{"attribution":{"source":"legal.exploreworldai.com","canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca6-25-5396-2026-07-13","cite_as":"NovaCopilot, legal.exploreworldai.com (https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca6-25-5396-2026-07-13)","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/revision","version":"legal-2026-10-14","fingerprint":"ewai:us:88b5b2","proof":"sha256:ba37c831c0b40a6829673720216efab2b31e188457f710fb8d401a9b2056f251","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","publisher":"NovaCopilot by ExploreWorld Legal","terms":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/om"},"brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","item":{"schema_version":"1.0.0","id":"us:ca6-25-5396-2026-07-13","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","brand":{"product":"NovaCopilot","platform":"ExploreWorldAI","infrastructure":"ExploreWorld Legal","infrastructure_url":"legal.exploreworldai.com","legal_entity":"Valkiv Ventures AB","permanent_url":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/novacopilot","source":"Source: NovaCopilot","powered_by":"Powered by NovaCopilot","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/licensvillkor"},"sections":[{"title":"RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"File Name: 26a0195p.06","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT","paragraphs":["para_6","para_7","para_8"]},{"title":"SUMMIT MEDICAL GROUP, INC.; ST. ELIZABETH","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; DR. ROBERT PRICHARD;","paragraphs":["para_11","para_12","para_13","para_14","para_15","para_16","para_17","para_18","para_19","para_20","para_21","para_22","para_23"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396","paragraphs":["para_25","para_26"]},{"title":"Argued: March 19, 2026","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Decided and Filed: July 13, 2026","paragraphs":["para_29","para_30"]},{"title":"COUNSEL","paragraphs":["para_32","para_33"]},{"title":"Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Christopher Wiest, Theodore J. Roberts, CHRIS","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"WIEST, ATTY AT LAW, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, Thomas B. Bruns, BRUNS CONNELL","paragraphs":["para_36","para_37","para_38","para_39"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 2","paragraphs":["para_41"]},{"title":"OPINION","paragraphs":["para_43"]},{"title":"LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Amy DiChiara was working as physician when her employer","paragraphs":["para_45","para_46","para_47","para_48","para_49","para_50","para_51","para_52"]},{"title":"Dr. Amy DiChiara worked as a gastroenterologist for St. Elizabeth Physicians (SEP), a","paragraphs":["para_54"]},{"title":"COVID-19 vaccination policy that required all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19","paragraphs":["para_56","para_57","para_58","para_59","para_60","para_61","para_62"]},{"title":"Two days after SEP and St. Elizabeth announced the vaccine policy, DiChiara emailed","paragraphs":["para_64"]},{"title":"She explained that she wanted to send the CEOs of St. Elizabeth and SEP her “medical [and]","paragraphs":["para_66","para_67","para_68"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 3","paragraphs":["para_70","para_71","para_72","para_73"]},{"title":"Deters then began to include DiChiara in group-email communications about potential","paragraphs":["para_75","para_76","para_77","para_78","para_79","para_80","para_81","para_82"]},{"title":"Meanwhile, DiChiara began to put her vaccine-response plan in motion. She first","paragraphs":["para_84"]},{"title":"Prichard, President and CEO of SEP. DiChiara asked for a meeting to discuss her concerns","paragraphs":["para_86","para_87"]},{"title":"DiChiara “intentionally did not talk about anything personal” and instead focused on her","paragraphs":["para_89","para_90","para_91","para_92","para_93"]},{"title":"Later that week, DiChiara followed up with Colvin and Prichard individually, asking if","paragraphs":["para_95","para_96","para_97","para_98"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 4","paragraphs":["para_100","para_101"]},{"title":"As DiChiara prepared to circulate the petition, she emailed Deters. This August 31 email","paragraphs":["para_103","para_104"]},{"title":"She further noted that she would be “applying for a religious exemption” and that she","paragraphs":["para_106","para_107","para_108","para_109","para_110"]},{"title":"The email told Deters that DiChiara would “forward [him] a few more emails,” including","paragraphs":["para_112","para_113","para_114"]},{"title":"PageID 2923. Lastly, she forwarded an email exchange between SEP and a physician who","paragraphs":["para_116","para_117"]},{"title":"After explaining these email exchanges to Deters, DiChiara once again repeated, “please","paragraphs":["para_119"]},{"title":"Deters to “store this [information] as ammunition for [his] case,” she wanted to help only","paragraphs":["para_121","para_122"]},{"title":"On the evening of August 31, a group of medical staff sent the petition signed by forty-","paragraphs":["para_124","para_125","para_126","para_127"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 5","paragraphs":["para_129","para_130","para_131"]},{"title":"On September 3, Deters Law filed another lawsuit against SEP and St. Elizabeth. This","paragraphs":["para_133","para_134"]},{"title":"Law attached the four emails that DiChiara had forwarded to Eric Deters. DiChiara was very","paragraphs":["para_136","para_137","para_138"]},{"title":"Two days later, DiChiara emailed an apology to Colvin and Prichard. She addressed the","paragraphs":["para_140","para_141","para_142","para_143","para_144","para_145"]},{"title":"R. 50-37, Email, PageID 3048. He then requested that DiChiara send him “any and all","paragraphs":["para_147","para_148","para_149","para_150"]},{"title":"DiChiara applied for a religious exemption. SEP granted her request on September 17, and","paragraphs":["para_152","para_153"]},{"title":"Then, on October 4, SEP fired DiChiara. The termination letter listed misappropriation","paragraphs":["para_155","para_156"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 6","paragraphs":["para_158","para_159"]},{"title":"After exhausting administrative procedures, DiChiara filed suit in federal court against","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"SEP, St. Elizabeth, Prichard, and Colvin. She brought federal claims for Title VII and ADA","paragraphs":["para_162","para_163","para_164","para_165","para_166","para_167","para_168","para_169","para_170","para_171","para_172","para_173","para_174","para_175"]},{"title":"We turn first to DiChiara’s retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADA. Both statutes","paragraphs":["para_177","para_178","para_179","para_180","para_181","para_182","para_183","para_184"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 7","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, DiChiara must show that she (1) “engaged","paragraphs":["para_187","para_188","para_189","para_190","para_191","para_192","para_193"]},{"title":"We start and end by analyzing protected activity. Title VII and the ADA provide two","paragraphs":["para_195","para_196"]},{"title":"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); id. § 12203(a). Second, an employee could “oppose[]” unlawful","paragraphs":["para_198","para_199","para_200","para_201"]},{"title":"Participation. DiChiara argues that she participated in a Title VII proceeding because","paragraphs":["para_203","para_204","para_205"]},{"title":"The participation clause “protect[s] the employee who utilizes the tools provided by","paragraphs":["para_207","para_208","para_209","para_210","para_211","para_212","para_213","para_214"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 8","paragraphs":["para_216","para_217","para_218"]},{"title":"Such broad protection necessitates a clear starting point. We have previously held that","paragraphs":["para_220","para_221","para_222","para_223","para_224","para_225","para_226"]},{"title":"DiChiara was not a party to any lawsuit and her own statements show that she never","paragraphs":["para_228","para_229","para_230","para_231","para_232","para_233"]},{"title":"2917. But DiChiara’s pre-lawsuit emails constitute indirect assistance at best. That’s not","paragraphs":["para_235"]},{"title":"Take Aldrich as an example. In that case, an employer had been sued for employment","paragraphs":["para_237","para_238","para_239","para_240","para_241","para_242","para_243","para_244"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 9","paragraphs":["para_246","para_247","para_248","para_249","para_250","para_251","para_252"]},{"title":"DiChiara tries to distinguish Aldrich by arguing that the employee “never gave the","paragraphs":["para_254","para_255","para_256","para_257","para_258","para_259","para_260","para_261"]},{"title":"Opposition. DiChiara also argues that her forwarding of confidential internal emails to","paragraphs":["para_263","para_264","para_265","para_266","para_267","para_268"]},{"title":"Taking the facts in DiChiara’s favor, she may have subjectively believed that SEP’s","paragraphs":["para_270","para_271"]},{"title":"DiChiara knew that SEP offered religious exemptions to the vaccine policy, but she wanted","paragraphs":["para_273","para_274"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 10","paragraphs":["para_276","para_277","para_278","para_279","para_280","para_281","para_282","para_283"]},{"title":"But any such belief still needed to be objectively reasonable. Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 646;","paragraphs":["para_285","para_286","para_287","para_288","para_289","para_290"]},{"title":"That’s the case here. No reasonable person could have believed that the facts known to","paragraphs":["para_292","para_293","para_294","para_295","para_296","para_297"]},{"title":"DiChiara fails to provide that crucial evidence. DiChiara had not yet applied for a","paragraphs":["para_299","para_300","para_301","para_302","para_303"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 11","paragraphs":["para_305","para_306"]},{"title":"DiChiara points to the fact that, as of September 13, SEP had granted only 10% of the","paragraphs":["para_308","para_309","para_310","para_311","para_312","para_313","para_314","para_315","para_316","para_317"]},{"title":"Because we find no protected activity, DiChiara’s prima facie case fails; so we do not","paragraphs":["para_319","para_320"]},{"title":"DiChiara’s retaliation claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA) also fails. She","paragraphs":["para_322","para_323","para_324","para_325","para_326","para_327"]},{"title":"Next, DiChiara claims that her discharge violated public policy because her termination","paragraphs":["para_329","para_330","para_331"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 12","paragraphs":["para_333","para_334","para_335","para_336","para_337","para_338","para_339","para_340","para_341","para_342"]},{"title":"Kentucky has applied this tort only to “terminable-at-will” employees. See id. at 651–55","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"(reviewing cases). And while the Kentucky Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the","paragraphs":["para_345","para_346","para_347","para_348","para_349","para_350","para_351"]},{"title":"DiChiara is not an at-will employee in either sense. Both parties agree that DiChiara had","paragraphs":["para_353","para_354","para_355","para_356"]},{"title":"The contract also set forth methods of termination. SEP could terminate DiChiara","paragraphs":["para_358","para_359","para_360","para_361"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 13","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Rather than end our inquiry, DiChiara asks us to extend Kentucky’s wrongful discharge","paragraphs":["para_364","para_365","para_366","para_367"]},{"title":"While it’s true that we must “anticipate how the relevant state’s highest court would rule","paragraphs":["para_369","para_370"]},{"title":"Kentucky has explicitly framed the wrongful discharge tort as “‘a narrow public policy","paragraphs":["para_372","para_373","para_374","para_375","para_376","para_377","para_378","para_379"]},{"title":"Michigan employment law). We see no authoritative signal here. So DiChiara’s claim for","paragraphs":["para_381"]},{"title":"DiChiara’s only response is that Kentucky would surely embrace the universal consensus","paragraphs":["para_383","para_384","para_385","para_386","para_387","para_388","para_389"]},{"title":"Hermreck v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 867 (Wyo. 1997) (“Where an employment","paragraphs":["para_391"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 14","paragraphs":["para_393"]},{"title":"652 N.E.2d 948, 951 (Ohio 1995) (noting that an employee cannot bring a tort for discharge","paragraphs":["para_395","para_396","para_397","para_398","para_399","para_400"]},{"title":"Finally, DiChiara argues that SEP breached its contractual agreement when it fired her","paragraphs":["para_402","para_403"]},{"title":"When SEP terminated DiChiara, the accompanying letter listed four reasons why it had","paragraphs":["para_405"]},{"title":"(1) “By disclosing internal emails . . . to an outside third party without consent or","paragraphs":["para_407"]},{"title":"SEP property” under Section 10.2(h). R. 50-44, Termination Letter, PageID","paragraphs":["para_409","para_410","para_411"]},{"title":"Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure Agreement, and Sections 103 and 106 of the","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Associate Handbook. Id. These policy violations allowed for termination under","paragraphs":["para_414"]},{"title":"(3) DiChiara’s disclosure of the emails “to a law office which already had sued SEP","paragraphs":["para_416","para_417","para_418"]},{"title":"(4) DiChiara’s disclosure “constituted a breach of [her] duty of loyalty owed to SEP”","paragraphs":["para_420","para_421","para_422","para_423"]},{"title":"And under Section 10.2(h) of the Employment Agreement, SEP could terminate DiChiara for","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 15","paragraphs":["para_426","para_427","para_428","para_429"]},{"title":"DiChiara contends that Prichard’s testimony contradicts this analysis because Prichard","paragraphs":["para_431","para_432","para_433","para_434","para_435","para_436","para_437","para_438","para_439"]},{"title":"DiChiara’s email use also allowed SEP to terminate her under Section 10.2(m). That","paragraphs":["para_441","para_442","para_443","para_444"]},{"title":"Electronic Comm. Policy, PageID 3109. And she agreed that “electronic forms of","paragraphs":["para_446","para_447","para_448","para_449"]},{"title":"SEP determined that DiChiara violated its communications policies because her email","paragraphs":["para_451","para_452","para_453","para_454"]},{"title":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 16","paragraphs":["para_456","para_457","para_458","para_459","para_460","para_461"]},{"title":"Co., 367 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). And because we find that SEP terminated DiChiara","paragraphs":["para_463","para_464","para_465"]}],"paragraphs":[{"text":"RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION","paragraph_id":"para_1"},{"text":"Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)","paragraph_id":"para_2"},{"text":"File Name: 26a0195p.06","paragraph_id":"para_3"},{"text":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS","paragraph_id":"para_4"},{"text":"FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT","paragraph_id":"para_5"},{"text":"DR. AMY DICHIARA,","paragraph_id":"para_6"},{"text":"Plaintiff-Appellant,","paragraph_id":"para_7"},{"text":"v.","paragraph_id":"para_8"},{"text":"SUMMIT MEDICAL GROUP, INC.; ST. ELIZABETH","paragraph_id":"para_9"},{"text":"MEDICAL CENTER, INC.; DR. ROBERT PRICHARD;","paragraph_id":"para_10"},{"text":"GARREN COLVIN,","paragraph_id":"para_11"},{"text":"Defendants-Appellees.","paragraph_id":"para_12"},{"text":"┐","paragraph_id":"para_13"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_14"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_15"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_16"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_17"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_18"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_19"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_20"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_21"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_22"},{"text":"┘","paragraph_id":"para_23"},{"text":"No. 25-5396","paragraph_id":"para_24"},{"text":"Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.","paragraph_id":"para_25"},{"text":"No. 2:22-cv-00111—David L. Bunning, District Judge.","paragraph_id":"para_26"},{"text":"Argued: March 19, 2026","paragraph_id":"para_27"},{"text":"Decided and Filed: July 13, 2026","paragraph_id":"para_28"},{"text":"Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.","paragraph_id":"para_29"},{"text":"_________________","paragraph_id":"para_30"},{"text":"COUNSEL","paragraph_id":"para_31"},{"text":"ARGUED: Christopher Wiest, CHRIS WIEST, ATTY AT LAW, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky,","paragraph_id":"para_32"},{"text":"for Appellant. Michael J. Enzweiler, DRESSMAN BENZINGER