Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber)
15 October 2026 ( * )
[para_4]( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Rule of law – Second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU – Independence of the judiciary – Independent and impartial tribunal established by law – National rules governing the procedures for the random assignment and reassignment of cases among the judges of a court – Resolution of the college of a court withdrawing from a judge, at his or her request, some of the cases assigned to that judge – Reassignment of those cases on a random basis to other judges of that court )
In Case C‑159/25 [Rowicz], ( i )
[para_6]REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland), made by decision of 6 February 2025, received at the Court on 26 February 2025, in the proceedings
[para_7]B. Ż.,
[para_8]V. sp. z o.o.
[para_9]v
[para_10]T. SA,
[para_11]Ł.W.,
[para_12]THE COURT (Second Chamber),
[para_13]composed of K. Jürimäe (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, Z. Csehi, M. Gavalec and F. Shalin, Judges,
[para_14]Advocate General: D. Spielmann,
[para_15]Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
[para_16]having regard to the written procedure,
[para_17]after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
[para_18]– the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, acting as Agent,
[para_19]– the European Commission, by K. Herrmann and P. Van Nuffel, acting as Agents,
[para_20]after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 19 March 2026,
[para_21]gives the following
Judgment
[para_23]1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and with recital 61 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L 2024/1689).
[para_24]2 The request has been made in two sets of proceedings between, first, B. Ż. and T. SA and, second, V. sp. z o.o. and Ł.W., concerning the payment of sums in connection with commercial transactions.
Legal context
European Union law
3 The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU states:
[para_28]‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.’
4 As set out in recital 61 of Regulation 2024/1689:
[para_30]‘Certain [artificial intelligence (‘AI’)] systems intended for the administration of justice and democratic processes should be classified as high-risk, considering their potentially significant impact on democracy, the rule of law, individual freedoms as well as the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. In particular, to address the risks of potential biases, errors and opacity, it is appropriate to qualify as high-risk AI systems intended to be used by a judicial authority or on its behalf to assist judicial authorities in researching and interpreting facts and the law and in applying the law to a concrete set of facts. … The use of AI tools can support the decision-making power of judges or judicial independence, but should not replace it: the final decision-making must remain a human-driven activity. …’
[para_31]5 Under the second paragraph of Article 113 of that regulation, that regulation ‘shall apply from 2 August 2026’.
Polish law
[para_33]6 Pursuant to Article 41(1) of the ustawa Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts) of 27 July 2001 (Dz. U. No 98, item 1070), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (Dz. U. 2024, item 334; ‘the Law on the ordinary courts’):
[para_34]‘The Minister for Justice, after consulting the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council of the Judiciary, Poland), shall determine, by regulation, the rules governing the internal operation of the [ordinary] courts, specifying:
[para_35](1) the internal organisation and operating arrangements of the courts,
(2) the detailed rules governing the assignment of cases, including:
[para_37](a) the method by which cases are drawn,
[para_38](b) the rules for determining the composition of multi-member formations of the court,
[para_39](c) (repealed),
[para_40](d) the rules governing reductions in the assignment of cases owing to functions performed and justified absences, and the grounds for temporarily suspending the assignment of cases,
[para_41](e) the conditions for participating in the assignment of only certain categories of cases heard within a division,
[para_42]…
[para_43]– having regard to the principles of efficiency, rationality, economy and speed, the need to ensure the proper performance of the tasks entrusted to the courts, and the need to ensure an even and objective distribution of workload among judges, trainee judges and judicial officers, the need to ensure a broadly comparable probability of participation in multi-member judicial formations, the use of IT solutions for the random allocation of cases and the use of other methods of random case allocation where those IT solutions cannot be used.’
[para_44]7 As set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 47a of the Law on the ordinary courts:
[para_45]‘1. Cases shall be assigned to judges and trainee judges at random, within the specific categories of cases, with the exception of the assignment of cases to a duty judge.
