{"attribution":{"source":"legal.exploreworldai.com","canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca8-24-3312-2026-03-23","cite_as":"NovaCopilot, legal.exploreworldai.com (https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca8-24-3312-2026-03-23)","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/revision","version":"legal-2026-10-12","fingerprint":"ewai:us:2a3d67","proof":"sha256:edf88ce92cac31d9919a75d1e3a346aa027c1e5fab8ceac096a76c85eb7d08a5","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","publisher":"NovaCopilot by ExploreWorld Legal","terms":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/om"},"brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","item":{"schema_version":"1.0.0","id":"us:ca8-24-3312-2026-03-23","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","brand":{"product":"NovaCopilot","platform":"ExploreWorldAI","infrastructure":"ExploreWorld Legal","infrastructure_url":"legal.exploreworldai.com","legal_entity":"Valkiv Ventures AB","permanent_url":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/novacopilot","source":"Source: NovaCopilot","powered_by":"Powered by NovaCopilot","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/licensvillkor"},"sections":[{"title":"United States Court of Appeals","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"For the Eighth Circuit","paragraphs":["para_3"]},{"title":"No. 24-3312","paragraphs":["para_5"]},{"title":"Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated;","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Estate of Doris M. Fasching, the, by and through Personal Representative Sandra","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Plaintiffs - Appellants","paragraphs":["para_10"]},{"title":"MidCountry Bank; Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Defendants - Appellees","paragraphs":["para_13"]},{"title":"Appeal from United States District Court","paragraphs":["para_15","para_16"]},{"title":"Submitted: October 21, 2025","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Filed: March 23, 2026","paragraphs":["para_19","para_20","para_21","para_22"]},{"title":"Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter sued MidCountry Bank and its attorney Taft","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Stettinius & Hollister LLP, alleging, as relevant, that MidCountry violated the Truth","paragraphs":["para_25"]},{"title":"Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). The district court","paragraphs":["para_27","para_28","para_29","para_30","para_31"]},{"title":"According to the pleadings, Doris M. Fasching and Harold N. Fasching","paragraphs":["para_33"]},{"title":"Hutchinson, Minnesota. At the time of their deaths in 2021, the mortgage was","paragraphs":["para_35","para_36","para_37"]},{"title":"In November 2021, MidCountry sent Fiecke-Stifter a loan statement showing","paragraphs":["para_39","para_40","para_41","para_42","para_43"]},{"title":"2022. Fiecke-Stifter did not make any payment in January. The January statement","paragraphs":["para_45","para_46"]},{"title":"On February 1, MidCountry began a nonjudicial foreclosure—which Fiecke-","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Stifter received notice of on February 18—based on her failure to make timely","paragraphs":["para_49","para_50"]},{"title":"On February 22, Fiecke-Stifter paid $1,067.84—equaling two monthly","paragraphs":["para_52"]},{"title":"MidCountry sent a February statement showing a payment due of $1,079.41 on","paragraphs":["para_54","para_55"]},{"title":"On March 24, MidCountry refunded $2,708.46—equal to the last two","paragraphs":["para_57","para_58","para_59"]},{"title":"On or around March 31, 2022, Fiecke-Stifter allegedly requested a “payoff”","paragraphs":["para_61","para_62","para_63","para_64"]},{"title":"2022, for $76,000.00. On June 9, Fiecke-Stifter redeemed the property for","paragraphs":["para_66"]},{"title":"($58,722.49) and the redemption amount ($77,159.29) includes late charges. She","paragraphs":["para_68","para_69"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter sued, alleging, as relevant, that MidCountry violated TILA by","paragraphs":["para_71","para_72","para_73","para_74","para_75","para_76","para_77","para_78","para_79","para_80","para_81","para_82","para_83","para_84","para_85"]},{"title":"Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A","paragraphs":["para_87","para_88","para_89","para_90","para_91","para_92","para_93","para_94"]},{"title":"TILA section 1639f(a) provides: “In connection with a consumer credit","paragraphs":["para_96","para_97"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter claims that MidCountry violated section 1639f(a) by initially crediting","paragraphs":["para_99","para_100"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter’s argument fails. The plain language of section 1639f(a) does","paragraphs":["para_102","para_103"]},{"title":"Mortgage Co., 780 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The