Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber)
17 September 2026 ( * )
[para_4]( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 17(1), Article 39 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Democratic principle – Right to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament – Limitation on the exercise of that right – Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage – Conditions of eligibility – Requirement to pay an electoral deposit – Presentation of non-serious or frivolous nominations for registration – Objective of discouragement – Representativeness of the electorate – Proportionality of the amount of that deposit having regard to the objectives pursued )
[para_5]In Case C‑438/24,
[para_6]REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia), made by decision of 31 May 2024, received at the Court on 19 June 2024, in the proceedings
Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised
[para_8]intervening parties:
[para_9]Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon,
[para_10]Riigikogu,
[para_11]Õiguskantsler,
[para_12]Justiitsminister,
[para_13]THE COURT (First Chamber),
[para_14]composed of F. Biltgen, President of the Chamber, I. Ziemele (Rapporteur), A. Kumin, S. Gervasoni and M. Bošnjak, Judges,
[para_15]Advocate General: T. Ćapeta,
[para_16]Registrar: C. Strömholm, Administrator,
[para_17]having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 3 July 2025,
[para_18]after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
[para_19]– the Estonian Government, by H. Hirsik and M. Kriisa, acting as Agents,
[para_20]– the Greek Government, by K. Boskovits, acting as Agent,
[para_21]– the Netherlands Government, by M.K. Bulterman, M.H.S. Gijzen and C.S. Schillemans, acting as Agents,
[para_22]– the European Parliament, by M. Allik, N. Lorenz and T. Lukácsi, acting as Agents,
[para_23]– the European Commission, by F. Erlbacher, S. Pardo Quintillán and E. Randvere, acting as Agents, and by A.-R. Brett, vandeadvokaat,
[para_24]after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 13 November 2025,
[para_25]gives the following
Judgment
[para_27]1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 17(1) and Article 39(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
[para_28]2 The request has been made in proceedings between the Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised (the Estonian Green party; ‘the EER’) and the Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (Electoral Commission of the Republic of Estonia; ‘the Electoral Commission), regarding the latter’s refusal to register seven nominations on that party’s list for the June 2024 elections to the European Parliament.
I. Legal context
A. European Union law
1. The Charter
[para_32]3 Article 17 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to property’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof:
[para_33]‘Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. …’
[para_34]4 Article 39 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament’, provides:
[para_35]‘1. Every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State.
[para_36]2. Members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.’
5 Article 51(1) of the Charter provides:
[para_38]‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the [European] Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.’
6 Article 52(1) of the Charter is worded as follows:
[para_40]‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’
2. The EU and FEU Treaties
7 Article 2 TEU provides:
[para_43]‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’
8 Article 10 TEU provides:
[para_45]‘1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.
[para_46]…
[para_47]3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.
[para_48]4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.’
9 Article 14(3) TEU provides:
[para_50]‘The members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot.’
10 Article 18 TFEU provides:
[para_52]‘Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.
[para_53]…’
11 Article 20(2) TFEU is worded as follows:
[para_55]‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia:
[para_56]…
[para_57](b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State;
[para_58]…
[para_59]These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder.’
12 Article 22 TFEU provides:
[para_61]‘1. Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council [of the European Union], acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.
[para_62]2. Without prejudice to Article 223(1) and to the provisions adopted for its implementation, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.’
13 Under Article 223(1) TFEU:
[para_64]‘The European Parliament shall draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary for the election of its Members by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States.
[para_65]The Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component Members, shall lay down the necessary provisions. These provisions shall enter into force following their approval by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’
3. The 1976 Act
[para_67]14 Article 1 of the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976 (OJ 1976 L 278, p. 1), as amended by Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 (OJ 2002 L 283, p. 1; ‘the 1976 Act’), provides:
[para_68]‘1. In each Member State, members of the European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote.
[para_69]…
3. Elections shall be by direct universal suffrage and shall be free and secret.’
15 The first paragraph of Article 8 of the 1976 Act provides as follows:
[para_72]‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, the electoral procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions.’