[para_46]2. Cases within the specific categories shall be allocated equally unless the share has been reduced because of the post held, participation in the assignment of cases of another category, or other reasons provided for by law.’
8 Article 47b of that law provides:
[para_48]‘1. The composition of a court may be changed only where it is impossible for the case to be heard by the existing formation or where there is a lasting obstacle to the case being heard by that formation. Article 47a shall apply mutatis mutandis .
[para_49]…
[para_50]4. A change in the place where a judge serves, his or her secondment to another court, or the termination of such a secondment shall not prevent that judge from taking [procedural] steps in cases assigned to him or her at his or her previous place of service or place where he or she previously performed his or her duties until those cases have been concluded.
[para_51]5. The college of the court having jurisdiction for the judge’s new place of service or place of secondment may, at the request of the judge or of its own motion, withdraw from that judge some or all of the cases assigned to him or her, in particular where there is a considerable distance between that court and the judge’s new place of service or place of secondment, and having regard also to the stage of proceedings reached in the cases being heard. Before adopting a resolution, the college of the court shall consult the presidents of the courts concerned.
[para_52]6. Paragraphs 4 and 5 shall apply mutatis mutandis in the event of a transfer to another division of the same court and in the event of an appointment to the position of judge in a higher court.’
[para_53]9 Article 2 of the Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości Regulamin urzędowania sądów powszechnych (Regulation of the Minister for Justice laying down rules on the internal operation of the ordinary courts) of 18 June 2019 (Dz. U. of 2024, item 867), contains, in point 16, the following definition:
[para_54]‘[System Losowego Przydziału Spraw (SLPS) (Random Case Allocation System)] – the IT system used for the random allocation of cases and judicial tasks, operating on the basis of a random number generator’.
The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
[para_56]10 On 13 and 14 June 2024, two appeals (‘the appeals at issue in the main proceedings’) were registered at the registry of the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland) against judgments delivered at first instance in disputes relating to claims for payment in respect of commercial transactions, within the meaning of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1).
[para_57]11 On 17 and 18 June 2024, Judge JD, who was then in the 23rd division of that court, was designated at random to hear and determine those appeals by the SLPS, an IT tool that operates on the basis of a random number generator.
[para_58]12 Judge JD was subsequently transferred to another division of that court.
[para_59]13 By decision of the college of the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw), 100 cases that had been assigned to Judge JD during the course of 2024, when she was sitting in the 23 rd division of that court, were withdrawn from her, with effect from 30 October 2024, following her transfer and at her own request. By that decision, that college also identified other cases which Judge JD was required to bring to a close. That decision contained no statement of reasons.
[para_60]14 Following a decision taken on 10 January 2025 by the President of the 23rd division of the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw), those 100 cases were reassigned at random to new Judge-Rapporteurs by the SLPS on 13 January 2025. Seventeen judges of that division were included in the random selection made by that system for the purpose of that reassignment. Judge Aneta Łazarska was assigned 56 cases, including those relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings. By contrast, other judges received only a smaller number of cases, or even none at all.
[para_61]15 The complaint lodged by Judge A. Łazarska against that assignment was rejected by the President of the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw).
[para_62]16 Judge A. Łazarska is called upon to decide the appeals at issue in the main proceedings as a single judge of the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw), which is the referring court. She has doubts as to whether the reassignment of those two cases was proper in the light of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, and as to whether the single-judge panel thus constituted is an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. She considers it essential, under the guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality, that the assignment of cases within a court be carried out following a transparent process that is based on objective criteria not open to manipulation.
[para_63]17 In the first place, the referring court points out that Polish law lays down, in Article 47a(1) of the Law on the ordinary courts, the principle that the composition of the court may not be altered. A derogation from that principle is permitted only in the situations prescribed by law, specifically, in accordance with Article 47b(1) of that law, where it is impossible for the case to be heard by the existing formation or where there is a lasting obstacle to the case being heard by that formation. However, according to the referring court, the reassignment of the cases relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings does not come within either of those situations. In particular, having regard to Article 47b(4) to (6) of that law, the transfer of a judge from one division to another within the same court cannot justify a change in the composition of the court.
