’s trade or profession . . . an unfair or deceptive act or practice.” R.C.","paragraph_id":"para_513"},{"text":"1345.09(A) allows recovery of, inter alia, “actual economic damages[.]” R.C.","paragraph_id":"para_514"},{"text":"1345.09(G) defines that phrase as “direct, incidental, or consequential pecuniary","paragraph_id":"para_515"},{"text":"losses resulting from a violation of Chapter 1345 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis","paragraph_id":"para_516"},{"text":"added.)","paragraph_id":"para_517"},{"text":"Appellants’ contentions regarding the trial court’s final judgment,","paragraph_id":"para_518"},{"text":"however, are incorrect. The trial court made specific, fact-based proximate cause","paragraph_id":"para_519"},{"text":"and damages determinations after trial. While appellants attempt to characterize","paragraph_id":"para_520"},{"text":"proximate cause as a purely legal question subject to de novo review, “[t]he question","paragraph_id":"para_521"},{"text":"of proximate cause is ordinarily one of fact[.]” Kehrer v. McKittrick, 176 Ohio St.","paragraph_id":"para_522"},{"text":"192, 195 (1964). It becomes a question of law only “where there is no conflict in the","paragraph_id":"para_523"},{"text":"evidence.” Id. Here, the trial court found “as a matter of fact” that the failure to","paragraph_id":"para_524"},{"text":"register (as well as the breach of contract) proximately caused damages to appellees.","paragraph_id":"para_525"},{"text":"It concluded that if Weaver Construction had not violated the CSPA — i.e., if it had","paragraph_id":"para_526"},{"text":"been registered — appellees would have known “before any money was spent or","paragraph_id":"para_527"},{"text":"work was started[]” that the Architectural Board of Review would not approve the","paragraph_id":"para_528"},{"text":"roofing materials. “In short,” the trial court wrote, “the ultimate rejection by Pepper","paragraph_id":"para_529"},{"text":"Pike was precipitated by Weaver Construction’s intentional decision to ignore","paragraph_id":"para_530"},{"text":"Pepper Pike’s ordinances.”","paragraph_id":"para_531"},{"text":"Appellants’ remaining arguments are principally fact-based rather","paragraph_id":"para_532"},{"text":"than legal. At the very least, they would require the application of proximate-cause","paragraph_id":"para_533"},{"text":"principles to specific facts, including, but not limited to, the trial court’s inference","paragraph_id":"para_534"},{"text":"that one purpose of Pepper Pike’s ordinance requiring contractor registration is “to","paragraph_id":"para_535"},{"text":"ensure that the contractor is conversant with Pepper Pike’s building codes,”","paragraph_id":"para_536"},{"text":"including the requirement to seek approval from the Architectural Board of Review","paragraph_id":"para_537"},{"text":"for certain renovations. In light of that finding, appellants’ argument that Weaver","paragraph_id":"para_538"},{"text":"Construction is blameless because the roof never would have been approved by the","paragraph_id":"para_539"},{"text":"Architectural Board of Review misses the trial court’s point. The trial court found,","paragraph_id":"para_540"},{"text":"based on the evidence at trial, that if Weaver Construction had been properly","paragraph_id":"para_541"},{"text":"registered it would have discovered that fact before money was paid, materials were","paragraph_id":"para_542"},{"text":"delivered, and part of the old roof was removed.","paragraph_id":"para_543"},{"text":"With no transcript, we have nothing to review to determine whether","paragraph_id":"para_544"},{"text":"the trial court’s findings, including the trial court’s ultimate proximate-cause","paragraph_id":"para_545"},{"text":"determination, were supported by the evidence.2 Instead, as explained above, we","paragraph_id":"para_546"},{"text":"presume regularity based on the absence of a transcript or App.R. 9 alternative.","paragraph_id":"para_547"},{"text":"Appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled.","paragraph_id":"para_548"},{"text":"D. Third Assignment of Error","paragraph_id":"para_549"},{"text":"In their third assignment of error, appellants argue that even if there","paragraph_id":"para_550"},{"text":"was a CSPA violation, Al Weaver is not personally liable. We find this assignment","paragraph_id":"para_551"},{"text":"of error