B. Estonian law
[para_74]16 The first sentence of Paragraph 2(2) of the Euroopa Parlamendi valimise seadus (Law on the elections to the European Parliament), of 18 December 2002 (RT I 2003, 4, 22) (‘the EPVS’), provides as follows:
[para_75]‘Elections to the European Parliament shall be by direct universal suffrage and shall be free and conducted under conditions of equality.’
[para_76]17 Paragraph 28 of the EPVS, entitled ‘List of candidates’, provides, in subparagraphs 1 and 2 thereof:
[para_77]‘(1) A list of candidates shall be drawn up by a political party.
[para_78](2) The list of candidates can contain two candidates more than the number of members of the European Parliament elected in Estonia.’
18 Under Paragraph 29 of the EPVS:
[para_80]‘…
[para_81](3) In order to register candidates, the political parties shall submit to the State Electoral Authority:
[para_82]…
3. a copy of the payment order certifying payment of the deposit;
[para_84]…
(4) Independent candidates shall provide the State Electoral Authority with:
[para_86]…
2. a copy of the payment order certifying payment of the deposit;
[para_88]…
[para_89](5) Before candidates are nominated for registration, a political party or an independent candidate shall pay into the bank account of the Ministry of Finance, by way of a deposit, a sum equal to five times the monthly minimum wage fixed by the Government of the Republic of Estonia in respect of each person who has been nominated for registration.’
19 Paragraph 77 of the EPVS provides:
[para_91]‘The deposit shall be refunded to an independent candidate or a political party where the candidate or political party has received at least 5% percent in total of the votes cast nationally. The [Electoral Commission] shall transfer the unrefunded deposits to the State Treasury.’
[para_92]II. The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
[para_93]20 The EER submitted to the Electoral Commission an application to register a list of nine nominated candidates at elections to the European Parliament held in June 2024.
[para_94]21 Since the EER had paid the deposit referred to in Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS in respect of two candidates only, the Electoral Commission registered the first two candidates on that list and rejected that application so far as it concerned the other seven candidates on that list.
[para_95]22 That party brought an election petition against that rejection decision before the Riigikohus (Supreme Court, Estonia), which is the referring court and which, by a decision of 6 May 2024, initiated proceedings for review of the constitutionality of Paragraph 29 of the EPVS.
[para_96]23 To guarantee, provisionally, the protection of the rights of the applicant in the main proceedings, that court, by order of 14 May 2024, instructed the Electoral Commission to grant the application for registration concerned with regard to the seven candidates on the EER’s list and referred to in paragraph 21 of the present judgment, which that commission did the same day.
[para_97]24 The Riigikohus (Supreme Court) observes, first, that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as it requires the payment of a deposit for the purposes of registering a nomination for the elections to the European Parliament (‘the requirement to lodge a deposit’) is such as to restrict the right to stand for election laid down by the Charter. Secondly, such a financial requirement may restrict the right to property enshrined in the first sentence of Article 17(1) of the Charter, since that deposit is paid to the State budget if it is not refunded following the elections.
[para_98]25 That court states that the requirement to lodge a deposit seeks to discourage the submission of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations, by making candidates bear responsibility. In doing so, that requirement ensures the European Parliament is more representative of voters and prevents misuse of public resources allocated for the organisation of the elections and the reporting on political debates in the public media.
[para_99]26 That court argues, however, that the amount of that deposit should be reasonable so as not to disproportionately restrict the right to stand for election. In respect of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, that amount was EUR 4 100 per candidate, that is, EUR 36 900 for a complete list of nine candidates. Thus, for one candidate, that amount represented 2.6 times the monthly gross median wage recorded in the fourth quarter of 2023.
[para_100]27 Having regard to the amount of the deposit the payment of which is required under the Estonian legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the referring court expresses doubts as to the proportionality of such legislation, which does not envisage any other way to prove the genuine nature of the intentions of candidates at elections to the European Parliament.