[para_64]18 In the second place, the referring court has doubts concerning the random assignment of cases by the SLPS.
[para_65]19 First, the SLPS is said to have been prone to errors since it was introduced. Multiple systemic errors are said to have been identified during the first years of its operation, in particular during the course of 2018. Furthermore, errors have allegedly been made by users of the system.
[para_66]20 Second, although the activities relating to the design, use and functioning of the SLPS are considered to be public in nature, the system’s source code is not publicly available. Only the application’s algorithm and the system’s random allocation reports are published. According to the referring court, the lack of transparency as to the source code casts doubt on the genuine impartiality of the system’s operation.
[para_67]21 Third, the specific procedures for assigning cases to judges come within the discretion of the Minister for Justice.
[para_68]22 Fourth, the random assignment of cases by the SLPS does not ensure an equal distribution of the workload among judges and could therefore result in delays in the handling of cases. It could even jeopardise the independence of a judge where, under time pressure, he or she conducts ‘rapid trials’ and disposes of cases as quickly as possible rather than seek to reach fair decisions.
[para_69]23 The referring court concludes that the complexity of the system put in place and its lack of transparency make it vulnerable to manipulation, which entails a risk of judicial panels being composed in an arbitrary manner.
[para_70]24 As regards the cases relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings, the referring court adds that, contrary to the guidance stemming from the judgment of 14 November 2024, S. (Modification of the formation of the court) (C‑197/23, EU:C:2024:956), the decision of the college of the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw) is not amenable to judicial review. Since there is no possibility of an appeal against that decision, a review of the rules governing the assignment of cases is precluded, with the result that the proceedings conducted by the referring court are invalid.
[para_71]25 In those circumstances, the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
[para_72]‘In the light of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) [TEU], read in conjunction with Articles 20 and 47 of the [Charter] and recital 61 of Regulation [2024/1689], does an ordinary court of last instance of a Member State whose composition includes a judge of that court designated by a random number generator to hear [a] case on the basis of the draw report and a prior decision of the college of [that] court constitute an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law that ensures cases are heard without undue delay in a non-discriminatory manner and guarantees effective judicial protection in circumstances where:
[para_73](1) a court administrative body such as the Kolegium Sądu Okręgowego (college of the regional court) arbitrarily released the previously assigned judge from the obligation to hear the cases already assigned to her, contrary to the provisions of national law on the assignment of cases, despite the fact that the national statutory criteria for releasing her from that obligation were not met, and did so in breach of the principle that a change in the composition of the court may only occur where it is impossible for the court to hear the case in its existing composition or where there is a lasting obstacle to it hearing the case in its existing composition;
[para_74](2) a new judge was assigned using the [SLPS] developed by a member of the executive branch of government, namely the Minister Sprawiedliwości (Minister for Justice), under the rules for the randomised assignment of cases in courts established by way of a regulation issued by that Minister […] and in a manner that infringes the right to an independent and impartial tribunal and the right to a tribunal established by law;
[para_75](3) a new judge was assigned using the [SLPS] without knowledge of the source code or the ability to verify the operation of the SLPS algorithm for random case allocation to judges, where information on that system was published only on the Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej [Public Information Bulletin] website, or the ability to ascertain the vulnerability of the random case allocation tool to errors and manipulation, in a manner that infringes the parties’ right to a fair trial;
[para_76](4) a new judge was assigned using the [SLPS] developed by a member of the executive branch of government, namely the Minister Sprawiedliwości (Minister for Justice), under the rules for the randomised assignment of cases in courts established by way of a regulation issued by that Minister […] and in a manner that infringes the parties’ right to have their cases heard without undue delay through a failure to guarantee an even workload for judges as a result of the operation of the SLPS, in a manner that discriminates against the parties and infringes the principle of equality before the law;
[para_77](5) this results in the judge hearing the case in proceedings that are invalid on account of the composition of the court being contrary to the provisions of law and the parties not being afforded effective judicial protection;
[para_78](6) there is no effective remedy in national law available to the judge against a written decision of the court administrative body regarding the allocation of the case, the assignment of judges and the composition of the court, as there is no judicial remedy enabling the judge to challenge such a written decision before an impartial and independent tribunal in proceedings that meet the requirements arising from Articles 47 of the [Charter]?’