meritless.","paragraph_id":"para_552"},{"text":"Under the CSPA,","paragraph_id":"para_553"},{"text":"an officer of a corporation is individually liable for each violation of the","paragraph_id":"para_554"},{"text":"CSPA in which he personally participates. Stultz v. Artistic Pools, Inc.,","paragraph_id":"para_555"},{"text":"Summit App. No. C.A. 20189, 2001 Ohio 1420, ¶ 4. Liability also exists","paragraph_id":"para_556"},{"text":"for actions where “the officer took part in the commission of the act,","paragraph_id":"para_557"},{"text":"specifically directed the particular act to be done, or participated or","paragraph_id":"para_558"},{"text":"cooperated therein.” Grayson v. Cadillac Builders, Inc., (Sept. 14,","paragraph_id":"para_559"},{"text":"1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68551, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3954, citing","paragraph_id":"para_560"},{"text":"State ex rel. Fisher v. Am. Courts, Inc. (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 297, 644","paragraph_id":"para_561"},{"text":"N.E.2d 1112. The officer’s “liability flows not from his status as * * * an","paragraph_id":"para_562"},{"text":"officer * * *, but from his personal actions in violating CSPA.” Inserra","paragraph_id":"para_563"},{"text":"v. J.E.M. Bldg. Corp. (Nov. 22, 2000), Medina App. No. 2973-M, 2000","paragraph_id":"para_564"},{"text":"Ohio App. LEXIS 5447 at *17, citing Sovel v. Richardson (Nov. 15,","paragraph_id":"para_565"},{"text":"1995), Summit App. No. 17150, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5076. This court","paragraph_id":"para_566"},{"text":"noted that the CSPA “does not change the existing common law of tort,","paragraph_id":"para_567"},{"text":"nor does it change the common law rule with respect to piercing the","paragraph_id":"para_568"},{"text":"corporate veil. A corporate officer may not be held liable merely by","paragraph_id":"para_569"},{"text":"virtue of his status as a corporate officer. It does, however, create a tort","paragraph_id":"para_570"},{"text":"2 We further decline appellants’ invitation to “follow the advisory mandate of the","paragraph_id":"para_571"},{"text":"jury and conclude that any CSPA violation was not the proximate cause of any damages,","paragraph_id":"para_572"},{"text":"and that there was also no breach of contract by Weaver Construction.” (Appellants’ brief","paragraph_id":"para_573"},{"text":"at p. 16.) In “a bench trial with an advisory jury pursuant to Civ.R. 39(C)(1) . . . [t]he","paragraph_id":"para_574"},{"text":"advisory jury [is] not the factfinder[.]” Rayco Mfg. v. Murphy, Rogers, Sloss & Gambel,","paragraph_id":"para_575"},{"text":"2019-Ohio-3756, ¶ 74 (8th Dist.).","paragraph_id":"para_576"},{"text":"which imposes personal liability upon corporate officers for violations","paragraph_id":"para_577"},{"text":"of the act performed by them in their corporate capacities.” Grayson,","paragraph_id":"para_578"},{"text":"1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3954 at *9, fn. 1.","paragraph_id":"para_579"},{"text":"Burns v. Spitzer Mgt., 2010-Ohio-5369, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.). This court quoted this","paragraph_id":"para_580"},{"text":"excerpt from Burns in its entirety in Garber v. STS Concrete Co., L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-","paragraph_id":"para_581"},{"text":"2700, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), a key case cited by appellants.","paragraph_id":"para_582"},{"text":"Appellants misunderstand Garber, however, arguing that it held that","paragraph_id":"para_583"},{"text":"“a plaintiff must identify and show that an individual corporate officer personally","paragraph_id":"para_584"},{"text":"committed specific ‘knowingly [sic] and unconscionable’ acts in order to be","paragraph_id":"para_585"},{"text":"personally liable in [sic] the CSPA.” (Appellants’ brief at p. 17.) Garber referenced","paragraph_id":"para_586"},{"text":"that requirement in discussing violations of R.C. 1345.03, entitled “Unconscionable","paragraph_id":"para_587"},{"text":"consumer sales acts or practices,” and only to contrast it with the less stringent","paragraph_id":"para_588"},{"text":"standard under R.C. 1345.02, the statute at issue in this case, entitled “Unfair or","paragraph_id":"para_589"},{"text":"deceptive acts or practices.” In Garber, this