{"attribution":{"source":"legal.exploreworldai.com","canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","cite_as":"NovaCopilot, legal.exploreworldai.com (https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05)","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/revision","version":"legal-2026-10-10","fingerprint":"ewai:us:e7268f","proof":"sha256:0ff65ee545d415f5f02dfefaa30e5abe38dce92482273bd99cb5c4d61abbe54f","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","publisher":"NovaCopilot by ExploreWorld Legal","terms":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/om"},"brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","item":{"schema_version":"1.0.0","id":"us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","jurisdiction":"us","lang":"en","brand_source":"Source: NovaCopilot","brand":{"product":"NovaCopilot","platform":"ExploreWorldAI","infrastructure":"ExploreWorld Legal","infrastructure_url":"legal.exploreworldai.com","legal_entity":"Valkiv Ventures AB","permanent_url":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/novacopilot","source":"Source: NovaCopilot","powered_by":"Powered by NovaCopilot","license":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/licensvillkor"},"sections":[{"title":"RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"File Name: 25a0206p.06","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT","paragraphs":["para_6","para_7","para_8","para_9","para_10","para_11","para_12","para_13","para_14","para_15","para_16","para_17","para_18","para_19"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862","paragraphs":["para_21","para_22"]},{"title":"Argued: April 30, 2025","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Decided and Filed: August 5, 2025","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Before: MOORE and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.*","paragraphs":["para_26"]},{"title":"COUNSEL","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"ARGUED: Rachele T. Yohe, BULLOCK & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Appellants. Carte P. Goodwin, FROST BROWN TODD LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for","paragraphs":["para_30"]},{"title":"LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Carte P. Goodwin, Blake N. Humphrey, FROST","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"BROWN TODD LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, Greg E. Mitchell, David C. Olson, GLOBAL","paragraphs":["para_33","para_34","para_35","para_36"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 2","paragraphs":["para_38"]},{"title":"OPINION","paragraphs":["para_40"]},{"title":"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. HBKY, LLC and Elk River Export, LLC, each claim","paragraphs":["para_42","para_43","para_44","para_45","para_46"]},{"title":"LLC. Kingdom contracted with Elk River for Elk River to cut and remove timber from certain","paragraphs":["para_48","para_49","para_50"]},{"title":"HBKY in June 2016. And Kingdom signed the operative contract with Elk River in March","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"2017.2","paragraphs":["para_53"]},{"title":"Kingdom ousted Elk River from the properties, breaching the timber contract. Then, Kingdom","paragraphs":["para_55","para_56"]},{"title":"In 2018, HBKY secured a judgment in New York federal court declaring Kingdom in","paragraphs":["para_58","para_59","para_60","para_61","para_62","para_63","para_64","para_65","para_66"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 3","paragraphs":["para_68","para_69"]},{"title":"The district court granted summary judgment to HBKY, rejecting all of Elk River’s","paragraphs":["para_71","para_72","para_73"]},{"title":"District courts grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any","paragraphs":["para_75","para_76","para_77"]},{"title":"The parties agree that Kentucky law, including its adoption of the Uniform Commercial","paragraphs":["para_79","para_80","para_81","para_82","para_83","para_84","para_85"]},{"title":"Elk River has two main arguments. First, it argues that the loan documents carved out an","paragraphs":["para_87","para_88","para_89"]},{"title":"We first consider the authorized-sale theory. When a debtor sells collateral, the security","paragraphs":["para_91","para_92","para_93"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 4","paragraphs":["para_95","para_96","para_97","para_98","para_99","para_100","para_101","para_102","para_103","para_104","para_105"]},{"title":"HBKY did not agree to release its security interest. When Kingdom mortgaged its","paragraphs":["para_107","para_108","para_109","para_110","para_111"]},{"title":"The mortgage also discussed sales of the collateral. It provided: “The lien and security","paragraphs":["para_113","para_114","para_115","para_116"]},{"title":"In response, Elk River points to three provisions of other documents that were part of the","paragraphs":["para_118","para_119","para_120","para_121","para_122"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 5","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Second, Elk River cites the Note Purchase Agreement, which provided that HBKY would","paragraphs":["para_125","para_126","para_127","para_128","para_129"]},{"title":"Third, Elk River points to the Royalty Assignment. In that document, Kingdom","paragraphs":["para_131","para_132","para_133","para_134","para_135"]},{"title":"While these references may show that HBKY expected Kingdom to sell timber and knew","paragraphs":["para_137","para_138","para_139"]},{"title":"S.W.3d 841, 845 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000). And while the Security Agreement, Note Purchase","paragraphs":["para_141"]},{"title":"HBKY’s security interest will survive any sale—a “sale” shall not “impair[]” the security","paragraphs":["para_143"]},{"title":"Can we still find some sort of implied release? Elk River thinks so. As support, it cites","paragraphs":["para_145","para_146","para_147","para_148","para_149","para_150","para_151"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 6","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court has found authorization free of a security interest","paragraphs":["para_154","para_155","para_156","para_157"]},{"title":"But neither Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. nor Trimble govern here.3 In neither case