LAVELLE, Covington,","paragraph_id":"para_33"},{"text":"Kentucky, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Christopher Wiest, Theodore J. Roberts, CHRIS","paragraph_id":"para_34"},{"text":"WIEST, ATTY AT LAW, PLLC, Covington, Kentucky, Thomas B. Bruns, BRUNS CONNELL","paragraph_id":"para_35"},{"text":"VOLLMAR & ARMSTRONG, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael J. Enzweiler, Mark D.","paragraph_id":"para_36"},{"text":"Guilfoyle, Nicholas C. Birkenhauer, DRESSMAN BENZINGER LAVELLE, Covington,","paragraph_id":"para_37"},{"text":"Kentucky, for Appellees.","paragraph_id":"para_38"},{"text":">","paragraph_id":"para_39"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 2","paragraph_id":"para_40"},{"text":"_________________","paragraph_id":"para_41"},{"text":"OPINION","paragraph_id":"para_42"},{"text":"_________________","paragraph_id":"para_43"},{"text":"LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Amy DiChiara was working as physician when her employer","paragraph_id":"para_44"},{"text":"determined that its employees must either vaccinate against COVID-19 or get an exemption.","paragraph_id":"para_45"},{"text":"DiChiara advocated against this policy and was eventually terminated. She sued her employer","paragraph_id":"para_46"},{"text":"for retaliation under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act; she also brought state","paragraph_id":"para_47"},{"text":"claims for retaliation, discharge against public policy, breach of contract, and tortious","paragraph_id":"para_48"},{"text":"interference with contract. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and","paragraph_id":"para_49"},{"text":"found that DiChiara’s claims failed as a matter of law. DiChiara has not shown that her","paragraph_id":"para_50"},{"text":"termination violated state or federal law, so we AFFIRM.","paragraph_id":"para_51"},{"text":"I.","paragraph_id":"para_52"},{"text":"Dr. Amy DiChiara worked as a gastroenterologist for St. Elizabeth Physicians (SEP), a","paragraph_id":"para_53"},{"text":"subsidiary of St. Elizabeth Healthcare. On August 5, 2021, SEP and St. Elizabeth announced a","paragraph_id":"para_54"},{"text":"COVID-19 vaccination policy that required all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19","paragraph_id":"para_55"},{"text":"on or before October 1, 2021, unless they were granted “an exemption for medical or sincerely-","paragraph_id":"para_56"},{"text":"held religious reasons.” R. 50-2, Vaccine Policy, PageID 2726. DiChiara had both scientific and","paragraph_id":"para_57"},{"text":"religious objections to the policy. While deciding how to approach the situation, DiChiara saw a","paragraph_id":"para_58"},{"text":"Facebook post from Eric Deters, a representative of Deters Law. Deters had been using social","paragraph_id":"para_59"},{"text":"media to advertise a litigation plan to fight against the vaccination policies at St. Elizabeth and","paragraph_id":"para_60"},{"text":"other area hospitals. Deters was disbarred at the time of his communication with DiChiara,","paragraph_id":"para_61"},{"text":"although DiChiara testified that she thought Deters was a practicing attorney.","paragraph_id":"para_62"},{"text":"Two days after SEP and St. Elizabeth announced the vaccine policy, DiChiara emailed","paragraph_id":"para_63"},{"text":"Deters seeking advice on her “planned response” to the policy. R. 50-4, Email, PageID 2735.","paragraph_id":"para_64"},{"text":"She explained that she wanted to send the CEOs of St. Elizabeth and SEP her “medical [and]","paragraph_id":"para_65"},{"text":"scientific” concerns about the vaccine and request a face-to-face meeting. Id. She did not plan","paragraph_id":"para_66"},{"text":"to mention “any religious concerns” but said that if the hospital failed to change its vaccine","paragraph_id":"para_67"},{"text":"policy, she planned to submit a religious exemption. Id. DiChiara wanted advice because, while","paragraph_id":"para_68"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 3","paragraph_id":"para_69"},{"text":"she “believe[d]” that “medical and scientific concerns” and “personal convictions” could exist at","paragraph_id":"para_70"},{"text":"the same time, she did not want SEP to question “the legitimacy of [her] religious exemption","paragraph_id":"para_71"},{"text":"request” if she chose to focus on her scientific concerns first. Id. Deters replied, “I think it’s","paragraph_id":"para_72"},{"text":"great. I’ll help you too.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_73"},{"text":"Deters then began to include DiChiara in group-email communications about potential","paragraph_id":"para_74"},{"text":"litigation, eventually asking recipients to sign a client contract for a class action. DiChiara did","paragraph_id":"para_75"},{"text":"not sign the contract, nor did she engage Deters Law to represent her. Two weeks later, on","paragraph_id":"para_76"},{"text":"August 23, Deters Law sued SEP and St. Elizabeth, contesting the vaccination policy on behalf","paragraph_id":"para_77"},{"text":"of their employees. The 111-page complaint contained many legal theories but did not mention","paragraph_id":"para_78"},{"text":"discrimination or retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or Title VII.","paragraph_id":"para_79"},{"text":"DiChiara was not a party to this lawsuit. On August 29, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the","paragraph_id":"para_80"},{"text":"case, indicating an intent to refile at a later date. See Beckerich v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., Inc.,","paragraph_id":"para_81"},{"text":"No. 2:21-cv-100-DLB-EBA (E.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2021), Dkt. No. 13.","paragraph_id":"para_82"},{"text":"Meanwhile, DiChiara began to put her vaccine-response plan in motion. She first","paragraph_id":"para_83"},{"text":"reached out to Garren Colvin, President and CEO of St. Elizabeth Healthcare, and Robert","paragraph_id":"para_84"},{"text":"Prichard, President and CEO of SEP. DiChiara asked for a meeting to discuss her concerns","paragraph_id":"para_85"},{"text":"about the vaccine. DiChiara, Colvin, and Prichard had an hour-long meeting on August 16 that","paragraph_id":"para_86"},{"text":"DiChiara later described as “very pleasant and courteous.” R. 50-22, Email, PageID 2913.","paragraph_id":"para_87"},{"text":"DiChiara “intentionally did not talk about anything personal” and instead focused on her","paragraph_id":"para_88"},{"text":"scientific concerns with the vaccines. R. 50, DiChiara Dep., PageID 2529. Her main concern","paragraph_id":"para_89"},{"text":"was that the vaccines did not actually prevent the spread of COVID, and she had prepared a 27-","paragraph_id":"para_90"},{"text":"page document explaining her concerns using scientific research. DiChiara shared this document","paragraph_id":"para_91"},{"text":"with Colvin and Prichard and asked them to share it with hospital leadership, which Prichard","paragraph_id":"para_92"},{"text":"then did.","paragraph_id":"para_93"},{"text":"Later that week, DiChiara followed up with Colvin and Prichard individually, asking if","paragraph_id":"para_94"},{"text":"either had further thoughts on her letter. Colvin did not reply, but Prichard told DiChiara that","paragraph_id":"para_95"},{"text":"they “d[id] not plan to alter [their] approach at this time” and they would “continue to monitor","paragraph_id":"para_96"},{"text":"new developments as they occur.” R. 50-18, Email, PageID 2897. Disappointed in the response,","paragraph_id":"para_97"},{"text":"DiChiara next planned a meeting with other physicians and medical staff to discuss the vaccine","paragraph_id":"para_98"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 4","paragraph_id":"para_99"},{"text":"policy. Afterward, she arranged for a petition and a summary of the group’s medical concerns","paragraph_id":"para_100"},{"text":"and proposed policy changes to be circulated to hospital leadership.","paragraph_id":"para_101"},{"text":"As DiChiara prepared to circulate the petition, she emailed Deters. This August 31 email","paragraph_id":"para_102"},{"text":"updated him on her communications with SEP over the preceding few weeks and expressed","paragraph_id":"para_103"},{"text":"frustration that Prichard and Colvin had not responded to her entreaties with a policy change.","paragraph_id":"para_104"},{"text":"She further noted that she would be “applying for a religious exemption” and that she","paragraph_id":"para_105"},{"text":"“assume[d] [she] w[ould] get it granted.” R. 50-22, Email, PageID 2914. DiChiara shared a","paragraph_id":"para_106"},{"text":"draft of the petition letter without any signatories but emphasized that she “d[idn’t] want [Deters]","paragraph_id":"para_107"},{"text":"to