court stated that “a requirement for","paragraph_id":"para_590"},{"text":"knowingly committing a violation of the CSPA in order to subject one to individual","paragraph_id":"para_591"},{"text":"liability is not found in R.C. 1345.02.” (Emphasis in original.) Garber at ¶ 30.","paragraph_id":"para_592"},{"text":"Garber relied in large part on Grayson v. Cadillac Builders, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS","paragraph_id":"para_593"},{"text":"3954 (8th Dist. Sept. 14, 1995). In that case, this court held that “proof of knowledge","paragraph_id":"para_594"},{"text":"is a requirement to prove an unconscionable act under R.C. 1345.03[,]” but “proof","paragraph_id":"para_595"},{"text":"of intent is not required to prove deception under R.C. 1345.02.” Id. at *10. In other","paragraph_id":"para_596"},{"text":"words, appellants’ reliance on Garber is wholly misplaced.","paragraph_id":"para_597"},{"text":"The trial court’s final judgment, based on “[t]he evidence at trial,”","paragraph_id":"para_598"},{"text":"included the factual finding that no one apart from Al Weaver acted on behalf of","paragraph_id":"para_599"},{"text":"Weaver Construction with respect to the transaction at issue and that Al Weaver was","paragraph_id":"para_600"},{"text":"therefore personally liable for the CSPA violation. Any argument to the contrary","paragraph_id":"para_601"},{"text":"depends on the trial evidence. Without the transcript, we must presume the record","paragraph_id":"para_602"},{"text":"supports the trial court’s finding.","paragraph_id":"para_603"},{"text":"Appellants’ third assignment of error is overruled.","paragraph_id":"para_604"},{"text":"E. Fourth Assignment of Error","paragraph_id":"para_605"},{"text":"In their fourth assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial","paragraph_id":"para_606"},{"text":"court’s award of attorney fees in connection with the CSPA violation was an abuse","paragraph_id":"para_607"},{"text":"of discretion and not supported by the required proof. We find no merit to this","paragraph_id":"para_608"},{"text":"assignment of error.","paragraph_id":"para_609"},{"text":"R.C. 1345.09(F)(2) of the CSPA provides, in pertinent part: “The court","paragraph_id":"para_610"},{"text":"may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee limited to the work","paragraph_id":"para_611"},{"text":"reasonably performed, if . . . [t]he supplier has knowingly committed an act or","paragraph_id":"para_612"},{"text":"practice that violates this chapter.” The Ohio Supreme Court has held that","paragraph_id":"para_613"},{"text":"“‘knowingly’ committing an act or practice in violation of R.C. Chapter 1345 means","paragraph_id":"para_614"},{"text":"that the supplier need only intentionally do the act that violates the Consumer Sales","paragraph_id":"para_615"},{"text":"Practices Act. The supplier does not have to know that his conduct violates the law","paragraph_id":"para_616"},{"text":"for the court to grant attorney fees.” Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Ohio St.3d 27,","paragraph_id":"para_617"},{"text":"30 (1990).","paragraph_id":"para_618"},{"text":"In Charvat v. Ryan, 2007-Ohio-6833, the Ohio Supreme Court","paragraph_id":"para_619"},{"text":"reaffirmed its holding in Einhorn “that to establish a knowing violation of R.C.","paragraph_id":"para_620"},{"text":"1345.09, for an award of attorney fees, a plaintiff need prove only that the defendant","paragraph_id":"para_621"},{"text":"acted in a manner that violated the CSPA and need not prove that the defendant","paragraph_id":"para_622"},{"text":"knew that the conduct violated the law.” Id. at ¶ 27. It further stated, however, that","paragraph_id":"para_623"},{"text":"“[t]he trial court has the discretion to determine whether attorney fees are","paragraph_id":"para_624"},{"text":"warranted under the facts of each case.” Id. Accordingly, “[a]n award of attorney","paragraph_id":"para_625"},{"text":"fees under R.C. 1345.09(F)(2) to a prevailing party is not mandatory, but within the","paragraph_id":"para_626"},{"text":"discretion of the trial court, subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion.”","paragraph_id":"para_627"},{"text":"Favors v. Burke, 2013-Ohio-823, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing Reagans v. Mountainhigh","paragraph_id":"para_628"},{"text":"Coachworks, Inc., 