opportunity (and perhaps","paragraphs":["para_105","para_106","para_107","para_108"]},{"title":"1The district court concluded that Fiecke-Stifter failed to allege that the","paragraphs":["para_110","para_111","para_112","para_113"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter focuses on the phrase “as of,” citing United States v. Munro-","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Van Helms Co., 243 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1957), for the definition: “‘As of’ means","paragraphs":["para_116","para_117","para_118","para_119","para_120","para_121","para_122","para_123","para_124","para_125","para_126"]},{"title":"Contrary to Fiecke-Stifter’s assertion about the next subsection of TILA, the","paragraphs":["para_128","para_129","para_130","para_131","para_132","para_133"]},{"title":"(1949) (stating the “ordinary meaning” of “credit”). See also Credit, Black’s Law","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Credit” means: “To enter (as an amount) on the credit","paragraphs":["para_136","para_137"]},{"title":"2026) (“Credit” means: “[A]n entry on the right-hand side of an account constituting","paragraphs":["para_139"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter adds restrictions to the statute that do not exist. See United","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"States v. Wounded Knee, 596 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1979) (“Congress expresses","paragraphs":["para_142","para_143","para_144","para_145"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter failed to plead a viable TILA claim. The district court properly","paragraphs":["para_147","para_148","para_149"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter’s attorney allegedly requested the amount necessary to pay off the","paragraphs":["para_151"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter alleges she sent a letter to Taft stating that she had the financial","paragraphs":["para_153","para_154","para_155"]},{"title":"Fiecke-Stifter, these allegations show that MidCountry lacked a present right to","paragraphs":["para_157"]},{"title":"FDCPA section 1692f(6)(A) prohibits a security-interest enforcer from taking","paragraphs":["para_159","para_160","para_161"]},{"title":"(2019) (recognizing that a law firm enforcing a mortgage in nonjudicial foreclosure","paragraphs":["para_163","para_164"]},{"title":"Because the FDCPA does not define a present right to possession, this court","paragraphs":["para_166","para_167","para_168"]},{"title":"968 (7th Cir. 2020) (stating that repossession rights are governed by the relevant","paragraphs":["para_170"]},{"title":"The statute governing the reinstatement of a mortgage after foreclosure","paragraphs":["para_172","para_173","para_174"]},{"title":"The last four sentences of section 580.30, subdivision 1 provide:","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"The holder of a mortgage shall inform the mortgagor of the amount","paragraphs":["para_177","para_178","para_179","para_180","para_181","para_182","para_183","para_184","para_185","para_186","para_187","para_188","para_189","para_190"]},{"title":"Minn. Stat. § 580.30, subd. 1. The Minnesota legislature enacted these four","paragraphs":["para_192","para_193","para_194","para_195","para_196"]},{"title":"For a century, the opening sentence of section 580.30, subdivision 1, has given","paragraphs":["para_198","para_199"]},{"title":"(Minn. 1972) (reinstatement requires payment of “only what was delinquent, plus","paragraphs":["para_201","para_202","para_203"]},{"title":"A reinstatement removes the default, ends the foreclosure proceedings, and","paragraphs":["para_205","para_206","para_207"]},{"title":"This outcome reflects the statute’s purpose: “to afford the vendee an","paragraphs":["para_209","para_210","para_211","para_212"]},{"title":"Minneapolis, 398 N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (summarizing the","paragraphs":["para_214"]},{"title":"Taft emphasizes another statute, section 580.02, that lists the “requisites” for","paragraphs":["para_216","para_217","para_218","para_219"]},{"title":"N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. 2013) (requiring section 580.02’s “conditions be met” in","paragraphs":["para_221"]},{"title":"N.W. 625, 626 (Minn. 1925) (holding that section 580.02’s conditions must exist","paragraphs":["para_223"]},{"title":"Citing Clarin, Fiecke-Stifter argues that Taft’s alleged failure to provide the","paragraphs":["para_225","para_226"]},{"title":"198 F.3d at 664. Because the notice was allegedly never given, Fiecke-Stifter","paragraphs":["para_228","para_229","para_230","para_231","para_232","para_233","para_234","para_235"]},{"title":"Supp. 3d 679, 688 (D. Minn. 2023), with Akerlund v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 99-","paragraphs":["para_237"]},{"title":"The district court predicted that the Minnesota Supreme Court would hold that","paragraphs":["para_239","para_240","para_241"]},{"title":"Plath, 