publicly share [her] letter” because she wanted to follow a “restrained approach” rather than","paragraph_id":"para_108"},{"text":"“take [SEP] before the . . . public.” Id. Her main goal was to let people know that there were","paragraph_id":"para_109"},{"text":"“doctors out there that oppose this mandate.” Id. at 2915.","paragraph_id":"para_110"},{"text":"The email told Deters that DiChiara would “forward [him] a few more emails,” including","paragraph_id":"para_111"},{"text":"her “follow-up email to . . . Prichard and his response” and “[her] follow-up email to [Colvin].”","paragraph_id":"para_112"},{"text":"Id. She then forwarded Deters those exchanges, as well as a third “[b]onus email” about the","paragraph_id":"para_113"},{"text":"mRNA vaccine, which she said Deters could “[f]eel free to share widely.” R. 50-25, Email,","paragraph_id":"para_114"},{"text":"PageID 2923. Lastly, she forwarded an email exchange between SEP and a physician who","paragraph_id":"para_115"},{"text":"contested SEP’s characterization of FDA approval for a COVID vaccine. DiChiara considered","paragraph_id":"para_116"},{"text":"SEP’s email about FDA approval to be “outright misleading.” R. 50-26, Email, PageID 2924.","paragraph_id":"para_117"},{"text":"After explaining these email exchanges to Deters, DiChiara once again repeated, “please","paragraph_id":"para_118"},{"text":"don’t share all these details publicly.” R. 50-22, Email, PageID 2915. Although she wanted","paragraph_id":"para_119"},{"text":"Deters to “store this [information] as ammunition for [his] case,” she wanted to help only","paragraph_id":"para_120"},{"text":"“quietly for now.” Id. at 2915–17. At the time, Deters Law had no active lawsuit against St.","paragraph_id":"para_121"},{"text":"Elizabeth or SEP because the previous lawsuit had been dismissed.","paragraph_id":"para_122"},{"text":"On the evening of August 31, a group of medical staff sent the petition signed by forty-","paragraph_id":"para_123"},{"text":"seven medical professionals to the SEP board. The email contained an edited version of the","paragraph_id":"para_124"},{"text":"scientific research DiChiara had already sent to Prichard and Colvin, as well as a cover letter","paragraph_id":"para_125"},{"text":"summarizing the group’s concerns about the vaccine. Within 24 hours, Deters sent out a group","paragraph_id":"para_126"},{"text":"email that included the names of all the physicians who had signed the petition. DiChiara did not","paragraph_id":"para_127"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 5","paragraph_id":"para_128"},{"text":"know how Deters got the names but reminded Deters that she wanted to work internally without","paragraph_id":"para_129"},{"text":"publicizing confidential information. DiChiara then emailed the letter’s signatories to notify","paragraph_id":"para_130"},{"text":"them that the letter and their names had been shared publicly.","paragraph_id":"para_131"},{"text":"On September 3, Deters Law filed another lawsuit against SEP and St. Elizabeth. This","paragraph_id":"para_132"},{"text":"lawsuit contained many of the same claims as the previous lawsuit, but it included new claims","paragraph_id":"para_133"},{"text":"under the ADA and Title VII. The complaint also included new exhibits—specifically, Deters","paragraph_id":"para_134"},{"text":"Law attached the four emails that DiChiara had forwarded to Eric Deters. DiChiara was very","paragraph_id":"para_135"},{"text":"upset. She tried to call Deters and left a voicemail when he didn’t pick up the phone. She also","paragraph_id":"para_136"},{"text":"sent him an urgent email demanding that he remove the emails from his exhibits. But DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_137"},{"text":"never heard from Deters again on the subject.","paragraph_id":"para_138"},{"text":"Two days later, DiChiara emailed an apology to Colvin and Prichard. She addressed the","paragraph_id":"para_139"},{"text":"new lawsuit directly and stated she was “shocked and angered” that copies of documents,","paragraph_id":"para_140"},{"text":"“including private email exchanges you and I have had from previous weeks,” had been shared","paragraph_id":"para_141"},{"text":"publicly. R. 50-36, Letter, PageID 3046. DiChiara further stated that “[i]t was never [her] intent","paragraph_id":"para_142"},{"text":"to seek litigation” and that she “never asked Deters Law to represent [her], nor did [she] sign any","paragraph_id":"para_143"},{"text":"affidavits for Deters Law.” Id. at 3047. Prichard replied saying he was “very disappointed and","paragraph_id":"para_144"},{"text":"upset that [DiChiara] would share [their] private conversations and emails with Mr. Deters.”","paragraph_id":"para_145"},{"text":"R. 50-37, Email, PageID 3048. He then requested that DiChiara send him “any and all","paragraph_id":"para_146"},{"text":"communications” she had with Deters Law. Id. After reaching out to counsel, DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_147"},{"text":"ultimately decided not to share any additional emails with Prichard because she still wanted","paragraph_id":"para_148"},{"text":"Deters to retract the documents and did not want to prejudice that endeavor.","paragraph_id":"para_149"},{"text":"Meanwhile, the September 15 vaccine exemption deadline loomed. On September 13,","paragraph_id":"para_150"},{"text":"DiChiara applied for a religious exemption. SEP granted her request on September 17, and","paragraph_id":"para_151"},{"text":"DiChiara received notification of approval on September 20. By October 1, 100% of SEP staff","paragraph_id":"para_152"},{"text":"had either been vaccinated or had received an exemption.","paragraph_id":"para_153"},{"text":"Then, on October 4, SEP fired DiChiara. The termination letter listed misappropriation","paragraph_id":"para_154"},{"text":"of company property, violations of company policy, disruptive and unprofessional conduct, and","paragraph_id":"para_155"},{"text":"breach of loyalty as “for-cause” reasons for termination. And because SEP deemed DiChiara’s","paragraph_id":"para_156"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 6","paragraph_id":"para_157"},{"text":"termination “for-cause,” it also enforced a one-year contractual non-compete provision against","paragraph_id":"para_158"},{"text":"her.","paragraph_id":"para_159"},{"text":"After exhausting administrative procedures, DiChiara filed suit in federal court against","paragraph_id":"para_160"},{"text":"SEP, St. Elizabeth, Prichard, and Colvin. She brought federal claims for Title VII and ADA","paragraph_id":"para_161"},{"text":"retaliation and Title VII religious accommodation,1 as well as state claims for retaliation and","paragraph_id":"para_162"},{"text":"conspiracy, discharge against public policy, breach of contract, tortious interference, and","paragraph_id":"para_163"},{"text":"declaratory relief from her noncompete clause. Both DiChiara and the defendants moved for","paragraph_id":"para_164"},{"text":"summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion on all claims. DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_165"},{"text":"now appeals.","paragraph_id":"para_166"},{"text":"II.","paragraph_id":"para_167"},{"text":"We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Franklin Am. Mortg.","paragraph_id":"para_168"},{"text":"Co. v. Univ. Nat’l Bank of Lawrence, 910 F.3d 270, 275 (6th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is","paragraph_id":"para_169"},{"text":"appropriate when the movant shows that “‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and","paragraph_id":"para_170"},{"text":"‘the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). We","paragraph_id":"para_171"},{"text":"view the facts presented in the “light most favorable to the party against whom summary","paragraph_id":"para_172"},{"text":"judgment was entered.” Id. (citation omitted). And for DiChiara’s state claims, “we apply the","paragraph_id":"para_173"},{"text":"substantive law of the forum state.” Jones v. City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 912 (6th Cir. 2020).","paragraph_id":"para_174"},{"text":"A.","paragraph_id":"para_175"},{"text":"We turn first to DiChiara’s retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADA. Both statutes","paragraph_id":"para_176"},{"text":"prevent retaliation against an individual who has “opposed any [unlawful] act or practice” or","paragraph_id":"para_177"},{"text":"“made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,","paragraph_id":"para_178"},{"text":"or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (ADA); accord id. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII).","paragraph_id":"para_179"},{"text":"The parties agree that retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADA should be analyzed in the","paragraph_id":"para_180"},{"text":"same manner. See Poe v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 201 F.3d 441, at *4 n.3 (6th Cir.","paragraph_id":"para_181"},{"text":"1999) (table) (“The analysis for a retaliation claim under Title VII and the ADA is the same.”);","paragraph_id":"para_182"},{"text":"Kelly v. Graphic Packaging Int’l, LLC, 2025 WL 573766, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025) (same).","paragraph_id":"para_183"},{"text":"1DiChiara later voluntarily withdrew her failure to accommodate claim.","paragraph_id":"para_184"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 7","paragraph_id":"para_185"},{"text":"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, DiChiara must show that she (1) “engaged","paragraph_id":"para_186"},{"text":"in protected activity,” (2) her “employer knew of the exercise of the protected right,” (3) her","paragraph_id":"para_187"},{"text":"employer took an “adverse employment action” against her, and (4) “there was a causal","paragraph_id":"para_188"},{"text":"connection between protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Niswander v.","paragraph_id":"para_189"},{"text":"Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008). If DiChiara presents sufficient evidence","paragraph_id":"para_190"},{"text":"to show prima facie retaliation, her employer then must produce “evidence of a legitimate,","paragraph_id":"para_191"},{"text":"nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. The burden then shifts back to DiChiara to show","paragraph_id":"para_192"},{"text":"that the proffered reasons were pretextual.2 Id.","paragraph_id":"para_193"},{"text":"We start and end by analyzing protected activity. Title VII and the ADA provide two","paragraph_id":"para_194"},{"text":"distinct ways that an employee can engage in protected activity. First, an employee could","paragraph_id":"para_195"},{"text":"“participate[] in any manner” in a Title VII or ADA investigation, proceeding, or hearing.","paragraph_id":"para_196"},{"text":"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); id. § 12203(a). Second, an employee could “oppose[]” unlawful","paragraph_id":"para_197"},{"text":"discrimination. Id. The distinction between the opposition clause and the participation clause “is","paragraph_id":"para_198"},{"text":"significant because federal courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for","paragraph_id":"para_199"},{"text":"participation in enforcement proceedings.” Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879","paragraph_id":"para_200"},{"text":"F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989). But neither clause covers DiChiara’s conduct in this case.","paragraph_id":"para_201"},{"text":"Participation. DiChiara argues that she participated in a Title VII proceeding because","paragraph_id":"para_202"},{"text":"she “confidentially gave employer documents to a law firm . . . to help build Title VII and ADA","paragraph_id":"para_203"},{"text":"claims.”3 Appellant Br. at 25 (citation modified). This sort of indirect assistance does not","paragraph_id":"para_204"},{"text":"qualify as protected conduct under the participation clause on the facts of this case.","paragraph_id":"para_205"},{"text":"The participation clause “protect[s] the employee who utilizes the tools provided by","paragraph_id":"para_206"},{"text":"Congress to protect his rights.” Niswander, 529 F.3d at 722 (quoting Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118","paragraph_id":"para_207"},{"text":"F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[O]nce activity in question is found to be within the scope of","paragraph_id":"para_208"},{"text":"the participation clause, the employee is generally protected from retaliation.” Johnson v. Univ.","paragraph_id":"para_209"},{"text":"2Alternatively, a plaintiff may present direct evidence of retaliation to avoid the burden-shifting","paragraph_id":"para_210"},{"text":"framework. See Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, the district court found that","paragraph_id":"para_211"},{"text":"DiChiara did not present any direct evidence of retaliation. DiChiara’s briefing failed to contest that conclusion.","paragraph_id":"para_212"},{"text":"3DiChiara frames her conduct as part of a proceeding rather than a hearing or an investigation. See Oral","paragraph_id":"para_213"},{"text":"Arg. at 2:16–30. We accept her framing for purposes of this appeal.","paragraph_id":"para_214"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 8","paragraph_id":"para_215"},{"text":"of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 582 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312). The","paragraph_id":"para_216"},{"text":"protection persists even if “[an] employee is wrong on the merits of the charge” or “the contents","paragraph_id":"para_217"},{"text":"of the charge are malicious or defamatory as well as wrong.” Id. (citation modified).","paragraph_id":"para_218"},{"text":"Such broad protection necessitates a clear starting point. We have previously held that","paragraph_id":"para_219"},{"text":"participation must be “direct”—it covers activities like being a party to a lawsuit, providing","paragraph_id":"para_220"},{"text":"deposition testimony, or responding to a subpoena. See Aldrich v. Rural Health Servs.","paragraph_id":"para_221"},{"text":"Consortium, Inc., 579 F. App’x 335, 337 (6th Cir. 2014);4 see also Niswander, 529 F.3d at 721.","paragraph_id":"para_222"},{"text":"By contrast, we have held that “any activity by the employee prior to the instigation of statutory","paragraph_id":"para_223"},{"text":"proceedings is to be considered pursuant to the opposition clause” rather than the participation","paragraph_id":"para_224"},{"text":"clause. Booker, 879 F.2d at 1313. To hold otherwise, we explained, “would blur the distinction","paragraph_id":"para_225"},{"text":"between opposition to unlawful practices and participation in proceedings.” Id. at 1313 n.3.","paragraph_id":"para_226"},{"text":"DiChiara was not a party to any lawsuit and her own statements show that she never","paragraph_id":"para_227"},{"text":"intended to “seek litigation,” that she “never asked Deters Law to represent [her],” and that she","paragraph_id":"para_228"},{"text":"never “sign[ed] any affidavits for Deters Law.” R. 50-36, Email, PageID 3047. Her attorney","paragraph_id":"para_229"},{"text":"also represented that she would “vigorously fight any subpoena” from Deters Law, and DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_230"},{"text":"was ultimately successful in that endeavor. R. 44-46, Email, PageID 1001. DiChiara does not","paragraph_id":"para_231"},{"text":"dispute these facts. Instead, she argues that her emails to Eric Deters were protected activity","paragraph_id":"para_232"},{"text":"because she sent them as “ammunition” to help build Deters’s case. R. 50-22, Email, PageID","paragraph_id":"para_233"},{"text":"2917. But DiChiara’s pre-lawsuit emails constitute indirect assistance at best. That’s not","paragraph_id":"para_234"},{"text":"enough.","paragraph_id":"para_235"},{"text":"Take Aldrich as an example. In that case, an employer had been sued for employment","paragraph_id":"para_236"},{"text":"discrimination. Aldrich, 579 F. App’x at 336. The employer then instructed an employee,","paragraph_id":"para_237"},{"text":"Aldrich, to destroy any emails that could have been relevant to the underlying discrimination","paragraph_id":"para_238"},{"text":"suit. Id. Instead of following instructions, Aldrich began forwarding emails to her personal","paragraph_id":"para_239"},{"text":"account because she was worried about her job security and believed that her employer was","paragraph_id":"para_240"},{"text":"4Although Aldrich involved the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), it examined Title VII","paragraph_id":"para_241"},{"text":"caselaw to reach its result. See id. at 337. “Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is similar in relevant respects to the","paragraph_id":"para_242"},{"text":"ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision,” and we look to cases construing both statutes “as a source of authority.” Fox v.","paragraph_id":"para_243"},{"text":"Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007).","paragraph_id":"para_244"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 9","paragraph_id":"para_245"},{"text":"destroying evidence relevant to her former co-worker’s lawsuit. Id. When Aldrich was","paragraph_id":"para_246"},{"text":"eventually fired, she sued her employer and alleged that she was fired for “refusing to destroy","paragraph_id":"para_247"},{"text":"evidence related to the . . . lawsuit.” Id. Even though there was an ongoing lawsuit, we held that","paragraph_id":"para_248"},{"text":"her activity did not involve participation because the employee “was not directly involved in any","paragraph_id":"para_249"},{"text":"litigation, or responding to any request from [the other employee’s] attorneys, when she","paragraph_id":"para_250"},{"text":"forwarded emails to her personal account.” Id. at 337. We also found it relevant that she did not","paragraph_id":"para_251"},{"text":"“disclos[e] emails in response to a subpoena” or give “deposition testimony.