2008-Ohio-271, ¶ 34.","paragraph_id":"para_629"},{"text":"Appellants are correct that attorney fees are not mandated under the","paragraph_id":"para_630"},{"text":"CSPA. Charvat at ¶ 24; Reagans at ¶ 34; Favors at ¶ 24. They are incorrect,","paragraph_id":"para_631"},{"text":"however, in contending that the trial court made the legal mistake of concluding an","paragraph_id":"para_632"},{"text":"award was mandated. Appellants contend that the trial court’s decision “presumes","paragraph_id":"para_633"},{"text":"that . . . a fee award is automatic if there is a CSPA violation.” (Emphasis in original.)","paragraph_id":"para_634"},{"text":"(Appellants’ brief at p. 22.) This is simply incorrect. The trial court, citing Einhorn,","paragraph_id":"para_635"},{"text":"specifically noted that the CSPA “gives a court discretion to award attorney’s fees[.]”","paragraph_id":"para_636"},{"text":"(Emphasis added.)","paragraph_id":"para_637"},{"text":"This is why appellants’ citations to cases such as Griffin Contracting","paragraph_id":"para_638"},{"text":"& Restoration v. McIntyre, 2018-Ohio-3121 (12th Dist.), and Sterling Constr., Inc.","paragraph_id":"para_639"},{"text":"v. Alkire, 2017-Ohio-7213 (12th Dist.), are inapposite. In Griffin, the Twelfth","paragraph_id":"para_640"},{"text":"District merely held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to","paragraph_id":"para_641"},{"text":"award attorney fees. Griffin at ¶ 45. Similarly, in Sterling Constr., Inc., the Twelfth","paragraph_id":"para_642"},{"text":"District wrote that it “simply cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by","paragraph_id":"para_643"},{"text":"finding it would be ‘unequitable’ to award attorney fees.” Id. at ¶ 23. In fact, the","paragraph_id":"para_644"},{"text":"holdings in these cases highlight the core problem with appellants’ arguments in this","paragraph_id":"para_645"},{"text":"and their remaining assignments of error. In both Griffin and Sterling Constr., Inc.,","paragraph_id":"para_646"},{"text":"the Twelfth District found no abuse of discretion by the trial court after review of the","paragraph_id":"para_647"},{"text":"record. We do not wish to belabor the point unnecessarily, but here we have no","paragraph_id":"para_648"},{"text":"record of the testimony accepted and exhibits admitted at trial. In the present case,","paragraph_id":"para_649"},{"text":"the trial court noted that it was permitted to award fees and then offered a fact-based","paragraph_id":"para_650"},{"text":"explanation for why it was doing so. For all the reasons previously recounted, “[i]n","paragraph_id":"para_651"},{"text":"the absence of a complete and adequate record[]” we presume the regularity of","paragraph_id":"para_652"},{"text":"proceedings and that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s","paragraph_id":"para_653"},{"text":"decision. Thomas v. Laws, 2016-Ohio-8491, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).","paragraph_id":"para_654"},{"text":"The propriety of the trial court’s specific fee award — i.e., the amount","paragraph_id":"para_655"},{"text":"of attorney fees awarded — is a closer call. Appellants are correct that the trial","paragraph_id":"para_656"},{"text":"court’s final judgment entry is sparse in that regard. The trial court awarded","paragraph_id":"para_657"},{"text":"attorney fees in the amount of $21,692. Its only supporting reference for that sum","paragraph_id":"para_658"},{"text":"is a footnote identifying, without description, a single trial exhibit. The Ohio","paragraph_id":"para_659"},{"text":"Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen making a fee award pursuant to R.C.","paragraph_id":"para_660"},{"text":"1345.09(F)(2), the trial court must state the basis for the fee determination.” Bittner","paragraph_id":"para_661"},{"text":"v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 146 (1991). It further held that","paragraph_id":"para_662"},{"text":"“[a]bsent such a statement, it is not possible for an appellate court to conduct a","paragraph_id":"para_663"},{"text":"meaningful review.