[para_101]28 In those circumstances, the Riigikohus (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
[para_102]‘Must Article 17(1), first sentence, and Article 39(2), read in conjunction with Article 52(1), of the [Charter] be interpreted as precluding an obligation, in order to stand in elections to the European Parliament, to pay a deposit amounting to [5] times the fixed monthly minimum wage [in force] for each person nominated for registration and [45] times the fixed monthly minimum wage [in force] for a party’s full list?’
III. Consideration of the question referred
A. Whether the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings still obtains
[para_105]29 It is apparent from the order for reference that the Electoral Commission, on 14 May 2024, registered all the candidates on the EER’s list, even though that party had paid a deposit only with respect to the registration of two of those candidates.
[para_106]30 According to settled case-law, questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 23 November 2021, IS (Illegality of the order for reference) , C‑564/19, EU:C:2021:949, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
[para_107]31 In the present case, the action for review of the constitutionality of the Estonian legislation rendering registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament subject to payment of a deposit is still pending before the referring court.
[para_108]32 First, the referring court states that that review of constitutionality involves the interpretation of the provisions of the Charter referred to in the question it submitted to the Court for a preliminary ruling. Accordingly, the outcome of that review of constitutionality is dependent, inter alia, on the interpretation by the Court of the relevant provisions of EU law.
[para_109]33 Secondly, having regard to the result obtained in the elections to the European Parliament by the EER, which did not attain the threshold of 5% of the votes cast set in Paragraph 77 of the EPVS, that party cannot obtain a refund of the deposit it has paid. Therefore, the Court of Justice’s answer is likely to have an impact on the right of the EER to obtain that refund.
[para_110]34 Consequently, it is necessary to rule on the request for a preliminary ruling.
B. Substance
[para_112]35 By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 17(1) and Article 39(2) of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit amounting to five times the minimum monthly wage in force at that time in the Member State concerned, refundable on condition that the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party has attained the threshold of 5% of the votes cast in those elections.
[para_113]36 As a preliminary point, it is important to bear in mind that, under Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of that charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law. It must be observed in the present case that, by adopting the EPVS, the Republic of Estonia has implemented its obligation to regulate the procedure and conditions under which elections to the European Parliament are held, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 14(3) TEU. Accordingly, it must be held that the Charter is applicable.
1. Article 17 (1) of the Charter
[para_115]37 Under Article 17(1) of the Charter, ‘everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest’.
[para_116]38 Article 17(1) of the Charter thus contains three distinct rules. The first rule, which appears in the first sentence of that provision, is of a general nature and gives concrete expression to the principle of respect for property. The second rule, set out in the second sentence of that provision, refers to a person being deprived of property and makes that deprivation subject to certain conditions. The third rule, which is contained in the third sentence of that provision, recognises that the Member States have the power to regulate the use of property in so far as is necessary for the general interest (judgment of 10 July 2025, INTERZERO and Others , C‑254/23, EU:C:2025:569, paragraph 144 and the case-law cited).
[para_117]39 It is apparent from the order for reference that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings renders the possibility of standing as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament subject to a requirement to lodge a deposit and makes the refund of that deposit conditional on the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party attaining a threshold of 5% of the votes cast.
[para_118]40 Such a requirement constitutes a condition which must be satisfied by candidates and political parties who freely decide to stand in elections to the European Parliament. It cannot in the present case be viewed as constituting a deprivation of possessions or as a regulation of the use of property within the meaning of Article 17(1) of the Charter.
[para_119]41 Consequently, the dispute in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope of Article 17(1) of the Charter.
2. Article 39 and Article 52(1) of the Charter
[para_121]42 Under Article 39(1) of the Charter, and Article 20(2)(b) and Article 22(2) TFEU, every citizen of the Union has the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he or she resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. In addition, under Article 39(2) of the Charter, and Article 14(3) TEU, ‘members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot’.