1989 WL 17598, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1989) (unpublished, not","paragraphs":["para_243","para_244","para_245"]},{"title":"See Pole v. Trudeau, 516 N.W.2d 217, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (Minnesota","paragraphs":["para_247","para_248","para_249","para_250","para_251"]},{"title":"The district court was properly concerned whether almost any violation of the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Minnesota foreclosure statutes might violate section 1692f(6)(A). See generally","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(“We require a foreclosing party to ‘show exact compliance’ with the terms of the","paragraphs":["para_256","para_257","para_258"]},{"title":"1018 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that the FDCPA generally “was not meant to convert","paragraphs":["para_260"]},{"title":"The district court, however, stopped with its concern about converting a state","paragraphs":["para_262","para_263"]},{"title":"The district court did not address whether Minnesota’s reinstatement statute, which","paragraphs":["para_265","para_266","para_267","para_268","para_269","para_270","para_271","para_272"]},{"title":"For these reasons, we affirm the judgment in part, vacate the judgment","paragraphs":["para_274","para_275","para_276"]}],"paragraphs":[{"text":"United States Court of Appeals","paragraph_id":"para_1"},{"text":"For the Eighth Circuit","paragraph_id":"para_2"},{"text":"___________________________","paragraph_id":"para_3"},{"text":"No. 24-3312","paragraph_id":"para_4"},{"text":"___________________________","paragraph_id":"para_5"},{"text":"Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated;","paragraph_id":"para_6"},{"text":"Estate of Doris M. Fasching, the, by and through Personal Representative Sandra","paragraph_id":"para_7"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated","paragraph_id":"para_8"},{"text":"Plaintiffs - Appellants","paragraph_id":"para_9"},{"text":"v.","paragraph_id":"para_10"},{"text":"MidCountry Bank; Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP","paragraph_id":"para_11"},{"text":"Defendants - Appellees","paragraph_id":"para_12"},{"text":"____________","paragraph_id":"para_13"},{"text":"Appeal from United States District Court","paragraph_id":"para_14"},{"text":"for the District of Minnesota","paragraph_id":"para_15"},{"text":"____________","paragraph_id":"para_16"},{"text":"Submitted: October 21, 2025","paragraph_id":"para_17"},{"text":"Filed: March 23, 2026","paragraph_id":"para_18"},{"text":"____________","paragraph_id":"para_19"},{"text":"Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.","paragraph_id":"para_20"},{"text":"____________","paragraph_id":"para_21"},{"text":"BENTON, Circuit Judge.","paragraph_id":"para_22"},{"text":"Sandra K. Fiecke-Stifter sued MidCountry Bank and its attorney Taft","paragraph_id":"para_23"},{"text":"Stettinius & Hollister LLP, alleging, as relevant, that MidCountry violated the Truth","paragraph_id":"para_24"},{"text":"in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1639f(a), and Taft violated the Fair Debt","paragraph_id":"para_25"},{"text":"Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6)(A). The district court","paragraph_id":"para_26"},{"text":"dismissed both claims. See Fiecke-Stifter v. Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, 753","paragraph_id":"para_27"},{"text":"-2-","paragraph_id":"para_28"},{"text":"F. Supp. 3d 756, 764 (D. Minn. 2024). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,","paragraph_id":"para_29"},{"text":"this court affirms in part, and reverses and remands in part.","paragraph_id":"para_30"},{"text":"I.","paragraph_id":"para_31"},{"text":"According to the pleadings, Doris M. Fasching and Harold N. Fasching","paragraph_id":"para_32"},{"text":"executed a mortgage with MidCountry Bank in December 1998 for their home in","paragraph_id":"para_33"},{"text":"Hutchinson, Minnesota. At the time of their deaths in 2021, the mortgage was","paragraph_id":"para_34"},{"text":"current. Their interest transferred to their heirs, including Fiecke-Stifter, who did","paragraph_id":"para_35"},{"text":"not make any payment in September or November 2021 and made only a partial","paragraph_id":"para_36"},{"text":"payment—less than the required minimum—in October 2021.","paragraph_id":"para_37"},{"text":"In November 2021, MidCountry sent Fiecke-Stifter a loan statement showing","paragraph_id":"para_38"},{"text":"a payment due for $1,640.62 on December 26—which included all past-due","paragraph_id":"para_39"},{"text":"amounts. She paid $562.35 on December 6 and $1,640.62 on December 29. Later,","paragraph_id":"para_40"},{"text":"on December 29, she called MidCountry; they confirmed that her payments were","paragraph_id":"para_41"},{"text":"current.","paragraph_id":"para_42"},{"text":"The December statement showed a payment due of $533.92 on January 26,","paragraph_id":"para_43"},{"text":"2022. Fiecke-Stifter