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_664"},{"text":"Bittner requires a trial court to first calculate the lodestar by","paragraph_id":"para_665"},{"text":"multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended on the case times an hourly","paragraph_id":"para_666"},{"text":"fee[.]” Id. at 145. The trial court may then modify that calculation by application of","paragraph_id":"para_667"},{"text":"certain factors. The Bittner Court wrote:","paragraph_id":"para_668"},{"text":"These factors are: the time and labor involved in maintaining the","paragraph_id":"para_669"},{"text":"litigation; the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; the","paragraph_id":"para_670"},{"text":"professional skill required to perform the necessary legal services; the","paragraph_id":"para_671"},{"text":"attorney’s inability to accept other cases; the fee customarily charged;","paragraph_id":"para_672"},{"text":"the amount involved and the results obtained; any necessary time","paragraph_id":"para_673"},{"text":"limitations; the nature and length of the attorney/client relationship;","paragraph_id":"para_674"},{"text":"the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; and whether the","paragraph_id":"para_675"},{"text":"fee is fixed or contingent. All factors may not be applicable in all cases","paragraph_id":"para_676"},{"text":"and the trial court has the discretion to determine which factors to","paragraph_id":"para_677"},{"text":"apply, and in what manner that application will affect the initial","paragraph_id":"para_678"},{"text":"calculation.","paragraph_id":"para_679"},{"text":"Id. at 145-146. In Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C.,","paragraph_id":"para_680"},{"text":"2020-Ohio-1056, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that the lodestar is","paragraph_id":"para_681"},{"text":"presumptively reasonable and that “[e]nhancements to the lodestar should be","paragraph_id":"para_682"},{"text":"granted rarely and are appropriate when an attorney produces objective and specific","paragraph_id":"para_683"},{"text":"evidence that an enhancement of the lodestar is necessary to account for a factor not","paragraph_id":"para_684"},{"text":"already subsumed in the lodestar calculation.” Id., at paragraph one of the syllabus.","paragraph_id":"para_685"},{"text":"Bittner, however, remains good law, particularly for the requirement that the trial","paragraph_id":"para_686"},{"text":"court state its basis for the fee determination. See Shury v. Cusato, 2022-Ohio-","paragraph_id":"para_687"},{"text":"4401, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.).","paragraph_id":"para_688"},{"text":"Appellants argue that the trial court’s attorney-fee award must be","paragraph_id":"para_689"},{"text":"reversed because the court awarded a bottom-line figure without providing a more","paragraph_id":"para_690"},{"text":"detailed lodestar analysis under Bittner. We acknowledge that a trial court should","paragraph_id":"para_691"},{"text":"state the basis for its determination of a fee award in sufficient detail to permit","paragraph_id":"para_692"},{"text":"meaningful appellate review. In the present case, however, meaningful review is not","paragraph_id":"para_693"},{"text":"prevented solely by the brevity of the trial court’s final judgment entry. It is","paragraph_id":"para_694"},{"text":"independently and primarily prevented by appellants’ failure to provide the record","paragraph_id":"para_695"},{"text":"necessary to review the award. The “meaningful review” requirement announced in","paragraph_id":"para_696"},{"text":"Bittner assumes an appellate court has the record necessary to review the trial","paragraph_id":"para_697"},{"text":"court’s stated basis for its fee award. In that case, for example, the Ohio Supreme","paragraph_id":"para_698"},{"text":"Court referenced exhibits and testimony, noted that the trial court “did not award","paragraph_id":"para_699"},{"text":"either of Bittner’s attorneys the fee amount requested[,]” and observed that “[t]hus,","paragraph_id":"para_700"},{"text":"in making its final determination, the trial court apparently took into consideration","paragraph_id":"para_701"},{"text":"other factors.” Bittner, 58 Ohio St.3d at 146. It then concluded that even though","paragraph_id":"para_702"},{"text":"there was presumably “sufficient evidence . . . to support the award[,]” without a","paragraph_id":"para_703"},{"text":"stated basis for the fee determination “it is not possible to determine what factors","paragraph_id":"para_704"},{"text":"the court considered or the weight, if any, it placed on those factors.