[para_122]43 As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in point 30 of her Opinion, the right to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament constitutes the expression of the principle of universal suffrage, a principle which is enshrined, in the same way as direct suffrage in a free and secret ballot, in Article 14(3) TEU and reiterated in Article 39(2) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies , C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraph 86).
[para_123]44 However, Article 39 of the Charter does not specify the conditions under which EU citizens exercise their right to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament, so that the determination of those conditions falls within the competence of each Member State, provided they comply with EU law.
[para_124]45 The Court has thus held, on the basis of a reading of Article 223(1) TFEU in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 8 of the 1976 Act, that Member States remain, as EU law currently stands, in principle competent to determine the rules on standing as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 December 2019, Junqueras Vies , C‑502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, paragraph 69, and of 22 December 2022, Junqueras i Vies v Parliament , C‑115/21 P, EU:C:2022:1021, paragraph 60).
[para_125]46 Nevertheless, where the Member States fix the conditions for the exercise of the right to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament, it is for them to observe the principles laid down in Article 39(2) of the Charter.
[para_126]47 Thus, by stating that ‘members of the European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot’, Article 39(2) of the Charter requires that Member States safeguard the exercise in practice of that right by EU citizens.
[para_127]48 In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings establishes a restriction on the exercise of that right, inasmuch as it provides that the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit corresponding to five times the minimum monthly wage and that the refund of that deposit is possible only where the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party attains a threshold of 5% of the votes cast in those elections.
[para_128]49 Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights such as those set forth in Article 39 of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised as legitimate by the European Union (judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne , C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
[para_129]50 Consequently, the dispute in the main proceedings falls within the scope of Article 39 and Article 52(1) of the Charter.
[para_130]51 However, it must be observed that, in accordance with Article 10(1) TEU, the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy, which gives concrete expression to democracy as a value, which is, under Article 2 TEU, one of the values on which the European Union is founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment) , C‑181/23, EU:C:2025:283, paragraph 89).
[para_131]52 The right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, guaranteed to every EU citizen by Article 10(3) TEU, entails, inter alia, the exercise of the right to vote and the right to stand as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment) , C‑181/23, EU:C:2025:283, paragraph 88).
[para_132]53 Thus, Article 10(3) TEU underscores, as regards elections to the European Parliament, the connection between the principle of representative democracy within the European Union and the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in those elections (judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) , C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraph 116, and of 19 November 2024, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) , C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraph 114).
[para_133]54 In that context, as is apparent from Article 10(4) TEU, political parties, one of whose functions is to field candidates in elections, thus fulfil an essential function in the system of representative democracy, on which the functioning of the European Union is founded (judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) , C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraph 121, and of 19 November 2024, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) , C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraph 119).
[para_134]55 It is also with a view to ensuring that the members of the European Parliament are representative that the Member States are bound, under Article 39(2) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 14(3) TEU, to ensure that the election of members of the European Parliament is by direct universal suffrage and in a free and secret ballot (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 October 2015, Delvigne, C‑650/13, EU:C:2015:648, paragraph 32).
[para_135]56 Having regard to the foregoing, the question asked must be reformulated and it must be held that, by that question, the referring court asks whether Article 39(2) of the Charter, read in conjunction with the principle of representative democracy which acts as a framework for the elections to the European Parliament, as expressed in Article 10 TEU, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit amounting to five times the minimum monthly wage in force at that time in the Member State concerned, refundable on condition that the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party has attained the threshold of 5% of the votes cast in those elections.
[para_136]57 It is apparent from the order for reference that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings establishes a restriction on the exercise of the right to stand as a candidate conferred on EU citizens under Article 39(2) of the Charter, inasmuch as it provides that the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit the amount of which corresponds to five times the minimum monthly wage and that that deposit may be refunded only where the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party attains a threshold of 5% of the votes cast in those elections.
[para_137]58 As it was observed in paragraph 49 of the present judgment, Article 52(1) of the Charter accepts that limitations may be imposed on the exercise of rights such as those set forth in Article 39 of the Charter, as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised as legitimate by the European Union.