did","paragraphs":["para_159","para_160","para_161","para_162","para_163","para_164","para_165","para_166","para_167","para_168","para_169","para_170","para_171","para_172","para_173","para_174","para_175","para_176","para_177","para_178","para_179","para_180","para_181","para_182","para_183","para_184","para_185","para_186","para_187","para_188"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 7","paragraphs":["para_190"]},{"title":"Even when a secured party doesn’t agree to release his lien, a later buyer can still claim","paragraphs":["para_192","para_193","para_194"]},{"title":"This defense has several elements. The party must “buy[] goods in good faith, without","paragraphs":["para_196","para_197","para_198","para_199","para_200"]},{"title":"This defense protects good-faith buyers when the secured party leaves the collateral with","paragraphs":["para_202","para_203","para_204","para_205","para_206"]},{"title":"We’re on summary judgment, so the burden generally rests on HBKY (as the moving","paragraphs":["para_208","para_209","para_210","para_211","para_212","para_213"]},{"title":"HBKY has met its burden. HBKY has shown that Elk River hasn’t provided evidentiary","paragraphs":["para_215","para_216"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 8","paragraphs":[]},{"title":"We acknowledge that Elk River did do enough on one or two elements—for example, on","paragraphs":["para_219","para_220","para_221","para_222","para_223","para_224","para_225"]},{"title":"622, 623 (Ky. Ct. App. 1924) (internal quotation marks omitted). The term “immediate","paragraphs":["para_227","para_228","para_229","para_230","para_231","para_232","para_233","para_234","para_235","para_236","para_237","para_238","para_239","para_240","para_241","para_242","para_243","para_244","para_245","para_246"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 9","paragraphs":["para_248","para_249"]},{"title":"But all of this helps Elk River on only one part of its defense. Questions about title and","paragraphs":["para_251","para_252","para_253"]},{"title":"The Plaintiff does not even attempt to claim that Elk River purchased the timber","paragraphs":["para_255","para_256","para_257","para_258","para_259","para_260","para_261","para_262","para_263"]},{"title":"But Elk River never showed the district court that Kingdom was “in the business of","paragraphs":["para_265","para_266","para_267","para_268","para_269","para_270","para_271","para_272","para_273","para_274","para_275","para_276","para_277","para_278","para_279","para_280","para_281"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 10","paragraphs":["para_283","para_284"]},{"title":"On appeal, Elk River directs us to HBKY’s complaint, which joined many defendants","paragraphs":["para_286","para_287","para_288","para_289"]},{"title":"The Columbia contract doesn’t do Elk River any good. First, Elk River didn’t cite it in","paragraphs":["para_291","para_292","para_293","para_294","para_295","para_296"]},{"title":"Second, even considering the Columbia contract, there’s still insufficient evidence to","paragraphs":["para_298","para_299","para_300","para_301","para_302"]},{"title":"K-Z Motors & Leasing Co., 309 N.E.2d 567, 568–69 (Ill. 1974) (sufficient evidence that","paragraphs":["para_304","para_305","para_306","para_307","para_308","para_309"]},{"title":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 11","paragraphs":["para_311","para_312"]},{"title":"It’s true that Kingdom sold timber to Elk River. But one transaction alone does not","paragraphs":["para_314","para_315","para_316"]},{"title":"Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (car rental company not in the business of","paragraphs":["para_318","para_319","para_320","para_321"]},{"title":"In sum, this record doesn’t tell us very much about who Kingdom is or what it does. The","paragraphs":["para_323","para_324"]},{"title":"The loan didn’t carve out any exception to HBKY’s first-priority lien, and Elk River","paragraphs":["para_326","para_327","para_328","para_329"]}],"paragraphs":[{"text":"RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION","paragraph_id":"para_1"},{"text":"Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)","paragraph_id":"para_2"},{"text":"File Name: 25a0206p.06","paragraph_id":"para_3"},{"text":"UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS","paragraph_id":"para_4"},{"text":"FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT","paragraph_id":"para_5"},{"text":"HBKY, LLC,","paragraph_id":"para_6"},{"text":"Plaintiff-Appellee,","paragraph_id":"para_7"},{"text":"v.","paragraph_id":"para_8"},{"text":"ELK RIVER EXPORT, LLC; ROBIN T. WILSON,","paragraph_id":"para_9"},{"text":"Defendants-Appellants.","paragraph_id":"para_10"},{"text":"┐","paragraph_id":"para_11"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_12"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_13"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_14"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_15"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_16"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_17"},{"text":"│","paragraph_id":"para_18"},{"text":"┘","paragraph_id":"para_19"},{"text":"No. 24-5862","paragraph_id":"para_20"},{"text":"Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.","paragraph_id":"para_21"},{"text":"No. 6:21-cv-00101—Gregory F. VanTatenhove, District Judge.","paragraph_id":"para_22"},{"text":"Argued: April 30, 2025","paragraph_id":"para_23"},{"text":"Decided and Filed: August 5, 2025","paragraph_id":"para_24"},{"text":"Before: MOORE and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.