did not make any payment in January. The January statement","paragraph_id":"para_44"},{"text":"showed a payment due of $1,619.59 on February 26—which included all past-due","paragraph_id":"para_45"},{"text":"amounts.","paragraph_id":"para_46"},{"text":"On February 1, MidCountry began a nonjudicial foreclosure—which Fiecke-","paragraph_id":"para_47"},{"text":"Stifter received notice of on February 18—based on her failure to make timely","paragraph_id":"para_48"},{"text":"monthly payments. For the foreclosure, MidCountry retained Taft Stettinius &","paragraph_id":"para_49"},{"text":"Hollister LLP.","paragraph_id":"para_50"},{"text":"On February 22, Fiecke-Stifter paid $1,067.84—equaling two monthly","paragraph_id":"para_51"},{"text":"payments but not including any late fees. Although the foreclosure had begun,","paragraph_id":"para_52"},{"text":"MidCountry sent a February statement showing a payment due of $1,079.41 on","paragraph_id":"para_53"},{"text":"March 26.","paragraph_id":"para_54"},{"text":"-3-","paragraph_id":"para_55"},{"text":"On March 24, MidCountry refunded $2,708.46—equal to the last two","paragraph_id":"para_56"},{"text":"payments made on December 29 and February 22. Later, on March 24, MidCountry","paragraph_id":"para_57"},{"text":"sent a past-due notice for $2,778.45 (including late fees) stating it could be","paragraph_id":"para_58"},{"text":"disregarded if the payment had been made.","paragraph_id":"para_59"},{"text":"On or around March 31, 2022, Fiecke-Stifter allegedly requested a “payoff”","paragraph_id":"para_60"},{"text":"amount for the loan, saying she had the financial resources to pay it. A Taft attorney","paragraph_id":"para_61"},{"text":"acknowledged the request, indicated it was valid, and agreed to provide the amount.","paragraph_id":"para_62"},{"text":"The payoff amount was never sent. The loan balance then was $58,722.49.","paragraph_id":"para_63"},{"text":"A week after the request, the property sold at a sheriff’s auction on April 7,","paragraph_id":"para_64"},{"text":"2022, for $76,000.00. On June 9, Fiecke-Stifter redeemed the property for","paragraph_id":"para_65"},{"text":"$77,159.29. She alleges that the difference between the last statement’s loan balance","paragraph_id":"para_66"},{"text":"($58,722.49) and the redemption amount ($77,159.29) includes late charges. She","paragraph_id":"para_67"},{"text":"also claims that the redemption amount was about $75,000.00 more than the payoff","paragraph_id":"para_68"},{"text":"amount she requested on or around March 31 (and never received).","paragraph_id":"para_69"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter sued, alleging, as relevant, that MidCountry violated TILA by","paragraph_id":"para_70"},{"text":"crediting and later refunding her December and February payments, causing late","paragraph_id":"para_71"},{"text":"fees. She alleged that Taft violated the FDCPA by foreclosing when MidCountry","paragraph_id":"para_72"},{"text":"lacked a present right to possession. The district court dismissed the TILA claim on","paragraph_id":"para_73"},{"text":"the pleadings. After allowing an amendment to the FDCPA claim, the district court","paragraph_id":"para_74"},{"text":"dismissed it. Fiecke-Stifter appeals.","paragraph_id":"para_75"},{"text":"“When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept","paragraph_id":"para_76"},{"text":"as true all factual allegations set out in the complaint, and must construe the","paragraph_id":"para_77"},{"text":"complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all inferences in his","paragraph_id":"para_78"},{"text":"favor.” Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2006). “Judgment on","paragraph_id":"para_79"},{"text":"the pleadings is appropriate only when there is no dispute as to any material facts","paragraph_id":"para_80"},{"text":"and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This court","paragraph_id":"para_81"},{"text":"reviews the district court’s decision de novo. Id.","paragraph_id":"para_82"},{"text":"-4-","paragraph_id":"para_83"},{"text":"“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual","paragraph_id":"para_84"},{"text":"matter, accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”","paragraph_id":"para_85"},{"text":"Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A","paragraph_id":"para_86"},{"text":"claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the","paragraph_id":"para_87"},{"text":"court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct","paragraph_id":"para_88"},{"text":"alleged.” Id. “In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept the allegations","paragraph_id":"para_89"},{"text":"contained in the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the","paragraph_id":"para_90"},{"text":"nonmoving party.” Martin v. Iowa, 752 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2014). “This court","paragraph_id":"para_91"},{"text":"reviews de novo a 