Consideration of the question referred
Preliminary observations
[para_81]26 It is apparent from the wording of the question submitted that the referring court is seeking guidance on the interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter and recital 61 of Regulation 2024/1689.
[para_82]27 In that regard, concerning, in the first place, the reference to Article 20 of the Charter, relating to the principle of equality, the referring court does not set out the specific reasons why it is asking the Court for guidance on the interpretation of that provision. It merely observes, on that point, that the SLPS fails to ensure that all judges have an equal workload.
[para_83]28 In the second place, as regards the reference to recital 61 of Regulation 2024/1689, suffice it to note that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 113 of that regulation, that regulation is to apply only from 2 August 2026. However, the reassignment of the cases relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings took place on 13 January 2025. That regulation is therefore not relevant for the purpose of examining the issue of the reassignment of those cases.
[para_84]29 In the third place, as regards the request for an interpretation of Article 2 TEU, it should be borne in mind that Article 19 TEU gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU, with the result that there is no need to interpret Article 2 TEU specifically.
[para_85]30 The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU entrusts the responsibility for ensuring the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection that individuals derive from EU law to national courts and tribunals and to the Court of Justice (judgments of 2 March 2021, A.B. and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions) , C‑824/18, EU:C:2021:153, paragraph 108, and of 16 November 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim and Others , C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, EU:C:2021:931, paragraph 59).
[para_86]31 In that context, that provision states that it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures ensuring for individuals compliance with their right to effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law.
[para_87]32 The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU refers to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses , C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraph 29, and of 16 November 2021, Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim and Others , C‑748/19 to C‑754/19, EU:C:2021:931, paragraph 62).
[para_88]33 The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU is intended, inter alia, to apply to any national body which can rule, as a court or tribunal, on questions concerning the interpretation or application of EU law and which therefore fall within the fields covered by that law (judgments of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny , C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others , C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 36).
[para_89]34 This is true of the referring court, which may be called upon to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation of EU law and, as a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of EU law, comes under the Polish judicial system in the ‘fields covered by Union law’, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Accordingly, that court must meet the requirements of effective judicial protection (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others , C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
[para_90]35 In the fourth place and lastly, since the referring court has also referred in its question to Article 47 of the Charter, it should be recalled that, in accordance with Article 51(1) thereof, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. That provision confirms settled case-law, which states that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed by EU law, but not outside such situations (judgments of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) , C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited, and of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others , C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 31).
[para_91]36 In the present case, the referring court states that the appeals at issue in the main proceedings are directed against judgments at first instance delivered in disputes relating to claims for payment in connection with commercial transactions, within the meaning of Directive 2011/7, without, however, providing further clarification as to whether the parties to those disputes invoked rights and obligations arising from that directive.
[para_92]37 In those circumstances, in the light of the information available to the Court and subject to verification by the referring court, Article 47 of the Charter does not appear to be applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.
[para_93]38 However, since the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires all Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law, within the meaning in particular of Article 47 of the Charter, that latter provision must be duly taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court) , C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
[para_94]39 In those circumstances, it is necessary to rule on the interpretation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter.
Substance
[para_96]40 By its question, the referring court seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a formation of a national court to which cases have been assigned at random by an IT system following the withdrawal of those cases from the judge initially responsible for them, at that judge’s own request, must be regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, even where there is no legal remedy specifically enabling the judge concerned to challenge that reassignment.