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_252"},{"text":"DiChiara tries to distinguish Aldrich by arguing that the employee “never gave the","paragraph_id":"para_253"},{"text":"documents to a third party.” Appellant Br. at 25 (emphasis omitted). But that’s not the relevant","paragraph_id":"para_254"},{"text":"question. We ask simply whether an employee was directly involved in an ongoing proceeding.","paragraph_id":"para_255"},{"text":"Booker, 879 F.2d at 1313; Aldrich, 579 F. App’x at 337. And here, the answer is no. DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_256"},{"text":"has presented no evidence of direct participation in a Title VII or ADA proceeding. No lawsuit","paragraph_id":"para_257"},{"text":"was ongoing at the time she forwarded the emails. And, even with respect to the later-filed","paragraph_id":"para_258"},{"text":"lawsuit, she was never a party. Nor did she participate in a deposition or subpoena. Indeed, she","paragraph_id":"para_259"},{"text":"affirmatively renounced any involvement in the relevant lawsuit as a party or witness. So her","paragraph_id":"para_260"},{"text":"conduct doesn’t qualify.","paragraph_id":"para_261"},{"text":"Opposition. DiChiara also argues that her forwarding of confidential internal emails to","paragraph_id":"para_262"},{"text":"Deters constituted protected opposition. For the opposition clause to apply, an employee must","paragraph_id":"para_263"},{"text":"“challenge[] an employment practice that [s]he reasonably believe[s] was unlawful.” Yazdian v.","paragraph_id":"para_264"},{"text":"ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 645 (6th Cir. 2015). That requires the plaintiff","paragraph_id":"para_265"},{"text":"to make two showings: (1) that she actually, subjectively believed that her employer was","paragraph_id":"para_266"},{"text":"engaging in discriminatory activity and (2) that such a belief was objectively reasonable in light","paragraph_id":"para_267"},{"text":"of the facts. See id. at 646; Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).","paragraph_id":"para_268"},{"text":"Taking the facts in DiChiara’s favor, she may have subjectively believed that SEP’s","paragraph_id":"para_269"},{"text":"vaccine mandate was unlawful under Title VII or the ADA. At certain points, DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_270"},{"text":"expressed concern that SEP might not grant appropriate religious exemptions. For instance,","paragraph_id":"para_271"},{"text":"DiChiara knew that SEP offered religious exemptions to the vaccine policy, but she wanted","paragraph_id":"para_272"},{"text":"advice from Deters on whether “[her] medical, scientific document . . . or eventual activism","paragraph_id":"para_273"},{"text":"against this mandate would somehow disqualify . . . the legitimacy of [her] religious exemption","paragraph_id":"para_274"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 10","paragraph_id":"para_275"},{"text":"request” in SEP’s eyes. R. 50-4, Email, PageID 2735. And she expressed to Deters that she","paragraph_id":"para_276"},{"text":"wanted to gather evidence “to build [her] case if indeed [she was] fired.” Id. at 2736. Later,","paragraph_id":"para_277"},{"text":"DiChiara stated in her deposition that she “was not . . . sure of [her] job security” based on “what","paragraph_id":"para_278"},{"text":"would happen in terms of [her] religious exemption.” R. 50, DiChiara Dep., PageID 2529. And","paragraph_id":"para_279"},{"text":"in another email to Deters, DiChiara stated that she “fear[ed] some retribution” if her name were","paragraph_id":"para_280"},{"text":"revealed in an affidavit. R. 50-22, Email, PageID 2914. Based on these facts, DiChiara may","paragraph_id":"para_281"},{"text":"have subjectively believed that SEP would either fail to accommodate her religious beliefs or","paragraph_id":"para_282"},{"text":"discriminate against her based on religion.","paragraph_id":"para_283"},{"text":"But any such belief still needed to be objectively reasonable. Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 646;","paragraph_id":"para_284"},{"text":"Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1312. Objective reasonableness requires a finding that “a reasonable person","paragraph_id":"para_285"},{"text":"in the same factual circumstances with the same training and experience as the aggrieved","paragraph_id":"para_286"},{"text":"employee would believe that the conduct complained of was unlawful.” Yazdian, 793 F.3d at","paragraph_id":"para_287"},{"text":"646 (citation modified). This inquiry is a matter of law “when no reasonable person could have","paragraph_id":"para_288"},{"text":"believed that the facts known to the employee amounted to a violation or otherwise justified the","paragraph_id":"para_289"},{"text":"employee’s belief that illegal conduct was occurring.” Id. (citation modified).","paragraph_id":"para_290"},{"text":"That’s the case here. No reasonable person could have believed that the facts known to","paragraph_id":"para_291"},{"text":"DiChiara amounted to a violation of Title VII or the ADA. DiChiara offers no evidence known","paragraph_id":"para_292"},{"text":"to her at the time that would support a reasonable belief that SEP engaged in “any practice made","paragraph_id":"para_293"},{"text":"an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). SEP’s vaccine","paragraph_id":"para_294"},{"text":"policy, which promised religious and medical accommodation, was facially legal. And DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_295"},{"text":"does not claim that she thought otherwise. So DiChiara needed some additional basis to think","paragraph_id":"para_296"},{"text":"that SEP would act unlawfully.","paragraph_id":"para_297"},{"text":"DiChiara fails to provide that crucial evidence. DiChiara had not yet applied for a","paragraph_id":"para_298"},{"text":"religious exemption and didn’t have any information about how SEP would process her","paragraph_id":"para_299"},{"text":"request—especially because she intentionally avoided discussing her religious objections with","paragraph_id":"para_300"},{"text":"SEP leadership. In fact, when DiChiara told Deters that she planned to “apply[] for a religious","paragraph_id":"para_301"},{"text":"exemption,” she “assume[d] [she] w[ould] get it granted.” R. 50-22, Email, PageID 2914. And","paragraph_id":"para_302"},{"text":"she expressed no qualms with any additional preventative requirements (like masking) that she","paragraph_id":"para_303"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 11","paragraph_id":"para_304"},{"text":"would face as an unvaccinated employee if SEP did grant her exemption. Neither does DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_305"},{"text":"claim that she knew of anyone who had been denied an exemption or fired for religious beliefs.","paragraph_id":"para_306"},{"text":"DiChiara points to the fact that, as of September 13, SEP had granted only 10% of the","paragraph_id":"para_307"},{"text":"total number of religious exemption requests it eventually approved (76 out of 760).5 She frames","paragraph_id":"para_308"},{"text":"this as evidence that SEP intended to withhold accommodations. But DiChiara presents no","paragraph_id":"para_309"},{"text":"evidence of the percentage of requests made by September 13 that SEP had granted (or failed to","paragraph_id":"para_310"},{"text":"grant). And SEP offered uncontested testimony that “[they] weren’t holding exemptions”;","paragraph_id":"para_311"},{"text":"instead, “a whole bunch of these [requests] came in at . . . or immediately prior to the deadline”","paragraph_id":"para_312"},{"text":"on September 15. R. 48, SEP Dep., PageID 2339–40. What’s more, DiChiara does not allege","paragraph_id":"para_313"},{"text":"that she knew about this data at the time of her alleged opposition, so it couldn’t have formed the","paragraph_id":"para_314"},{"text":"basis of any reasonable belief. See Yazdian, 793 F.3d at 646. Without some objective basis to","paragraph_id":"para_315"},{"text":"ground her subjective fear of unlawful activity, DiChiara’s conduct did not amount to protected","paragraph_id":"para_316"},{"text":"opposition.","paragraph_id":"para_317"},{"text":"Because