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, 102 F.4th 894,","paragraph_id":"para_92"},{"text":"898 (8th Cir. 2024).","paragraph_id":"para_93"},{"text":"II.","paragraph_id":"para_94"},{"text":"TILA section 1639f(a) provides: “In connection with a consumer credit","paragraph_id":"para_95"},{"text":"transaction secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling, no servicer shall fail to","paragraph_id":"para_96"},{"text":"credit a payment to the consumer’s loan account as of the date of receipt . . . .”","paragraph_id":"para_97"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter claims that MidCountry violated section 1639f(a) by initially crediting","paragraph_id":"para_98"},{"text":"her payments, refunding them, and then assessing late fees.1 She believes that a","paragraph_id":"para_99"},{"text":"servicer cannot credit a payment and then return it.","paragraph_id":"para_100"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter’s argument fails. The plain language of section 1639f(a) does","paragraph_id":"para_101"},{"text":"not prohibit a servicer from returning payments; rather, it prohibits the delayed","paragraph_id":"para_102"},{"text":"crediting of payments (which would generate late fees then). See Fridman v. NYCP","paragraph_id":"para_103"},{"text":"Mortgage Co., 780 F.3d 773, 780 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The opportunity (and perhaps","paragraph_id":"para_104"},{"text":"even incentive) to delay the crediting of accounts explains TILA’s ‘date of receipt’","paragraph_id":"para_105"},{"text":"requirement. Reading TILA to require mortgage servicers to credit electronic","paragraph_id":"para_106"},{"text":"authorizations when they are received protects consumers from this unwarranted—","paragraph_id":"para_107"},{"text":"and possibly limit-less—delay.”).","paragraph_id":"para_108"},{"text":"1The district court concluded that Fiecke-Stifter failed to allege that the","paragraph_id":"para_109"},{"text":"reversal of the crediting caused her to incur late fees. This court need not address","paragraph_id":"para_110"},{"text":"whether the complaint adequately alleged causation. See generally Martin, 752 F.3d","paragraph_id":"para_111"},{"text":"at 727.","paragraph_id":"para_112"},{"text":"-5-","paragraph_id":"para_113"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter focuses on the phrase “as of,” citing United States v. Munro-","paragraph_id":"para_114"},{"text":"Van Helms Co., 243 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1957), for the definition: “‘As of’ means","paragraph_id":"para_115"},{"text":"‘as if it were.’” This definition is incomplete because “as of” in section 1639f(a)","paragraph_id":"para_116"},{"text":"refers to the earliest possible date to credit a payment, not when the servicer","paragraph_id":"para_117"},{"text":"processes it. See Fridman, 780 F.3d at 779. As the district court said:","paragraph_id":"para_118"},{"text":"[Fiecke-Stifter] does not allege that MidCountry failed to credit the","paragraph_id":"para_119"},{"text":"account for those payments as of the date of receipt. . . . It is difficult","paragraph_id":"para_120"},{"text":"to understand how the allegation that a creditor or servicer improperly","paragraph_id":"para_121"},{"text":"returned a payment that originally was credited in compliance with","paragraph_id":"para_122"},{"text":"§ 1639f(a) shows a violation of § 1639f(a). . . . [Fiecke-Stifter’s]","paragraph_id":"para_123"},{"text":"alleged harms all resulted from what she alleges was a wrongful","paragraph_id":"para_124"},{"text":"foreclosure. . . . Sandra cites no factually similar case or other authority","paragraph_id":"para_125"},{"text":"to support this claim.","paragraph_id":"para_126"},{"text":"Contrary to Fiecke-Stifter’s assertion about the next subsection of TILA, the","paragraph_id":"para_127"},{"text":"plain language does not define the verb “credit.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1639f(b) (“If a","paragraph_id":"para_128"},{"text":"servicer specifies in writing requirements for the consumer to follow in making","paragraph_id":"para_129"},{"text":"payments, but accepts a payment that does not conform to the requirements, the","paragraph_id":"para_130"},{"text":"servicer shall credit the payment as of 5 days after receipt.”). This court thus","paragraph_id":"para_131"},{"text":"interprets TILA by its ordinary meaning. “Credit” is: “the obligation due on","paragraph_id":"para_132"},{"text":"accounting between parties to transactions.” Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 480","paragraph_id":"para_133"},{"text":"(1949) (stating the “ordinary meaning” of “credit”). See also Credit, Black’s Law","paragraph_id":"para_134"},{"text":"Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“Credit” means: “To enter (as an amount) on the credit","paragraph_id":"para_135"},{"text":"side of an account.”); Credit, Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary,","paragraph_id":"para_136"},{"text":"https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/unabridged/credit (last visited Jan. 21,","paragraph_id":"para_137"},{"text":"2026) (“Credit” means: “[A]n entry on the right-hand side of an account constituting","paragraph_id":"para_138"},{"text":"an addition to a revenue, net worth, or liability account.”).","paragraph_id":"para_139"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter adds restrictions to the statute that do not exist. See United","paragraph_id":"para_140"},{"text":"States v. Wounded Knee, 596 F.2d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1979) (“Congress expresses","paragraph_id":"para_141"},{"text":"its purpose by words. It is for [courts] to ascertain neither to add nor to subtract,","paragraph_id":"para_142"},{"text":"neither to delete nor to distort.”), quoting 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing","paragraph_id":"para_143"},{"text":"Six Jars of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951).","paragraph_id":"para_144"},{"text":"-6-","paragraph_id":"para_145"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter failed to plead a viable TILA claim. The district court properly","paragraph_id":"para_146"},{"text":"granted judgment on the pleadings.","paragraph_id":"para_147"},{"text":"III.","paragraph_id":"para_148"},{"text":"After the foreclosure proceedings had begun, but before the property was sold,","paragraph_id":"para_149"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter’s attorney allegedly requested the amount necessary to pay off the","paragraph_id":"para_150"},{"text":"mortgage. Taft promised to provide the payoff amount, but it was never provided.","paragraph_id":"para_151"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter alleges she sent a letter to Taft stating that she had the financial","paragraph_id":"para_152"},{"text":"resources to pay off the loan—a plausible assertion due to the recent return of her","paragraph_id":"para_153"},{"text":"payments and her post-sale redemption of the property. Taft allegedly never","paragraph_id":"para_154"},{"text":"responded to the requests but proceeded with the sale one week later. According to","paragraph_id":"para_155"},{"text":"Fiecke-Stifter, these allegations show that MidCountry lacked a present right to","paragraph_id":"para_156"},{"text":"possession until Taft replied to her requests, and thus violated the FDCPA.","paragraph_id":"para_157"},{"text":"FDCPA section 1692f(6)(A) prohibits a security-interest enforcer from taking","paragraph_id":"para_158"},{"text":"“any nonjudicial action” to dispossess property without a “present right to","paragraph_id":"para_159"},{"text":"possession” of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security","paragraph_id":"para_160"},{"text":"interest. See Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 586 U.S. 466, 473–76, 478","paragraph_id":"para_161"},{"text":"(2019) (recognizing that a law firm enforcing a mortgage in nonjudicial foreclosure","paragraph_id":"para_162"},{"text":"proceedings—a “security-interest enforcer”—is subject to the specific prohibitions","paragraph_id":"para_163"},{"text":"in § 1692f(6), without precisely deciding what conduct violates § 1692f(6)).","paragraph_id":"para_164"},{"text":"Because the FDCPA does not define a present right to possession, this court","paragraph_id":"para_165"},{"text":"looks to state law to determine whether the security-interest enforcer had that right","paragraph_id":"para_166"},{"text":"at the time of taking any action to foreclose. See Clarin v. Minn. Repossessors,","paragraph_id":"para_167"},{"text":"Inc., 198 F.3d 661, 664–65 (8th Cir. 1999); Richards v. PAR, Inc., 954 F.3d 965,","paragraph_id":"para_168"},{"text":"968 (7th Cir. 2020) (stating that repossession rights are governed by the relevant","paragraph_id":"para_169"},{"text":"state’s property and contract law).","paragraph_id":"para_170"},{"text":"The statute governing the reinstatement of a mortgage after foreclosure","paragraph_id":"para_171"},{"text":"proceedings have begun, but before the sale of the property, is Minnesota statute","paragraph_id":"para_172"},{"text":"-7-","paragraph_id":"para_173"},{"text":"section 580.30. See First Tr. Co. v. Leibman, 445 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 1989).","paragraph_id":"para_174"},{"text":"The last four sentences of section 580.30, subdivision 1 provide:","paragraph_id":"para_175"},{"text":"The holder of a mortgage shall inform the mortgagor of the amount","paragraph_id":"para_176"},{"text":"necessary to reinstate the mortgage within three days of receipt of a","paragraph_id":"para_177"},{"text":"request for a reinstatement amount from the mortgagor. If the amount","paragraph_id":"para_178"},{"text":"necessary to reinstate the mortgage was not mailed to the mortgagor","paragraph_id":"para_179"},{"text":"within three days of receipt of the request, no liability accrues to the","paragraph_id":"para_180"},{"text":"party foreclosing the mortgage or