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_705"},{"text":"The trial court here plainly relied on some evidence, including but not","paragraph_id":"para_706"},{"text":"necessarily limited to “Plaintiffs’ trial exhibit H,” in determining the amount of the","paragraph_id":"para_707"},{"text":"fee award. Appellants, however, did not file a transcript of the trial or any exhibits,","paragraph_id":"para_708"},{"text":"including the exhibit on which the trial court relied for its bottom-line fee number.","paragraph_id":"para_709"},{"text":"Without those materials, we cannot independently review the contents of the","paragraph_id":"para_710"},{"text":"exhibit, any testimony explaining it, any objections raised, possible stipulations, or","paragraph_id":"para_711"},{"text":"whether the evidence supported the trial court’s fee award. Moreover, this inability","paragraph_id":"para_712"},{"text":"to conduct a meaningful review would exist even if the trial court had devoted ten or","paragraph_id":"para_713"},{"text":"more pages of its judgment entry to a fee analysis. In other words, even if the trial","paragraph_id":"para_714"},{"text":"court had included a detailed lodestar calculation and explained any adjustments,","paragraph_id":"para_715"},{"text":"this court would still be unable to determine whether the hours claimed, the hourly","paragraph_id":"para_716"},{"text":"rates, testimony, objections, stipulations, or other evidence admitted at trial","paragraph_id":"para_717"},{"text":"supported the trial court’s calculation.","paragraph_id":"para_718"},{"text":"Under these circumstances, remanding for a more detailed","paragraph_id":"para_719"},{"text":"explanation of the fee calculation would not cure the central defect in this appeal. It","paragraph_id":"para_720"},{"text":"would merely require the trial court to explain evidence that appellants have already","paragraph_id":"para_721"},{"text":"failed to make part of the appellate record. We do not read Bittner as requiring","paragraph_id":"para_722"},{"text":"reversal where the inability to conduct a meaningful review is attributable to the","paragraph_id":"para_723"},{"text":"appellants’ own failure to provide the transcript and exhibits necessary to evaluate","paragraph_id":"para_724"},{"text":"the fee award. Instead, in the absence of a complete and adequate record, appellants","paragraph_id":"para_725"},{"text":"cannot demonstrate that the lack of specificity in the fee award, even if erroneous","paragraph_id":"para_726"},{"text":"under Bittner, was prejudicial. “[A]n appellant, in order to secure reversal of a","paragraph_id":"para_727"},{"text":"judgment against him, must not only show some error but must also show that that","paragraph_id":"para_728"},{"text":"error was prejudicial to him.” (Cleaned up.) In re A.Z., 2020-Ohio-2941, ¶ 56 (8th","paragraph_id":"para_729"},{"text":"Dist.); Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 2009-Ohio-3626, ¶ 26; Smith v. Flesher, 12","paragraph_id":"para_730"},{"text":"Ohio St.2d 107, 110 (1967); Low v. Ohio Historical Soc. Museum, 2012-Ohio-6164,","paragraph_id":"para_731"},{"text":"¶ 6 (10th Dist.); Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 2026-Ohio-23, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.); Logan","paragraph_id":"para_732"},{"text":"v. Stovall, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5491, *14 (8th Dist. Jan. 30, 1986); App.R. 12(D).","paragraph_id":"para_733"},{"text":"Appellants’ fourth assignment of error is overruled.","paragraph_id":"para_734"},{"text":"Judgment affirmed.","paragraph_id":"para_735"},{"text":"It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed.","paragraph_id":"para_736"},{"text":"The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.","paragraph_id":"para_737"},{"text":"It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment","paragraph_id":"para_738"},{"text":"into execution.","paragraph_id":"para_739"},{"text":"A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27","paragraph_id":"para_740"},{"text":"of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.","paragraph_id":"para_741"},{"text":"DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE","paragraph_id":"para_742"},{"text":"EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and","paragraph_id":"para_743"},{"text":"EMANUELLA D. 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