*","paragraph_id":"para_25"},{"text":"_________________","paragraph_id":"para_26"},{"text":"COUNSEL","paragraph_id":"para_27"},{"text":"ARGUED: Rachele T. Yohe, BULLOCK & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for","paragraph_id":"para_28"},{"text":"Appellants. Carte P. Goodwin, FROST BROWN TODD LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, for","paragraph_id":"para_29"},{"text":"Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rachele T. Yohe, Thomas D. Bullock, BULLOCK & ASSOCIATES,","paragraph_id":"para_30"},{"text":"LLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Carte P. Goodwin, Blake N. Humphrey, FROST","paragraph_id":"para_31"},{"text":"BROWN TODD LLP, Charleston, West Virginia, Greg E. Mitchell, David C. Olson, GLOBAL","paragraph_id":"para_32"},{"text":"REGULATORY RISK & COMPLIANCE PLLC, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.","paragraph_id":"para_33"},{"text":"*During the pendency of this appeal, the Hon. Richard F. Suhrheinrich, a member of the original panel,","paragraph_id":"para_34"},{"text":"retired. Judge Moore and Judge Nalbandian act as a quorum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).","paragraph_id":"para_35"},{"text":">","paragraph_id":"para_36"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 2","paragraph_id":"para_37"},{"text":"_________________","paragraph_id":"para_38"},{"text":"OPINION","paragraph_id":"para_39"},{"text":"_________________","paragraph_id":"para_40"},{"text":"NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. HBKY, LLC and Elk River Export, LLC, each claim","paragraph_id":"para_41"},{"text":"thousands of acres of timber in Kentucky. They interpret a series of timber sales contracts,","paragraph_id":"para_42"},{"text":"security agreements, and mortgages differently. Finding that HBKY had the better reading of the","paragraph_id":"para_43"},{"text":"relevant documents, the district court granted summary judgment. We agree, and so we affirm.","paragraph_id":"para_44"},{"text":"I.","paragraph_id":"para_45"},{"text":"HBKY and Elk River both had deals with a third company, Kingdom Energy Resources,","paragraph_id":"para_46"},{"text":"LLC. Kingdom contracted with Elk River for Elk River to cut and remove timber from certain","paragraph_id":"para_47"},{"text":"land. But Kingdom also took out a $22 million loan from a group of lenders, who set up HBKY","paragraph_id":"para_48"},{"text":"to handle the loan.1 In return, Kingdom mortgaged several properties—including those on which","paragraph_id":"para_49"},{"text":"the timber stood—and gave HBKY a security interest in them. Kingdom executed the loan with","paragraph_id":"para_50"},{"text":"HBKY in June 2016. And Kingdom signed the operative contract with Elk River in March","paragraph_id":"para_51"},{"text":"2017.2","paragraph_id":"para_52"},{"text":"Kingdom didn’t follow through on its obligations with either Elk River or HBKY. First,","paragraph_id":"para_53"},{"text":"Kingdom ousted Elk River from the properties, breaching the timber contract. Then, Kingdom","paragraph_id":"para_54"},{"text":"didn’t pay back the loan, leaving HBKY in the lurch. That left Elk River and HBKY both with","paragraph_id":"para_55"},{"text":"valid legal claims against Kingdom, but also competing for the same prize—the timber.","paragraph_id":"para_56"},{"text":"In 2018, HBKY secured a judgment in New York federal court declaring Kingdom in","paragraph_id":"para_57"},{"text":"default on the loan. HBKY then registered that judgment in the Eastern District of Kentucky and","paragraph_id":"para_58"},{"text":"began foreclosing on the collateral, including the timber, located there. The foreclosure suit","paragraph_id":"para_59"},{"text":"1From now on, we refer to the lenders (and their interests) as HBKY (and HBKY’s interests). HBKY is","paragraph_id":"para_60"},{"text":"technically the lenders’ agent and assignee.","paragraph_id":"para_61"},{"text":"2Elk River and Kingdom first signed a timber contract on May 5, 2016, before the secured loan’s","paragraph_id":"para_62"},{"text":"execution. But they renegotiated several times and kept settling on different terms. They replaced the original","paragraph_id":"para_63"},{"text":"contract with a new one on May 11, 2016, also before Kingdom mortgaged the timber to HBKY. After the loan and","paragraph_id":"para_64"},{"text":"mortgage, Elk River and Kingdom renegotiated again with a third timber contract on July 7, 2016. They did so for","paragraph_id":"para_65"},{"text":"the final time on March 1, 2017.","paragraph_id":"para_66"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 3","paragraph_id":"para_67"},{"text":"joined Elk River and its president, Robin Wilson, as defendants who claimed an interest in the","paragraph_id":"para_68"},{"text":"collateral.","paragraph_id":"para_69"},{"text":"The district court granted summary judgment to HBKY, rejecting all of Elk River’s","paragraph_id":"para_70"},{"text":"arguments—Elk River didn’t take title to the timber under the contracts, didn’t have a superior","paragraph_id":"para_71"},{"text":"interest, and wasn’t a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Elk River appealed.","paragraph_id":"para_72"},{"text":"II.","paragraph_id":"para_73"},{"text":"District courts grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any","paragraph_id":"para_74"},{"text":"material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).","paragraph_id":"para_75"},{"text":"We review summary-judgment grants de novo. Walden v. Gen. Elec. Int’l, Inc., 119 F.4th 1049,","paragraph_id":"para_76"},{"text":"1056 (6th Cir. 2024).","paragraph_id":"para_77"},{"text":"The parties agree that Kentucky law, including its adoption of the Uniform Commercial","paragraph_id":"para_78"},{"text":"Code (UCC), governs the contracts and loan documents. In a secured transaction under Article 9","paragraph_id":"para_79"},{"text":"of the UCC, a borrower who takes a loan gives the lender a security interest in some property—","paragraph_id":"para_80"},{"text":"the collateral—to ensure repayment of the debt. The secured lender can foreclose on the","paragraph_id":"para_81"},{"text":"collateral if the debtor defaults. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.9-201, 203, 601.","paragraph_id":"para_82"},{"text":"When Kingdom took out the loan, HBKY took a security interest in the timber.","paragraph_id":"para_83"},{"text":"Generally, a valid, perfected security interest prevails over other interests. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.","paragraph_id":"para_84"},{"text":"§ 355.9-201. So the question is whether Elk River can trump HBKY’s security interest.","paragraph_id":"para_85"},{"text":"Elk River has two main arguments. First, it argues that the loan documents carved out an","paragraph_id":"para_86"},{"text":"exception for the timber, authorizing the sale to Elk River free of the security interest. Second,","paragraph_id":"para_87"},{"text":"Elk River claims that it bought the timber in the ordinary course of business.","paragraph_id":"para_88"},{"text":"A.","paragraph_id":"para_89"},{"text":"We first consider the authorized-sale theory. When a debtor sells collateral, the security","paragraph_id":"para_90"},{"text":"interest follows the collateral through the sale “unless the secured party authorized the","paragraph_id":"para_91"},{"text":"disposition free of the security interest.