[para_97]41 In that regard, it should be pointed out that, in so far as the Charter sets out rights corresponding to those guaranteed under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed at Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), Article 52(3) of the Charter is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the rights contained in the Charter and the corresponding rights guaranteed under the ECHR, without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of EU law. According to the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR. The Court must therefore ensure that its interpretation in the case before it safeguards a level of protection which does not fall below the level of protection established in Article 6(1) ECHR, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (judgments of 11 July 2024, Hann-Invest and Others , C‑554/21, C‑622/21 and C‑727/21, EU:C:2024:594, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited, and of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) , C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraph 64).
[para_98]42 Having clarified that point, it should be recalled, in the first place, that every Member State must, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, ensure that the bodies which are called upon, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, to rule on questions relating to the application or interpretation of EU law and which thus come within its judicial system in the fields covered by EU law, meet the requirements of effective judicial protection, including that of independence (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).
[para_99]43 That requirement that courts be independent, which is inherent in the task of adjudication, forms part of the essence of the right to effective judicial protection and the fundamental right to a fair hearing, which are of cardinal importance as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
[para_100]44 That requirement of independence has two aspects. The first aspect, which is external in nature, requires that the court concerned exercise its functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, being thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions. The second aspect, which is internal in nature, is linked to the concept of ‘impartiality’ and seeks to ensure that an equal distance is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
[para_101]45 While the ‘external’ component of independence is essentially aimed at preserving the independence of the courts from the legislature and the executive in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, it also seeks to protect judges from undue influence from within the court concerned (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
[para_102]46 It should also be pointed out that the performance of the task of adjudicating must be protected not only from any direct influence, in the form of instructions, but also from more indirect forms of influence capable of guiding judicial decisions (judgments of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) , C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited, and of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 77).
[para_103]47 Those guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules as regards, inter alia, the composition of the body concerned, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
[para_104]48 Moreover, as the Court noted in paragraph 71 of its judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) (C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143), the European Court of Human Rights has also emphasised that the paramount importance, in particular, of judicial independence and legal certainty for the rule of law call for particular clarity of the rules applied in any one case and for clear safeguards to ensure objectivity and transparency and, above all, to avoid any appearance of arbitrariness in the assignment of particular cases to judges (ECtHR, 5 October 2010, DMD GROUP, a.s. v. Slovakia , CE:ECHR:2010:1005JUD001933403, § 66).
[para_105]49 In the second place, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU also requires the existence of a tribunal ‘previously established by law’, having regard to the inextricable links which exist between access to such a tribunal and the guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality (judgments of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) , C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited, and of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 79).
[para_106]50 The reference to a tribunal ‘previously established by law’, which also appears in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, reflects, in particular, the principle of the rule of law and covers not only the legal basis for the very existence of a tribunal, but also the composition of the bench in each case and any other provision of national law which, if breached, would render the participation of one or more judges in the examination of a case irregular. The concept of a tribunal ‘previously established by law’ thus encompasses the rules governing the assignment and reassignment of cases (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) , C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraphs 73 and 74 and the case-law cited).
[para_107]51 Consequently, the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU also requires that the rules governing the composition of judicial panels are such as to preclude any undue interference in the decision-making process relating to a given case by persons from outside the judicial panel responsible for that case before whom the parties have not been able to put forward their arguments (judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
[para_108]52 It is in the light of those considerations that an answer to the referring court’s question is to be given. That court is uncertain, in particular, as to whether the reassignment of a case to a formation of the court is compatible with the requirements inherent in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, as recalled in paragraphs 41 to 51 above, where that reassignment, first, takes place after the case has been withdrawn from the judge initially designated, second, is effected by means of a system for the random allocation of cases and, third, cannot be challenged by the judge affected by that reassignment.
The withdrawal from a judge of some of his or her cases
[para_110]53 In accordance with the Court’s case-law, where the formation of the court to which a case was initially assigned has had that case removed from it in circumstances that are incompatible with the requirements recalled in paragraphs 41 to 51 above, the formation of the court to which that case has been reassigned is required to refrain from hearing and determining that case (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 July 2023, YP and Others (Lifting of a judge’s immunity and his or her suspension from duties) , C‑615/20 and C‑671/20, EU:C:2023:562, paragraphs 76 and 77 and the case-law cited).