[para_138](a) The legal basis of the limitation on the right to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament , the respect for the essence of that right and the objectives pursued by the measure at issue
[para_139]59 As is apparent from the order for reference, the requirement to lodge a deposit complies with the condition that it must be provided for by law, since it is imposed by the EPVS. In accordance with Paragraph 29(3) and (4) of that law, the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit corresponding to five times the minimum monthly wage. In addition, under Paragraph 77 of the EPVS, that deposit may be refunded only if the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party has obtained at least 5% of the votes cast.
[para_140]60 So far as concerns the second condition recalled in paragraphs 49 and 58 of the present judgment, namely that the essence of the right to stand as a candidate at the elections to the European Parliament must be respected, it should be observed that the exercise of that right is not rendered impossible by the requirement to lodge a deposit, but rendered subject to a financial condition, so that that requirement does not call in question, as such, the essence of the right to stand as a candidate at those elections.
[para_141]61 So far as concerns the issue of whether the objectives of general interest relied upon to justify the limitation on the right to stand as a candidate conferred on EU citizens by Article 39(2) of the Charter, established by the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, are legitimate having regard to EU law, it must be observed that, as the referring court has stated and as the Estonian Government confirmed, the requirement to lodge a deposit has the objective of discouraging the submission of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations for registration in elections to the European Parliament, to increase candidates’ sense of responsibility such as to reduce the number of ‘lost votes’ not contributing to the election of a member of the European Parliament, to improve the correlation between the results of those elections and the genuine wishes of voters and, as a result, to guarantee the right of voters to effective representation. The requirement to lodge a deposit also seeks, as a secondary objective, to ensure that unnecessary public expense linked to the holding of elections and the reporting on debates in the public media is not incurred.
[para_142]62 The Estonian Government stated, at the hearing before the Court of Justice, that lodging a deposit constitutes a means of influence encouraging the candidate concerned to bear responsibility with regard to the probability of being elected at elections to the European Parliament, since his or her deposit may be refunded only if he or she attains a certain threshold of the votes cast.
[para_143]63 It is apparent from the written observations submitted to the Court, and the oral arguments presented at the hearing before the Court, that the concept of ‘non-serious or frivolous nominations’ must be understood as covering, first, candidates who wish to stand for election to the European Parliament for purposes other than becoming members of that institution and actually participating in the democratic life of the European Union and, secondly, candidates who, from the outset, have no possibility of obtaining a sufficient number of votes to be elected at the European Parliament, so that their nomination results in ‘lost votes’.
[para_144]64 According to the explanations relating to the Charter, which, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, must be given due regard for the purpose of interpreting that charter, and as is apparent from paragraphs 42 and 43 of the present judgment, Article 39(2) of the Charter corresponds to Article 14(3) TEU, which sets out the basic principles of the electoral regime in a democratic system.
[para_145]65 As recalled in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the present judgment, the participation of EU citizens in the democratic life of the European Union is expressed, inter alia, through the exercise by those citizens of the right to stand as candidates at elections to the European Parliament held by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot, as provided for under Article 39(2) of the Charter.
[para_146]66 Having regard to those considerations, the objective of discouraging the submission of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations for registration in the elections to the European Parliament must be regarded as a legitimate objective, in so far as it seeks to ensure representative democracy by preventing nominations for registration from persons who do not have the intention of becoming a member of the European Parliament or actually participating in the democratic life of the European Union, making those persons bear responsibility in the form of the payment of a deposit.
[para_147]67 Likewise, ensuring that the European Parliament is truly representative of EU citizens to the highest possible degree is in line with democracy, a foundational value of the European Union, and helps to ensure representative democracy. Consequently, the objective of reducing the number of ‘lost votes’, which do not contribute to the election of a member of the European Parliament, in order to obtain an institution which is more representative of the electorate may, in principle, also be recognised as a legitimate objective.