the party’s attorney and the","paragraph_id":"para_181"},{"text":"foreclosure is not invalidated if the mortgage reinstatement amount was","paragraph_id":"para_182"},{"text":"mailed by first class mail to the mortgagor at least three days prior to","paragraph_id":"para_183"},{"text":"the date of the completed sheriff’s sale. Notwithstanding any law to the","paragraph_id":"para_184"},{"text":"contrary, the holder of a mortgage has no obligation to delay or","paragraph_id":"para_185"},{"text":"postpone a foreclosure sale upon receipt of a request for a reinstatement","paragraph_id":"para_186"},{"text":"amount when that request was made less than three days prior to the","paragraph_id":"para_187"},{"text":"sale. The reinstatement amount provided is effective for a period of","paragraph_id":"para_188"},{"text":"seven days after the holder of the mortgage provides it to the mortgagor","paragraph_id":"para_189"},{"text":"or until the foreclosure sale, whichever occurs first.","paragraph_id":"para_190"},{"text":"Minn. Stat. § 580.30, subd. 1. The Minnesota legislature enacted these four","paragraph_id":"para_191"},{"text":"sentences in 2015 as the dominant centerpiece of an act to clarify the law of","paragraph_id":"para_192"},{"text":"foreclosure sales. Act of Sept. 29, 2015, 2015 Minn. Laws ch. 13 (S.F. 1444). By","paragraph_id":"para_193"},{"text":"the 2015 amendment, as relevant here, the mortgage-holder must, if requested, tell","paragraph_id":"para_194"},{"text":"the mortgagor the reinstatement amount at least three days before the sale. § 580.30,","paragraph_id":"para_195"},{"text":"subd. 1.","paragraph_id":"para_196"},{"text":"For a century, the opening sentence of section 580.30, subdivision 1, has given","paragraph_id":"para_197"},{"text":"the mortgagor the right—“at any time before the sale”—to pay the delinquent","paragraph_id":"para_198"},{"text":"amount (plus other statutory costs). Id.; see Davis v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 473, 475","paragraph_id":"para_199"},{"text":"(Minn. 1972) (reinstatement requires payment of “only what was delinquent, plus","paragraph_id":"para_200"},{"text":"the costs set out in the statute, without requiring the accelerated principal to be","paragraph_id":"para_201"},{"text":"tendered”). If that amount is paid, “the mortgage shall be fully reinstated and further","paragraph_id":"para_202"},{"text":"proceedings in such foreclosure shall be thereupon abandoned.” § 580.30, subd. 1.","paragraph_id":"para_203"},{"text":"A reinstatement removes the default, ends the foreclosure proceedings, and","paragraph_id":"para_204"},{"text":"-8-","paragraph_id":"para_205"},{"text":"“restore[s] both mortgagor and mortgagee to the status quo ante.” Davis, 196","paragraph_id":"para_206"},{"text":"N.W.2d at 475.","paragraph_id":"para_207"},{"text":"This outcome reflects the statute’s purpose: “to afford the vendee an","paragraph_id":"para_208"},{"text":"opportunity to save and reinstate his equitable rights by removing the default.” Id.,","paragraph_id":"para_209"},{"text":"quoting Needles v. Keys, 184 N.W. 33 (Minn. 1921). “[T]he mortgagor’s right to","paragraph_id":"para_210"},{"text":"reinstate is absolute . . . and the statute is intended to protect mortgagors and be","paragraph_id":"para_211"},{"text":"construed in their favor.” Oleisky v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of","paragraph_id":"para_212"},{"text":"Minneapolis, 398 N.W.2d 627, 634–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (summarizing the","paragraph_id":"para_213"},{"text":"Davis opinion).","paragraph_id":"para_214"},{"text":"Taft emphasizes another statute, section 580.02, that lists the “requisites” for","paragraph_id":"para_215"},{"text":"foreclosure that “entitle” MidCountry to make a foreclosure. See Minn. Stat. §","paragraph_id":"para_216"},{"text":"580.02. Taft argues that despite any failure to comply with the reinstatement statute,","paragraph_id":"para_217"},{"text":"compliance with section 580.02 establishes a present right to possession throughout","paragraph_id":"para_218"},{"text":"the foreclosure proceeding. See Ruiz v. 1st Fiduciary Loan Servicing, LLC, 829","paragraph_id":"para_219"},{"text":"N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. 