we find no protected activity, DiChiara’s prima facie case fails; so we do not","paragraph_id":"para_318"},{"text":"reach the burden-shifting analysis.","paragraph_id":"para_319"},{"text":"B.","paragraph_id":"para_320"},{"text":"DiChiara’s retaliation claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA) also fails. She","paragraph_id":"para_321"},{"text":"concedes that “unlawful retaliation under the KCRA is interpreted consistently with retaliation","paragraph_id":"para_322"},{"text":"under federal law.” Appellant Br. at 42–43 (citation modified); see also Curtis v. Hanger","paragraph_id":"para_323"},{"text":"Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc., 101 F. App’x 61, 64 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Under Kentucky law, claims","paragraph_id":"para_324"},{"text":"of retaliation are analyzed in the same way as retaliation claims brought under Title VII.”).","paragraph_id":"para_325"},{"text":"DiChiara’s KCRA claim fails for the same reasons as her Title VII claim.","paragraph_id":"para_326"},{"text":"C.","paragraph_id":"para_327"},{"text":"Next, DiChiara claims that her discharge violated public policy because her termination","paragraph_id":"para_328"},{"text":"“was, in part, based on her refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege.” Appellant Br. at 45.","paragraph_id":"para_329"},{"text":"5SEP testified that 760 out of 785 religious exemptions were ultimately granted (equaling a roughly 97%","paragraph_id":"para_330"},{"text":"grant rate). DiChiara does not contest this number.","paragraph_id":"para_331"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 12","paragraph_id":"para_332"},{"text":"Kentucky recognizes a “cause of action for retaliatory discharge” for at-will employees when the","paragraph_id":"para_333"},{"text":"discharge is “contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing","paragraph_id":"para_334"},{"text":"law.” Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 400–01 (Ky. 1985) (citation modified). This tort is","paragraph_id":"para_335"},{"text":"“narrow” and functions as an “exception” to the general rule that “at-will employee[s] may be","paragraph_id":"para_336"},{"text":"discharged for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that some might view as morally","paragraph_id":"para_337"},{"text":"indefensible.” Marshall v. Montaplast of N. Am., Inc., 575 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Ky. 2019) (citation","paragraph_id":"para_338"},{"text":"modified). For the exception to apply, the discharge must be “contrary to a fundamental and","paragraph_id":"para_339"},{"text":"well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law,” and “[t]hat policy must be evidenced","paragraph_id":"para_340"},{"text":"by a constitutional or statutory provision.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether the exception applies","paragraph_id":"para_341"},{"text":"is a “a question of law” rather than a question of fact. Id. (citation omitted).","paragraph_id":"para_342"},{"text":"Kentucky has applied this tort only to “terminable-at-will” employees. See id. at 651–55","paragraph_id":"para_343"},{"text":"(reviewing cases). And while the Kentucky Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the","paragraph_id":"para_344"},{"text":"contours of at-will employment in this context, a few general principles can be drawn from","paragraph_id":"para_345"},{"text":"existing law. Most obviously, an employee is at-will when there is no “employment contract.”","paragraph_id":"para_346"},{"text":"Carlozzi v. Perkins L. Grp., 2007 WL 2893661, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2007); accord Steele","paragraph_id":"para_347"},{"text":"v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 2009 WL 1562940, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. June 5, 2009). But an employee","paragraph_id":"para_348"},{"text":"may also be at-will if a contract fails to “govern[] the length of the parties’ association or the","paragraph_id":"para_349"},{"text":"reasons why they may end it.” Hall v. Rag-O-Rama, LLC, 2021 WL 5782381, at *3 (6th Cir.","paragraph_id":"para_350"},{"text":"Dec. 7, 2021) (citing Shah v. Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1983)).","paragraph_id":"para_351"},{"text":"DiChiara is not an at-will employee in either sense. Both parties agree that DiChiara had","paragraph_id":"para_352"},{"text":"an employment contract with SEP. And it’s equally uncontested that her contract set forth the","paragraph_id":"para_353"},{"text":"length of the parties’ association and the modes of termination. DiChiara’s contract initially","paragraph_id":"para_354"},{"text":"extended for “[t]hree (3) years” and then “automatically” “extended for additional one year","paragraph_id":"para_355"},{"text":"periods unless terminated[] as provided in th[e] Agreement.” R. 44-4, Contract, PageID 538.","paragraph_id":"para_356"},{"text":"The contract also set forth methods of termination. SEP could terminate DiChiara","paragraph_id":"para_357"},{"text":"“immediately” if it found her in violation of a “for-cause” provision and gave her written notice.","paragraph_id":"para_358"},{"text":"Id. at 528. Otherwise, SEP could terminate DiChiara only if it provided “ninety (90) days prior","paragraph_id":"para_359"},{"text":"written notice.” Id. So, as a contract employee, DiChiara cannot sue for discharge against public","paragraph_id":"para_360"},{"text":"policy.","paragraph_id":"para_361"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 13","paragraph_id":"para_362"},{"text":"Rather than end our inquiry, DiChiara asks us to extend Kentucky’s wrongful discharge","paragraph_id":"para_363"},{"text":"tort to contract employees. She points to other states that extend wrongful discharge torts to","paragraph_id":"para_364"},{"text":"contract employees and asks us to apply those rationales here, arguing that there is “no reason","paragraph_id":"para_365"},{"text":"that [the Kentucky Supreme] Court would not do so.” Appellant Br. at 47. But that argument","paragraph_id":"para_366"},{"text":"misunderstands this court’s role in expanding state law.","paragraph_id":"para_367"},{"text":"While it’s true that we must “anticipate how the relevant state’s highest court would rule","paragraph_id":"para_368"},{"text":"in [a] case,” we look to the “binding or persuasive authority” of that court for guidance.","paragraph_id":"para_369"},{"text":"Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 696 F.3d 604, 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).","paragraph_id":"para_370"},{"text":"Kentucky has explicitly framed the wrongful discharge tort as “‘a narrow public policy","paragraph_id":"para_371"},{"text":"exception’ to the terminable-at-will doctrine.” Marshall, 575 S.W.3d at 652 (quoting Grzyb, 700","paragraph_id":"para_372"},{"text":"S.W.2d at 401). It has never extended this tort past those bounds, and DiChiara does not point to","paragraph_id":"para_373"},{"text":"any Kentucky cases that provide evidence of a liberalizing impulse in analogous contexts. But","paragraph_id":"para_374"},{"text":"that was her burden. “[F]ederal courts must be cautious when making pronouncements about","paragraph_id":"para_375"},{"text":"state law.” US Framing Int’l LLC v. Cont’l Bldg. Co., 134 F.4th 423, 435 (6th Cir. 2025)","paragraph_id":"para_376"},{"text":"(citation omitted). And we “are in a particularly poor position to endorse a fundamental policy","paragraph_id":"para_377"},{"text":"innovation in state law absent some authoritative signal favoring the innovation.” Id. (citation","paragraph_id":"para_378"},{"text":"modified); see also Berrington, 696 F.3d at 610 (declining to extend a public policy claim in","paragraph_id":"para_379"},{"text":"Michigan employment law). We see no authoritative signal here. So DiChiara’s claim for","paragraph_id":"para_380"},{"text":"expansion falters.","paragraph_id":"para_381"},{"text":"DiChiara’s only response is that Kentucky would surely embrace the universal consensus","paragraph_id":"para_382"},{"text":"of the other states if confronted with the question. But, even if this were a sufficient reason to","paragraph_id":"para_383"},{"text":"think that Kentucky would follow suit, many states hold that the tort does not extend beyond the","paragraph_id":"para_384"},{"text":"at-will context. See, e.g., Keeshan v. Eau Claire Coop. Health Ctrs., Inc., 394 F. App’x 987,","paragraph_id":"para_385"},{"text":"992–93 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that South Carolina’s public policy tort applies to","paragraph_id":"para_386"},{"text":"only at-will employees); Burns v. Bd. of Trs. of Robeson Cmty. Coll., 2013 WL 5309750, at *7","paragraph_id":"para_387"},{"text":"(E.D.N.C. Sept. 19, 