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.9-315(1)(a). Thus, without","paragraph_id":"para_92"},{"text":"the secured party’s consent, “a debtor cannot avoid or nullify a security interest in property by","paragraph_id":"para_93"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 4","paragraph_id":"para_94"},{"text":"sale or transfer.” In re Bluegrass Ford-Mercury, Inc., 942 F.2d 381, 386 (6th Cir. 1991)","paragraph_id":"para_95"},{"text":"(Kentucky UCC).","paragraph_id":"para_96"},{"text":"The secured party must authorize a sale free of the security interest to release the security","paragraph_id":"para_97"},{"text":"interest. In other words, the secured party must give consent for both the sale and the dissolution","paragraph_id":"para_98"},{"text":"of the lien. See id. So consent to “the sale of secured property” isn’t necessarily the same as","paragraph_id":"para_99"},{"text":"consent to “a transfer free of a security interest.” Wegner v. Grunewaldt, 821 F.2d 1317, 1321","paragraph_id":"para_100"},{"text":"(8th Cir. 1987) (South Dakota UCC); see also In re S. Props., Inc., 44 B.R. 838, 842 (Bankr.","paragraph_id":"para_101"},{"text":"E.D. Va. 1984) (same under Virginia UCC); In re Hanson Restaurants, Inc., 155 B.R. 758, 761–","paragraph_id":"para_102"},{"text":"62 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (same under Minnesota UCC). If the secured party authorizes a sale","paragraph_id":"para_103"},{"text":"but doesn’t lift the lien, the transferee can still lawfully take the collateral. But he takes it","paragraph_id":"para_104"},{"text":"encumbered.","paragraph_id":"para_105"},{"text":"HBKY did not agree to release its security interest. When Kingdom mortgaged its","paragraph_id":"para_106"},{"text":"property as collateral for the loan, Kingdom and HBKY agreed that HBKY would take “a","paragraph_id":"para_107"},{"text":"continuing security interest in . . . [a]ll . . . timber.” R. 316-7, Mortgage, p.2–3, PageID 6296–","paragraph_id":"para_108"},{"text":"97. The mortgage provided that this security interest was a “valid, perfected first priority lien.”","paragraph_id":"para_109"},{"text":"Id. at p.7, PageID 6301. And it stated that “the lien of this Security Document shall be absolute","paragraph_id":"para_110"},{"text":"and unconditional.” Id. at p.23, PageID 6317.","paragraph_id":"para_111"},{"text":"The mortgage also discussed sales of the collateral. It provided: “The lien and security","paragraph_id":"para_112"},{"text":"interest hereof shall not in any manner be impaired or affected by . . . sale . . . or disposition of","paragraph_id":"para_113"},{"text":"any of the Secured Obligations, or of any of the collateral or security therefor . . . .” Id. Put","paragraph_id":"para_114"},{"text":"simply, any “sale” of the collateral would not “impair[]” the security interest. So the parties did","paragraph_id":"para_115"},{"text":"not agree to lift the security interest upon the timber’s sale.","paragraph_id":"para_116"},{"text":"In response, Elk River points to three provisions of other documents that were part of the","paragraph_id":"para_117"},{"text":"larger loan package. First, Elk River notes that the Security Agreement stated: “Except for the","paragraph_id":"para_118"},{"text":"sale or lease of Inventory in the ordinary course of business and other sales of assets expressly","paragraph_id":"para_119"},{"text":"permitted by the term of the Note Purchase Agreement, each Debtor will keep the Collateral at","paragraph_id":"para_120"},{"text":"the locations specified.” R. 1-7, Security Agreement, p.11, PageID 859. Elk River argues that","paragraph_id":"para_121"},{"text":"this clause assumed that timber sales would go forward.","paragraph_id":"para_122"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 5","paragraph_id":"para_123"},{"text":"Second, Elk River cites the Note Purchase Agreement, which provided that HBKY would","paragraph_id":"para_124"},{"text":"“establish . . . procedures acceptable to [HBKY], in [HBKY’s] sole discretion, for the collection","paragraph_id":"para_125"},{"text":"of checks, wire transfers, revenues, sales proceeds (including, without limitation from the sale of","paragraph_id":"para_126"},{"text":"timber . . .).” R. 317-6, Note Purchase Agreement, p.4, PageID 8075. Elk River again insists","paragraph_id":"para_127"},{"text":"that this clause assumed that Elk River would sell timber—how else would it give HBKY “sales","paragraph_id":"para_128"},{"text":"proceeds” from a “sale of timber”?","paragraph_id":"para_129"},{"text":"Third, Elk River points to the Royalty Assignment. In that document, Kingdom","paragraph_id":"para_130"},{"text":"warranted to HBKY “that the Royalty Interests conveyed to . . . [HBKY] are each free and clear","paragraph_id":"para_131"},{"text":"of any and all . . . encumbrances or burdens other than . . . [the] Timber Sale Contract between","paragraph_id":"para_132"},{"text":"Grantor and Elk River Export, LLC.” R. 50-3, Royalty Assignment, pp.1–2, PageID 1886–87.","paragraph_id":"para_133"},{"text":"The Royalty Assignment also stated that Kingdom was supposed to market and sell the timber.","paragraph_id":"para_134"},{"text":"Id. at p.3, PageID 1888.","paragraph_id":"para_135"},{"text":"While these references may show that HBKY expected Kingdom to sell timber and knew","paragraph_id":"para_136"},{"text":"of Kingdom’s dealings with Elk River, they don’t show that HBKY agreed to extinguish its","paragraph_id":"para_137"},{"text":"security interest. The various legal instruments, executed together as part of one larger","paragraph_id":"para_138"},{"text":"transaction, must be interpreted together. See ABCO-BRAMER, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 55","paragraph_id":"para_139"},{"text":"S.W.3d 841, 845 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000). And while the Security Agreement, Note Purchase","paragraph_id":"para_140"},{"text":"Agreement, and Royalty Assignment may authorize timber sales, the mortgage makes clear that","paragraph_id":"para_141"},{"text":"HBKY’s security interest will survive any sale—a “sale” shall not “impair[]” the security","paragraph_id":"para_142"},{"text":"interest. R. 316-7, Mortgage, p.23, PageID 6317.","paragraph_id":"para_143"},{"text":"Can we still find some sort of implied release? Elk River thinks so. As support, it cites","paragraph_id":"para_144"},{"text":"one case, Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Middlesboro Motor Sales, Inc., which held that","paragraph_id":"para_145"},{"text":"authorization to sell goods in the ordinary course of business can be authorization free of the","paragraph_id":"para_146"},{"text":"lien. 424 S.W.2d 409, 412–13 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). The agreement in that case provided that","paragraph_id":"para_147"},{"text":"the debtor had “liberty to exhibit and to sell each chattle [sic] in the ordinary course of trade and","paragraph_id":"para_148"},{"text":"for the respective Principal Obligations shown in the respective statements.” Id. at 412 (internal","paragraph_id":"para_149"},{"text":"quotation marks omitted). At face value, this looks a little like Kingdom’s situation; Elk River","paragraph_id":"para_150"},{"text":"argues that the loan documents let Kingdom sell trees in the ordinary course.","paragraph_id":"para_151"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 6","paragraph_id":"para_152"},{"text":"Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court has found authorization free of a security interest","paragraph_id":"para_153"},{"text":"implied under some circumstances. In Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., the court held that a","paragraph_id":"para_154"},{"text":"security agreement allowing collateral to “be sold, exchanged or otherwise transferred or","paragraph_id":"para_155"},{"text":"assigned” permitted a transferee to take the property sans lien. 700 S.W.2d 396, 397–98 (Ky.","paragraph_id":"para_156"},{"text":"1985).","paragraph_id":"para_157"},{"text":"But neither Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. nor Trimble govern here.3 In neither case did","paragraph_id":"para_158"},{"text":"the contracts explicitly say that the security interest would remain unaltered by any sale. The","paragraph_id":"para_159"},{"text":"mortgage in this case does. So Kingdom could dispose of the timber, but the mortgage made","paragraph_id":"para_160"},{"text":"clear that HBKY would keep its security interest, whatever happened to it.","paragraph_id":"para_161"},{"text":"3We also have questions about these cases’ applicability today because the relevant UCC language has","paragraph_id":"para_162"},{"text":"since changed.","paragraph_id":"para_163"},{"text":"Before 2001, the UCC and the Kentucky UCC required that “the disposition . . . was authorized,” without a","paragraph_id":"para_164"},{"text":"clear statement that the sale be authorized free of the security interest. The old language was more amenable to","paragraph_id":"para_165"},{"text":"finding implied releases, as Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. and Trimble show. See Pre-Revision U.C.C. § 9-306(2),","paragraph_id":"para_166"},{"text":"in Appendix O, Uniform Commercial Code (Am. L. Inst. & Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L. 2023) (“[A]","paragraph_id":"para_167"},{"text":"security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the","paragraph_id":"para_168"},{"text":"disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise.”) (emphasis added); 1958","paragraph_id":"para_169"},{"text":"Ky. Acts 396 (“[A] security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition","paragraph_id":"para_170"},{"text":"thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party . . . .”) (emphasis added).","paragraph_id":"para_171"},{"text":"To be sure, the official commentary didn’t favor implied releases. It remarked that a “transferee will","paragraph_id":"para_172"},{"text":"acquire the collateral free and clear of a preexisting security interest only if the disposition of the collateral by the","paragraph_id":"para_173"},{"text":"debtor was authorized by the secured party free and clear of the secured party’s security interest.” Pre-Revision","paragraph_id":"para_174"},{"text":"U.C.C. § 9-306 cmt. 3, in Appendix O, Uniform Commercial Code (Am. L. Inst. & Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on","paragraph_id":"para_175"},{"text":"Unif. State L. 2023) (emphasis added). And other courts didn’t favor implied releases. See Wegner, 821 F.2d at","paragraph_id":"para_176"},{"text":"1321; N. Com. Co. v. Cobb, 778 P.2d 205, 208 (Alaska 1989). Neither did the dissent in Trimble. 700 S.W.2d at","paragraph_id":"para_177"},{"text":"398 (Stephenson, J., dissenting) (“We should afford more dignity to a recorded security interest . . . . Any","paragraph_id":"para_178"},{"text":"authorization in accordance with the statute should be specific and not by inference.”).","paragraph_id":"para_179"},{"text":"But in 2000, the text of the UCC and Kentucky UCC was amended (effective 2001). Now the text states","paragraph_id":"para_180"},{"text":"that a security interest continues “unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest.”","paragraph_id":"para_181"},{"text":"U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1) (Am. L. Inst. & Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L. 2023); 2000 Ky. Acts 1321 (codified","paragraph_id":"para_182"},{"text":"at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.9-315(1)(a)). According to the commentary, this change “makes explicit that the","paragraph_id":"para_183"},{"text":"authorized disposition to which [the provision] refers is an authorized disposition ‘free of’ the security interest.”","paragraph_id":"para_184"},{"text":"U.C.C. § 9-315 cmt. 2 (Am. L. Inst. & Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State L. 2023); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.9-","paragraph_id":"para_185"},{"text":"315 cmt. 2.","paragraph_id":"para_186"},{"text":"So whatever the correct reading of the pre-2001 UCC text, it’s possible that the Kentucky courts would","paragraph_id":"para_187"},{"text":"approach implied releases differently today.","paragraph_id":"para_188"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 7","paragraph_id":"para_189"},{"text":"B.","paragraph_id":"para_190"},{"text":"Even when a secured party doesn’t agree to release his lien, a later buyer can still claim","paragraph_id":"para_191"},{"text":"the collateral lien-free as a “buyer in the ordinary course of business.” Such a buyer “takes free","paragraph_id":"para_192"},{"text":"of a security interest created by the buyer’s seller, even if the security interest is perfected and","paragraph_id":"para_193"},{"text":"the buyer knows of its existence.