[para_111]54 As regards, more specifically, the withdrawal from a judge of his or her cases, the Court has held that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which a body of a national court may withdraw from a judge of that court some or all of the cases assigned to him or her, where that legislation does not lay down criteria which must guide that body when it takes such a decision to withdraw cases or require that reasons for that decision be stated (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) , C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraph 86).
[para_112]55 In order to avoid leaving room for the arbitrariness which might result from a non-transparent procedure liable to undermine the principles of independence and irremovability of judges, it is important that the national rules governing the withdrawal of cases should lay down clearly stated objective criteria on the basis of which cases may be withdrawn from a judge, as well as the obligation to state the reasons for decisions to withdraw cases, in particular in the case of withdrawal of cases without the consent of the judge concerned, in order to ensure that judicial independence is not compromised by undue external influence (judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) , C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143, paragraph 85).
[para_113]56 In the present case, it appears, subject to the checks which it is for the referring court to carry out, that Article 47b(1) of the Law on the ordinary courts provides that the composition of a court may be changed where there is a ‘lasting obstacle to the case being heard’. In accordance with Article 47b(6) of that law, the college of the court concerned has the power to withdraw cases from a judge, at the request of that judge or of its own motion, where that judge is transferred to another division of that court.
[para_114]57 In that regard, the Court held, in paragraph 77 of the judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. (Withdrawal of cases from a judge) (C‑647/21 and C‑648/21, EU:C:2025:143), that national legislation, such as Article 47b(1) and (4) to (6) of the Law on the ordinary courts, does not lay down precise and objective criteria governing the possibility of withdrawing from a judge one or more of his or her cases and allows the college of the court concerned to withdraw cases from a judge without giving reasons for such a decision.
[para_115]58 However, that assessment was made in the context of a case concerning the withdrawal from the judge concerned, without her consent, of the cases assigned to her, following her transfer, likewise without her consent, to another division of the court to which she belonged.
[para_116]59 In the present case, it is apparent from the material before the Court that Judge JD had some of her cases withdrawn from her by a decision adopted at her own request. Subject to verification by the referring court, that withdrawal, at the request of the judge concerned, appears, as the European Commission states in its written observations, to be covered by the situations provided for in Article 47b(6) of the Law on the ordinary courts.
[para_117]60 In addition, it is apparent from the explanations provided by the referring court that that withdrawal took place following a transfer of Judge JD within the court to which she belonged. Nothing in those explanations suggests that that transfer was non-consensual or even arbitrary, or that the removal of cases was requested as a result of external influences capable of affecting that judge’s independence.
[para_118]61 Therefore, subject to the checks which it will be for the referring court to carry out, it must be held that, in so far as the request for that withdrawal was made by Judge JD of her own free will, that partial withdrawal of cases is not such as to give rise to reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to her independence. In those circumstances, it should be added that, since the cases relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings do not seem to have been withdrawn from Judge JD in circumstances incompatible with the requirements recalled in paragraphs 41 to 51 above, it cannot be held, on the basis of the case-law cited in paragraph 53 above, that the formation of the court to which those cases have been reassigned is required to refrain from hearing and determining them.
[para_119]62 Indeed, the partial withdrawal from a judge of one or more of his or her cases cannot undermine that judge’s independence where that withdrawal takes place at his or her request and there is no evidence to suggest that the judge concerned did not make that request of his or her own free will.
The reassignment of cases by means of a random allocation system
[para_121]63 According to the case-law of the Court, a system for allocating cases within national courts which is based on the principle of a random selection of the formation of the court, with certain exceptions, is not, in itself, such as to expose the formations of the court to undue influence, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 45 and 46 above (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2025, Sinalov , C‑16/24, EU:C:2025:116, paragraph 51).