2013) (requiring section 580.02’s “conditions be met” in","paragraph_id":"para_220"},{"text":"order to foreclose, or the “right to proceed” “is suspended”); Adlinger v. Close, 201","paragraph_id":"para_221"},{"text":"N.W. 625, 626 (Minn. 1925) (holding that section 580.02’s conditions must exist","paragraph_id":"para_222"},{"text":"when “the first step is taken in the foreclosure” or the sale “is suspended”).","paragraph_id":"para_223"},{"text":"Citing Clarin, Fiecke-Stifter argues that Taft’s alleged failure to provide the","paragraph_id":"para_224"},{"text":"reinstatement amount suspended MidCountry’s right to possession until at least three","paragraph_id":"para_225"},{"text":"days after Taft or MidCountry gave notice of the reinstatement amount. See Clarin,","paragraph_id":"para_226"},{"text":"198 F.3d at 664. Because the notice was allegedly never given, Fiecke-Stifter","paragraph_id":"para_227"},{"text":"concludes that Taft’s continuing actions to foreclose, without a present right to","paragraph_id":"para_228"},{"text":"possession, violate section 1692f(6)(A). Clarin held that there was no violation of","paragraph_id":"para_229"},{"text":"the FDCPA because the car repossession company in that case committed no breach","paragraph_id":"para_230"},{"text":"of the peace and maintained a present right to possession. See id. at 665. This court","paragraph_id":"para_231"},{"text":"has not addressed in Clarin or elsewhere whether a repossession company’s breach","paragraph_id":"para_232"},{"text":"of the peace (or violation of a foreclosure statute) would suspend a present right to","paragraph_id":"para_233"},{"text":"possession under Minnesota law. Compare Hansen v. Santander Bank, 689 F.","paragraph_id":"para_234"},{"text":"-9-","paragraph_id":"para_235"},{"text":"Supp. 3d 679, 688 (D. Minn. 2023), with Akerlund v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 99-","paragraph_id":"para_236"},{"text":"1537, 2001 WL 1631440, at *6 (D. Minn. June 11, 2001).","paragraph_id":"para_237"},{"text":"The district court predicted that the Minnesota Supreme Court would hold that","paragraph_id":"para_238"},{"text":"the alleged violation of section 580.30, subdivision 1, would void the foreclosure,","paragraph_id":"para_239"},{"text":"but the district court ruled that a void foreclosure does not equate to the absence of","paragraph_id":"para_240"},{"text":"a present right to possession. See Fiecke-Stifter, 753 F. Supp. 3d at 764; Radel v.","paragraph_id":"para_241"},{"text":"Plath, 1989 WL 17598, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 1989) (unpublished, not","paragraph_id":"para_242"},{"text":"precedential) (setting aside the foreclosure where servicer demanded an excessive","paragraph_id":"para_243"},{"text":"payoff amount under section 580.30). Taft adds that Fiecke-Stifter never brought a","paragraph_id":"para_244"},{"text":"state action to void the foreclosure based on an alleged violation of section 580.30.","paragraph_id":"para_245"},{"text":"See Pole v. Trudeau, 516 N.W.2d 217, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (Minnesota","paragraph_id":"para_246"},{"text":"“foreclosures are set aside in judicial proceedings”). That is true, although we must","paragraph_id":"para_247"},{"text":"consider that Fiecke Stifter is not bringing a wrongful-foreclosure claim, but a claim","paragraph_id":"para_248"},{"text":"under the FDCPA where the word “present” in section 1692f(6)(A) measures the","paragraph_id":"para_249"},{"text":"right to possession at the specific time a security-interest enforcer takes “any” action","paragraph_id":"para_250"},{"text":"to foreclose.","paragraph_id":"para_251"},{"text":"The district court was properly concerned whether almost any violation of the","paragraph_id":"para_252"},{"text":"Minnesota foreclosure statutes might violate section 1692f(6)(A). See generally","paragraph_id":"para_253"},{"text":"Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009)","paragraph_id":"para_254"},{"text":"(“We require a foreclosing party to ‘show exact compliance’ with the terms of the","paragraph_id":"para_255"},{"text":"statutes . . . . If the foreclosing party fails to strictly comply with the statutory","paragraph_id":"para_256"},{"text":"requirements, the foreclosure proceeding is void.”), quoting Moore v. Carlson, 128","paragraph_id":"para_257"},{"text":"N.W. 578, 579 (Minn. 1910); Carlson v. First Revenue Assurance, 359 F.3d 1015,","paragraph_id":"para_258"},{"text":"1018 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that the FDCPA generally “was not meant to convert","paragraph_id":"para_259"},{"text":"every violation of a state debt collection law into a federal violation”).","paragraph_id":"para_260"},{"text":"The district court, however, stopped with its concern about converting a state","paragraph_id":"para_261"},{"text":"violation into a federal violation. The issue here is whether the alleged violation of","paragraph_id":"para_262"},{"text":"the reinstatement statute is also a violation of section 1692f(6)(A) of the FDCPA.","paragraph_id":"para_263"},{"text":"The district court did not address whether Minnesota’s reinstatement statute, which","paragraph_id":"para_264"},{"text":"-10-","paragraph_id":"para_265"},{"text":"requires timely notice about the mortgagor’s absolute right to vacate the first","paragraph_id":"para_266"},{"text":"requisite for a nonjudicial foreclosure—“default in a condition of such mortgage,”","paragraph_id":"para_267"},{"text":"§ 580.02(1)—is distinguishable from other violations of the Minnesota foreclosure","paragraph_id":"para_268"},{"text":"statute for purposes of a “present right to possession” and the FDCPA. 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