[para_148]68 It should, however, be pointed out that Member States cannot validly combat ‘lost votes’ solely on the basis of an assessment that certain political programmes do not stand a real chance of winning sufficient votes.
(b) The proportionality of the requirement to lodge a deposit
[para_150]69 According to the Court’s settled case-law, compliance with the principle of proportionality requires that the measures provided for by national legislation do not exceed what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by that legislation, it being understood that, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2023, Volkswagen Group Italia and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft , C‑27/22, EU:C:2023:663, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited).
(1) Whether the requirement to lodge a deposit is appropriate
[para_152]70 As regards, in the first place, whether the requirement to lodge a deposit is appropriate for the purposes of achieving the objectives referred to in paragraph 61 of the present judgment, consisting in discouraging the submission of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations, of reducing the number of ‘lost votes’ not contributing to the election of a member of the European Parliament and of thus guaranteeing effective representation, it is important to point out that, in principle, the inability of an independent candidate or a list of candidates to gather the funds necessary to pay a deposit, which may be refunded only where that candidate or that list attains a certain fixed threshold of votes cast, attests to the fact that the organisational abilities, the network or the commitment necessary to prepare a serious campaign are lacking, so that that candidate or that list will probably be at the origin of ‘lost votes’ not resulting in the election of a member of the European Parliament, in addition to them being under-funded.
[para_153]71 Furthermore, although the requirement to lodge a deposit is not an absolute guarantee that all the nominations submitted for registration in elections to the European Parliament will be motivated by the intention to participate effectively in democratic life in the European Union, the fact remains that, having regard to the initial financial burden involved and the risk of the financial loss incurred where the candidate does not attain the threshold of votes cast entitling him or her to have that deposit refunded, that requirement is necessarily such as to lead the candidates concerned to reflect on their true motivation and may therefore contribute to filtering out ‘non-serious or frivolous’ candidates.
[para_154]72 Consequently, the requirement to lodge a deposit seems to be appropriate in order to reduce the number of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations for registration and the number of ‘lost votes’, so as to guarantee the right of voters to effective representation.
(2) Whether the requirement to lodge a deposit is necessary
[para_156]73 In the second place, as regards the need for the requirement to lodge a deposit in order to meet the objectives set out in paragraph 61 of the present judgment, it is appropriate to examine whether the amount of that deposit and the arrangements for refunding it, as provided for under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, go beyond that which is necessary to achieve those objectives.
[para_157]74 In the present case, Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS provides for the payment, in respect of each candidate at elections to the European Parliament, of a deposit equivalent to five times the minimum monthly wage. Paragraph 77 of the EPVS states that that deposit is refunded where an independent candidate or a list of candidates of a party obtains at least 5% of the votes cast.
[para_158]75 It is apparent from the order for reference that, at the date the action in the main proceedings was brought before the referring court, the deposit required under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings amounted, at that time, to EUR 4 100 in respect of each candidate and EUR 36 900 in respect of a party presenting a complete list of candidates. At that date, the Estonian average gross monthly wage and the Estonian median gross monthly wage were EUR 1 904 and EUR 1 578 respectively. Therefore, the amount of the deposit in respect of each candidate was approximately 2.2 times higher than that average gross monthly wage and approximately 2.6 times higher than that median gross monthly wage.
[para_159]76 It follows that the requirement to lodge a deposit risks placing a significant financial burden on the assets of an EU citizen wishing to stand, in Estonia, as a candidate at elections to the European Parliament.
[para_160]77 It should also be noted, first, that, at the hearing before the Court, the Estonian Government confirmed that the amount of the deposit required for registration of a nomination in the national parliamentary elections is five times less than that required for registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament.
[para_161]78 Thus, even if the national parliamentary elections and elections to the European Parliament have differences which may warrant rules specific to each of them, the national legislature has not considered it necessary, with a view to achieving the objective consisting in discouraging the submission of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations, to require payment of a deposit of such a high amount in respect of registration of a nomination in elections to the national Parliament, although it is pursuing that objective in respect of both types of elections.