[para_122]64 In the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 41 to 51 above, it should nevertheless be added that the functioning of such a system must be based on rules which are transparent, objective and known in advance, in order to make it possible to rule out any arbitrary use of that system and any undue interference in the decision-making process relating to a given case by persons outside the formation of the court.
[para_123]65 Since the final assessment of the facts and the application and interpretation of national law falls solely to the referring court in proceedings which are the subject of Article 267 TFEU, it is for that court to assess definitively whether the functioning of the SLPS, in particular in the context of the reassignment of the cases relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings, meets the requirements inherent in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. However, in accordance with settled case-law, the Court may, on the basis of the material available to it, provide that court with an interpretation of EU law which may be useful to it for that purpose (judgments of 6 October 2021, W.Ż. (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court – Nomination) , C‑487/19, EU:C:2021:798, paragraph 133, and of 13 July 2023, YP and Others (Lifting of a judge’s immunity and his or her suspension from duties) , C‑615/20 and C‑671/20, EU:C:2023:562, paragraph 66).
[para_124]66 In that regard, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court has doubts as to the compatibility of the SLPS with those requirements on four grounds relating, in essence, to (i) the lack of transparency of that system; (ii) the role of the Minister for Justice in determining the rules governing the operation of that system; (iii) the errors which the use of that system may have caused; and (iv) the imbalance in judges’ workloads which the system causes.
[para_125]67 First, it must be held that those requirements, and in particular those set out in paragraph 64 of the present judgment, are met, inter alia, where the random case allocation system in question operates on the basis of pre-determined and publicly available parameters, where it is governed by transparent rules laying down the procedure and criteria for the assignment and reassignment of cases, and where it is designed – in particular by means of a fully automated random draw – so as to prevent cases from being assigned to a judge on a discretionary basis, and where records of the random assignment of cases are made public. Such elements constitute appropriate safeguards to avoid any appearance of arbitrariness in the assignment or reassignment of specific cases to judges and any undue interference, by persons outside the judicial panel hearing a given case, in the decision-making process relating to that case.
[para_126]68 It is apparent from the material in the file before the Court that the operation of the SLPS is governed by legislation which lays down the criteria and procedures for the assignment or reassignment of cases to judges. In addition, the random allocation is carried out automatically. Lastly, both the full algorithm of that system and the random allocation reports are published. In those circumstances, the mere fact that the system’s source code – which expresses, in programming language, the instructions making up the system – is not made public is not such as to give rise to a risk of influence capable of steering judicial decisions or of arbitrary manipulation of the assignment and reassignment of cases. On the contrary, as the Polish Government states in its written observations, making the SLPS source code available could facilitate a cyber-attack against the system.
[para_127]69 Second, as regards the doubts relating to the role of the Minister for Justice in determining the rules governing the operation of the SLPS, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraphs 47 and 51 above, the guarantees of independence and impartiality and the requirement for a ‘tribunal previously established by law’ necessitate the existence of rules as regards, inter alia, the composition of the court hearing the case, in order to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it.
[para_128]70 In that regard, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary must in particular be ensured in relation to the legislature and the executive (judgments of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) , C‑585/18, C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paragraph 124, and of 24 March 2026, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Recusal of a judge of an ordinary court) , C‑521/21, EU:C:2026:242, paragraph 72).
[para_129]71 Thus, in accordance with settled case-law, the reason for the requirement for a ‘tribunal previously established by law’, within the meaning of EU law, is to ensure that the organisation of the judicial system does not depend on the discretion of the executive, but that it is regulated by law emanating from the legislature in compliance with the rules governing its jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 March 2020, Review Simpson v Council and HG v Commission , C‑542/18 RX-II and C‑543/18 RX-II, EU:C:2020:232, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited, and of 24 March 2026, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Recusal of a judge of an ordinary court) , C‑521/21, EU:C:2026:242, paragraph 73).