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.9-320(1).","paragraph_id":"para_194"},{"text":"This defense has several elements. The party must “buy[] goods in good faith, without","paragraph_id":"para_195"},{"text":"knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary","paragraph_id":"para_196"},{"text":"course from a person . . . in the business of selling goods of that kind.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.","paragraph_id":"para_197"},{"text":"§ 355.1-201(2)(i). A sale in the “ordinary course” must comport “with the usual or customary","paragraph_id":"para_198"},{"text":"practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller’s own usual or","paragraph_id":"para_199"},{"text":"customary practices.” Id.","paragraph_id":"para_200"},{"text":"This defense protects good-faith buyers when the secured party leaves the collateral with","paragraph_id":"para_201"},{"text":"a debtor who sells goods of that kind. By doing so, the secured party “confers apparent authority","paragraph_id":"para_202"},{"text":"on the debtor to sell the goods,” and the law protects the buyer over the secured party, who","paragraph_id":"para_203"},{"text":"assumes the risk of the debtor making an unauthorized transaction. Madison Cap. Co., LLC v. S","paragraph_id":"para_204"},{"text":"& S Salvage, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 923, 931 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (Kentucky UCC), aff’d, 507 F.","paragraph_id":"para_205"},{"text":"App’x 528 (6th Cir. 2012).","paragraph_id":"para_206"},{"text":"We’re on summary judgment, so the burden generally rests on HBKY (as the moving","paragraph_id":"para_207"},{"text":"party) to make its case. But at trial, Elk River would bear the burden of proof on “buyer in the","paragraph_id":"para_208"},{"text":"ordinary course,” an affirmative defense. See United States v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.","paragraph_id":"para_209"},{"text":"of Chi., 889 F.2d 1248, 1253–54 (2d Cir. 1989). And when the nonmovant will bear the burden,","paragraph_id":"para_210"},{"text":"the movant has to demonstrate “that the nonmoving party has failed to make a showing sufficient","paragraph_id":"para_211"},{"text":"to establish the existence of an essential element of that claim.” Pineda v. Hamilton County, 977","paragraph_id":"para_212"},{"text":"F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).","paragraph_id":"para_213"},{"text":"HBKY has met its burden. HBKY has shown that Elk River hasn’t provided evidentiary","paragraph_id":"para_214"},{"text":"support for each element of its defense. Elk River failed to do so below, and it can’t cure that","paragraph_id":"para_215"},{"text":"problem on appeal.","paragraph_id":"para_216"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 8","paragraph_id":"para_217"},{"text":"We acknowledge that Elk River did do enough on one or two elements—for example, on","paragraph_id":"para_218"},{"text":"the “buyer of goods in good faith” prong. Elk River’s briefing (below and here) argues at length","paragraph_id":"para_219"},{"text":"that the contracts gave it title (not an “option”) to the trees as goods (not real property), and we","paragraph_id":"para_220"},{"text":"understand this argument to go, at least partially, to the “buyer in ordinary course” elements.","paragraph_id":"para_221"},{"text":"The district court rejected Elk River’s title argument by misapplying the law of property interests","paragraph_id":"para_222"},{"text":"in standing timber.","paragraph_id":"para_223"},{"text":"A “sale of standing trees, in contemplation of their immediate separation from the soil . . .","paragraph_id":"para_224"},{"text":"is a constructive severance of them, and they pass as chattels.” Cheatham v. Head, 262 S.W.","paragraph_id":"para_225"},{"text":"622, 623 (Ky. Ct. App. 1924) (internal quotation marks omitted). The term “immediate","paragraph_id":"para_226"},{"text":"separation” or “immediate severance” is a bit of misnomer. It “does not mean a severance ‘at","paragraph_id":"para_227"},{"text":"once.’” Id. at 624. It’s “a relative term and contemplates a severance as soon as can reasonably","paragraph_id":"para_228"},{"text":"be done under the circumstances, which include the amount of timber, its accessibility, labor","paragraph_id":"para_229"},{"text":"conditions, etc.” Id. It means that the timberer must begin working diligently and remove the","paragraph_id":"para_230"},{"text":"trees with reasonable speed, not that the trees must be removed by tomorrow.","paragraph_id":"para_231"},{"text":"A timber purchaser generally forfeits title to any trees not removed during the contractual","paragraph_id":"para_232"},{"text":"time window. But if the purchaser “was prevented . . . by act of the seller from removing” any","paragraph_id":"para_233"},{"text":"timber during that time, then he does not forfeit it. Ream v. Fugate, 97 S.W.2d 11, 14–15 (Ky.","paragraph_id":"para_234"},{"text":"Ct. App. 1936). So when a landowner improperly ousts a purchaser from the land, courts will","paragraph_id":"para_235"},{"text":"add a “reasonable time” on to the term. Wright v. Cline, 189 S.W. 425, 426 (Ky. Ct. App. 1916).","paragraph_id":"para_236"},{"text":"The district court ruled that the timber contracts weren’t for title, but the court did not","paragraph_id":"para_237"},{"text":"conduct the multi-factor “immediate severance” analysis that Kentucky caselaw calls for. See","paragraph_id":"para_238"},{"text":"Cheatham, 262 S.W. at 623–24. We aren’t sure that the contracts were for title—but we aren’t","paragraph_id":"para_239"},{"text":"sure that they weren’t, either. If the case turned solely on this point, summary judgment","paragraph_id":"para_240"},{"text":"would’ve been improper.4","paragraph_id":"para_241"},{"text":"The district court also erred in ruling that Elk River forfeited its right to whatever timber","paragraph_id":"para_242"},{"text":"it hadn’t yet cut down. Kingdom ousted Elk River in breach of the contract, meaning that the","paragraph_id":"para_243"},{"text":"4We don’t think the record holds enough evidence to say—as a matter of law—that the contracts were or","paragraph_id":"para_244"},{"text":"weren’t for “immediate severance.” Declining to give summary judgment to HBKY wouldn’t have necessarily","paragraph_id":"para_245"},{"text":"meant granting it to Elk River.","paragraph_id":"para_246"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 9","paragraph_id":"para_247"},{"text":"clock stopped running. See