2013) (“Under North Carolina law[,] it is well established that the tort of","paragraph_id":"para_388"},{"text":"wrongful discharge arises only in the context of employees at will.” (citation modified));","paragraph_id":"para_389"},{"text":"Hermreck v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 867 (Wyo. 1997) (“Where an employment","paragraph_id":"para_390"},{"text":"contract is present, there does not exist any necessity for invoking a separate action for the tort of","paragraph_id":"para_391"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 14","paragraph_id":"para_392"},{"text":"retaliatory discharge as to vindicate public policy.”); Haynes v. Zoological Soc’y of Cincinnati,","paragraph_id":"para_393"},{"text":"652 N.E.2d 948, 951 (Ohio 1995) (noting that an employee cannot bring a tort for discharge","paragraph_id":"para_394"},{"text":"against public policy unless she is employed at will). So there is no consensus outside the state.","paragraph_id":"para_395"},{"text":"More importantly, DiChiara has not pointed us to any inclination toward expansion within. We","paragraph_id":"para_396"},{"text":"therefore have no basis to expand Kentucky law. We leave this tort where we found it—as “‘a","paragraph_id":"para_397"},{"text":"narrow . . . exception’ to the terminable-at-will doctrine.” Marshall, 575 S.W.3d at 652 (quoting","paragraph_id":"para_398"},{"text":"Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 401). Because DiChiara’s employment was not at-will, her claim fails.","paragraph_id":"para_399"},{"text":"D.","paragraph_id":"para_400"},{"text":"Finally, DiChiara argues that SEP breached its contractual agreement when it fired her","paragraph_id":"para_401"},{"text":"for cause. But DiChiara violated her terms of employment, so there is no breach of contract. See","paragraph_id":"para_402"},{"text":"Brett v. Media Gen. Operations, Inc., 326 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).","paragraph_id":"para_403"},{"text":"When SEP terminated DiChiara, the accompanying letter listed four reasons why it had","paragraph_id":"para_404"},{"text":"cause for her termination:","paragraph_id":"para_405"},{"text":"(1) “By disclosing internal emails . . . to an outside third party without consent or","paragraph_id":"para_406"},{"text":"authorization, which emails are the property of SEP, [DiChiara] misappropriated","paragraph_id":"para_407"},{"text":"SEP property” under Section 10.2(h). R. 50-44, Termination Letter, PageID","paragraph_id":"para_408"},{"text":"3107.","paragraph_id":"para_409"},{"text":"(2) DiChiara’s “afore-described conduct” violated numerous other SEP policies,","paragraph_id":"para_410"},{"text":"including the Electronic Forms of Communication Policy, the","paragraph_id":"para_411"},{"text":"Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure Agreement, and Sections 103 and 106 of the","paragraph_id":"para_412"},{"text":"Associate Handbook. Id. These policy violations allowed for termination under","paragraph_id":"para_413"},{"text":"Section 10.2(m).","paragraph_id":"para_414"},{"text":"(3) DiChiara’s disclosure of the emails “to a law office which already had sued SEP","paragraph_id":"para_415"},{"text":"and which was actively preparing to sue SEP again, and which emails related to","paragraph_id":"para_416"},{"text":"the subject matter of the lawsuits, constituted disruptive and unprofessional","paragraph_id":"para_417"},{"text":"conduct” under Section 10.2(n). Id.","paragraph_id":"para_418"},{"text":"(4) DiChiara’s disclosure “constituted a breach of [her] duty of loyalty owed to SEP”","paragraph_id":"para_419"},{"text":"under Section 10.2(q). Id.","paragraph_id":"para_420"},{"text":"The district court found that DiChiara violated all the policies listed in her termination letter, but","paragraph_id":"para_421"},{"text":"even a single violation allowed SEP to terminate DiChiara under the contract.","paragraph_id":"para_422"},{"text":"Start with the first reason. Pursuant to SEP policy, internal emails are SEP’s property.","paragraph_id":"para_423"},{"text":"And under Section 10.2(h) of the Employment Agreement, SEP could terminate DiChiara for","paragraph_id":"para_424"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 15","paragraph_id":"para_425"},{"text":"“[m]isappropriating any funds or property of SEP with the exception of incidental medical","paragraph_id":"para_426"},{"text":"supplies.” R. 44-4, Contract, PageID 529. Based on those terms, when DiChiara forwarded the","paragraph_id":"para_427"},{"text":"internal emails from Prichard and Colvin to Deters Law, she misappropriated SEP property and","paragraph_id":"para_428"},{"text":"thus could be fired for cause.","paragraph_id":"para_429"},{"text":"DiChiara contends that Prichard’s testimony contradicts this analysis because Prichard","paragraph_id":"para_430"},{"text":"agreed that no contract violation would occur if an employee “communicate[d] with a lawyer to","paragraph_id":"para_431"},{"text":"obtain information about [her] rights, obligations, or duties.” R. 45, Prichard Dep, PageID 1840.","paragraph_id":"para_432"},{"text":"But we agree with the district court that seeking information about one’s rights and forwarding","paragraph_id":"para_433"},{"text":"confidential documents to a third party are distinct concepts. Prichard’s testimony does not","paragraph_id":"para_434"},{"text":"mean that an employee may forward internal documents without violating the terms of the","paragraph_id":"para_435"},{"text":"contract. Nor does DiChiara provide any argument for why she needed to forward internal","paragraph_id":"para_436"},{"text":"emails in violation of company policy to obtain information about her rights in the first place.","paragraph_id":"para_437"},{"text":"Cf. Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App’x 473, 481 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that plaintiff","paragraph_id":"para_438"},{"text":"did not show why she needed to violate company policy).","paragraph_id":"para_439"},{"text":"DiChiara’s email use also allowed SEP to terminate her under Section 10.2(m). That","paragraph_id":"para_440"},{"text":"section allows termination if SEP determines that an employee has violated its “policies or","paragraph_id":"para_441"},{"text":"procedures.” R. 44-4, Contract, PageID 528. DiChiara signed an Electronic Communications","paragraph_id":"para_442"},{"text":"Policy that she would not use her email to “communicate SEP’s official position on any matter”","paragraph_id":"para_443"},{"text":"or “[f]or any purpose that is . . . in any way contrary to SEP’s best interests.” R. 50-45,","paragraph_id":"para_444"},{"text":"Electronic Comm. Policy, PageID 3109. And she agreed that “electronic forms of","paragraph_id":"para_445"},{"text":"communication . . . may only be used for appropriate business purposes.” Id. at 3110.","paragraph_id":"para_446"},{"text":"“Violation[s]” were “grounds for disciplinary action up to, and including, termination.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_447"},{"text":"DiChiara also signed a non-disclosure agreement that marked “any electronic or written record”","paragraph_id":"para_448"},{"text":"as confidential. R. 50-46, NDA, PageID 3112.","paragraph_id":"para_449"},{"text":"SEP determined that DiChiara violated its communications policies because her email","paragraph_id":"para_450"},{"text":"disclosure “was not for appropriate business purposes” and was “contrary to SEP’s best","paragraph_id":"para_451"},{"text":"interests.” R. 50-44, Termination Letter, PageID 3107. DiChiara argues that she did not violate","paragraph_id":"para_452"},{"text":"the communications policy because “[d]efendants admitted that engaging in protected activity","paragraph_id":"para_453"},{"text":"does not violate SEP or SEH policies.” Appellant Br. at 52. But for all the reasons expressed","paragraph_id":"para_454"},{"text":"No. 25-5396 DiChiara v. Summit Med. Group, Inc., et al. Page 16","paragraph_id":"para_455"},{"text":"above, DiChiara has not shown that she engaged in protected activity under state or federal law.","paragraph_id":"para_456"},{"text":"And DiChiara has not otherwise shown that SEP acted in bad faith when it determined that she","paragraph_id":"para_457"},{"text":"had violated company policies. So her breach of contract claim fails.","paragraph_id":"para_458"},{"text":"E.","paragraph_id":"para_459"},{"text":"DiChiara’s remaining state claims are contingent on breach of contract, so they fail too.","paragraph_id":"para_460"},{"text":"Without a breach, there is no tortious interference. See Snow Pallet, Inc. v. Monticello Banking","paragraph_id":"para_461"},{"text":"Co., 367 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 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