[para_130]72 That requirement is met where, on the basis of a legislative delegation, such as that provided for in Article 41 of the Law on the ordinary courts, the Minister for Justice is empowered to adopt general rules on the assignment of cases and to determine the general parameters for the operation of a system for the random allocation of cases, such as the SLPS. Furthermore, the adoption, by that minister, of such general rules is not, in itself, such as to give rise to doubts as to the independence and impartiality of judges.
[para_131]73 Third, the Court has held that an error in the application of the rules for allocating cases does not necessarily imply the existence of an influence liable to have an effect on court decisions or of arbitrary manipulation of case allocations (see, to that effect, judgment of 27 February 2025, Sinalov , C‑16/24, EU:C:2025:116, paragraph 51). In that context, the mere fact, noted by the referring court, that the operation of a system for the random allocation of cases may have been vitiated by errors is not in itself such as to reveal, at a later stage, undue influence in the decision-making process relating to specific cases. That is all the more so since, as the Polish Government states in its written observations, the criticisms regarding the operation of the SLPS mentioned by the referring court appear to be purely historical, since the malfunctions mentioned all occurred in 2018.
[para_132]74 Fourth, as regards the fact that a system for the random allocation of cases may lead to an unequal distribution of workload among the judges of a court, it should be observed that the referring court is essentially referring to the number of cases assigned to the various judges. A mere imbalance in the number of cases assigned, which may be justified on the basis of the sound administration of justice, does not necessarily constitute an imbalance in the workload.
[para_133]75 In any event, the fact that a system for the random allocation of cases may lead to an unequal distribution of workload among the judges of a court is not such as to give rise to a risk of undue interference in the decision-making process relating to a given case or of control over the content of judicial decisions.
Judicial review of the reassignment of cases
[para_135]76 As regards judicial review of the application of a system for the random allocation of cases, it should be recalled that the possibility of verifying compliance with the guarantees attached to the concept of an ‘independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’ is necessary for the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in those subject to their jurisdiction (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 May 2024, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ (Associations of judges) , C‑53/23, EU:C:2024:388, paragraph 55, and of 27 February 2025, Sinalov , C‑16/24, EU:C:2025:116, paragraph 53).
[para_136]77 Thus, compliance with rules of national law relating to the assignment and reassignment of cases, as the case may be through a system for the random allocation of cases, must be open to judicial review at the request of a party or of the court’s own motion where there is serious doubt, in order to determine whether the judicial panel to which a given case has been assigned or reassigned constitutes an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 November 2024, S. (Modification of the formation of the court) , C‑197/23/, EU:C:2024:956, paragraphs 65 and 67, and of 27 February 2025, Sinalov , C‑16/24, EU:C:2025:116, paragraphs 54 and 55).
[para_137]78 Therefore, provided that the national court seised is able to review whether it is properly constituted for the purpose of ruling on the case brought before it, it is not necessary to provide, to that end, for a separate legal remedy for the benefit of the judge affected by that reassignment (see, by analogy, judgment of 1 August 2025, Daka and Others , C‑422/23, C‑455/23, C‑459/23, C‑486/23 and C‑493/23, EU:C:2025:592, paragraph 99).
[para_138]79 In the present case, the cases relating to the appeals at issue in the main proceedings clearly illustrate that the referring court is able to review whether it is properly constituted for the purpose of deciding those appeals.
[para_139]80 In the light of all of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a formation of a national court, to which cases have been assigned at random by an IT system following the withdrawal of those cases from the judge initially responsible for them, at that judge’s own request, must be regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, even where there is no legal remedy specifically enabling the judge concerned to challenge that reassignment.
Costs
[para_141]81 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules:
[para_143]The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
[para_144]must be interpreted as meaning that a formation of a national court, to which cases have been assigned at random by an IT system following the withdrawal of those cases from the judge initially responsible for them, at that judge’s own request, must be regarded as an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law, even where there is no legal remedy specifically enabling the judge concerned to challenge that reassignment.
[para_145][Signatures]
[para_146]* Language of the case: Polish.
[para_147]i The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.