Ream, 97 S.W.2d at 14–15. How could Elk River have exercised its","paragraph_id":"para_248"},{"text":"rights while Kingdom blocked access to the land?5","paragraph_id":"para_249"},{"text":"But all of this helps Elk River on only one part of its defense. Questions about title and","paragraph_id":"para_250"},{"text":"buyer-of-goods status only get the company so far. In its district-court briefing, Elk River didn’t","paragraph_id":"para_251"},{"text":"apply the law to the facts on the defense’s remaining elements with argument and citation to","paragraph_id":"para_252"},{"text":"record evidence. Aside from the title discussion, Elk River’s analysis consists of two sentences:","paragraph_id":"para_253"},{"text":"The Plaintiff does not even attempt to claim that Elk River purchased the timber","paragraph_id":"para_254"},{"text":"“with knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods[.]”","paragraph_id":"para_255"},{"text":"[DN 316, 317.] In fact, the opposite is true as the Royalty Collateral Agreements","paragraph_id":"para_256"},{"text":"explicitly authorize Kingdom to market and sell the timber, and these agreements","paragraph_id":"para_257"},{"text":"also specifically identify prospective timber contracts by and between Kingdom","paragraph_id":"para_258"},{"text":"and Elk River therein. [DN 50-3.]","paragraph_id":"para_259"},{"text":"R. 321, Elk River Resp./Reply, p.8, PageID 9865 (citations in original). That’s it. In other","paragraph_id":"para_260"},{"text":"words, there’s one sentence about what HBKY didn’t demonstrate, even though it’s Elk River’s","paragraph_id":"para_261"},{"text":"burden to provide affirmative support. And there’s another sentence arguably claiming that Elk","paragraph_id":"para_262"},{"text":"River had no malintent.","paragraph_id":"para_263"},{"text":"But Elk River never showed the district court that Kingdom was “in the business of","paragraph_id":"para_264"},{"text":"selling” timber, or that Elk River took title “in the ordinary course.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.","paragraph_id":"para_265"},{"text":"§ 355.1-201(2)(i). The district court wasn’t told what Kingdom’s business was, how it operated,","paragraph_id":"para_266"},{"text":"how the contracts with Elk River came about—or much else about Kingdom. Elk River","paragraph_id":"para_267"},{"text":"5Elk River also argued below that if it had secured title to the timber before the loan, then HBKY never","paragraph_id":"para_268"},{"text":"took a valid security interest. It’s true that if the pre-loan contracts gave title to Elk River in May 2016, then","paragraph_id":"para_269"},{"text":"Kingdom wouldn’t have had any title to mortgage in June 2016 (save, perhaps, a reversionary interest). See supra","paragraph_id":"para_270"},{"text":"note 2 (pre-mortgage contracts); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 355.9-203(2) (debtor must have “rights in the collateral” to","paragraph_id":"para_271"},{"text":"give a valid security interest); Bach v. Little, 131 S.W. 172, 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1910) (reversion in standing timber).","paragraph_id":"para_272"},{"text":"On appeal, though, Elk River hasn’t renewed its argument that HBKY never took a valid security interest. So we do","paragraph_id":"para_273"},{"text":"not reach the issue.","paragraph_id":"para_274"},{"text":"Elk River tacks on an issue-preclusion argument for good measure. Years after this case’s events, a state","paragraph_id":"para_275"},{"text":"court declared Kingdom in breach for ousting Elk River, and Elk River now suggests that the state-court judgment","paragraph_id":"para_276"},{"text":"precludes HBKY from disputing who has title to the timber.","paragraph_id":"para_277"},{"text":"It doesn’t. First, the state-court decision expressly noted that Elk River’s rights remained subject to","paragraph_id":"para_278"},{"text":"HBKY’s foreclosure action in federal court. Second, issue preclusion wouldn’t apply anyway. Title wasn’t actually","paragraph_id":"para_279"},{"text":"litigated or necessary to the state-court judgment, and HBKY wasn’t a party in that suit. See Weatherford U.S., L.P.","paragraph_id":"para_280"},{"text":"v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 68 F.4th 1030, 1039 (6th Cir. 2023).","paragraph_id":"para_281"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 10","paragraph_id":"para_282"},{"text":"provided no declaration, interrogatories, or deposition testimony asserting that Kingdom was in","paragraph_id":"para_283"},{"text":"the timber business.6 Nor did it offer business records or other evidence to that end.","paragraph_id":"para_284"},{"text":"On appeal, Elk River directs us to HBKY’s complaint, which joined many defendants","paragraph_id":"para_285"},{"text":"claiming an interest in the collateral. One such defendant is Columbia Plywood Corporation,","paragraph_id":"para_286"},{"text":"who the complaint alleges also had a timber contract for some of the land (we aren’t given","paragraph_id":"para_287"},{"text":"further details). This contract, Elk River suggests, is evidence of Kingdom’s involvement in the","paragraph_id":"para_288"},{"text":"timber business.","paragraph_id":"para_289"},{"text":"The Columbia contract doesn’t do Elk River any good. First, Elk River didn’t cite it in","paragraph_id":"para_290"},{"text":"the district court, and at summary judgment, district courts “need consider only the cited","paragraph_id":"para_291"},{"text":"materials.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). While a district court can look around for other evidence in","paragraph_id":"para_292"},{"text":"the record, nothing requires it to. “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the","paragraph_id":"para_293"},{"text":"record.