[para_162]79 At the hearing before the Court of Justice, the Estonian Government explained that difference in the amount of the deposit by the fact that, having regard to the number of posts to be filled, a higher number of candidates must be nominated for registration at the national parliamentary elections than at the European Parliament elections. It is for the referring court to determine whether that difference is warranted by the different voting systems used during those elections. If that proves not to be the case, the amount of the deposit set in Paragraph 29(5) of the EPVS cannot be considered proportionate having regard to the objective consisting in discouraging the presentation of ‘non-serious or frivolous’ nominations for registration.
[para_163]80 Secondly, the Estonian Government conceded at the hearing before the Court that while there is, under Estonian law, a budget allocation enabling the expenses incurred by that government for the participation in national legislative elections by political parties who have obtained at least 2% of the votes cast in those elections to be covered, such an allocation is not provided for in respect of elections to the European Parliament, the refund of the deposit paid for registration of an independent candidate or a list of candidates of a party in the latter elections being linked to the condition that that candidate or that list must attain the threshold of 5% of the votes cast.
[para_164]81 It is apparent from the order for reference that the Estonian legislation restricts the capacity of political parties to generate revenue to fund their activities, including to pay the deposit concerned. On the one hand, a political party may obtain revenue only from the membership fees which must be paid by its members in accordance with its articles of association, State budget allocations paid pursuant to the law, donations made by natural persons under the conditions set by law and transactions concerning its assets. On the other hand, anonymous donations and those from legal persons are prohibited and restrictions are also applied so far as loans are concerned.
[para_165]82 In those circumstances, the high amount of the deposit required for registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings may exhaust a significant part of the annual budget of some candidates and/or political parties, since they must bear simultaneously the campaign expenses and the risk of losing the sum paid in respect of that deposit where they do not obtain the threshold of 5% of the votes cast.
[para_166]83 Therefore, the amount of that deposit and the arrangements for its refund, as provided for under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, are likely to render it difficult in practice for candidates or parties with low revenues to stand or to present a list of candidates at elections to the European Parliament.
[para_167]84 It should be added that, as the Advocate General noted in points 65 and 66 of her Opinion, an excessively high deposit and/or threshold of votes cast required for that deposit to be refunded might result in the exclusion of candidates from marginalised groups, new political movements or low-income individuals who, while not likely to win a seat, may embody important and unrepresented political demands and garner a respectable number of votes. Likewise, a strict deposit requirement could prevent the emergence of new parties and would run counter to the principle of political pluralism guaranteed under EU law.
[para_168]85 In those circumstances, it must be found that the amount of the deposit and the arrangements for refunding it, such as provided for under the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, exceed the limits of that which is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by that legislation and, accordingly, there is no need to examine separately the issue of the existence of other, less restrictive measures.
[para_169]86 It follows from the foregoing considerations that Article 39(2) of the Charter, read in conjunction with the principle of representative democracy which acts as a framework for the elections to the European Parliament, as expressed in Article 10 TEU, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit amounting to five times the minimum monthly wage in force at that time in the Member State concerned, that deposit being refundable on condition that the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party has attained the threshold of 5% of the votes cast in those elections, since the amount of that deposit and the arrangements for refunding it exceed the limits of that which is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by that legislation.
Costs
[para_171]87 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
[para_173]Article 39(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with the principle of representative democracy which acts as a framework for the elections to the European Parliament, as expressed in Article 10 TEU,
[para_174]must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the registration of a nomination in elections to the European Parliament is subject to payment of a deposit amounting to five times the minimum monthly wage in force at that time in the Member State concerned, that deposit being refundable on condition that the independent candidate or the list of candidates of a party has attained the threshold of 5% of the votes cast in those elections, since the amount of that deposit and the arrangements for refunding it exceed the limits of that which is necessary to achieve the objectives pursued by that legislation.
[para_175][Signatures]
[para_176]* Language of the case: Estonian.