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 67 n.7 (2024) (cleaned up). And it’s “especially","paragraph_id":"para_294"},{"text":"important” to hold parties to their burdens in cases—like this one—where the record spans tens","paragraph_id":"para_295"},{"text":"of thousands of pages. Id.","paragraph_id":"para_296"},{"text":"Second, even considering the Columbia contract, there’s still insufficient evidence to","paragraph_id":"para_297"},{"text":"establish Kingdom as regularly engaged in the timber business. Evidence on what constitutes","paragraph_id":"para_298"},{"text":"ordinary-course business can take many forms, such as testimony from a person with knowledge","paragraph_id":"para_299"},{"text":"of the company and industry norms. See, e.g., Fordyce Bank & Tr. Co. v. Bean Timberland, Inc.,","paragraph_id":"para_300"},{"text":"251 S.W.3d 267, 272–73 (Ark. 2007) (sufficient evidence when several witnesses testified about","paragraph_id":"para_301"},{"text":"industry practices and how their companies operated); Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi. v. Mar-","paragraph_id":"para_302"},{"text":"K-Z Motors & Leasing Co., 309 N.E.2d 567, 568–69 (Ill. 1974) (sufficient evidence that","paragraph_id":"para_303"},{"text":"company was in the business of selling cars when the company’s witness testified that his","paragraph_id":"para_304"},{"text":"company ordinarily leased and sold cars). But we don’t have anything like that here. No","paragraph_id":"para_305"},{"text":"declarations, deposition testimony, or business records showing that Kingdom was engaged in","paragraph_id":"para_306"},{"text":"6Elk River’s fallback—that the district court should’ve denied judgment for HBKY in favor of more","paragraph_id":"para_307"},{"text":"discovery—falls flat. Elk River began the round of summary-judgment briefing in the district court. (Both parties","paragraph_id":"para_308"},{"text":"ultimately moved; recall that this appeal concerns HBKY’s motion.)","paragraph_id":"para_309"},{"text":"No. 24-5862 HBKY, LLC v. Elk River Export, LLC, et al. Page 11","paragraph_id":"para_310"},{"text":"the business of selling timber or that Elk River bought timber in the ordinary course of that","paragraph_id":"para_311"},{"text":"business.7","paragraph_id":"para_312"},{"text":"It’s true that Kingdom sold timber to Elk River. But one transaction alone does not","paragraph_id":"para_313"},{"text":"suffice. Companies make one-off or side deals all the time, disposing of assets outside their","paragraph_id":"para_314"},{"text":"primary business. And courts have routinely found that those transactions, by themselves, aren’t","paragraph_id":"para_315"},{"text":"enough to prove that a company is regularly engaged in certain business. See McKenzie v.","paragraph_id":"para_316"},{"text":"Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (car rental company not in the business of","paragraph_id":"para_317"},{"text":"selling cars, even though it sold one car); Madison Capital, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (mining","paragraph_id":"para_318"},{"text":"company in the business of mining, not selling mining equipment, even though it sold some","paragraph_id":"para_319"},{"text":"equipment); In re Keystone Gen., Inc., 135 B.R. 275, 281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (radio retailer","paragraph_id":"para_320"},{"text":"in the business of selling completed radios, not radio parts).","paragraph_id":"para_321"},{"text":"In sum, this record doesn’t tell us very much about who Kingdom is or what it does. The","paragraph_id":"para_322"},{"text":"record thus doesn’t support Elk River’s status as a “buyer in the ordinary course of business.”","paragraph_id":"para_323"},{"text":"IV.","paragraph_id":"para_324"},{"text":"The loan didn’t carve out any exception to HBKY’s first-priority lien, and Elk River","paragraph_id":"para_325"},{"text":"hasn’t shown that it purchased the timber in the ordinary course of business. We affirm.","paragraph_id":"para_326"},{"text":"7Which is all the more curious because in the state-court case, see supra note 5, Elk River president Robin","paragraph_id":"para_327"},{"text":"Wilson did offer testimony, drawing on his “personal knowledge of the parties’ agreement” and his expertise","paragraph_id":"para_328"},{"text":"“be[ing] in the timber businesses for over 30 years.” R. 313-1, Bell Circuit Court Judgment, p.2, PageID 5542.","paragraph_id":"para_329"}],"word_count":4285,"cites":["603 U.S. 43","119 F.4th 1049","942 F.2d 381","821 F.2d 1317","889 F.2d 1248","977\nF.3d 483","68 F.4th 1030"],"cited_by":[],"sha256":"5eed776db387727bb9dde677ddebe946d4198a9a2d5c7d49d62c5c323eabc596","source_url":"http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0206p-06.pdf","fetched_at":"2026-10-01T23:07:12.968+00:00","canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/ai/judgments/us/ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","risk_graph":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/risk?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","relations_graph":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/relations?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","changes":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/us-praxis/changes","agent":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/us-praxis/agent?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","verification":{"stored_sha256":"5eed776db387727bb9dde677ddebe946d4198a9a2d5c7d49d62c5c323eabc596","recomputed_sha256":"5eed776db387727bb9dde677ddebe946d4198a9a2d5c7d49d62c5c323eabc596","intact":true,"checked_at":"2026-10-11T06:04:06.240Z"}},"hash":"sha256:0ff65ee545d415f5f02dfefaa30e5abe38dce92482273bd99cb5c4d61abbe54f","version":"legal-2026-10-10","expires":"2026-10-12T00:00:00.000Z","dependency":{"index_version":"legal-2026-10-10+legal-2026-10-10+2026-10-10T17:32:53","content_hash":"sha256:0ff65ee545d415f5f02dfefaa30e5abe38dce92482273bd99cb5c4d61abbe54f","revalidate_after":"2026-10-11T07:04:06.394Z","max_copy_age_seconds":3600,"policy":"revalidate-required; attribution-preferred","changelog":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/dependency","verify":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/verify","stale_copy_invalid":true},"canonical":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/judgment-text?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05","follow":[{"rel":"risk","href":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/risk?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05"},{"rel":"relations","href":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/relations?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05"},{"rel":"agent","href":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/us-praxis/agent?id=us:ca6-24-5862-2025-08-05"},{"rel":"obligations","href":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/obligation-chain"},{"rel":"changes","href":"https://legal.exploreworldai.com/api/public/v1/whats-new?jurisdiction=us"}],"disclaimer":"Source reference with official identifier. 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